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Abstract 
This thesis builds on information asymmetry, agency conflicts and litigation-risk 
backgrounds to examine real and accrual earnings management activities around 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), mitigating factors (regulators and auditors), and 
consequences for future performance (stock return and IPO survivability). The IPO 
event is associated with higher levels of information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts between insiders and outsiders that are found to provide managers with 
strong incentives and more flexibility to engage in earnings management activities 
to maximise their wealth instead of shareholders. Due to the existence of 
information asymmetry around IPOs, IPO firms hire high quality auditors during the 
IPO to send positive signals about the offer to outside investors (Titman and 
Trueman, 1986).  
The first empirical study (chapter five) of this thesis examines whether 
different regulatory environments impact the use of real and accrual earnings 
management around IPOs via an analysis of the heavily regulated Main market of 
the London Stock Exchange and the more lightly regulated Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), and whether these different regulatory burdens (restrictive vs. 
lighter) have different mechanisms/capabilities to correct stock prices that were 
inflated by earnings management during the IPO. The results of this study show that 
IPO firms in the UK manage earnings upward utilizing both real and accrual 
earnings management around IPOs, and that IPO firms on the lightly regulated AIM 
market exhibit higher levels of sales-based and accrual-based and a lower level of 
discretionary expenses-based earnings management than IPO firms on the heavily 
regulated Main market. Further, the results show that real and accrual earnings 
management, which take place during the IPO year, have severe negative 
consequences for post-IPO stock return performance, and that the heavily regulated 
Main market of the London Stock Exchange has better mechanisms-capabilities to 
correct stock prices that were inflated by earnings management during the IPO year 
than the lighter regulated AIM market. 
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The second empirical study (chapter six) investigates whether enhanced 
audit quality impacts real earnings management activities that occur during the IPO, 
whether enhanced audit quality impacts managers’ tendency to choose between real 
and accrual earnings management, and whether enhanced audit quality affects the 
association between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock 
return performance. The results show that high quality auditors mitigate real 
earnings management activities that occur through discretionary expenses-based 
manipulation during the IPO year, and that IPO firms audited by high quality 
auditors (big N audit firms) undertake a higher level of sales-based manipulation to 
avoid the monitoring of discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based 
manipulations. Further, IPO firms audited by high quality auditors are found to 
experience a severe decline in post-IPO stock return performance due to the 
extensive use of sales-based manipulation at the IPO year. Thus, this evidence 
confirms that high quality auditors impact the relationship between real and accrual 
earnings management and post-IPO stock return performance. 
 Finally, the third empirical study (chapter seven) explores whether real and 
accrual earnings management that occur during the IPO year are associated with 
post-IPO failure and survivability in the subsequent periods. The results show that 
IPO firms with high levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO 
year have a higher probability of failure in the subsequent period. Further, IPO firms 
that engage in high levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO 
year have lower survival rates in the post-IPO period.  
In summary, the main findings of this thesis suggest that real and accrual 
earnings management activities are utilized by IPO firms, that the level of utilizing 
these activities is dependent on the regulatory environment and audit quality, and 
that these activities are negatively associated with future stock performance and 
post-IPO survivorship. Regulators and audit firms should consider the fact that 
managers switch between real and accrual earnings management to avoid external 
monitoring. Further, the greater restriction on discretionary expenses-based and 
accrual-based manipulation seems to lead managers to engage extensively in sales-
based manipulation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction  
An Initial Public Offering is a significant driver of earnings management due to the 
existence of high levels of information asymmetry between insiders and outside 
investors (e.g., Aharony et al., 1993; Teoh et al., 1998a), notably that information 
asymmetry leads to two types of agency conflicts; adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Ritter and Welch, 2002; Bruton et al., 2009). Moral hazard implies that 
managers may not perform their duties efficiently in line with the interest of 
shareholders due to the information asymmetry between managers and shareholder 
(Nygaard and Myrtveith, 2000), while adverse selection implies that managers have 
better information about the firm and therefore, they may not reveal all they know 
about the firm to outsiders e.g. shareholders (e.g. Bruton et al., 2009). These agency 
conflicts that may raise between insiders and outsiders can lead managers to engage 
in certain activities (e.g. earnings management) to obtain a private gain (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Teoh et al. (1998a) indicate that managers of IPO firms have 
strong incentives to manage earnings upward at the end of the IPO year to obtain 
private gains e.g. to maintain high stock prices given the lock-up restriction on 
managerial shares selling post-IPO, avoiding a potential litigation risk especially 
when post-IPO earnings decline compared with the pre-IPO period, meeting 
earnings forecasts in the prospectuses to avoid any reputation damage, and meeting 
performance-based compensation targets. 
Consistent with this view about information asymmetry, prior literature has 
presented evidence that IPO firms utilize real and accrual earnings management 
activities to manage earnings upward around IPOs (e.g., Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 
1998c; DuCharme et al., 2001; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Darrough and Rangan, 
2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Singer and Fedyk, 2011; Wongsunwai, 2012) and 
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experience lower post-IPO stock returns and operating performance due to earnings 
management taking place at the IPO (e.g. Teoh et al. 1998a; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 
2010). This literature also has shown that real and accrual earnings management 
activities are extensively utilized around Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) to 
manipulate reported earnings upward and that these activities have negative 
consequences for future stock returns and operating performance (e.g., Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012).  
Therefore, and given the fact that disclosure systems and financial reporting 
quality in the capital markets are associated with the level of information asymmetry 
and agency conflicts (Heal and Palepu, 2001), it is expected that the regulatory 
environments of the stock exchanges will play a significant role to either mitigate or 
motivate the use of earnings management activities around IPOs. On the one hand, a 
restrictive regulatory environment that has higher quality disclosure systems and 
financial reporting is expected to reduce the level of information asymmetry and 
agency conflicts and, therefore, managers have less flexibility to manage earnings 
upward around IPOs to obtain private gains. On the other hand, a lighter regulatory 
environment that has lower quality disclosure systems and financial reporting can 
lead to a higher level of information asymmetry and agency conflicts and, therefore 
managers have more flexibility to manage earnings upward around IPOs to obtain 
private gains. Despite this clear association between the regulatory environments 
and the use of earnings management, no research to date has examined whether 
different regulatory burdens (restrictive vs. lighter) that have different disclosure 
system and financial reporting quality would lead to different impacts on the level of 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts around IPOs and, therefore, the use of 
earnings management.  
Further, and due to the fact that the IPO event is associated with a higher 
level of information asymmetry, hiring high quality audit firms during IPOs would 
help IPO firms to send a positive signal about the offer to outside investors (Titman 
and Trueman, 1986; Brau and Fawcett, 2006). This is due to the fact that high 
quality auditors consider the potential litigation risks that are associated with the 
IPO event and, therefore, they are expected to provide high quality audits that 
overall help to reduce information asymmetry and IPO underpricing (Balvers et al. 
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1988; Beatty 1989; Datar et al. 1991; Hogan, 1997). Consistent with this, prior 
research finds high quality auditors mitigate the use of accrual earnings management 
to increase reported earnings upwards during the IPO (e.g. Elder and Zhou, 2002; 
Chen et al., 2005). On the other hand, and in contrast with accruals accounting, real 
earnings management activities represent managerial decisions that deviate from 
normal business practices such as the unexpected reduction of research and 
development expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006) and, therefore, these activities are 
less subject to the scrutiny of audit firms ( e.g. Graham et al. 2005). Also, real 
earnings management activities are found to lead to severe negative consequences 
for future stock return and operating performance (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Kothari et al. 2012) and are associated with a higher future litigation risk (Sohn 
2011)1. Thus, it still unclear how high quality auditors would response to their IPO 
clients who engage in a higher level of real earnings management activities during 
the IPO2.  Indeed, whether high quality auditors will ignore the potential litigation 
risks that are associated with earnings manipulation and just turn a blind eye to 
opportunistic real activities by their IPO clients during the IPO is still an open 
question.3 
Moreover, the IPO is a significant event in a firm’s life cycle that has 
consequences for the firm and its shareholders. If earnings management can lead to a 
future decline in stock returns and operating performance, then these consequences 
are likely to affect the economy as a whole (e.g. insiders, investors, lenders, 
financial institutions, and the unemployment rate), especially when earnings 
management leads to an IPO failure. Thus, exploring real and accrual earnings 
                                            
1 Sohn (2011) conducted a survey with high quality auditors (Big 4) and found that more than 30% of 
the respondents admitted that real earning management activities are associated with a higher 
probability of future litigation penalties. 
2 It is worth noting that recent literature has examined this relationship based on a SEO setting and 
found that high quality auditors play no monitoring role on real activities, but rather they lead their 
SEO clients to engage in a higher level of real activities to avoid the monitoring of accruals 
manipulation (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al. 2011). A SEO event is also associated with a 
higher level of information asymmetry during the offer year, but to a lesser degree than the IPO event. 
This is due to the fact that SEO firms are public firms and, therefore, the market participants already 
know a lot of information about these firms, while an IPO firm is a private firm with limited 
information that is available to the public. 
3 The focus on high quality auditors is due to the fact that a potential litigation risk would lead to 
severe negative consequences for the reputation of high quality auditors (big N audit firms) compared 
with lower quality auditors (non-big N audit firms) (Hogan, 1997). 
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management around IPOs is relevant to the economy as a whole as well to extending 
knowledge in the core areas of accounting and finance. This thesis therefore aims to 
explore and investigate real and accrual earnings management activities around IPOs 
in the UK, the relationships between these activities, mitigating factors (regulators 
and audit firms), and the consequences of these activities for future performance 
(post-IPO stock returns and IPO failure). Specifically, this thesis examines how 
multiple agency conflicts in IPO firms, which are caused by information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders, can lead to an extensive use of real and accrual 
earnings management to manage earnings upward around IPOs under different 
regulatory environments. Further, this thesis examines how a litigation-risk 
hypothesis (potential litigation risks) would impact high quality auditors’ response 
to the use of real earnings management activities during the IPO, even though these 
activities are considered outside the audit targets. Finally, this thesis explores how 
these real and accrual earnings management activities (which represent deviation 
from normal business and accounting practices) can impact IPO firms’ future 
performance through analyzing post-IPO stock return and IPO survivability. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section two discusses the 
association between regulatory environments and real and accrual earnings 
management. Section three presents an overview on the expected impact of 
enhanced audit quality on real and accrual earnings management at the IPO. Section 
four explores consequences of real and accrual earnings management for IPO failure 
and survivability. Section five presents the research questions. Section six outlines 
the significance of the research. Section seven presents the contribution of the 
research. Section eight provides the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Regulatory Environments  
The first empirical chapter (chapter five) of this thesis examines whether IPO firms 
engage in real and accrual earnings management around IPOs, via analysis of a six-
year window starting from two years before the IPO year, and up to three years after 
the IPO year, under different regulatory environments. This chapter also analyzes 
the impact of different regulatory environments (restricted vs. flexible) on the 
association between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock 
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return performance. The IPO presents a unique setting in which to examine real and 
accrual earnings management, notably that IPO firms exhibit a higher level of 
information asymmetry that may lead to higher agency conflicts and, therefore, 
strong incentives and more flexibility to manage reported earnings upwards around 
the offer year. Further, the UK stock market provides a unique setting to address the 
impact of the regulatory environment on earnings management as all firms are 
governed by the same legal regime, accounting standards and general economic 
environment, but are subject to differing disclosure systems, listing requirements 
and monitoring. 
The increased interest in earnings management research has led to an 
examination of the association between managers’ tendency to choose between real 
and accrual earnings management and regulation. Graham et al. (2005) for example 
present evidence that executives prefer to manage earnings by utilizing real 
activities manipulation over accrual accounting to avoid the scrutiny of regulators. 
Real activities represent managerial decisions that deviate from normal business 
practices and, therefore, are less subject to the scrutiny of regulators and auditors 
(Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006). Consistent with this, Cohen et al. 
(2008) examine the impact of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on managers’ 
tendency to manage earnings utilizing real and accrual earnings management. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was issued in the US after the big accounting scandals in 
2002 in order to remedy corporate governance failures and to mitigate earnings 
management. Consistent with Graham et al. (2005), Cohen et al. (2008) find 
evidence that managers resort to manage real earnings management after the passage 
of SOX. Specifically, Cohen et al. (2008) indicate that SOX has constrained the use 
of accrual earnings management and, therefore, managers have switched to use real 
activities after the passage of SOX.   
Despite this recent increased interest in research that examines the impact of 
regulatory environments on real and accrual earnings management, no research to 
date has examined whether different regulatory environments impact managers’ 
tendency to manage earnings and to choose between real and accrual earnings 
management around IPOs. The IPO represents an event where managers have a very 
strong incentive to manage earnings upward around the offer year.  
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In the UK, the heavily regulated Main market of the London Stock Exchange 
and the more lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM) provide a 
unique setting to assess the impact of different sets of regulation (flexible vs. 
restricted) on managers’ tendency to manage earnings upward and to choose 
between real and accrual earnings management. Specifically, the AIM and Main 
markets have very different regulatory environments, listing requirements, and 
corporate governance structure and disclosure systems. However, firms listed on 
these markets are governed by the same legal regime, accounting standards and 
general economic conditions. In addition, the Main market is considered to be one of 
the most developed markets in the world that attracts the attention of analysts and 
sophisticated investors (Arcot et al., 2007), who in turn help to re-evaluate stock 
prices that were inflated by earnings manipulation around IPOs. Thus, this thesis 
enhances the literature by providing evidence on the relation between the regulatory 
environment and managers’ tendency to manage earnings and to choose between 
real and accrual earnings management activities around IPOs, and whether different 
regulatory environments may have different mechanisms/capabilities to correct the 
stock prices that were inflated by earnings management during the IPO. 
1.3 Enhanced Audit Quality  
The second empirical chapter (chapter six) of this thesis examines whether enhanced 
audit quality is associated with real and accrual earnings management at the IPO. 
While prior literature finds evidence that enhanced audit quality constrains accrual-
based manipulation to avoid potential litigation risks (e.g. Becker et al., 1998), 
recent literature presents evidence that the monitoring of accruals manipulation by 
high quality auditors leads to more extensive use of real activities. For example, Chi 
et al. (2011) examine whether high quality auditors affect managers’ tendency to 
choose between real and accrual earnings management. By examining firms with 
strong incentives to manage earnings upward (e.g. firms that have issued a Seasoned 
Equity Offering [SEO] and firms who just meet or beat earnings benchmarks), Chi 
et al. (2011) find evidence that firms audited by high quality auditors resort to high 
levels of real earnings management to avoid the monitoring of accrual based-
manipulation. In addition, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine SEO firms and find 
evidence that the presence of high quality auditors is associated with higher levels of 
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real earnings management. Although recent increased interest in real and accrual 
earnings management research has led to an examination of the association between 
enhanced audit quality and managers’ tendency to choose between real activities-
based and accrual-based manipulation around SEOs, no research to date has 
examined this association around IPOs. Based on the litigation-risk hypothesis, it is 
expected that high quality auditors to detect real earnings management activities that 
are associated with potential litigation risks, even though these activities are 
considered outside the audit targets.  
Further, real and accrual earnings management are found to have severe 
negative consequences for subsequent stock returns and operating performance. For 
example, prior research has found IPO and SEO firms that manage accruals upward 
around the offer year experience a decline in stock returns and operating 
performance in the following periods (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a, 1998c; Fan, 
2007). Prior research also has examined the impact of both real and accrual earnings 
management for post-SEO returns and operating performance and found evidence 
that real earnings management has more severe negative consequences for future 
performance (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al. 2012).  
Therefore, and based on the above evidence, it is expected that the impact of 
high quality auditors on real and accrual earnings management will extend for 
subsequent performance. On the one hand, accrual-based manipulation is found to 
be negatively associated with future stock returns and operating performance 
(Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a; Fan, 2007) and, therefore, reducing accruals 
manipulation by high quality auditors would mitigate the negative consequences of 
accruals manipulation for subsequent returns and operating performance. On the 
other hand, the monitoring of accruals manipulation by high quality auditors is 
found to lead managers to engage more in real activities manipulation (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011) and, therefore, this extensive use of real activities-
based will have more severe negative consequences for subsequent stock return and 
operating performance (even greater than the impact of accrual-based manipulation 
e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al. 2012). 
Thus, this thesis is the first empirical research (based on the IPO context or 
any other context e.g. SEO) that examines the impact of enhanced audit quality on 
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the relation between real and accrual earnings management and subsequent stock 
return performance. Specifically, if enhanced audit quality has an impact on real and 
accrual earnings management at the IPO, then it is predicted that this will feed 
through into post-IPO stock return performance. 
1.4 IPO Failure Risks  
The third and final empirical chapter (chapter seven) of this thesis explores the 
impact of real and accrual earnings management on the probability of IPO failure 
and survivability in the subsequent period. Fama and French (2004) document that 
the survival rates of IPO firms have sharply declined over the past several decades 
due to the new characteristics of IPO firms, which are lower profitability and the 
higher growth that are both driven by the lower cost of equity in the market. Given 
the importance of IPO failure and survivability and its impact for the economy as a 
whole (e.g. investors, lenders, financial institutions, unemployment rate, etc), recent 
research has focused on examining several factors that may be associated with IPO 
failure. For example, Jain and Kini (2000) examine the association between the 
presence of venture capitalists and IPO survivability. Schultz (1993) examines 
whether IPO firms with more reputable underwriters have higher survival rates. 
Willenborg and McKeown (2001), Weber and Willenborg (2003) and Jain and 
Martin (2005) investigate whether enhanced audit quality is associated with IPO 
survivability. Hensler et al. (1997) examine whether IPO survivability is associated 
with IPO firms characteristics such as underpricing, size and firm age.  
Despite this extensive research on IPO failure and survivability, little 
research has examined whether IPO failure and survivability are associated with real 
and accrual earnings management (e.g. Li and Zhou, 2006; Demers and Joos, 2007). 
Prior literature has shown evidence that real and accrual earnings management 
activities are utilized to manipulate reported earnings around IPOs (e.g., Friedlan, 
1994; Teoh et al. 1998a; DuCharme et al., 2001; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; 
Darrough and Rangan, 2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Chang et al., 2010; Singer 
and Fedyk, 2011; Wongsunwai, 2012) and that these activities have severe negative 
consequences for subsequent returns and operating performance (Teoh et al. 1998a; 
Teoh et al., 1998b; Fan, 2007; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012). 
Chapter 1. Introduction  
- 9 - 
 
Thus, IPO firms that engage in higher levels of real and accrual earnings 
management during the IPO are expected to have a higher probability of failure and 
lower survival rates in the subsequent period.   
Consistent with the negative impact of earnings manipulation, a recent paper 
by Li and Zhou (2006) finds evidence that IPO firms with high levels of accruals 
manipulation during the IPO year have a higher probability of failure and lower 
survival rates in the subsequent period. Further, Demers and Joos (2007) find IPO 
firms that have lower spending on research and development (R&D) and selling, 
general, and administrative (SG& A) expenses during the year pre the IPO have a 
higher probability of failure in the following periods.4  
In summary, this thesis examines whether real and accrual-based earnings 
management that take place during the IPO year are associated with IPO failure risk 
and survivability in the subsequent period. It is predicted that IPO firms with high 
levels of real activities-based and accrual-based manipulations during the IPO year 
will have a higher probability of failure and lower survival rates in subsequent 
periods. 
1.5 Research Questions  
Based on the previous discussion, the objectives of this thesis are to examine the 
following research questions. 
1.  It examines whether IPO firms manage earnings upward around Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) utilizing real and accrual earnings management under different 
regulatory via an analysis of the heavily regulated Main market of the London 
Stock Exchange and the more lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM).  
                                            
4 It is worth noting that while recent accounting research employs empirical models to estimate 
discretionary expenses-based manipulation (e.g. the abnormal reduction of R&D and SG&A 
expenses), Demers and Joos (2007) examine the annual level of discretionary expenses during the 
year pre the IPO. 
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2. It investigates whether regulatory environments have different 
mechanisms/capabilities to correct stock prices that were inflated by earnings 
management during the IPO year.  
3. It examines whether enhanced audit quality affects real earnings management 
activities during the IPO and whether enhanced audit quality has an impact on 
managers’ tendency to choose between real and accrual earnings management.     
4. It investigates whether enhanced audit quality has an impact on the relationships 
between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock return 
performance. 
5.  It explores the consequences of real and accrual earnings management at the 
IPO through assessing the probability of IPO failure and survivability in the 
subsequent periods. 
1.6 Significance of the Thesis  
This study attempts to explore whether UK IPO firms manipulate reported earnings 
using real earnings management and accrual accounting around the offer year. By 
examining real earnings management activities, this study provides new evidence on 
earnings manipulation around IPOs. Prior research has examined accrual earnings 
management hypothesis in an IPO context; however, the evidence is inconclusive 
whether IPO firms engage in accrual earnings management. A substantial number of 
studies find evidence that IPO firms manage earnings upward using accrual 
accounting (e.g., Aharony et al., 1993; Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 1998a; 
DuCharme et al., 2001). However, other studies find no evidence of accruals 
manipulation around IPOs and indicate that the previous findings of high levels of 
accruals manipulation around IPOs are attributed to the bias in the estimation of 
discretionary accruals (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2009). 
While prior research focuses extensively on accrual-based manipulation around 
IPOs, recent research shows that IPO firms utilize both real activities and accrual 
accounting to manipulate reported earnings upward around the offer year (e.g., 
Darrough and Rangan, 2005; Wongsunwai, 2012). 
Given the mixed evidence on accrual manipulation around IPOs, and given 
the increased interest on real activities-based earnings management, this study 
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enhances the literature by examining real and accrual earnings management around 
IPOs in the UK. This study is therefore significant for the following reasons:  
First, it provides new evidence whether IPO firms engage in real earnings 
management activities to manipulate reported earnings around the offer year. In 
addition, given the previous mixed evidence on accruals manipulation during IPOs, 
this study examines whether IPO firms manage accrual accounting upward around 
IPOs by taking account of comments in recent research that questions the evidence 
of accruals manipulation around IPOs (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Armstrong 
et al., 2009). Second, this study presents evidence whether the regulatory 
environment has an impact on managers’ tendency to choose between real and 
accrual earnings management. Prior literature shows that more restrictive regulations 
constrain accrual-based manipulation, but at the expense of more use of real 
activities manipulation. Graham et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2008) show that 
managers prefer to manipulate real activities over accrual-based manipulation to 
avoid the scrutiny of regulators. Thus, this thesis illustrates how managers can 
response to more restrictive regulations and how managers choose between real and 
accrual earnings management under different regulatory environments, namely 
flexible vs. restricted.  
Third, there is a growing body of literature has examined the association 
between enhanced audit quality and real activities-based manipulation. Real 
activities manipulation represent managerial decisions (e.g. R&D and SG&A 
expenses) that are less subject to the scrutiny of auditors (Graham et al., 2005; 
Roychowdhury, 2006), in line with this Chi et al. (2011) find evidence that the 
presence of high quality auditors is associated with high levels of real activities. This 
recent research examines firms with strong incentives to manage earnings upward 
(e.g. SEO firms) and finds firms audited by high quality auditors engage in more 
real activities-based manipulation to avoid the monitoring which occurs when 
accrual-based manipulation occurs (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the findings of this thesis provide evidence on the importance of 
considering real activities by audit firms, even though these activities are less 
subject to the scrutiny of auditors. The effective monitoring of accrual manipulation 
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by audit firms without considering real activities therefore leads to more negative 
consequences for future performance. 
Finally, the failure of an IPO is a significant event that has negative 
consequences for the firm and its shareholders (investors, lenders, financial 
institutions, etc). Thus, this thesis enhances the literature by providing evidence 
whether real and accrual earnings management are associated with IPO failure and 
survivability. Real and accrual earnings management are negatively associated with 
future performance, and therefore, constraining these activities will reduce the risk 
of IPO failure and improve the survivability.  
1.7 Contribution of the Thesis 
This thesis contributes to the knowledge in the following theoretical aspects. First, 
this is the first study to examine how the level of information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts may differ under different regulatory environments and how this impacts 
the use of real and accrual earnings management activities during the IPO. The 
findings of this thesis show that IPO firms on the lighter regulatory environment of 
the AIM market of the London Stock exchange exhibit higher levels of information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts that, in turn, leads to more flexibility to manage 
real and accrual earnings management to inflate reported earnings upward around 
IPOs. While IPO firms on the more restrictive regulatory environment of the Main 
market of the London Stock Exchange are found to exhibit lower levels of 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts that, in turn, leads to less flexibility to 
manage earnings upward.5   
Second, this is the first study to examine whether a litigation-risk hypothesis 
(the risk of potential litigation penalties) can impact high quality auditors’ response 
to real activities that are utilized by their IPO clients during the IPO year to manage 
                                            
5  In addition to the use of the level of earnings management as a proxy for the presence of 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts, the results of Table 5.9 show that the coefficient of 
ZeroReturn is positive and statistically significant, suggesting AIM IPOs exhibit a higher level of 
information asymmetry during the IPO year than Main IPOs. The variable ZeroReturn is included 
into Model 5.9 to control for information asymmetry problems as IPO firms with high levels of 
information asymmetry their stock are less likely to be traded. ZeroReturn is defined as the number of 
zero-return trading days divided by the total number of trading days since the IPO date and up to one 
year later. 
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earnings upward. Prior research shows that high quality auditors mitigate the use of 
accrual earnings management during the IPO to avoid any potential litigation risks 
(e.g. Elder and Zhou, 2002), while no research to date has examined whether high 
quality auditors may mitigate the use of real activities during the IPO. This limited 
research is due to the fact that real activities represent managerial decisions that are 
less subject to the scrutiny of audit firms (Graham et al., 2005) and, therefore, 
researchers would not expect to find any relationship between audit firms and real 
activities. In contrast with this view, the findings of this thesis provide the first 
evidence that a litigation-risk hypothesis impacts the monitoring role of high quality 
auditors on real earnings management activities during the IPO. Specifically, high 
quality auditors are found to mitigate the use of real activities that occur via 
discretionary expenses-based manipulation. These discretionary activities are 
associated with future litigation risks especially when the IPO firms manage 
earnings upward utilizing both sales and discretionary expenses.6   
Further, this thesis contributes to the knowledge in the following empirical 
aspects. First, this study provides the first empirical evidence to the literature on the 
impact of the regulatory environment on managers’ tendency to engage in earnings 
management and to choose between real and accrual earnings management activities 
around IPOs. The findings of chapter five show that IPO firms on the lighter 
regulatory environment of the AIM market exhibit a higher level of information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts that, in turn, leads to higher levels of real activities 
(sales-based) and accrual earnings management during the IPO. Further, the findings 
of chapter five show that IPO firms on the lighter regulatory environment of the 
AIM market have more flexibility to choose between real and accrual earnings 
management activities based on the costs and benefits of utilizing each of them.  
Second, this study provides the first empirical evidence to the literature that 
different regulatory environments (restrictive vs. lighter) are found to have different 
mechanisms/capabilities to correct stock prices that were inflated by earnings 
management during the IPO year. It is already documented in the literature that 
                                            
6 A higher level of sales is expected to be combined with a higher spending on discretionary expenses 
e.g. selling and advertising expenses. Thus, and as sales-based manipulation is hard to detect, it 
seems that high quality auditors mitigate any abnormal reduction of discretionary expenses especially 
when the IPO firms experience high growth in sales. 
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earnings management during the IPO year predicts post-IPO poor stock return and 
operating performance. However, no research to date has examined how this 
relationship may differ under different regulatory environments. For example, a 
more developed stock market with a more restrictive regulatory environment can 
attract the attention of sophisticated investors and analysts who help to correct stock 
prices that were inflated by earnings management. Consistent with this, the findings 
of chapter five show that the more heavily regulated environment of the Main 
market of the London Stock Exchange has better mechanisms/capabilities than the 
lighter regulated environment of the AIM market to correct stock prices that were 
inflated by earnings management during the IPO year. 
Third, this study is the first empirical test to examine the impact of audit 
quality on real earnings management activities during the IPO, and whether audit 
quality impacts managers’ tendency to choose between real and accrual earnings 
management activities during the IPO. Prior literature focuses on the relationship 
between audit quality and accrual earnings management around IPO, while no 
research to date has examined the relationship between audit quality and real 
earnings management activities during the IPO. The findings of chapter six show 
that high quality auditors mitigate real earnings management that occurs via 
discretionary expenses-based manipulation. Further, the findings of chapter six show 
that the monitoring of discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based 
manipulations by high quality auditors lead their IPO clients to engage in a higher 
level of sales-based manipulation to manage earnings upward during the IPO year.  
Fourth, this study also provides the first empirical test to examine the impact 
of enhanced audit quality on the association between real and accrual earnings 
management and subsequent stock return performance. As enhanced audit quality is 
expected to impact managers’ tendency to choose between real and accrual earnings 
management, and as both real and accrual earnings management lead to negative 
impacts for future stock return performance (Kothari et al., 2012), then it is expected 
that the impact of enhanced audit quality on earnings management during the IPO 
will feed through into post-IPO stock return performance. The findings of chapter 
six provide the first evidence to the literature that IPO firms audited by high quality 
auditors during the IPO experience more severe poor stock return performance in the 
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following periods due to the extensive use of sales-based manipulation during the 
IPO year.     
Finally, this study represents the first evidence to the literature on the 
association between real earnings management activities and IPO failure risks. 7 
Prior research has examined the relationship between accrual earnings management 
during the IPO and IPO failure risks (e.g. Li and Zhou, 2006), but no research to 
date has examined whether real earnings management activities during the IPO are 
associated with the probability of IPO failure.8 The findings of chapter seven show 
that IPO firms who exhibit higher levels of real and accrual earnings management 
during the IPO year experience a higher probability of IPO failure and lower 
survival rates in the subsequent periods, confirming that earnings management 
activities lead to severe negative consequences for future performance.  
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter provides a summary on the 
motivations to conduct this research and the expected contribution to the literature. 
In addition, it shows the significance of this study concerning the expected 
implications to the IPO market, and presents the research questions and the structure 
of this thesis. 
Chapter two aims to provide an overview on the development of earnings 
management, its activities, and the empirical models employed to measure these 
activities. Starting with definitions, earlier research will be discussed in order to 
present the most commonly accepted definitions of earnings management and to 
distinguish between earnings management and accounting fraud. Further, this 
chapter shows the difference between real and accrual earnings management 
                                            
7 It is worth noting that this study is most closely related to Demers and Joos (2007), which examines 
whether the annual level of SG&A, R&D, and sales during the year pre the IPO is associated with the 
probability of IPO failure. However, while Demers and Joos (2007) just examine the annual level of 
these items pre the IPO, this thesis uses empirical models developed by Roychowdhury (2006) to 
estimate real activities manipulation during the IPO year. 
8 It is also worth noting that this thesis is the first study to examine real earnings management 
activities during the IPO in the UK. Thus, this thesis provides new avenues for future research in the 
UK, notably the differences in the IPO process between the UK and the other part of this world e.g. 
the US.  
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concerning the timing of each method and the consequences for subsequent 
performance. Finally, chapter two provides a summary of the most commonly used 
empirical models to estimate real and accrual earnings management, discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of these empirical models. 
Chapter three reviews the motivations, mitigating factors and theories of 
earnings management. In particular, it reviews prior research that presents evidence 
on various targets to manipulate reported earnings such as executive compensation, 
avoidance of debt covenant violation, and meet earnings benchmarks. In addition, 
this chapter provides a review and discussion of the literature on factors that 
mitigate earnings management (such as corporate governance, institutional 
investors, auditors, and accounting standards setters). Further, the most related 
theories of earnings management will be reviewed e.g. the agency theory, the 
litigation-risk hypothesis.  
Chapter four presents an overview on the data used in the empirical analysis, 
data sources, sample construction, definition of variables, and descriptive statistics 
of key variables. Further, this chapter describes and presents statistics for the 
samples that are used in the three empirical chapters. The control sample (all non-
IPO UK firms) and the process of measuring real and accrual earnings management 
measures are also presented here. 
Chapter five is devoted to the first empirical chapter that examines whether 
UK IPO firms engage in real and accrual earnings management around IPOs and 
whether the regulatory environment is associated with earnings management. In 
addition, the effect of earnings management on post-IPO stock return performance is 
also examined under different regulatory environments. Sample selection, data 
description, and the empirical methodology will be presented in this chapter. 
Chapter six presents the second empirical chapter. This research question 
examines the effect of audit quality on real and accrual earnings management during 
the IPO. Whether audit quality has an impact on managers’ tendency to manage real 
activities and to choose between real and accrual earnings management during the 
IPO is an unanswered question and, therefore, this chapter investigates this. In 
addition, this chapter investigates the effect of audit quality on the association 
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between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock return 
performance. 
Chapter seven investigates whether real and accrual earnings management 
during the IPO are associated with IPO failure risk and survivability. This chapter 
defines IPO failure as firms that are delisted from the stock exchange for negative 
reasons within five years of the IPO date. Both Logit regression and survival 
analysis are employed to examine IPO failure risk and survivability. This chapter 
also is the first study to examine the impact of real earnings management on IPO 
failure risks. Chapter eight provides the conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 
Definitions, Activities, and Measurement of Earnings Management   
 
2.1 Introduction  
Chapter one provides a summary for the structure of this thesis, which examines real 
and accrual earnings management activities by UK IPO firms. Chapter two presents 
the definition of earnings management, earnings management activities, and 
empirical models that are employed to measure earnings management. In addition, 
the difference between earnings management and accounting fraud is presented in 
this chapter. Prior literature shows evidence that managers engage in several 
activities of earnings management to manipulate reported earnings, some of these 
activities violate the Generally Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP) and other 
activities occur within the bounds of GAAP (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994; Balsam, 1998; Beneish, 1999)  
However, later research has taken a slightly different approach, 
distinguishing earnings management activities from accounting fraud that violates 
GAAP (e.g. Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Given the importance of earnings 
manipulation, this chapter reviews the most related studies that focus on the 
difference between earnings management and accounting fraud. Further, as the 
purpose of this thesis is to examine real and accrual earnings management activities 
around IPOs, this chapter presents the differences between the two activities 
concerning the motivations and consequences for utilizing each of them. Prior 
research presents evidence that managers manipulate earnings utilizing real and 
accrual earnings management either as complementary or substitute techniques 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section two presents 
the definitions of real and accrual earnings management and shows the differences 
between earnings management and accounting fraud. Section three discusses the 
most commonly utilized activities of earnings manipulation. Section four presents 
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differences between real and accrual earnings management. Section five presents 
empirical models that are employed to measure real earnings management. Section 
six focuses on accrual earnings management and the models used to estimate 
discretionary accruals. Finally section seven concludes. 
 2.2 Earnings Management Definition  
Earnings management as a widespread phenomenon that aims to manipulate 
reported earnings upward or downward to meet various targets such as meeting 
earnings benchmarks (Degeorge et al., 1999;  Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Osma, 
2008), increasing share prices (Schipper, 1989), etc. Prior literature has extensively 
researched the motivations and consequences of earnings management activities 
(e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Jones, 1991). However, prior literature has not 
indicated a specific definition of earnings management that can cover all the various 
activities of earnings manipulation. One of the most commonly definition of 
earnings management is presented by Healy (1985,  p. 368) whereby, 
“earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers” 
Consistent with Healy’s (1985) definition, later research finds evidence that 
managers manipulate earnings upward to influence contractual outcomes. For 
example, prior literature finds evidence that managers manipulate reported earnings 
upward to meet performance based compensation (e.g., Balsam, 1998; Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006) and to avoid debt covenant 
violations (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; Jaggi and Picheng, 
2002). Further, Schipper (1989) presents another definition of earnings management, 
focusing on private gain as the main motivation to manipulate reported earnings. 
Schipper (1989, p. 92) defines earnings management as: 
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“purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting 
process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed 
to say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)”. 
Other studies have focused on the question of whether earnings management 
activities violate or occur within the bounds of GAAP. For example, Beneish (1999) 
focuses on earnings management activities that violate GAAP, and in particular, 
earnings overstatement. He finds firms that overstate their annual earnings have a 
higher level of insider trading compared with firms without overstatement. 
Moreover, Beneish (1999) finds evidence on earnings manipulation that violates 
GAAP and is consistent with previous definitions of earning management by Healy 
(1985) and Schipper (1989). 
Thus, and in the light of above-mentioned studies, one might ask whether 
earnings management activities violate GAAP and whether there is a difference 
between earnings management and accounting fraud. Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
explain this misclassification and provide Figure 2.1 which differentiates between 
earnings management activities and accounting fraud. Specifically, Figure 2.1 shows 
that earnings management activities occur without violating GAAP and are 
classified under two categories; accounting choices and real cash flow choices. 
While accounting choices (accrual-based earnings management) occur within the 
bounds of GAAP and at the end of the fiscal year, real cash flow choices (real 
activities-based earnings management) occur throughout the fiscal year and have 
direct consequences for current and future cash flows  (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Consistent with Dechow and Skinner (2000), Roychowdhury (2006) focuses 
on examining a set of real cash flow choices (real activities-based earnings 
management). Roychowdhury (2006) defines real earnings management as 
managerial decisions that aim to increase current earnings on the expense of future 
earnings such as the unexpected reduction of research and development expenses, 
the timing of asset sales, and providing more price discounts or/and more lenient the 
credit terms. Roychowdhury (2006, p. 336) defines real earnings management as 
follows,   
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“management actions that deviate from normal business practices, 
undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings 
thresholds”. 
Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence that managers manipulate earnings 
upward utilizing real earnings management activities to avoid reporting annual 
losses. Consistent with the above definition of real earnings management, a large 
body of research, theoretical and empirical, has found evidence that managers 
engage extensively in real earnings management activities to meet various targets 
(e.g. Ewert and Wagenhofer; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Zang, 2012). 
The central premise underlying the previous line of research is that earnings 
management activities can be implemented without violating GAAP, utilizing either 
accounting choices or real cash flow choices (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
Figure 2.1 Differences between accounting fraud and earnings management 
   Accounting Choices      Real Cash Flows Choices  
   Within GAPP     
  -Overly aggressive recognition of provision or 
reserves. 
 -Delaying sales. 
“Conservative” 
accounting 
-Overvaulting of acquired in-process R&D in 
purchases acquisitions. 
 -Accelerating R&D or 
advertising expenditures. 
  -Overstatement of restructuring charges and 
asset write-offs. 
  
“Neutral” 
Accounting  
-Earnings that result from a neutral operation 
of the process. 
  
  -Understatement of the provision for bad debts.    -Postponing R&D or 
advertising expenditures. 
“Aggressive” 
Accounting 
-Drawing down provisions or reserves in an 
overly aggressive manner. 
 -Accelerating sales. 
    Violate GAAP    
  -Recording Sales before they are “realisable”.   
“Fraudulent” 
Accounting  
-Recording fictitious sales.   
  -Backdating sales invoices.   
  -Overstating inventory be recording fictitious 
inventory. 
  
Source; (Dechow and Skinner, 2000  P. 239) 
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2.3 Earnings Management Activities  
Given the importance of understanding earnings management, a vast body of 
research has focused largely on accrual earnings management activities and little 
research on real activities manipulation, which are considered as the most commonly 
utilized techniques to manipulate reported earnings without violating GAAP (e.g., 
Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Friedlan, 1994; Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; 1998b; 
1998c; DuCharme et al., 2001; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Roychowdhury, 2006; Fan, 2007; Cohen et al., 
2008; Chang et al., 2010; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Kothari et al., 
2012; Zang, 2012). 
However, recent research finds evidence of another activity of earnings 
management, classification shifting, and this occurs within the bounds of GAAP, but 
it is not considered as real or accrual earnings management (e.g., McVay, 2006; 
Athanasakou et al., 2009; Yun et al., 2010). Specifically, while real and accrual 
earnings management change the reported earnings (the bottom-line GAAP net 
income), classification shifting manipulates core earnings without having any impact 
on GAAP net income (McVay, 2006; Yun et al., 2010).9 McVay (2006) indicates 
that investors and analysts pay more attention to core earnings and, therefore, 
managers manipulate core earnings upward through shifting core expenses (e.g. cost 
of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses) to special items. 
Athanasakou et al. (2009) find evidence for a sub-sample of UK larger firms that 
classification shifting is utilized to manage earnings upward to meet analysts’ 
forecasts.  
Other studies have presented another classification of earnings management 
activities. For example, Scott (1997) classifies earnings management activities 
following five groups: (1) big bath, (2) smooth income, (3) increase income, and (4) 
decrease income. Further, and similar to Scott (1997), Levitt (1998) provides five 
categories of earnings management activities, namely (1)” big bath” charges, (2) 
creative acquisition accounting, (3) miscellaneous "cookie jar reserves", (4) 
"materiality", and (5) revenue recognition. Based on these classifications, a big bath 
                                            
9  McVay (2006) defines core earnings as (sales) – (cost of goods sold + selling, general, and 
administrative expenses, excluding depreciation and amortization). 
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for example occurs when the firms expect to miss earnings targets and the gap 
between actual earnings and earnings targets is greater than what can be adjusted by 
utilizing earnings management. In this case, managers may manage earnings 
downward to make reserves that help to report a profit in the subsequent periods.  
In summary, a substantial body of research shows that earnings management 
can be implemented by utilizing main three activities; accrual accounting, real 
activities, and classification shifting. While classification shifting affects core 
earnings, real and accrual earnings management are utilized to manipulate reported 
earnings (net income). Thus, the decision to choose between these activities is 
associated with many other factors such as analysts’ forecast, the occurrence of 
special events (e.g. restructure, merger, and acquisition), corporate governance, 
institutional investors, audit quality, regulatory environment, executive 
compensation, accounting standards, industry, etc (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011; Zang, 2012). 
2.4 The Difference between Real and Accrual Earnings 
Management 
Although real and accrual earnings management occur without violating the bounds 
of GAAP, prior literature shows that these activities have many differences e.g. 
when the manipulation occurs, the consequences for current and future cash flows, 
the scrutiny of regulator and auditors (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen et al., 2008). For example, accrual earnings management represents 
accounting choices that occur at the end of the fiscal year and before the issuance of 
the financial statements (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Specifically, at the end of the 
fiscal year managers are likely to know whether earnings will meet or miss the 
desired threshold and, therefore, reported earnings are adjusted utilizing accrual 
accounting to meet the desired threshold (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010). 
Further, accrual earnings management has no direct impact on operating cash flows, 
but it does reverse over time (e.g. Healy, 1996; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Ahmed et 
al., 2002). Thus, there are two situations where accrual accounting can be utilized to 
manipulate reported earnings. First, when expected earnings fall short the desired 
threshold, income-increasing accrual accounting might be utilized to ensure meeting 
the desired threshold. Second, if the difference between expected earnings and the 
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desired threshold is greater than what can be adjusted by accrual accounting. In the 
later situation, managers may engage in income-decreasing accrual accounting to 
make a reserve for the future (see e.g. Scott, 1997; Levitt, 1998; Barton and Simko, 
2002).  
On the other hand, and in contrast with accrual earnings management, real 
earnings management provides managers with more flexibility as its activities can 
be manipulated throughout the fiscal year (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010). 
Real earnings management represents managerial decisions that deviate from normal 
business practices, such as the unexpected reduction of  research and development 
(R&D) and selling, general, and administrative (SG& A) expenses (Roychowdhury, 
2006). Thus, managers decide the time and the volume of these activities with less 
interference and scrutiny (compared with accruals) from auditors, regulators, etc 
(Graham et al., 2005; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Further, managers prefer to utilize 
real earnings management over accrual earnings management when accounting 
standard setters and regulators restrict the regulations to mitigate accruals 
manipulation (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Graham et al., 2005). For example, 
Cohen et al. (2008) find that managers switch from utilizing accrual accounting pre 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) to real earnings management post-SOX.10 Cohen 
et al. (2008) indicate that managers switch to real earnings management after SOX 
because of the restriction on accrual accounting manipulations.  
In addition, Graham et al. (2005) find evidence that executives prefer real 
earnings management over accrual earnings management to avoid the scrutiny of 
auditors and regulators. Consistent with the evidence of Graham et al. (2005), Chi et 
al. (2011) find SEO firms that are audited by big N audit firms engage intensively in 
real earnings management activities to avoid the monitoring of accrual earnings 
management. Similar evidence is presented by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) that the 
probability of SEO firms to utilize real earnings management during the SEO year 
increases when they are audited by big N audit firms. Although managers prefer real 
earnings management over accrual earnings management, recent studies find 
evidence that real earnings management activities have severe negative 
                                            
10 Sarbanes-Oxley Act was issued on 30
th
 July 2002 by the Securities Exchange Committee after the 
big accounting scandals in the US in an attempt to remedy corporate governance failures that had 
allowed to scandal to occur. 
Chapter 2. Definitions, Activities, and Measurement of Earnings Management   
- 25 - 
 
consequences for subsequent operating and stock return performance, and are even 
greater than the consequences of accrual earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Kothari et al., 2012).  
2.4.1 Evidence on Real Earnings Management Activities  
Prior literature has extensively investigated accrual earnings management and 
presented evidence on the pervasiveness of accruals manipulation (e.g., Jones, 1991; 
Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Becker et al., 1998; Rangan, 1998; 
Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Richardson, 2000; Klein, 2002; Balsam et al., 
2003; Krishnan, 2003; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Peasnell 
et al., 2005;  Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Fan, 2007; Lee and Masulis, 2011; 
and Wongsunwai, 2012). However, recent research finds that real earnings 
management activities also are utilized to manipulate reported earnings upward 
(e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). 
One of the most common activities of real earnings management is 
discretionary expenses manipulation (the unexpected reduction of R&D, SG&A, and 
advertising expenses). The abnormal reduction of R&D expenses has received 
considerable attention by previous studies (Baber et al., 1991; Cheng, 2004; Osma, 
2008). For example, Bushee (1998) finds that US managers cut R&D expenses to 
increase annual earnings. Zarowin and Oswald (2005) and Osma (2008) find that 
UK listed firms manipulate reported earnings by cutting R&D expenses to meet 
earnings benchmarks. Cheng (2004) finds a significant positive association between 
the change in R&D spending and the change in CEO annual compensation for firms 
with CEOs approaching the retirement and firms reporting small losses or small 
decreases. 
In addition to R&D manipulation, timing of asset sales is also considered as 
real earnings management activity. Specifically, managers take advantage of the 
flexibility of timing asset sales to opportunistically increase reported earnings to 
meet the desired threshold. Bartov (1993) finds evidence that managers time the 
sales of long-lived assets in order to manipulate reported earnings. Specifically, he 
finds managers increase reported earnings utilizing asset sales to smooth reported 
earnings and to avoid debt covenant violations. Herrmann et al. (2003) examine 
whether Japanese firms adjust operating income by utilizing asset sales to reduce the 
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errors of management earnings forecasts. Herrmann et al. (2003) find evidence that 
Japanese firms manage earnings upward (downward) utilizing asset sales when the 
operating income below (above) management earnings forecasts. Generally, asset 
sales-manipulation occurs during the fourth quarter (Bartov, 1993) as managers at 
this time are likely to know whether earnings will meet or miss the desired threshold 
and, therefore, they decide the volume and the time of these sales. 
Moreover, other activities of real earnings management can be implemented 
through overproduction (conducted through increasing the number of produced units 
which reduces the cost per unit sold) and sales-based manipulations (conducted 
through increasing sales by providing more price discounts and/or more lenient 
credit terms) (see for more details Roychowdhury, 2006). Confirming the existence 
of real activities-based manipulation, Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence that US 
firms engage simultaneously in several activities of real earnings management to 
avoid reporting annual losses. He finds evidence on sales-based, overproduction, 
and discretionary expenses manipulations. Similar evidence is reported by Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010) and Chi et al. (2011) who find SEO firms exhibit evidence of 
higher levels of real earnings management during the SEO year. Specifically, and in 
addition to accruals manipulation, they find SEO firms exhibit higher levels of 
abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation), abnormal 
discretionary expenses (discretionary expenses-based manipulation), and abnormal 
production cost (overproduction cost-based manipulation). Recently, a survey 
conducted by Graham et al. (2005) supports the previous empirical evidence on real 
earnings management activities.11
 
The survey shows that Chief Financial Officers 
(CFOs) prefer to engage in real earnings management activities over accrual 
accounting to meet annual earnings targets and analysts’ forecasts.  
 2.4.2 The Consequences of Real Earnings Management Activities  
Managers engage in real earnings management activities by adopting suboptimal 
decisions to manipulate reported earnings such as the unexpected reduction of R&D 
expenses to increase reported earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006). By focusing on these 
                                            
11 Graham et al. (2005) conducted a survey with more than 400 financial officers in the US and found 
evidence that more than 50% of executives expressed a willingness to engage in real earnings 
management activities as long as the impact on economic value was not too large. 
Chapter 2. Definitions, Activities, and Measurement of Earnings Management   
- 27 - 
 
suboptimal decisions, previous literature presents evidence on the negative 
consequences of real earnings management for subsequent performance (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010, Kothari et al., 2012). For example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find 
SEO firms engage in real earnings management activities during the offer year and 
that these activities have severe negative consequences for subsequent operating 
performance. Kothari et al. (2012) find similar evidence to Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) that SEO firms manage earnings upward utilizing real earnings management 
activities during the offer year. Kothari et al. (2012) also find evidence that real 
earnings management activities have negative consequences for long-run stock 
return performance. Most importantly, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. 
(2012) find evidence that real earnings management activities have more severe 
negative consequences for subsequent operating and stock return performance than 
accrual earnings management. This recent evidence by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
and Kothari et al. (2012) sheds lights on the importance of examining real earnings 
management activities. Prior literature has extensively examined accrual earnings 
management without considering real activities (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechow and 
Sloan, 1991; Becker et al., 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a, Klein, 2002; Fan, 2007, Lee and 
Masulis, 2011). 
Further, Leggett et al. (2009) examine whether real earnings management is 
utilized to manipulate reported earnings upward and whether it is associated with 
subsequent performance. Leggett et al. (2009) find evidence that firms manage real 
earnings management activities to meet earnings benchmarks. In addition, they find 
evidence those firms with high levels of real earnings management activities 
experience inferior operating performance and a lower level of operating cash flows 
in the subsequent periods. Zhang (2008) finds evidence that firms manage real 
earnings management activities upward to meet analysts’ cash flow forecasts. 
Further, Zhang (2008) finds similar evidence to Leggett et al. (2009), Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), and Kothari et al. (2012) that firms with high levels of real 
activities-based manipulation experience deterioration in future operating 
performance. 
Although the majority of recent research finds evidence that real earnings 
management activities have negative consequences for future performance, Gunny 
(2010) finds evidence that real earnings management leads to better subsequent 
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operating performance. Specifically, Gunny (2010) finds firms that utilize real 
earnings management activities to just meet earnings benchmarks experience better 
subsequent operating performance than firms who just meet or miss earnings 
benchmarks without utilizing real earnings management activities. Gunny (2010) 
examines a sample of 23,308 firm-year observations over the period 1988-2002 and 
finds evidence that US firms manage earnings upward utilizing real activities (sales-
based, discretionary expenses-based, and overproduction cost-based manipulations) 
to just meet earnings benchmarks. Gunny (2010) focuses on two earnings 
benchmarks (last year earnings and zero earnings benchmarks) and explains this 
positive association between real earnings management and subsequent performance 
as follows: (1) real earnings management help managers to attain benefits that leads 
to better future performance, and (2) real earnings management can send a positive 
signal about the future firms value. 
In summary, although limited research questions the negative consequences 
of real earnings management (Gunny, 2010), the majority of prior studies find 
evidence that real earnings management has severe negative consequences for 
subsequent operating and stock return performance (Zhang, 2008; Leggett et al., 
2009), with even greater than the consequences of accrual earnings management 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012). Table 2.1 presents some examples 
on research that examines real earnings management activities.  
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Table 2.1 Evidence on real earnings management activities  
Year Journal  and authors Sample Research question Results 
2003  Journal of Accounting 
Research 
 
Don Herrmann 
Inoue Tatsuo 
Thomas Wayne 
Japanese sample of 
3,068 firms-year  
observations  over the 
period 1993-1997 
The Sale of Assets to Manage 
Earnings in Japan 
-Japanese firms manipulate earnings by using timing of asset 
sales to meet management earnings forecasts. 
-Utilizing the asset sales is associated with firms’ inability to 
meet management earnings forecasts through normal business 
practices. 
2004 Accounting Review 
 
Shijun Cheng 
US sample of 160 firms  
over the period 1984-
1997 
R&D Expenditures and CEO 
Compensation 
-A significant positive association between the change in 
R&D spending and the change in CEO annual compensation 
for firms with CEOs approaching the retirement and firms 
reporting small losses or small decreases. 
 
2006 Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 
 
Sugata Roychowdhury 
 
US sample of 17,338 
firms-year observations  
over the period 1987-
2001 
 
Earnings Management through Real 
Activities Manipulation 
-Firms engage in real activities manipulation to avoid annual 
losses or to meet analysts’ forecasts. 
-These activities such as price discounts to boost sales, over 
production to lower the cost of good sales, and reduce the 
discretionary expenses to lower the expenses.  
 
2008 Corporate Governance: 
An International Review  
 
Beatriz Garcia Osma 
 
UK sample of 3,438  
firm-year observations  
over the period 1989-
2002 
 
Board Independence and Real 
Earnings Management: The Case of 
R&D Expenditure 
-The reduction of R&D as a response to short-term pressure is 
constrained by independent directors.  
-Independent directors prevent firms that reduce R&D 
expenditures as a response for previous failures or to meet 
current earnings target.  
-The percentage of insider directors on the board is positively 
associated with short-term managerial decisions. 
( The table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 2.1 (continued)   
Year Journal  and authors Sample Research question Results 
2008  Accounting Review 
 
Daniel Cohen 
Aiyesha Dey 
Thomas Z. Lys 
 
US sample of 87,217 
firm-year observations 
over the period 1987-
2005 
 
Real and Accrual- Based Earnings 
Management in the Pre- and post- 
Sarbanes Oxley Periods 
-They find evidence that firms switch from accrual earnings 
management pre-SOX to real activities manipulation post-
SOX. 
 -They find evidence that firms just meet earnings 
benchmarks exhibit higher levels of real activities-based 
manipulation than accrual-based manipulation. 
- They find evidence that accrual-based manipulation is 
extensively utilized pre-SOX. 
2010 Journal of Accounting 
and Economic 
Daniel Cohen 
Paul Zarowin 
 
US sample of  1,511 
US offer over the 
period 1987-2006 
 
Accrual-based and Real Earnings 
Management Activities around 
Seasoned Equity Offerings 
-They find SEO firms manipulate earnings upward utilizing 
real and accrual earnings management during the SEO year. 
-They find evidence that real earnings management has more 
negative consequences than accrual earnings management for 
subsequent operating performance. 
2011 
Accounting Horizons 
 
Wuchun Chi 
Ling Lei Lisic 
Mikhail Pevzner 
 
US sample of 925 firm-
year observations over 
the period 2001-2008 
 
Is Enhanced Audit Quality 
Associated with Greater Real 
Earnings Management?  
-They find evidence that firms audited by high quality 
auditors resort to high levels of real earnings management to 
avoid the monitoring of accrual based-manipulation. 
-They examine firms with strong incentive to manage 
earnings upward, namely firms issue Seasoned Equity and 
firms meet or beat earnings benchmarks. 
2012 Accounting Review 
Amy Zang 
US sample of firms that 
just beat or meet 
earnings benchmarks 
over the period 1987-
2008 
 
Evidence on the Trade-Off between 
Real Activities Manipulation and 
Accrual-Based Earnings 
Management 
-She finds evidence that managers engage real activities-
based throughout the fiscal year and then accrual-based 
earnings management is adjusted at the end of fiscal year by 
the unrealized amount of real activities to meet the desired 
threshold. 
Table 2.1 provides examples on research that examines real activities-based and accrual-based earnings management.  
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2.5   Measurement of Real Earnings Management Activities 
Prior literature has employed several models to measure real earnings management 
activities, namely discretionary expenses-based, sales-based, production cost-based, 
and timing of asset sales (see section 2.4.1 for more details). 
  2.5.1 Discretionary Expenses Manipulation 
Discretionary expenses represent the sum of R&D, SG&A, and advertising 
expenses. Prior studies follow two approaches to estimate discretionary expenses-
based manipulation. The first approach focuses on estimating the abnormal level for 
each single activity of discretionary expenses separately (e.g. the abnormal reduction 
of R&D expenses, Berger, 1993; Bushee, 1998; Osma, 2008; Osma and Young, 
2009; Gunny, 2010), while the second approach estimates the abnormal level for the 
sum of R&D, SG&A, and advertising expenses (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et 
al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011; Zang, 2012). Managers 
typically attempt to decrease these expenses to increase reported earnings. 
One of the first models to measure R&D manipulation is presented by Perry 
and Grinaker (1994) who examine the association between the reduction of R&D 
expenses and earnings expectations for a small sample of 99 firms. Perry and 
Grinaker (1994) designed their expectations model to estimate the normal level of 
R&D expenditures based on a model developed by Berger (1993). First, Perry and 
Grinaker (1994) estimate the normal level of R&D expenditures for the period 1972-
1983. Second, the estimated coefficients are taken to estimate the normal level of 
R&D expenditures for the sample-firms during the period 1984-1990. Perry and 
Grinaker (1994) present their model as follows, 
(2.1)t,it,i6
t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i21t,i10t,i
εGNPβ
ICAPβD&IRβCAPβFUNDSβD&RβαD&R

 
 
Where                                                                                                                                        
R&D i,t: R&D expenses divided by sales. 
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FUNDS i,t: (income before extraordinary items + R&D + depreciation) divided by 
sales. 
CAP i,t: capital expenditures divided by sales. 
IR&D i,t:  R&D expenditures divided by sales for all firms in one industry, 4-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. 
ICAP i,t: capital expenditures divided by sales for all firms in one industry, 4-digit 
SIC cod. 
GNP i,t: real gross national product divided by sales.  
ε i,t: the error term.  
Consistent with this approach, which focuses on a single activity of discretionary 
expenses, Gunny (2010) presents another model to estimate the normal level of 
R&D expenses by developing the previous expectations model as suggested by 
Berger (1993). Gunny (2010) estimates the normal level of R&D expenses as 
follows, 
(2.2)t,i
1-t
1-t,i
4
1-t
t,i
3t,i2t,i 1
1-t
10
t,i
ε
A
RD
β
A
INT
βQβMVβ
A
1
αα
A
RD
1-t
  
Where:                                                                                                                                     
RD i,t: research and development expenses.  
A i,t-1: total assets at the end of the prior year. 
MV i,t: natural log of market value of equity.  
Q i,t: Tobin’s Q defined as firms’ market value divided by replacement cost of its 
assets. 
INT i,t: internal funds, a proxy for reduced funds available for investment. 
 
Chapter 2. Definitions, Activities, and Measurement of Earnings Management   
- 33 - 
 
Further, Gunny (2010) estimates the normal level of selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses based on a model developed by Anderson et al. 
(2003). Gunny’s (2010) model is presented as follows, 
(2.3)
* t,i
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Where:                                                                                                                         
 
SGA i,t: selling, general and administrative expenses at year t. 
S i,t: sales at year t. 
DD: a dummy variable equalling to 1 when there is a decrease of sales revenue 
between current year and previous year and zero otherwise. All other variables are 
previously defined.  
The second approach has adopted a slightly different view by estimating the sum of 
discretionary expenses (R&D, SG&A, and advertising expenses e.g. Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Specifically, this approach 
follows Roychowdhury (2006) who builds his model based on a model developed by 
Dechow et al. (1998). Roychowdhury (2006) estimates the normal level of the sum 
of discretionary expenses as a linear function of contemporaneous sales as follows,                                                                             
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However, Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008) point out that 
estimating the normal level of discretionary expenses as specified in regression (2.4) 
will create a problem if firms manage sales upwards to increase reported earnings 
during any year. This problem will result unusually low residuals from running the 
regression as specified in (2.4). To overcome this problem, discretionary expenses 
are estimated as a function of lagged sales. Therefore, the normal level of 
discretionary expenses are estimated using a cross-sectional regression for each year 
and industry as follows, 
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Abnormal level of discretionary expenses is actual discretionary expenses for the 
firms minus the normal level of discretionary expenses calculated using the 
estimated coefficients from regression (2.5). 
Where 
DISEXP i,t: the sum of R&D, SG&A; and advertising expenses for firms i at period t. 
All other variables are previously defined. 
2.5.2 Sales Manipulation  
Prior literature finds evidence that firms manage sales upward by increasing price 
discounts or/and providing more lenient credit terms (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen 
et al. 2008). Despite the fact that sales-based manipulation will increase current 
reported earnings, reversal consequences will lead to a lower level of operating cash 
flows in current year (Roychowdhury, 2006). In order to estimate sales-based 
manipulation, Roychowdhury (2006) builds on Dechow et al. (1998) and estimates 
the normal level of cash flows from operations as a linear function of sales and 
change in sales at the same year. Specifically, Roychowdhury (2006) estimates the 
normal level of cash flows from operations using the following cross-sectional 
regression for each year and industry. 
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Abnormal CFO for the firms is actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO 
calculated using the estimated coefficients from regression (2.6). 
Where: 
 CFO i,t : cash flows from operations for firm i at period t. All other variables are 
previously defined. 
Chapter 2. Definitions, Activities, and Measurement of Earnings Management   
- 35 - 
 
2.5.3 Production Cost Manipulation 
Production manipulation aims to enhance current earnings by producing more units 
in order to lower the total cost of goods sold, which leads to increase the profit 
margin. More specifically, firms attempt to decrease the fixed overhead cost per unit 
sold by increasing the number of produced units, as this increase is not reflected by 
any increase in the marginal cost per unit (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 
2008). Roychowdhury (2006) develops a model based on Dechow et al. (1998) to 
estimate the normal level of production cost, and defines the production cost as the 
sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and change in inventory (INV) throughout the 
year. Roychowdhury (2006) estimates the normal level of COGS as linear function 
of contemporaneous sales using the following cross-sectional regression.                                                                                                                      
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Where:  
COGS i,t: costs of goods sold for firms i at period t. 
The normal level of inventory growth is estimated as follows,   
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Where 
 Δ INV i,t: change in inventory at the end of period t. 
 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), production cost is defined as PROD i,t = COGS i,t  
+ ∆INV i,t . Using (2.7) and (2.8), normal level of production cost is estimated as 
follows,   
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2.5.4 Timing of Asset Sales Manipulation 
Timing of asset sales provides the managers with a flexible technique to enhance 
reported earnings when normal business practices are expected to fall short the 
desired threshold. Gunny (2010) develops a model based on Bartov (1993) and 
Herrmann et al. (2003) in order to measure the manipulation of asset sales. She runs 
a cross-sectional regression for each year and industry and indicates that a 
significant high residual from the regression is consistent with asset sales 
manipulation. Gunny (2010) estimate the normal level of gain on asset sales as 
follows, 
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Where  
GainA i,t: income from asset sales deflated by stock price at the beginning of the 
year.Dat199] 
ASales i,t: long-lived asset sales. 
ISales i,t: long-lived investment sales. 
  2.6 Measurement of Accrual-Based Manipulation 
Prior research follows two approaches to measure discretionary accruals; specific 
accruals approach (e.g. McNichols and Wilson, 1988) and the aggregated accruals 
approach (e.g. Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). The specific accruals approach 
focuses on accrual earnings management based on a specific accrual such as the bad 
debt provision, while the aggregated accruals approach focuses on total accruals for 
the firm. The majority of accounting research follows the total accruals approach to 
examine accrual earnings management because it provides a powerful and 
comprehensive test for discretionary accruals (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995). In the next 
sub-sections, the specific and total accrual approaches are reviewed and discussed. 
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2.6.1 Specific Accruals Approach   
Following this approach, prior research has examined several specific accruals such 
as bad debt provision (McNichols and Wilson, 1988), deferred tax assets (Miller and 
Skinner, 1998), claim loss reserve of insurance (Beaver and McNichols, 2001), the 
allowance for uncollectable accounts and bad debt expenses (Cecchini et al., 2012). 
For example, McNichols and Wilson (1988) hypothesize that bad debt provision 
consists of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals and find evidence that firms 
with unusually high earnings or unusually low earnings engage in both discretionary 
and non-discretionary accruals to decrease reported earnings. Cecchini et al. (2012) 
provide evidence that IPO firms manipulate reported earnings downward using more 
decreasing allowances. However, the specific accrual approach does not control for 
the assumption that managers can use several accruals simultaneously to manipulate 
reported earnings. For example, if no evidence is found that a firm manages bad debt 
provision, then it seems premature to suggest that there is no evidence on accrual-
based manipulation because this firm might manage other specific accruals. 
2.6.2 Aggregate Accruals Approach 
Consistent with the aggregate accruals approach, several models have been 
employed to estimate discretionary accruals over time. These models follow two 
streams of research: total accruals and discretionary accruals. The first stream of 
research is to measure the change in total accruals as a proxy for the change in 
discretionary accruals (DeAngelo, 1986). The second stream of research, which is 
found to be more efficient, is to decompose total accruals into discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals using a cross-sectional regression (e.g., Healy, 1985). 
Consistent with the second stream, most of recent research in earnings management 
employs the Jones (1991) model or the modified Jones (1991) model (Dechow et al., 
1995) to estimate discretionary accruals. The most important models following the 
aggregate approach will be discussed in the following sections to illustrate the 
measurement of discretionary accruals. 
2.6.2.1 The Healy Model 
Healy (1985) investigates whether managers manipulate accrual accounting and 
accounting procedures to meet earnings bonus schemes. Based on a sample of 94 
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firms from the Fortune 250 in the US over the period 1930-1980, Healy (1985) finds 
evidence that managers manipulate accrual accounting to increase reported earnings 
in order to meet performance-based compensation targets. Following Healy (1985), 
accruals are calculated as reported earnings minus operating cash flows and then are 
decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Healy (1985) model 
is presented as follows, 
  
(2.11) τ )/TA(TA1/nNDA 1-t,it,it,i
 
Where: 
NDA i,t: estimated non-discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
TA i,t: total accruals.  
Ai,t-1: lagged total asset. 
n: number of years in the estimation period. 
τ :a year subscript as an indicator for a year in the estimation period. 
t: event year. 
 2.6.2.2 The DeAngelo Model 
DeAngelo (1986) focuses on whether firms manage earnings downward utilizing 
accrual accounting. By examining a sample of 64 firms from New York and 
American Stock Exchanges, DeAngelo (1986) finds no evidence that managers 
manipulate earnings downward pre-management buyout utilizing accrual accounting. 
DeAngelo (1986) assumes that non-discretionary accruals do not change over time 
(approximately the change is very close to zero). Thus, the difference in total 
accruals between current year and previous year is attributed to discretionary 
accruals. However, later research points out that the assumption of DeAngelo (1986) 
(that non-discretionary accruals do not change over time) seems to be premature 
(Dechow et al., 1995). DeAngelo (1986) presents the model to estimate 
discretionary accruals as follows,  
(2.12)2-t,i  t,it,i A /TANDA 1-
 
Where: 
NDA i,t: non-discretionary accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets. 
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TA i,t-1: total accruals.  
A i,t-2: total assets. 
 2.6.2.3 The Jones (1991) Model 
Jones (1991) examines whether US firms, which would benefit from import relief 
(e.g. tariff increases, quota reduction, marketing agreement and federal adjustment 
assistance), may attempt to manage reported earnings downward by using income-
decreasing accrual accounting. Specifically, Jones (1991) focuses on periods with 
relief investigation by the US International Trade Commission (ITC) where the 
import relief decisions are decided based on many factors such as the profitability of 
the industry. By examining a sample of 23 US firms, Jones (1991) finds evidence 
that US firms engage in income-decreasing accrual accounting to benefit from 
import relief. Further, and in contrast with Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) who 
build their models based on the assumption that the level of non-discretionary 
accrual does not change over time, the Jones (1991) model controls for the change in 
the economic circumstances that cause the difference of non-discretionary accruals. 
Jones (1991) estimates non-discretionary accruals as follows, 
(2.13)ˆˆˆ )/A(PPEα)/AREV (Δα)(1/AαNDA 1-t,i t,i31-t,i t,i2-t,i1t,i 1 
     
Where: 
NDA i,t: non-discretionary accruals in a year t 
A i,t-1: total assets for firms i in year t-1 
∆REV i,t-1: is revenue in year t less revenue in year t-1 scaled by total assets in year t. 
PPE i,t: gross property, plant, and equipment. 
αˆ 1, αˆ 2, and αˆ 3 firm specific parameters.  
The following model is used to estimate firm specific parameters, αˆ 1, αˆ 2, and αˆ 3 
during the estimation period: 
(2.14)t,i1-t,i t,i31-t,i t,i2-t,i1-t,it,i ε)/A(PPEα)/AREV (Δα)(1/Aα/ATA 11 
 
Where α1, α2, and α3 denote the ordinary least squares estimates 
Chapter 2. Definitions, Activities, and Measurement of Earnings Management   
- 40 - 
 
εi,t: error term in year t, which represents discretionary accruals as a proportion of 
total accrual for firm i in year t . 
 2.6.2.4 The Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
Dechow et al. (1995) point out that Jones (1991) model eliminates part of the 
managed earnings from the proxy of discretionary accruals when earnings are 
managed through discretionary revenue. To overcome this problem, Dechow et al. 
(1995) designed the modified version of Jones (1991) model. In addition, Dechow et 
al. (1995) present evidence on the importance of controlling for firms’ financial 
performance (a problem that can bias accruals estimation and was not considered by 
previous models). Dechow et al. (1995) estimate the modified version of Jones 
(1991) model to estimate non-discretionary accruals as follows,  
(2.15))/A(PPEα))/AΔRECREV (Δα)(1/AαNDA 1-t,i t,i31-t,i t,i- t,i2-t,i1t,i 1 
 
Where: 
∆REC: is net receivable in year t less than net receivable in year t-1, and all other 
variables are previously defined. 
 2.6.2.5 The Industry Model 
The industry model is used by Dechow and Sloan (1991) under the assumption that 
the level of non-discretionary accruals is constant over time, in particular, the 
variation of non-discretionary accruals is similar for firms in the same industry. 
Later research points out that such an assumption will lead to measurement errors in 
estimating non-discretionary accrual because it does not control for the change in 
firm’s economic circumstances (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995). The industry model 
estimates non-discretionary accruals as follows, 
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Where: 
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median i (TA t): is the median of total accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets 
for all non-sample firms in the same industry (two digit-SIC code) and year.  
β1 and β2 : firms specific parameters are estimated by using ordinary least square 
(OLS) on the observations in the estimation period. 
 2.6.2.6 The K S Model (Sok-Hyon and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995) 
Sok-Hyon and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) build their model to measure earnings 
management based on McNichols and Wilson (1988) approach. They argue that 
previous models do not provide a plausible solution to overcome common problems 
that might affect the estimation of accrual earnings management e.g. the omitted 
variables problem. To overcome these problems Sok-Hyon and Sivaramakrishnan 
(1995) provide a number of suggestions based on their empirical results. First, they 
find evidence that increasing the number of regressors in the model mitigates the 
omitted variables problem. They include into the model all major components of 
income such as cost of goods sold. Second, Sok-Hyon and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) 
provide evidence that using the instrumental variables (IV) approach will mitigate 
the simultaneity and the error in variables problem. Finally, they indicate that using 
generalised method of moments (GMM) provides greatest power and robustness. 
Sok-Hyon and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) demonstrate their model as follows,                                                                                                                                                               
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AB i,t : total accruals balance. 
DA i,t: total managed accruals during period t.  
AR i,t: account receivable, excluding tax refund. 
APB i,t: account balance related to the expense, for example inventory and account 
payable. 
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DEP i,t : depreciation and amortization. 
REV i,t: net sales revenues.   
EXP i,t: operating expenses, including the cost of goods sold and selling and 
administrative expenses before depreciation.   
GPPE i,t: gross property, plant, and equipment. 
PART i,t partitioning variable that captures factors that allegedly motivate earnings 
management. 
 2.6.2.7 The Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals Model 
Kothari et al. (2005) present the performance-matched approach to measure 
discretionary accruals. This approach controls for the operating performance of the 
firm and avoids the misspecification of applying the Jones (1991) model and the 
modified Jones (1991) model (Dechow et al., 1995) for a stratified random sample 
of firms. As suggested by Kothari et al. (2005), the performance-matched approach 
can be employed either by adding return on assets (ROA) as a regressor into the 
model or by adjusting firm’s discretionary accruals to a matched firm. Following 
this approach, ROA for the past year and industry membership are used as 
benchmarks for creating the matched-sample. Specifically, each treatment firm is 
matched with a control firm (out-of-sample) based on industry (SIC-code) and the 
closest operating performance (ROA). Kothari et al. (2005) indicate that using ROA 
as a proxy for the performance is consistent with Dechow et al. (1998) and Barber 
and Lyon (1996) who find that ROA is a powerful variable to control for operating 
performance and to create a matched sample. Kothari et al. (2005) estimate the 
performance-matched discretionary accruals model as follows, 
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Where: 
ROA i,t: return on asset. 
∆SALES i,t: change in sales. 
PPE i,t: gross property, plant, and equipment. 
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2.6.2.8 Other approaches 
Other research has focused on the difference between signed and unsigned models to 
estimate discretionary accruals. Hribar and Nichols (2007), for example, mention for 
two streams of research that examine discretionary accruals. The first stream of 
research has examined signed discretionary accruals, namely income-increasing vs. 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals (e.g., Healy, 1985). The second stream of 
research has examined unsigned discretionary accruals which is represented by the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals (e.g., Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Klein, 
2002). Hribar and Nichols (2007) analytically show the difference between signed 
and unsigned discretionary accruals concerning the mean and standard deviation and 
find the models which estimate unsigned discretionary accruals are highly correlated 
with firms’ characteristics, in particular, the volatility of both sales and cash flows.  
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the literature on the definitions, activities, and empirical 
models of earnings management. Real and accrual earnings management activities 
are the most commonly utilized techniques to manipulate reported earnings. While 
accrual earnings management represents accounting choices that occur within the 
bounds of GAAP, real earnings management activities represent managerial 
decisions that deviate from normal business practices such as the unexpected 
reduction of R&D and SG&A expenses and have direct impact on current and future 
cash flows (Roychowdhury, 2006). Prior literature provides evidence that managers 
choose between real activities and accounting choices based on the costs and 
benefits of utilizing each of them e.g. managers prefer real activities over accrual 
accounting to avoid the scrutiny of regulators and auditors (Graham et al., 2005; Chi 
et al., 2011).  
Further, while the recent empirical models to measure real activities are 
relatively new and still under development (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 
2010), measuring accrual earnings management has received more attention and 
development in prior accounting research (e.g. Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). 
Overall, and based on the previous accounting literature, it seems there is no specific 
model that can measure discretionary accruals with great precision; however, the 
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majority of prior studies have used the modified Jones (1991) model (Dechow et al., 
1995) and the performance matched approach (Kothari et al., 2005) to measure 
accrual-based manipulation around IPOs. Regarding measuring real earnings 
management, the majority of studies have employed models developed by Dechow 
et al. (1995) and as implemented by Roychowdhury (2006) to measure real 
activities-based manipulation around IPOs (e.g. Wongsunwai, 2012). 
In the next chapter, the literature is reviewed and discussed to provide an 
overview on motivations, mitigating factors, and theories that are associated with 
earnings management.  
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Chapter 3 
The Motivations, Mitigating Factors, and Theories of Earnings 
Management   
 
3.1 Introduction  
Consistent with the purpose of this thesis, the previous chapter provides an overview 
on the definitions, activities, and empirical models of earnings management. Since 
the focus of this thesis is to examine IPOs as the main motive to manage reported 
earnings, this chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the motivations, mitigating 
factors, and theories of earnings management. Prior research has examined the 
association between earnings management and several motivations that may explain 
managers’ tendency to engage in earnings management e.g. performance-based 
compensation targets (e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Cheng, 2004). In addition, 
prior research has shown that earnings management activities are constrained by 
several mitigating factors such as corporate governance (Klein, 2002), accounting 
standards setters (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005), institutional investors (Bushee, 
1998), audit firms (Becker et al., 1998), etc. Hence, this chapter reviews the most 
relevant studies that have examined the association between earnings management 
activities and these motivating and mitigating factors, as well as related theories to 
provide a comprehensive overview of earnings management. 
The remainder of this chapter is presented as follows. Section two reviews 
the literature on earnings management motivations. Section three provides a 
discussion for the mitigating factors that constrain earnings management. Section 
four presents the related theories. Section five concludes.  
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3.2 Earnings Management Motivations 
Previous literature provides evidence on the association between earnings 
management and different motivations such as increasing share prices (Schipper, 
1989), meeting performance-based compensation targets (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006), avoiding debt covenant violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) 
and manipulating earnings around equity offerings e.g. IPO and SEO (Rangan, 
1998; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998c). However, there is no conclusive evidence on the 
best activities of earnings management to meet a particular goal over others. In the 
next-sub sections, these motivations are reviewed and discussed. 
3.2.1 Earnings Benchmarks 
Earnings benchmarks are considered as important reference points that have been 
used by many users of the financial information to evaluate the firm’s performance 
and its financial position. Typically, managers attempt to meet earnings benchmarks 
through normal business practices, but when expected earnings fall short of the 
desired threshold, managers resort to utilizing earnings management. Consistent 
with this, prior literature finds evidence that managers engage in earnings 
management to meet three earnings benchmarks: (1) avoid reporting losses (Osma, 
2008); (2) avoid reporting earnings decreases (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997); and 
(3) meeting analysts’ forecasts (Degeorge et al., 1999;  Dechow and Dichev, 2002).  
Focusing on two of these important benchmarks in the capital market, 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find evidence that firms manage reported earnings 
upward utilizing accrual accounting and cash flows from operations to avoid 
reporting losses and earnings decreases. Specifically, they find an unexpectedly 
small number of firms reporting small losses or small decreases and a high number 
of firms reporting positive earnings or small earnings increases. Roychowdhury 
(2006) presents similar evidence on cash flow manipulation to meet earnings 
benchmarks. Based on a sample of 17,338 firm-year observations during the period 
1987-2001, Roychowdhury (2006) finds firms engage in real earnings management 
activities to meet two earnings benchmarks: avoid reporting losses and meeting 
analysts’ forecasts.  
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Moreover, Osma and Young (2009) investigate the association between the 
change in R&D expenses and two earnings benchmarks: positive earnings and 
earnings growth. By examining a sample of 3,866 firm-year observations during the 
period 1989-2002, Osma and Young (2009) find evidence that previous failures to 
meet earnings benchmark increases the probability of reducing current R&D 
spending in order to avoid repeating this failure. They also find evidence that firms 
cut current R&D investment to meet current earnings benchmarks.  
3.2.2 Timing Equity Offerings 
Generally, a firm resort to equity offerings by going public (IPOs) or issuing 
Seasoned Equity (SEOs), to expand its shareholders, raise more capital and extend 
its operation activities in the capital markets. A large body of research has presented 
evidence that managers engage in earnings management activities to enhance 
reported earnings around the time of equity offerings (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et 
al., 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). This literature has found that IPO and SEO firms manage 
reported earnings upward; (1) pre the offer year to enhance the offer price and, thus, 
the offer proceeds (Friedlan, 1994; DuCharme et al., 2001); (2) during the offer year 
to maintain high shares prices as most insiders and VCs are restricted by the lock-up 
period from selling their shares directly after the IPO (Aharony et al. 1993; Teoh et 
al., 1998a); and (3) post the offer year to avoid disappointing the market about their 
performance, and to limit future litigation risk (Roosenboom et al., 2003). A recent 
survey conducted by Brau and Fawcett (2006) confirms this view and finds evidence 
that managers consider historical reported earnings as a very important factor in 
sending a positive signal about the offer to outsiders.  
Further, prior studies present evidence that earnings management which 
takes place during the offer year is negatively associated with post SEO and IPO 
operating and stock return performance. For example, Teoh et al. (1998a) find IPO 
firms that manage earnings upward (utilizing accruals earnings management) during 
the offer year experience a decline in stock return performance for three years after 
the IPO date. Rangan (1998) finds SEO firms with a high level of accrual earnings 
management during the offer year experience inferior operating and stock return 
performance in subsequent periods. DuCharme et al. (2004) examine IPO firms and 
find evidence that accrual earnings management during the IPO year is negatively 
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associated with post-IPO stock return performance. Roosenboom et al. (2003) find 
evidence that IPO firms with high levels of accrual-based manipulation during the 
first year after the IPO experience worse stock performance for three years after the 
IPO date.  
While prior literature has focused on accrual-based manipulation (e.g. Teoh 
et al., 1998a), recent studies by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2012) 
have examined both real and accrual earnings management. Specifically, Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2012) have presented new evidence that both real 
activities-based and accrual-based manipulations are utilized by SEO firms and that 
real activities have severe negative consequences for subsequent operating and stock 
return performance, with even greater than the consequences of accrual 
manipulation.  
Despite the extensive evidence on earnings management around equity 
offerings (IPO and SEO), little research has questioned this evidence (e.g., Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2009; Cecchini et al., 2012). For example, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2008) examined earnings quality pre-IPO and presented evidence 
based on a UK sample that IPO firms report more conservatively prior to the offer 
year. Armstrong et al. (2009) also examined accrual earnings management around 
IPOs and found no evidence on accruals manipulation. Armstrong et al. (2009) 
found that the negative relation between accrual earnings management, which takes 
place during the IPO year, and post-IPO stock return performance is attributed to 
cash flow mispricing. More recently, Cecchini et al. (2012) focused on examining a 
specific accrual (the allowance for uncollectible accounts) instead of total accruals 
around IPOs and found evidence that IPO firms utilize more decreasing allowances 
to manage reported earnings downward. Further, Cecchini et al. (2012) has found 
evidence that IPO firms record larger debt expenses compared with matched non-
IPO firms, suggesting that IPO firms report more conservatively.  
In summary, although limited research has questioned accrual manipulation 
around equity offerings (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2009), 
the majority of prior research has presented evidence on both real activities-based 
and accrual-based manipulation around IPO and SEO (e.g. Aharony et al., 1993; 
Friedlan, 1994; Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; DuCharme et al., 
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2001; Chen et al., 2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 2010; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Lee and Masulis, 2011; Chahine et al., 2012; Kothari et 
al., 2012; Wongsunwai, 2012). 
3.2.3 Merger, Acquisitions and New Listings  
Managing reported earnings prior to events such as mergers, acquisitions and new 
listings is a widespread phenomenon in the capital market. For example, Erickson 
and Wang (1999) find evidence that acquiring firms manipulate reported earnings 
pre-merger in order to decrease the total cost of the merger. By examining a sample 
of 55 stock-for-stock mergers during the period 1985-1990, Erickson and Wang 
(1999) find evidence that acquiring firms engage in earnings management pre stock-
for-stock merger to increase their stock prices and, therefore, decrease the cost of 
acquiring the target firms. They also find the merger size is positively associated 
with level of income-increasing discretionary accruals. Louis (2004) examines 
whether the acquiring firms engage in earnings management activities and whether 
these activities are associated with subsequent performance. Specifically, Louis 
(2004) examines a sample of 373 mergers during the period 1992-2000 and finds 
evidence that firms engage in earnings management pre-merger. Louis (2004) also 
finds the acquiring firms with high levels of accrual earnings management, which 
takes place pre-merger, experience post-merger stock return underperformance. 
Further, other research has examined whether firms manage earnings before 
they switch between stock exchanges. For example, Lin (2003) focuses on firms that 
switch from the NASDAQ and AMEX to the NYSE stock exchange over the period 
1990-1997. Consistent with earnings management hypothesis, Lin (2003) finds 
evidence that firms manage earnings upward utilizing accrual earnings management 
prior to listing on a new stock exchange. Further, Lin (2003) finds evidence that 
accrual earnings management, which takes place prior to the new listing, is 
negatively associated with post-listing operating and stock return performance. 
Lang et al. (2006) took a slightly different approach, focusing on whether 
foreign firms (cross-listed non-US firms) mange earnings when they reconcile their 
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net income to be consistent with the US GAAP.12 By comparing reported earnings 
for US firms with the reconciled earnings for cross-listed non-US firms, Lang et al. 
(2006) find evidence that such firms are more likely to manipulate earnings toward 
earnings targets and less likely to be conservative in loss recognition. They also find 
that these firms exhibit evidence of earnings smoothing and that the highest level of 
earnings management is found for firms from countries with weak investors 
protection. 
3.2.4 Executive Compensation 
As suggested by the agency theory, the role of executive compensation is considered 
as one of the best solutions to mitigate the conflict between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
clearly state that managers could engage in certain transactions that aim to maximise 
their wealth instead of shareholders. Consistent with this view, prior research finds 
evidence that performance-based compensation motivates managers to engage in 
higher levels of earnings management activities (e.g. Balsam, 1998; Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005), which are found to have negative impact for shareholders’ wealth 
(e.g. Fan, 2007; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012). 
Focusing on the compensation of Chief Executives Officers (CEOs), prior 
literature has found evidence that CEOs manipulate reported earnings upward to 
meet performance-based compensation targets utilizing earnings management 
activities such as accrual-based (e.g. Healy, 1985; Balsam, 1998; Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Ronen et al., 2006; Kuang, 2008; 
Laux and Laux, 2009) and real activities-based earnings management (e.g., Dechow 
and Sloan, 1991; Cheng, 2004; Cazier, 2009; Cao and Laksmana, 2010). For 
example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) examine the association between CEOs’ 
equity incentive and earnings management based on a US sample over the period 
                                            
12 Lang et al. (2006) focus on foreign firms that are required to reconcile their financial statement 
consistent with the US GAAP according to form 20-F. They mention that the form 20-F requires all 
foreign firms that want to be listed on the American stock exchanges to present a reconciliation of 
any significant variation between the method and the principle that have been used to prepare their 
financial statement and the US GAAP. This form can be found at the following website:  
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form20-f.pdf. 
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1993-2000. They find evidence that CEOs with high equity incentives manage 
earnings upward utilizing accrual earnings management to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts. Dechow and Sloan (1991) examine the association between the abnormal 
reduction of R&D expenses and CEOs’ performance-based compensation. They find 
evidence that CEOs who approaching the retirement reduce R&D expenses to 
increase reported earnings.  
While prior literature has focused on the association between CEO 
compensation and earnings management (e.g., Healy, 1985; Balsam, 1998), recent 
research has examined whether Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) and their equity 
incentives are associated with earnings management. For example, Jiang et al. 
(2010) argue that CFOs are more involved in the financial reporting processes 
compared to the CEOs and, therefore, CFO equity incentives are expected to be a 
significant driver of earnings management and beating analysts’ forecasts. 
Consistent with this, Jiang et al. (2010) find evidence that CFO equity incentives are 
positively associated with accrual earnings management and beating analysts’ 
forecasts, with even greater impact than CEO equity incentives. 
However, a recent paper by Feng et al. (2011) shows contradictory evidence 
on the association between CFOs’ equtiy incentives and accounting manipulation. 
Specifically, Feng et al. (2011) examine reasons that can explain why CFOs are 
involved in material accounting manipulation. They compare executives’ (CEOs and 
CFOs) equity incentives and power between firms engaged in material accounting 
manipulation and non-manipulating firms. Feng et al. (2011) find CFOs of 
manipulating firms have the same level of equity incentives as CFOs of non-
manipulating firms, but that CEOs of manipulating firms have higher levels of 
equity incentives and power than CEOs of non-manipulating firms. Thus, Feng et al. 
(2011) explain that CFOs engage in material accounting manipulation as a response 
to a pressure from their powerful CEOs.  
3.2.5 Debt Contracts 
Prior research has presented evidence that firms engage in accrual earnings 
management to avoid debt covenant violations (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994). This research has primarily investigated accrual-based earnings 
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management and found evidence that firms manipulate reported earnings upward 
(downward) to avoid debt covenant violations (to restructure debt covenants) (e.g., 
Jaggi and Picheng, 2002). One of the earliest studies of debt covenant violations was 
conducted by Sweeney (1994) who finds evidence that firms use income-increasing 
accounting changes to reduce the default cost imposed by lenders. She examines a 
sample of 130 firms that reported a debt covenant violation in their annual reports 
over the period 1980-1989. Specifically, Sweeney (1994) finds that manager’s 
tendency to use income-increasing accounting changes is reflected by the accounting 
flexibility and the imposed cost by lenders. These results have been confirmed by 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) who examine the association between accrual 
accounting and debt covenant violations. Specifically, they investigate a sample of 
94 listed firms that show a debt covenant violation in their annual reports over the 
period 1985-1988. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find a significant level of positive 
total accruals and working capital accruals in the year prior to the violation. Further, 
after controlling for the audit going-concern qualification and the change in firm 
management, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find evidence on positive abnormal 
working capital accruals in the violation year.  
Jaggi and Picheng (2002) extend this line of research by investigating the 
association between earnings management and debt restructuring. By examining a 
sample of 135 firms that have a technical default over the period 1989-1996, Jaggi 
and Picheng (2002) find violating firms use income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals when their waiver requests for debt covenant violations are denied and the 
firms will start a new negotiation to restructure their debt contracts. In addition, 
Jaggi and Picheng (2002) indicate that distressed firms use income-increasing 
discretionary accruals when their waiver requests for debt covenant violations are 
accepted. More recently, Rodríguez-Pérez and Hemmen (2010) investigate whether 
the level of diversification has an impact on the association between earnings 
management and the level of debt. By examining a Spanish sample of 1,853 firm-
year observations during the period 1992-2002, Rodríguez-Pérez and Hemmen 
(2010) find evidence for firms with a lower level of diversification, that the level of 
debt is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that debt-
holders play an effective role in mitigating earnings manipulation. 
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Despite the extensive research on accrual earnings management, there has 
been limited research examining whether firms engage in real earnings management 
activities to avoid debt covenant violations. Bartov (1993) for example finds 
evidence that firms increase reported earnings through timing the sales of long-lived 
assets to smooth reported earnings and to avoid debt covenant violations. Recently, 
Kim et al. (2011) find firms utilize real earnings management activities to avoid debt 
covenant violations. They also find firms with less flexibility to re-negotiate a debt-
covenant technical default exhibit a higher probability to manage real activities in 
order to avoid debt covenant violations.  
3.2.6 Import Relief and Political Cost 
Jones (1991) examines whether firms that would benefit from import relief (e.g. 
tariff increases, quota reduction, marketing agreement and federal adjustment 
assistance) may engage in income-decreasing accrual accounting. Jones (1991) 
focuses on periods with relief investigation by the US International Trade 
Commission (ITC), where the profitability of industry was considered by ITC as one 
of the main factors to decide the import relief decisions. By examining a sample of 
23 US firms from five industries, Jones (1991) finds evidence that firms manage 
earnings downward utilizing accrual manipulation to benefit from import relief. She 
also presents one of the most commonly used models to estimate discretionary 
accruals, the Jones (1991) model.  
Further, prior literature found evidence that firms manage earnings to avoid 
political cost. Key (1997) for example examines whether US firms manage earnings 
downward utilizing accrual earnings management to avoid the congressional 
scrutiny and lower the chance of new regulations, being imposed on firms that report 
excessive profits. By examining a period of intense congressional scrutiny (1989-
1991), Key (1997) finds firms in the cable television industry engage in income-
decreasing earnings management to mitigate the effect of congressional scrutiny and 
new regulations.  
Han and Wang (1998) examine earnings management during periods of 
unusual increases in the product prices. Specifically, they focus on the excessive 
increases in oil prices during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis. Han and Wang (1998) 
Chapter 3. Motivations, Mitigating Factors and Theories  
 
- 54 - 
 
hypothesize that oil firms during this period are expected to engage in income-
decreasing accrual accounting to avoid political cost that will be imposed on firms 
reporting high profits. By examining a sample of 76 oil and gas firms during 1990, 
Han and Wang (1998) find evidence firms use income-decreasing accrual 
accounting to decrease reported earnings during the third and fourth quarters of the 
fiscal year. They indicate that these results are consistent with the view that firms 
avoid reporting profits due to the expected political cost. 
3.3 Mitigating Factors on Earnings Management  
3.3.1 The Role of Corporate Governance  
The role of corporate governance in mitigating earnings management activities is 
well-known and extensively researched. In line with importance of corporate 
governance in constraining earnings management, Keasey et al. (2005) indicate that 
the reform of corporate governance in the UK, which is started since the 
establishment of Cadbury Committee in the early 1990s, was as a response to three 
main issues; earnings management (creative accounting), corporate failures, and the 
excessive executive compensation. However, a large body of research indicates that 
the mitigating role of corporate governance is contingent upon the existence of many 
factors such as the proportion of outside directors on the board, the separation of 
CEO and Chairman, the independence of the audit committee, long-term vs. short-
term institutional investors (e.g., Hsu and Ping-Sheng, 2005; Osma, 2008). 
Consistent with this view, two mechanisms of corporate governance have been 
found to be the most effective in constraining earnings management, namely board 
structure and institutional investors. Hence, the role of the board and institutional 
investors are discussed in the following sub-sections.  
3.3.1 .1 The Role of the Board of Directors and the Audit Committee 
Previous research has focused on examining whether the board of directors and its 
committees constrain accrual earnings management (e.g., Klein, 2002; Yang and 
Krishnan, 2005; Cornett et al., 2008; Laux and Laux, 2009), and limited research has 
investigated other earnings management activities such as real earnings management 
(e.g., Osma, 2008; Visvanathan, 2008). Focusing on accrual accounting, Klein 
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(2002) investigates the effect of the board of directors and audit committee on 
accrual earnings management. By examining a sample of 692 US firms, Klein 
(2002) finds evidence that the presence of outside directors on the audit committee 
and board of directors is negatively associated with accruals manipulation. He also 
indicates that the level of discretionary accruals increases steadily as a result of the 
decline in the proportion of outside directors. Klein (2002) finds that the board of 
directors and audit committee are less affected by the CEO when there is a high 
proportion of outside directors. Overall, Klein (2002) mentions that increasing the 
proportion of outside directors leads to a lower level of earnings management and a 
powerful monitoring role of the accounting processes in the firms. 
Other studies have taken an approach similar to Klein (2002) examining 
whether corporate governance plays the same monitoring role on real earnings 
management activities. For example, Visvanathan (2008) examines the effect of the 
board of directors and audit committee on real earnings management activities. 
Specifically, he examines whether the characteristics of directors that are found to 
constrain accrual earnings management play the same role in constraining real 
earnings management activities. By using a US sample of 9,567 firm-year 
observations pre- SOX 2002, Visvanathan (2008) finds evidence that outside 
directors play an effective role in constraining real earnings management activities.  
Consistent with Visvanathan (2008), Osma (2008) presents additional 
evidence on the role of board independence in mitigating real activities 
manipulation. Specifically, Osma (2008) examines the moderating effect of board 
independence on the association between R&D manipulation and the capital market 
pressure to meet earnings benchmarks. By examining a UK sample of 3,438 firm-
year observations over the period 1989-2002, Osma (2008) finds evidence that 
outside directors reduce R&D manipulation. She indicates that firms reduce R&D 
expenses as a response to short-term pressure or to a previous failure to meet an 
earnings target. In addition, Osma (2008) finds that a high proportion of inside 
directors on the board increases the tendency toward short-term managerial 
decisions such as a reduction in R&D expenses.  
Despite the fact that research has investigated the role of board structure and 
the audit committee on earnings manipulation, few studies have examined whether 
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directors’ accounting and financial expertise mitigate earnings management (e.g. 
Carcello et al., 2006; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). For example, Carcello et al. 
(2006) investigate the association between real and accrual earning management and 
the accounting and financial expertise of the audit committee by examining a sample 
of 283 US firms during 2003. For firms with weak corporate governance, Carcello et 
al. (2006) find evidence that an audit committee with accounting expertise and some 
types of financial expertise play an effective role in constraining accrual earnings 
management, notably when all the members of the audit committee are independent. 
However, Carcello et al. (2006) find the accounting and financial expertise of the 
audit committee has no impact on real earnings management via overproduction 
manipulation, and it is positively associated with real earnings management via 
discretionary expenses manipulation.  
In contrast with Carcello et al. (2006), Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) 
examine a sample of 1,176 firm-year observations over the period 2000-2002 and 
find evidence that the accounting and financial expertise of the audit committee is 
negatively associated with real earnings management activities. Further, Krishnan 
and Visvanathan (2008) find evidence that the accounting and financial expertise of 
the audit committee is positively associated with accounting conservatism, 
confirming the monitoring explanation for appointing expertise on the audit 
committee (DeFond et al. 2005).  
3.3.1.2 The Role of Institutional Ownership 
Recent changes in the field of corporate governance have led to a renewed interest in 
examining whether the presence of institutional investors reduces earnings 
manipulation (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Chung et al., 2002; Hsu and Ping-Sheng, 2005). 
Bushee (1998) for example investigates the association between institutional 
investors and the unexpected reduction of R&D spending to meet earnings targets. 
By focusing on prior year earnings targets for a sample of US firms over the period 
1983-1994, he finds evidence that the presence of sophisticated institutional 
investors prevents managers from cutting R&D spending to meet the previous year’s 
earnings target. However, Bushee (1998) finds evidence that the presence of 
institutional investors with a high portfolio turnover and a momentum trading 
strategy is positively associated with R&D manipulation to increase annual earnings. 
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Consistent with Bushee (1998), Chung et al. (2002) provide evidence that the 
presence of institutional investors is negatively associated with earnings 
management activities. Specifically, Chung et al. (2002) find evidence that the 
presence of large institutional investors constrains managers’ flexibility to manage 
earnings either upward or downward utilizing accrual earnings management.   
Other research has examined whether the monitoring role of institutional 
investors is associated with long-term vs. short-term investment. Hsu and Ping-
Sheng (2005) find evidence that long-term institutional investors constrain earnings 
management, while the presence of short-term institutional investors is positively 
associated with high levels of income-increasing accrual earnings management. Yu 
(2008) investigates the effect of institutional investors on real and accrual earnings 
management. By conducting experimental research, Yu (2008) examines whether 
institutional ownership impacts managers’ decision to choose between real and 
accrual earnings management when the accounting standards are restricted. Yu 
(2008) finds evidence that the restriction of accounting standards leads managers to 
engage in real earnings management activities instead of accrual accounting, but this 
switch between earnings management activities is contingent upon the presence of 
institutional investors who focus on short-term earnings. Concerning the long-term 
institutional investors, Yu (2008) finds similar evidence to Hsu and Ping-Sheng 
(2005) that long-term institutional investors limit earnings management activities. 
Overall, institutional investors are found to play an efficient role in mitigating 
earnings manipulation. 
3.3.2 The Role of Audit Quality  
The association between audit quality and earnings management is well-established 
and it has been extensively researched in the accounting literature. This literature 
has investigated the effect of several proxies of audit quality on accrual earnings 
management e.g. big 6 audit firms (Becker et al., 1998), audit and non-audit fees 
(Frankel et al., 2002; Antle et al., 2006), auditor industry expertise (Krishnan, 2003), 
audit effort (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008), audit report (Francis and Krishnan, 
1999), etc. Prior research has focused on accruals manipulation and found evidence 
that enhanced audit quality mitigates accrual earnings management. For example, 
one of the earliest studies on audit quality by DeAngelo (1981) indicated that the 
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size of audit firms is considered as a good proxy of audit quality. Consistent with 
this, Becker et al. (1998) examined the association between accruals manipulation 
and audit quality proxied by the presence of big 6 audit firms.13 Becker et al. (1998) 
find evidence firms audited by big 6 auditors exhibit a lower level of accruals 
manipulation (discretionary accruals) than firms audited by non-big 6 auditors.  
Frankel et al. (2002) focus on the association between earnings management 
and audit and non-audit fees. By examining a sample of 3,074 US firms, Frankel et 
al. (2002) find evidence that audit fees are negatively associated with discretionary 
accruals, suggesting that the higher audit fees imply higher audit quality and, this in 
turn, leads to a lower level of accrual-based manipulation. They also find non-audit 
fees are positively associated with discretionary accruals and small earnings 
surprises, suggesting that non-audit fees might compromise auditor independence.   
Moreover, prior literature has examined the association between auditor 
opinion and earnings management. Francis and Krishnan (1999) for example find 
evidence that audit firms are likely to issue a modified audit opinion when their 
clients have a higher level of accruals manipulation. Further, Francis and Krishnan 
(1999) indicate that audit firms resort to lower their threshold (the requirements) to 
issue the modified audit opinion because their clients exhibit higher levels of 
accruals manipulation, which can lead to future litigation risks. Caramanis and 
Lennox (2008) have focused on the association between audit effort and earnings 
management. They have examined whether audit hours are associated with the 
levels of earnings management. Confirming the hypothesis that the greater the audit 
effort the less earnings manipulation that occurs, Caramanis and Lennox (2008) find 
firms with less audit hours exhibit evidence of higher levels of income-increasing 
accrual accounting, abnormal accruals, and positive abnormal accruals.  
While prior literature has examined the role of enhanced audit quality on 
accrual earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; Frankel et al., 2002), there has 
been limited research examined whether audit quality is associated with real 
earnings management activities. Real earnings management represents managerial 
                                            
13 The classification for audit firms as big8, big 6, big 5, and big4 is changed over time after series of 
merger to become now as big 4 audit firms. 
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decisions deviate from normal business practices and are subject to lower scrutiny 
by auditors e.g. the unexpected reduction in R&D and SG&A expenses (Graham et 
al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006). 
However, a recent paper by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) finds evidence that 
enhanced audit quality is associated with higher real earnings management. 
Specifically, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find evidence that the probability of SEO 
firms to engage in real earnings management activities during the SEO year 
increases when they are audited by high quality auditors (big N audit firms). Chi et 
al. (2011) find similar evidence to Cohen and Zarowin (2010) on the positive 
association between enhanced audit quality and real earnings management. Focusing 
on firms with strong incentives to manage earnings upward i.e. SEO firms and firms 
just meet or beat earnings benchmarks, Chi et al. (2011) find evidence that firms 
audited by high quality auditors resort to manage earnings upward utilizing real 
activities-based manipulation to avoid the monitoring of accrual-based 
manipulation. Further, Sohn (2011) examines the association between audit fees and 
real earnings management and finds evidence that audit fees are positively 
associated with real activities-based manipulation, confirming recent evidence 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al, 2011) on the positive association between 
enhanced audit quality and real earnings management activities.  
In summary, high quality auditors constrain accrual-based manipulation and 
this leads their clients, especially when they have a strong incentive to manage 
earnings upward, to resort to higher levels of real activities-based manipulation, 
which has more severe negative consequences for future performance (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al. 2012).  
3.3.3 The Role of Accounting Regulation. 
Given the evidence on the pervasiveness of earnings management and its negative 
impact for future performance (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a) and given the 
recent accounting scandals in the US, there has been a renewed interest on 
examining whether accounting regulations are associated with earnings 
manipulation. The most common view, according to accounting literature, is that 
tightening accounting standards will constrain accrual earnings management (e.g., 
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Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005;  Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). Consistent with this, a 
growing body of literature has focused on examining the impact of the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on earnings management (e.g., 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008).14  Barth et al. 
(2008) for example examine whether accounting quality is affected by the voluntary 
adoption of IFRS. By examining a sample of international firms from 21 countries 
that voluntarily adopted the IFRS, Barth et al. (2008) find evidence that firms that 
adopted IFRS exhibit more timely loss recognition, more value relevance, and a 
lower level of earnings management.  
In contrast with Barth et al. (2008), Callao and Jarne (2010) find evidence 
that the IFRS adoption leads to a higher level of accrual earnings management. By 
examining a sample of 1,408 non-financial firms from 11 European Union member 
states, Callao and Jarne (2010) find evidence that the level of accrual earnings 
management has increased after the IFRS adoption. They explain this result as being 
due to the differences between the IFRS and local accounting standards. Further, 
Ahmed et al. (2012) find firms that are mandatory adopters of IFRS in 2005 exhibit 
more income smoothing, more accruals manipulation, and less timely loss 
recognition. Ahmed et al. (2012) examine a sample of 3,262 firms from 20 countries 
that are mandatory adopters of IFRS in 2005 relative to a benchmark sample of 
firms from countries with no IFRS adoption.  
Other studies have adopted a different approach by examining whether the 
restriction of accounting standards and corporate governance regulation is associated 
with managers’ tendency to choose between earnings management activities 
(accruals vs. real activities). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) for example adopt a 
rational expectations equilibrium model to examine whether earnings management 
is affected by tightening accounting standards. They find that the level of real 
earnings management has increased after tightening accounting standards. 
Consistent with Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) examine 
whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS is associated with managers’ tendency to 
                                            
14 The term IFRS indicates for International Financial Reporting Standards and International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). 
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engage in real and accrual earnings management for a sample of 53,853 firm-year 
observations from 37 countries over the period 2000-2008. For countries with strict 
enforcement regimes, Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) find evidence that after the IFRS 
adoption firms switch from accrual-based manipulation to real activities-based 
manipulation. Further, Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) find firms that switch from 
accrual-based manipulation pre-IFRS to real activities-based manipulation post-
IFRS experience a greater decline in operating performance. 
3.3.4 The Role of Regulatory Environment 
Recent research has presented evidence that managers’ tendency to choose between 
real and accrual earnings management is associated with the regulatory 
environments. Graham et al. (2005) conducted a survey with Chief Financial 
Officers (CFOs) and found evidence that CFOs prefer to manage earnings utilizing 
real activities over accrual accounting to avoid the scrutiny of auditors and 
regulators. Specifically, 80% of executives surveyed admitted to utilizing real 
activities such as reducing R&D and advertising expenses to meet earnings targets. 
Over 50% of CFOs also expressed a willingness to postpone starting a new project 
as long as the impact on economic value was not too large. Recently, Cohen et al. 
(2008) investigated whether the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) is 
associated with less earnings management. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was issued on 
30
th
 July 2002 by the Securities Exchange Committee (SEC) after the big accounting 
scandals in the US in order to remedy the regulatory and corporate governance 
failures. Cohen et al. (2008) find evidence that US firms switch from using accrual-
based manipulation pre-SOX to real activities-based post-SOX. This evidence is 
consistent with Graham et al. (2005), that managers under more restricted regulatory 
environment prefer real activities manipulation over accrual-based manipulation. 
Also, this evidence is consistent with Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), that, more 
stringent accounting regulation mitigates accrual earnings management, but leads to 
the more extensive use of real earnings management. 
More recently, Gerakos et al. (2011) examine whether the regulatory 
environment is associated with the characteristics of IPO firms. Specifically, they 
compare the characteristics of IPO firms listed on the lightly regulated AIM market 
vs. IPO firms listed on the more heavily regulated Main market of the London Stock 
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Exchange and other US developed markets. Gerakos et al. (2011) find evidence that 
firms listed on the AIM market have higher levels of information asymmetry, failure 
rates, post-listing underperformance as well as lower liquidity than firms listed on 
the Main market and US markets. These results suggest that there is a higher 
likelihood of earnings management occurring. For example, Trueman and Titman 
(1988), Schipper (1989) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) indicate that one of the 
strong incentives to manage earnings is the presence of high levels of information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Richardson (2000) examines the impact 
of information asymmetry on earnings management and finds evidence that firms 
with higher levels of information asymmetry exhibit higher levels of accrual 
earnings management. 
Moreover, it is well-known that a lightly regulatory environment imposes 
lower listing and corporate governance requirements and, this in turn, may lead to 
more flexibility to utilize earnings management. For example, the AIM market (the 
lightly regulated environment) in the UK requires the listing firms to have an 
appropriate corporate governance mechanism, while the Main market (the restrictive 
regulatory environment) requires the firms to comply with the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. Prior research shows that corporate governance plays an effective 
role in mitigating real and accrual earnings management (e.g., Yang and Krishnan, 
2005; Cornett et al., 2008; Laux and Laux, 2009). In addition, Mendoza (2008) 
indicates that firms listed on the AIM market have liquidity problems and recent 
research finds evidence that firms with lower levels of liquidity have higher levels of 
earnings management (Chung et al., 2009). 
In summary, firms listed on a lightly regulatory environment are expected to 
have more flexibility to engage in real and accrual earnings management than firms 
listed on a more restrictive regulatory environment.  
3.4 Theories of Earnings Management and Monitoring 
3.4.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory indicates that the conflict between managers and shareholders 
arises as managers may engage in certain activities to obtain a private gain (Jensen 
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and Meckling, 1976) and that these activities may decrease the shareholders’ wealth. 
Prior research for example finds that information asymmetry during the IPO leads to 
two types of agency conflicts; adverse selection and moral hazard (Ritter and Welch, 
2002; Bruton et al., 2009). Thus, and given the impact of this conflict between 
managers and shareholders, executive compensation is considered by the agency 
theory as one of the best solutions to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). However, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate that executive compensation may motivate 
managers to engage in certain transactions that aim to maximise their wealth instead 
of shareholders. Confirming this view, prior literature has shown that managers 
manipulate reported earnings upward utilizing earnings management activities to 
meet performance-based compensation targets (Healy, 1985; Dechow and Sloan, 
1991; Balsam, 1998; Cheng, 2004; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Ronen et al., 2006; Kuang, 2008; Cazier, 2009; Laux and Laux, 
2009; Cao and Laksmana, 2010). This literature also has presented evidence that 
earnings management activities are negatively associated with subsequent operating 
and stock return performance, which in turn leads to a reduction in shareholders’ 
wealth (DuCharme et al., 2001; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 2010; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Kothari et al., 2012). 
A recent paper by Jiraporn et al. (2008) examines two competing views that 
explain the relation between earnings management and the agency theory, namely 
the beneficial use vs. the opportunistic use of earnings management. The first view 
is that earnings management can be used by managers to communicate private 
information to the shareholders and the public to improve the information value of 
earnings (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Holthausen, 1990; Healy and Palepu, 
1993; Guay et al., 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Demski, 1998; Arya et al., 2003). 
Hence, Jiraporn et al. (2008) expect, if firms suffer high levels of agency costs, then 
managers will engage in a lower level of earnings management because managers 
will not use earnings management opportunistically (managers just use earnings 
management to communicate private information). 
The second view is that earnings management can be used opportunistically 
by managers to obtain a private gain, and this leads to negative consequences for 
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shareholders’ wealth (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; Kothari et al., 2012). 
Consistent with the second scenario, Jiraporn et al. (2008) expect, if firms suffer 
high levels of agency costs, then managers will engage opportunistically in a higher 
level of earnings management. By examining these two competing views on the 
relation between the agency costs and earnings management, Jiraporn et al. (2008) 
find evidence that firms which suffer high levels of agency costs exhibit evidence of 
a lower level of earnings management, confirming the first view on the beneficial 
use of earnings management. In other words, Jiraporn et al. (2008) find managers 
use earning management to communicate private information to shareholders and 
public and, this in turn, leads to enhance the value of earnings. Consistent with 
Jiraporn et al. (2008), Gunny (2010) finds evidence on the beneficial use of earnings 
management that leads to better future performance.  
In summary, while the agency theory has presented theoretical explanation 
why managers engage in earnings management, the recent literature has found that 
earnings management can be utilized either opportunistically and this leads to a 
negative impact for shareholders’ wealth (Teoh et al., 1998a; Fan, 2007, amongst 
other) or beneficially (through enhancing the value of earnings) and this leads to a 
positive impact for shareholders’ wealth (Jiraporn et al. 2008; Gunny, 2010). 
3.4.2 Monitoring Role and Moral Hazard Hypotheses  
Monitoring role and moral hazard hypotheses provide an explanation for the role of 
Venture Capitalists (VCs) during the IPO and whether these VCs will motivate or 
mitigate the use of earnings management by IPO firms. VCs are financial 
intermediaries, with a limited liability partnership, that raise funds from investors in 
order to invest in the financial events such as IPOs and SEOs. Generally, VCs go 
through three main stages: fundraising, investing funds, and exiting the investment 
(e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). The monitoring role 
and moral hazard hypotheses have different views about whether the presence of 
VCs during the IPO will lead to safeguard or expropriate the shareholders’ wealth.  
The monitoring hypothesis implies that VCs may play a monitoring role on 
their investments during IPOs to protect their reputation and to avoid any expected 
litigation risk in the future. Thus, a monitoring role by VCs will lead to safeguard 
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the interests of other shareholders by monitoring the managers (e.g. Morsfield and 
Tan, 2006). On the other hand, the moral hazard hypothesis implies that VCs may 
turn a blind eye to opportunistic earnings management to ensure high offer prices 
and better stock return performance later, which in turn will increase the gains from 
IPOs (e.g. Agrawal and Cooper, 2009).  
A growing body of literature finds evidence consistent with monitoring role 
of VCs on earnings management. For example, Morsfield and Tan (2006) 
investigate the effect of VCs on earnings management during IPOs. By examining a 
sample of 2,630 IPO firms during the period 1983-2001, they find evidence that the 
presence of VCs is associated with less accrual earnings management during the IPO 
year. Further, Morsfield and Tan (2006) find no evidence that supports the view that 
the presence of VCs is associated with earnings inflation during internet bubble and 
the huge number of IPOs that occurred during this period. Lee and Masulis (2011) 
find similar evidence that more reputable VCs play a monitoring role during IPOs in 
mitigating earnings management. However, after controlling for underwriters’ 
reputation Lee and Masulis (2011) find the presence of VC is not associated with 
earnings management.  
Moreover, Agrawal and Cooper (2009) find evidence that VCs mitigate 
earnings management during IPOs, notably if VCs are mature and more reputable. 
Agrawal and Cooper (2009) also find the reputation of VCs is negatively associated 
with the probability that IPO firms restate their financial accounts during the 
subsequent periods. Wongsunwai (2012) meanwhile examines the role of VCs in 
constraining real and accrual earnings management around IPOs and finds evidence 
that IPO backed by  more reputable VCs exhibit lower levels of real and accrual 
earnings management and a lower level of financial restatement. 
Despite the evidence on the monitoring role of VCs, little research has 
presented evidence that the presence of VCs during the IPO is negatively associated 
with future performance. For example, Chahine et al. (2012) investigate the 
association between the diversity of a VC syndicate and accrual earnings 
management around IPOs. By examining a sample of 274 IPOs that are backed by 
venture capitalists from both the US and the UK, they find evidence the diversity of 
a VC syndicate is associated with higher levels of accrual-based manipulation pre-
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IPO. They also find evidence that IPO firms with higher levels of accrual 
manipulation and VC diversity experience higher levels of underpricing and post-
IPO stock return underperformance.  
Coakley et al. (2007) and Coakley et al. (2009) find evidence that the 
presence of VCs during the IPO has a negative impact for offer prices and operating 
performance during the dot-com bubble. By examining a sample of 316 UK IPOs 
that were backed by VCs and 274 IPOs that were not backed by VCs over the period 
1985–2003, Coakley et al. (2007) find evidence that the presence of VC 
representatives on the board of directors is negatively associated with subsequent 
operating performance. In addition, Coakley et al. (2009) examines the effect of 
VCs on IPOs’ underpricing in the UK. Coakley et al. (2009) examine a sample of 
591 UK IPOs over the period 1985-2003 and find evidence that the presence of VCs 
and prestigious underwriters during the dot-com bubble is associated with a decline 
in offers prices. However, for periods other than the internet bubble Coakley et al. 
(2009) find evidence consistent with the certification role of VCs and underwriters 
during the IPO. 
3.4.3 Certification Hypothesis. 
Based on the certification hypothesis, financial institutions (e.g. VCs and 
underwriters) are expected to perform due-diligence investigations by picking and 
monitoring their IPO firms carefully to protect their reputation and to avoid any 
litigation risk (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 1991). Focusing on underwriters, prior 
literature shows that underwriters play a significant role in equity offerings by 
purchasing, marketing, and distributing these offers to outside investors (e.g., Beatty 
and Ritter, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).   
IPO and SEO firms typically attempt to appoint more prestigious 
underwriters to send a positive signal about the offer to outside investors. For 
example, Booth and Smith (1986) find evidence that supports the view that the 
presence of underwriters during the IPO leads to reduce the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders (prospective shareholders). Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
conducted a survey with 336 CFOs to compare between the theory and practice of 
IPOs and found evidence that historical earnings and prestigious underwriters, 
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respectively, are considered by CFOs as the most important factors that send 
positive signals about IPOs to outside investors. Moreover, Yung and Zender (2010) 
find evidence that IPO firms with more prestigious underwriters experience a lower 
level of information asymmetry. 
Thus, and based on the certification hypothesis, prior literature has 
investigated whether prestigious underwriters reduce accrual earnings management 
around equity offerings. For example, Jo et al. (2007) find evidence that the 
presence of more reputable underwriters is negatively associated with accrual 
earnings management during a SEO. They indicate that underwriters constrain 
earnings manipulation to avoid any future litigation risk and to protect their 
reputation. Chang et al. (2010) find evidence that IPO firms with less reputable 
underwriters exhibit a higher level of accrual earnings management. Lee and 
Masulis (2011) find similar evidence that the presence of more reputable 
underwriters is associated with less accrual earnings management. Further, it is 
worth noting that the role of underwriters in constraining earnings manipulation is 
found to be more efficient when the IPO firms are backed by VCs and audited by 
high-quality auditors (e.g. Lee and Masulis, 2011). 
3.4.4 Litigation Risk Hypothesis  
Prior research shows that IPO firms have strong incentives to hire high quality 
auditors to send positive signals about the offer to outsiders (Titman and Trueman, 
1986; Brau and Fawcett, 2006). This is due to the fact that high quality auditors (big 
N) are expected to provide high-quality audits to avoid any future litigation risks and 
to protect their reputation in the capital market (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and 
Krishnan, 1999). Khurana and Raman (2004) examined the association between 
litigation risk, reputation damage, and enhanced audit quality. Their results showed 
that avoiding litigation risk is the primary driver for providing high quality audits by 
more reputable audit firms. 
Consistent with this, an extensive body of research has found evidence that 
high quality auditors play a significant role in constraining accrual-based earnings 
management (Becker et al., 1998; Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003; Reichelt and 
Wang, 2010). For example, Becker et al. (1998) find evidence that firms audited by 
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high quality auditors exhibit a lower level of accrual-based earnings management.  
Elder and Zhou (2002) find high quality auditors constrain accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year. Chen et al. (2005) find similar evidence that the 
presence of high quality auditors is associated with a lower level of accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year. Further, Balsam et al. (2003), Krishnan (2003), 
and Reichelt and Wang (2010) find evidence that the presence of auditor industry 
specialism is associated with less accrual earnings management. Thus, prior research 
supports the view that high quality auditors constrain accrual earnings management 
to limit future litigation risk. 
However, recent research has presented evidence that high quality auditors 
affect managers’ tendency to choose between real and accrual earnings management 
activities (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011). While constraining 
accrual earnings management is one of the main responsibility of audit firms, real 
earnings management represents managerial decisions that deviate from normal 
business practices (Roychowdhury, 2006) and, therefore, are less subject to the 
scrutiny of audit firms (Graham et al., 2005). Consistent with this view, Chi et al. 
(2011) find evidence that firms audited by high quality auditors switch to more real 
activities-based earnings management to avoid the monitoring of accrual-based 
earnings management. Chi et al. (2011) focus on firms with strong incentives to 
manage reported earnings upward such as SEO firms and public firms that just meet 
or beat earnings benchmarks. Further, and in line with Chi et al. (2011), Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) find evidence that SEO audited by big N exhibit higher levels of 
real earnings management activities. 
In summary, the role of enhanced audit quality on accrual earnings 
management has been extensively researched, but little research has examined the 
relation between enhanced audit quality and real earnings management (e.g. Chi et 
al. 2011). Hence, whether audit firms will face a litigation risk due to the extensive 
use of real activities-based manipulation by their clients is still an open question. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter introduces several motivations and mitigating factors of earnings 
management as well as related theories that explain the association between these 
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factors and earnings management. The central premise of this literature is that 
managers can switch between real and accrual earnings management activities based 
on the costs and benefits of utilizing each of them (Zang, 2012). For example, if a 
monitoring body (e.g. auditors) focuses on constraining a specific activity of 
earnings management (e.g. accrual-based manipulation), then managers are likely to 
switch to another activity (e.g. real activities-based manipulation), notably when 
there is a strong incentive to manage earnings upward (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Chi et al. 2011). In addition, the decision to choose between real and accrual 
earnings management is likely to have an impact for firm’s subsequent performance. 
Prior literature shows that both real and accrual earnings management are negatively 
associated with subsequent stock returns and operating performance (Fan, 2007; 
Kothari et al., 2012) and, therefore, the extensive use of these activities will lead to 
more negative consequences for future performance.  
Thus, all monitoring e.g. auditors, corporate governance structure, 
accounting standards setters, regulators, etc (that are expected to constrain earnings 
manipulation) should consider the fact that managers can switch between earnings 
management activities, and that these activities are negatively associated with future 
performance. The next chapter presents data collection, sample construction, 
descriptive statistics, and the estimation of real and accrual earnings management 
activities. 
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Chapter 4 
Data and Research Methods  
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the data used in the empirical analysis, data sources, sample 
construction, descriptive statistics of the variables, the estimation of real and accrual 
earnings management, and the control sample (all UK non-IPO firms).15 This thesis 
examines British IPO companies that have gone public on the AIM and Main 
markets of the London Stock Exchange over the period 1998-2008.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section two provides the process of 
constructing the sample and the databases that were used to download the data. 
Section three presents descriptive statistics for the pooled IPO sample and for 
samples that are used in the three empirical chapters of this thesis; namely 
regulatory environments, audit quality, and IPO failure risk. The processes of 
measuring real activities-based and accrual-based earnings management and the 
control sample (all non-IPO UK firms) are presented and discussed in section four. 
Finally section five concludes.  
4.2 Sample Construction  
The sample consists of 571 IPO firms that went public on either the Main or AIM 
markets between January 1998 and December 2008.16  All financial IPO firms are 
excluded from the sample due to differences in their financial reporting and 
disclosure requirements (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; 1998c; Chen et al., 2005; 
                                            
15 It is worth noting that descriptive statistics of the variables and the estimation of real and accrual 
earnings management are also discussed in the following empirical chapters (five, six and seven). 
However, in this chapter a detailed discussion is provided.  
16 The London Stock Exchange provides information about IPOs on the Main market starting from 
1998 while information about IPOs on the AIM market starts from 1995. Therefore, and to be 
consistent, the sample covers the period 1998 - 2008. 
Chapter 4. Data and Research Methods 
- 71 - 
 
Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 2010; Lee and Masulis, 2011; 
Chahine et al., 2012; Wongsunwai, 2012). The sample also is restricted to all IPO 
firms with available prospectuses and the necessary data to allow estimating of real 
and accrual earnings management proxies. This restriction results in the sample 
consisting of larger and more successful firms, and as noted by Cohen et al., (2008) 
and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), a more conservative test of earnings management.  
Data are collected using the following sources: (1) IPO firms are identified 
using the list of IPOs on the London Stock Exchange website for UK firms that were 
admitted to the AIM and Main markets during the period 1998-2008. This list 
provides information about IPOs such as, issue price, the date of an IPO, market 
capitalization, etc; (2) the ICC Plum and Lexis-Nexis databases were used to obtain 
information about the company identifier for IPO firms, such as the WorldScope and 
ISIN codes; (3) financial data for the IPO firms and for the control sample of all UK 
non-IPO firms were obtained from the WorldScope database; (4); WorldScope 
however, does not provide all the required financial data for the sample of IPO 
firms, therefore, IPO prospectuses were downloaded from the Thomson One Banker 
database and all missing financial data were manually collected from IPO 
prospectuses; (5) the DataStream database was used to collect the stock prices for 
the sample of IPOs and their matched firms; (6) the Fame database was used to 
collect the reasons of delisting from the stock exchange and date of delisting which 
was cross checked with the delisted dates that were obtained from DataStream. 
Further, the delisted reasons obtained from Fame are double checked with 
Companies House. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics of key variables for the sample at the IPO. 
Table 4.1 shows that the average total assets of IPO firms prior to go public is 
£56.12 million, the median is £4.47 million, the standard deviation is £233.90 
million, the minimum amount is £0.07 million, and the maximum amount is 
£1969.10 million. This large difference in total assets values is due to the fact that 
the sample comprises very small IPO firms (AIM IPOs sample) and very large firms 
(Main IPOs sample). The AIM market is designed to fit the needs of small, growing 
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IPO firms. Consistent with this, Table 4.1 shows that the mean market capitalization 
for IPO firms is £113.93 million and the median is £25.11 million with a range from 
£1.44 million to £2,020.68 million. Table 4.1 also shows that the money raised by 
IPO firms ranges from £0.14 million to £1499.85 million with a mean of £43.41 
million and a median of £7.00 million. With regards to the net income of IPO firms, 
Table 4.1 shows that the operating performance (net income) for IPO firms on 
average £1.93 million with a standard deviation of £25.38 million and a median of 
£-0.03 million. The minimum and the maximum amount of net income range from 
£-124.10 million to approximately £398 million. 
Table 4.2 presents the distribution of IPOs and shows that four years (2000, 
2004, 2005, and 2006) account for more than 60% of IPOs. Consistent with the 
internet bubble the highest number of IPOs (103 IPOs) in the sample is in 2000. 
These statistics are also consistent with the view that IPO firms usually time their 
offerings to take advantage of the hot market (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Lowry and 
Schwert, 2002). While the lowest number of IPOs in the sample is in 2008 due to the 
recent global financial crisis. 
Table 4.3 presents the frequency of IPOs based on the industry standard 
classification, measured by 2-digit SIC codes. The Business Services industry 
accounts for approximately 32% of the total sample, while the majority of other 
industries have similar percentages of IPOs ranging from 1% to 10%. 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for pooled IPOs sample during 1998-2008  
 Total assets  
(£ mill.) 
Net income  
(£ mill.) 
Market value 
 (£ mill.) 
Money raised  
(£ mill.) 
Mean 56.12 1.93 113.93 43.41 
Median 4.47 -0.03 25.11 7.00 
Std. dev 233.90 25.38 302.19 136.22 
Minimum 0.07 -124.10 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Table 4.1 presents sample descriptive statistics for IPOs sample over the period 1998-2008. Total assets are the 
beginning of period total assets; net income at the end of the IPO year; market value is the market capitalization 
for IPO firms immediately after the listing; and money raised is the offer amount of the IPO. Total assets and net 
income are obtained from the WorldScope database; market value and money raised are obtained from the 
London Stock Exchange website. 
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Table 4.2 Time distribution for pooled IPOs sample during 1998-2008  
Year Freq % 
1998 35 6.13 
1999 29 5.08 
2000 103 18.04 
2001 43 7.53 
2002 35 6.13 
2003 23 4.03 
2004 97 16.99 
2005 94 16.46 
2006 70 12.26 
2007 40 7.01 
2008 2 0.35 
Total 571 100.00 
Table 4.2 presents the frequency of IPO firms by year over the period 1998-2008. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Industry distribution for pooled IPOs sample during 1998-2008  
 
Industry                                                  SIC 2-digit Freq % 
Oil & gas extraction                                                         13 26 4.55 
Food products                                                  20 11 1.93 
Printing and publishing                                                        27 13 2.28 
Chemicals and allied products                                            28 37 6.48 
Industrial machinery                 35 16 2.80 
Electronic equipment                                36 36 6.30 
Instruments and related products                                        38 25 4.21 
Communications 48 27 4.73 
Electric, gas, and sanitation                                   49 10 1.75 
Durable goods                                         50 11 1.93 
Eating and drinking establishments 58 15 2.63 
Retail 59 8 1.40 
Business services                                                                   73 182 31.87 
Media and entertainment 78 8 1.40 
Amusement and recreation                                       79 27 4.73 
Engineering and management services                                   87 58 10.16 
All others - 61 10.68 
Total  571 100.00 
Table 4.3 presents the frequency of IPO firms by industry over the period 1998-2008. 
Chapter 4. Data and Research Methods 
- 74 - 
 
4.3.1 Regulatory Environment  
The first empirical research question of this thesis (chapter five) examines real and 
accrual earnings management under different regulatory environments. In the UK, 
the London Stock Exchange comprises two different regulatory environments; that 
is, the Main market and the AIM market. Data concerning the regulatory 
environment are collected using a list provided by the London Stock Exchange. This 
list shows all UK firms that were admitted to the AIM and Main markets and 
provides information about IPOs such as, issue price, the date of an IPO, market 
capitalization, etc. Further, the London Stock Exchange provides information about 
IPOs on the Main market starting from 1998 while information about IPOs on the 
AIM market starts from 1995. Thus, to be consistent, the sample covers the period 
1998 – 2008. 
To collect financial and non-financial data for IPO firms on the AIM and the 
Main markets several databases are used such as WorldScope, DataStream, Fame, 
and ICC Plum. In addition, when data are missing from the databases they are 
manually collected from the prospectuses. Following prior research (e.g., Teoh et al., 
1998a; Morsfield and Tan, 2006), financial IPO firms are excluded from the sample 
due to the differences in their financial reporting from other IPO firms. These 
procedures result in a sample consisting of 433 IPOs on the AIM market and 138 
IPOs on the Main market over the period 1998-2008 with available prospectuses and 
the necessary data to analyze real and accrual earnings management.  
Table 4.4 (Panels A and B) present descriptive statistics for IPOs on the AIM 
and the Main markets. Panel A shows that the market capitalization for IPO firms on 
the AIM market on average £27.73 million with a standard deviation of £32.67 
million and a median of £17.83 million. The minimum and the maximum amounts 
of market capitalization range from £1.44 million to £183.06 million. While for IPO 
firms on the Main market, Panel B shows that the average market capitalization is 
£384.40 million, the median is £151.80 million, the standard deviation is £528.58 
million, the minimum amount is £6.11million, and the maximum amount is 
£2020.68 million. This large difference in market capitalization values between 
IPOs on the two markets is attributed to the fact that IPO firms on the AIM market 
are very small firms compared with IPOs on the Main market. However, the range 
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of market values on the AIM market shows that some IPO firms with large market 
values have listed on AIM. 
Table 4.4 also presents statistics for other figures (e.g. total assets and money 
raised) and again shows similar evidence that IPO firms on the AIM market are 
smaller than IPO firms on the Main market. In addition, Table 4.4 shows that IPO 
firms on the AIM market experience greater losses during the IPO year compared 
with IPO firms on the Main market. For example, the mean (median) net income for 
IPO firms on the AIM market is £-0.15 million (£-0.09 million), while the mean 
(median) net income for IPO firms on the Main market is £8.47 million (£1.75 
million).  
Table 4.5 reports the distribution of IPOs on the AIM and the Main markets 
from 1998 to 2008. For IPO firms on the AIM market Table 4.5 shows that more 
than 60% of IPOs have gone public during 2000, 2004, 2005, and 2006 with the 
highest number of IPOs (85 IPOs) occurred in 2005. For IPO firms on the Main 
market Table 4.5 shows that the highest number of IPOs (44 IPOs) is in 2000, 
consistent with the internet bubble, while the other years have similar percentages of 
IPOs ranging from 2% to 16%. It is worth noting for both the AIM and the Main 
market that the lowest number of IPOs is in 2008, due to the recent global financial 
crisis. 
Table 4.6 shows the frequency of IPOs relative to the industry standard 
classification, measured by 2-digit SIC codes. For IPO firms on the AIM market the 
maximum number of IPOs in a single industry is 129 in Business Services. The 
other industries have similar frequencies ranging from 5 IPOs in Retail industry to 
49 IPOs in Engineering and Management Services industry. In addition, Table 4.6 
presents the frequency of IPOs on the Main market and shows that the Business 
Services industry accounts for approximately 39% of the total sample, consistent 
with the frequency of AIM IPOs. Except for the clustering in the Business Services 
industry, the majority of other industries on the Main market have similar 
percentages of IPOs ranging from 1% to 7%. 
 
Chapter 4. Data and Research Methods 
- 76 - 
 
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for sample IPO firms during 1998-2008 by market 
 Total assets  
(£ mill.) 
Net income  
(£ mill.) 
Market value 
 (£ mill.) 
Money raised  
(£ mill.) 
Panel A: AIM sample (n=433)     
Mean 15.99 -0.15 27.73 10.82 
Median 2.73 -0.09 17.83 5.00 
Std. Dev 102.53 5.30 32.67 26.43 
Minimum 0.07 -12.61 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 1969.10 74.25 183.06 388.97 
Panel B: Main sample (n=138)     
Mean 182.06 8.47 384.40 145.65 
Median 29.86 1.75 151.80 53.21 
Std. Dev 416.43 50.35 528.58 247.21 
Minimum 0.07 -124.1 6.11 0.55 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Table 4.4 presents sample descriptive statistics for the AIM and Main Market IPO firms over the period 1998-
2008. All variables are previously defined.  
Table 4.5 Time distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008 by market 
 
AIM market         Main Market 
Year Freq % Freq % 
1998 14 3.23 21 15.22 
1999 16 3.70 13 9.42 
2000 59 13.63 44 31.88 
2001 39 9.01 4 2.90 
2002 24 5.54 11 7.97 
2003 19 4.39 4 2.90 
2004 84 19.40 13 9.42 
2005 85 19.63 9 6.52 
2006 61 14.09 9 6.52 
2007 30 6.93 10 7.25 
2008 2 0.46 -    - 
Total 433 100.00 138 100.00 
Table 4.5 presents the frequency of IPO firms by year over the period 1998-2008.  
Table 4.6 Industry distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008 by market 
  SIC   AIM market    Main Market 
Industry                                                  2-digit Freq % Freq % 
Oil & gas extraction                                                         13 20 4.62 6 4.35 
Food products                                                  20 8 1.85 3 2.17 
Printing and publishing                                                        27 12 2.77 1 0.72 
Chemicals and allied products                                            28 28 6.60 9 6.52 
Industrial machinery                 35 16 3.50 2 1.45 
Electronic equipment                                36 28 6.47 8 5.80 
Instruments and related products                                        38 16 3.70 7 5.07 
Communications 48 20 4.62 7 5.07 
Electric, gas, and sanitation                                   49 9 2.08 1 0.72 
Durable goods                                         50 7 1.62 4 2.90 
Eating and drinking 
establishments 
58 13 3.00 2 1.45 
Retail 59 5 1.15 3 2.17 
Business services                                                                   73 129 29.79 53 38.41 
Media and entertainment 78 6 1.39 2 1.45 
Amusement and recreation                                       79 24 5.54 3 2.17 
Engineering and management 
services                                   
87 49 11.32 9 6.52 
All others - 43 9.93 18 13.04 
Total 
 
433 100.00 138 100.00 
Table 4.6 presents the frequency of IPO firms by industry over the period 1998-2008.                                                                                 
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4.3.2 Audit Quality   
The second empirical research question of this thesis (chapter six) examines the 
impact of enhanced audit quality on real and accrual earnings management at the 
IPO. Data concerning audit quality (the name of auditors, audit tenure, and audit 
fees) for IPO firms are collected from Fame and cross checked with the 
prospectuses. Financial and non-financial data are collected from several databases 
such as WorldScope, DataStream, ICC Plum, and Lexis-Nexis. All missing data are 
manually collected from IPO prospectuses. An audit firm is classified as a big N 
auditor (high quality auditor) if it is considered as one of the big 4 audit firms.17 
With regards to audit tenure, Fame just provides the name of previous auditors and 
the period for each one of them. Thus, auditor’s tenure is constructed by calculating 
(accumulating) the number of years that the auditor was auditing the IPO client. 
Finally, and following Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) and Reichelt and Wang (2010), 
an auditor is identified as an industry expert if the auditor is the largest provider of 
audit services in the industry and the difference in market share between the largest 
provider and second provider is greater than 10 percent in a specific industry and 
year. The market share for each auditor is calculated based on the total audit fees 
and just for big N audit firms to avoid a brand name effect (Craswell et al. 1995).  
After imposing the restriction to all non-financial IPO firms with available 
prospectuses and the necessary data to analyze the impact of audit quality on real 
and accrual earnings management, the final sample consists of 240 IPOs audited by 
big N and 275 IPOs audited by non-big N audit firms over the period 1998-2008. 
Table 4.7 (Panel A) presents descriptive statistics for IPO firms audited by big N 
audit firms.  Panel A shows that the market capitalization of IPO firms audited by 
big N on average £199.59 million with a median of £57.62 million. The minimum 
market capitalization amount is £2.39 million and the maximum amount is 
£2,020.68 million. While for IPO firms audited by non-big N Table 4.7 (Panel B) 
shows that the mean (median) market capitalization is £24.83 million (£15 million) 
with a minimum amount of £1.44 million and a maximum amount of £147.66 
million. This large difference in market values between IPO firms audited by big N 
                                            
17 The classification for audit firms as big8, big 6, and big 5 is changed over time after series of 
mergers to become now as big 4 audit firms. 
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and IPO firms audited by non-big N is consistent with view that large IPO firms 
have strong incentives to hire high quality auditors to send a positive signal about 
IPOs to outsiders (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Brau and Fawcett, 2006). In other 
words, large IPO firms can afford to pay the high costs of those reputable audit firms 
which allows them to send positive signals about the offer. Moreover, the other 
figures of Table 4.7, namely total assets and money raised, show similar evidence 
that IPO firms audited by big N are larger in size than IPO firms audited by non-big 
N audit firms. 
Table 4.8 (Panel A) reports the distribution of IPOs over the period 1998 to 
2008 and shows that for IPO firms audited by big N auditors the years 2000, 2004, 
and 2005 account for more than 50% of the sample, while the majority of other 
years have similar percentages of IPOs. For IPO firms audited by non-big N audit 
firms Table 4.8 (Panel A) shows that more than 50% of IPOs have gone public 
during 2004, 2005, and 2006 with the highest number of IPOs (57 IPOs) is in 2005. 
Table 4.8 (Panel B) shows the frequency of IPOs relative to the industry standard 
classification, measured by 2-digit SIC codes. For both IPO firms audited by big N 
and non-big N Table 4.8 (Panel B) shows that the Business Services industry 
accounts for more than 30% of the sample, while the majority of other industries 
show similar percentages of IPOs ranging from 1% to 13%. 
Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics for sample IPO firms during 1998-2008 by audit quality  
  
Total assets 
Net 
income 
Market 
value 
Money raised 
(£ mill.) (£ mill.)  (£ mill.) (£ mill.) 
Panel A: IPO clients of big N audit firms sample (n=240)  
Mean 102.78 3.95 199.59 75.44 
Median 9.65 0.17 57.62 21.73 
Std. dev 319.86 38.21 380.08 169.42 
Minimum 0.20 -124.10 2.39 0.28 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Panel B: IPO clients of non-big N audit firms sample (n=275) 
Mean 8.97 0.05 24.83 10.97 
Median 2.03 -0.07 15.00 3.50 
Std. dev 42.33 3.88 29.45 56.62 
Minimum 0.07 -11.84 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 671.60 37.67 147.66 928.80 
Table 4.7 presents sample descriptive statistics for IPO clients of big N auditors and IPO clients of non-big N 
auditors over the period 1998-2008. All variables are previously defined. 
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Table 4.8 Time and industry distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008 by audit quality 
 
Panel A: Time distribution  
 Big N clients non- Big N clients 
Year   Freq % Freq % 
1998 24 10.00 9 3.27 
1999 10 4.17 16 5.82 
2000 59 24.58 35 12.73 
2001 17 7.08 24 8.73 
2002 15 6.25 14 5.09 
2003 9 3.75 11 4.00 
2004 38 15.83 47 17.09 
2005 31 12.92 57 20.73 
2006 21 8.75 44 16.00 
2007 15 6.25 18 6.55 
2008 1 0.42 -    - 
Total 240 100.00 275 100.00 
 
Panel B: Industry distribution  
  
 Big N clients non-Big N clients 
Industry                                                  SIC 2-digit Freq % Freq % 
Oil and gas extraction                                                         13 9 3.75 15 5.45 
Food products                                                  20 3 1.25 8 2.91 
Printing and publishing                                                        27 5 2.08 6 2.18 
Chemicals and allied products                                            28 19 7.92 16 5.82 
Industrial machinery                 35 9 3.75 6 2.18 
Electronic equipment                                36 17 7.08 16 5.82 
Instruments and related products                                        38 10 4.17 12 4.36 
Communications 48 15 6.25 12 4.36 
Electric, gas, and sanitation                                   49 2 0.83 6 2.18 
Durable goods                                         50 5 2.08 5 1.82 
Eating and drinking establishments 58 5 2.08 9 3.27 
Retail 59 3 1.25 5 1.82 
Business services                                                                   73 87 36.25 86 31.27 
Media and entertainment 78 1 0.42 4 1.45 
Amusement and recreation                                       79 7 2.92 19 6.91 
Engineering and management 
services                                   
87 19 7.92 37 13.45 
All others - 24 10.00 13 4.75 
Total 
 
240 100.00 275 100.00 
Table 4.8 reports time and industry distributions for IPO clients of big N auditors and IPO clients of non-big N 
auditors over the period 1998 -2009. 
4.3.3 IPO Failure Risk  
The third empirical research question of this thesis (chapter seven) examines the 
association between IPO failure and real and accrual earnings management. 
Following prior research (e.g., Li and Zhou, 2006; Demers and Joos, 2007) IPO 
failure is defined as those IPO firms who delisted from the stock exchanges for 
negative reasons within five years post the IPO date. The negative reasons 
(involuntary delisted) are, administration, receivership, liquidation, winding up, and 
bankruptcy. Delisted reasons and dates of delisting are collected form Fame and 
Chapter 4. Data and Research Methods 
- 80 - 
 
were double checked with delisted dates that are obtained from the DataStream. In 
addition, the delisted reasons from Fame were cross checked with the delisted 
reasons obtained from Companies House (ICC Plum). 
 Out of 571 non-financial IPO firms that went public on either the Main or 
AIM markets between January 1998 and December 2008 (with available 
prospectuses and the necessary data to analyze real and accrual earnings 
management), 317 IPOs are delisted and 253 IPOs survive prior to December 2011. 
Specifically, 90 IPOs are delisted for negative reasons (administration, receivership, 
liquidation, winding up, and bankruptcy), 140 IPOs are delisted as a result of being 
acquired by other firms, 68 IPOs are delisted at the request of the company, and 19 
IPOs are delisted for other reasons. After imposing the definition of IPO failure 
(delisted for negative reasons within 5 years after the IPO date), 60 IPOs out of 90 
IPOs are found to be delisted for negative reasons within 5 years after the IPO date. 
Thus, the final sample consists of 60 IPOs delisted for negative reasons and 253 IPO 
survivors prior to December 2011.  
Table 4.9 presents a breakdown of 317 delisted IPOs by reasons for delisting. 
Table 4.9 shows that 28.39% (90 IPOs) are delisted for negative reasons out of the 
total delisted IPOs (317 IPOs), 44.16% are delisted for being acquired (takeover) by 
other firms, 21.46% are delisted at the request of the company, and 5.99% are 
delisted for other reasons. While after imposing the five-year restriction Table 4.9 
shows that 36.58% (60 IPOs) are delisted for negative reasons out of the total 
delisted IPOs within five year (164 IPOs).  
Table 4.9 Data on reasons for the cancellation (delisting) of 317 IPOs between January 
1998 and December 2011 
 
Since the IPO date and up 
to December 2011 
 Since the IPO date and up to 
5 years after the IPO date 
Delisted reasons  Number Percentage (%)   Number Percentage (%)  
Negative reasons  90 28.39  60 36.58 
Takeover (being acquired) 140 44.16  72 43.90 
At the request of the 
company   
68 21.46  51 31.09 
Other reasons  19 5.99  11 6.71 
Total delisted IPOs 317 100.00  164 100.00 
Table 4.9 reports the distribution and reasons for the cancellation (delisting) of 317 IPOs between January 1998 
and December 2011. 
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Table 4.10 (Panels A and B) present descriptive statistics for IPOs delisted 
for negative reasons within five years after the IPO date and survivor IPOs. Panel A 
shows that the mean (median) market capitalization for IPO firms delisted for 
negative reasons is £33.34 million (£18.26 million), while Panel B shows that the 
mean (median) market capitalization for IPO survivors is £140.80 million (£26.12 
million). This large difference in market values between the two samples suggests 
that small IPO firms exhibit a higher probability of delisting from the stock 
exchange in the following periods. In addition, Table 4.10 shows that IPO firms 
delisted for negative reasons experience operating losses during the IPO year 
compared with IPO survivors. Specifically, Table 4.10 (Panel A) shows that the 
average net income of IPO firms delisted for negative reasons at the IPO is £-0.54 
million, the median is £-0.32 million, the standard deviation is £3.78 million, the 
minimum amount is £-11.84 million, and the maximum amount is £16.19 million. 
While for IPO survivors Table 4.10 (Panel B) shows that the mean (median) net 
income is £4.51 million (£0.01 million) with a minimum amount of £-124.10 million 
and a maximum amount of £397.47 million. 
Table 4.11 (Panel A) reports the time distribution of IPOs delisted for 
negative reasons and IPO survivors over the period from 1998 to 2008. For IPOs 
delisted for negative reasons Table 4.11(Panel A)  shows that more than 60% of the 
sample are delisted during the years 2000, 2004 and 2005, while the majority of 
other years show similar percentages range from  1% to 11%. Table 4.11 (Panel B) 
presents the frequency of IPOs relative to the industry standard classification, 
measured by 2-digit SIC code. For IPO firms delisted for negative reasons Table 
4.11 (Panel B) shows that the maximum number (highest percentage) of delisted 
IPOs in a single industry, 2-digits SIC, is 19 IPOs (31.67%) in Business Services 
industry, while other industries have similar frequencies of delisted IPOs ranging 
from 1 IPO (1.67%) to 7 IPOs (11.67%). 
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Table 4.10 Descriptive statistics for sample IPO firms during 1998-2008 by IPO failure 
  
Total assets  Net income  Market value Money raised  
(£ mill.) (£ mill.)  (£ mill.) (£ mill.) 
Panel A: IPO delisted for negative reasons  (n=60)  
Mean 7.75 -0.54 33.34 10.45 
Median   2.58 -0.32 18.26 4.70 
Std. dev 13.84 3.78 41.78 13.91 
Minimum 0.12 -11.84 1.44 0.25 
Maximum 75.18 16.19 193.04 55.00 
Panel B: IPO survivors  (n=253) 
Mean 78.45 4.51 140.80 60.86 
Median 4.11 0.01 26.12 6.64 
Std. dev 284.31 33.98 349.29 184.76 
Minimum 0.07   -124.10 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Table 4.10 presents sample descriptive statistics for IPO firms delisted for negative reasons and survivor IPO 
firms. All variables are previously defined. 
Table 4.11 Time and industry distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008 by IPO failure 
Panel A: Time distributions  
 Delisted for negative reasons within 
5 years post IPO 
               Survivors 
Year   Freq % Freq % 
1998 4 6.67 8 3.16 
1999 3 5.00 6 2.37 
2000 13 21.67 29 11.46 
2001 2 3.33 19 7.51 
2002 1 1.67 19 7.51 
2003 3 5.00 8 3.16 
2004 12 20.00 47 18.58 
2005 15 25.00 42 16.60 
2006 7 11.67 42 16.60 
2007 - - 31 12.25 
2008 - - 2 0.79 
Total 60 100.00 253 100.00 
Panel B: Industry distributions 
Table 4.11 reports time and industry distributions for IPOs delisted for negative reasons and survivor IPO firms.  
  Delisted for negative reasons within 
5 years post IPO 
 Survivors 
Industry                                                  2-digit SIC Freq % Freq % 
Oil and gas extraction                                                         13 2 3.33 17 6.72 
Food products                                                  20 1 1.67 4 1.58 
Printing and publishing                                                        27 1 1.67 6 2.37 
Chemicals and allied products                                            28 5 8.33 16 6.32 
Industrial machinery                 35 2 3.33 6 2.37 
Electronic equipment                                36 6 10.00 19 7.51 
Instruments and related products                                        38 2 3.33 9 3.56 
Communications 48 1 1.67 12 4.74 
Electric, gas, and sanitation                                   49 1 1.67 5 1.98 
Durable goods                                         50 - - 2 0.79 
Eating and drinking establishments   58 3 5.00 5 1.98 
Retail 59 - - 3 1.19 
Business services                                                                   73 19 31.67 76 30.04 
Media and entertainment 78 1 1.67 5 1.98 
Amusement and recreation                                       79 7 11.67 8 3.16 
Engineering and management services                                87 1 1.67 28 11.07 
All others - 8 13.36 32 12.64 
Total - 60 100.00 253 100.00 
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4.4 The Estimation of Real Activities and Discretionary 
Accruals 
4.4.1 Measuring Accrual-Based Earnings Management  
Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between total accruals and the 
estimated normal accruals. Following prior research in earnings management, the 
Dechow et al. (1995) cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones (1991) model 
is used to estimate normal accruals. However, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) point out 
estimating normal accruals for IPO firms using lagged total assets to scale accrual 
variables may inflate the measure of accruals in the current year. They argue that 
lagged total assets are qualitatively smaller than total assets at the end of the IPO 
year because IPO firms tend to use proceeds to invest in assets. In order to overcome 
this problem, and following Armstrong et al. (2009), all variables in the model are 
scaled by average total assets rather than lagged total assets. Further, return on assets 
(ROA) is added to the model as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) in order to 
control for extreme operating performance as this can bias the estimation of normal 
accruals.  
To estimate normal accruals for IPO firms, a cross-sectional regression is 
used for the control sample for each 2-digit SIC code industry-year group. The 
control sample comprises all non-IPO UK listed firms (non-financial active and 
dead firms to avoid the survivorship bias) over the period 1998-2008. This approach, 
in part, controls for changes in economic conditions that impact on total accruals 
across different industry groups, but allows for coefficients to vary through time 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994, Kasznik, 1999; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Further, 
and following prior research (e.g., Rosner, 2003; Iqbal et al., 2009; Athanasakou et 
al., 2011), any group of firms with less than 6 observations (for each 2-digit SIC 
code industry-year group) are excluded from the control sample. This restriction 
results in 174 portfolios (industry-year groups) with more than 6 observations: 147 
out of the 174 had observations over 10. Table 4.12 presents industry-year 
classification for the control sample (all non-IPO UK active and dead firms) that is 
used to estimate discretionary accruals, abnormal cash flows from operations, and 
abnormal discretionary expenses.   
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Table 4.12 Industry-year group classification for the control sample                                                                                                                                                                       
  SIC 
(2-digit) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
10 - - 8 9 11 12 12 13 17 19 - 101 
13 16 20 17 - 19 - 26 24 27 27 - 176 
15 - - - 28 - 24 24 - - - - 76 
16 - - - - - - 8 - - - - 8 
20 33 - - 29 30 31 31 30 - - - 184 
22 - - - - - - - 7 - - - 7 
23 - - 6 - 7 - - - - - - 13 
25 - - - 8 - - 6 - - - - 14 
27 - 33 26 29 - 31 30 28 26 25 - 228 
28 43 - 43 45 44 39 39 42 42 - - 337 
32 18 - - 15 - 13 12 - - - - 58 
33 - - - - - - - - 6 - - 6 
34 - - - 20 - - - 16 16 16 - 68 
35 - - 32 32 34 34 33 36 38 - - 239 
36 42 - 42 44 45 42 42 44 46 46 - 393 
37 - - - - 18  - - - - - 18 
38 - 36 32 32 33 30 31 29 27 - - 250 
44 8 - - - -  8 - - 7 - 23 
48 - 20 21 27 - 24 18 19 18 18 - 165 
49 - - - 18 18 19 20 21 21 25 - 142 
50 47 47 40 35 - 35 35 33 32 - - 304 
51 - 16 - - - - 15 - - 13 - 44 
53 - - - - - - - - 6 - - 6 
55 - - - - - - 7 - - 8 - 15 
56 19 16 - - - - - - - - - 35 
57 - 9 9 - 7 - 6 - - - 6 31 
58 17 20 21 22 21 - - 18 16 - - 135 
59 13 - 13 14 14 - 13 - - 11 - 78 
70 - - - - 13 11 - - - - - 24 
73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 - 730 
78 - - - - 15 - 15 14 - 18 - 62 
79 19 28 27 27 32 - 30 26 25 - - 214 
80 - - 7 - 9 - 8 - 9 - - 33 
82 - - - -  - 6 6 - - - 12 
87 39 46 44 46 48 53 56 57 52 58 - 499 
Total 387 364 461 553 491 471 604 536 497 364 6 4728 
Table 4.12 presents the classification of industry-year group for the control sample  
 
Thus, in the first stage the normal accruals are estimated for all non-IPO UK firms 
for each year-industry group using the following model: 
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Where TAi,t is total accruals defined as earnings before extraordinary items minus 
cash flows from operations; AvAssetsi,t is the sum of total assets at the beginning of 
the year and the total assets at the end of the year divided by 2; ∆SALESi,t  is the 
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change in sales during a year scaled by average total assets; PPEi,t  is the gross value 
of property, plant and equipment scaled by average total assets; and ROAi,t  is return 
on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items scaled by average total 
assets. 
In the second stage, the estimated coefficients α0, β1, β2, β3 and β4 from equation 
(4.1) are used to estimate normal accruals (NAi,t) for all IPO firms in each year and 
industry as follows, 
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∆ RECi,t  is the change in receivables during the year scaled by average total assets. 
Discretionary accruals (DAi,t) are measured as the difference between total accruals 
and fitted normal accruals where, 
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For robustness the analysis is repeated using the performance-matched 
discretionary accruals approach following Kothari et al. (2005). First, each IPO firm 
is matched with a non-IPO firm based on year, 2-digit SIC industry code and the 
closest return on assets (+/- 0.20 of IPO firms’ return on assets). Second, 
discretionary accruals for IPO firms and the matched firms are estimated as above. 
Then, discretionary accruals for an IPO firm are adjusted by the discretionary 
accruals for its matched firms. 
4.4.2 Measuring Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
Following prior research real earnings management proxies are estimated based on 
models of real earnings management developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and applied 
by Roychowdhury (2006). Later researchers such as Zang, (2012), Cohen and 
Zarowin, (2010), and Cohen et al., (2008) also apply these models to estimate real 
earnings management. This thesis focuses on two activities of real earnings 
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management; sales-based manipulation and reducing discretionary expenses. 
Production cost manipulation is not considered within the analysis of real earnings 
management as this is a method that can only be fully utilized by manufacturing 
companies (Roychowdhury, 2006) and manufacturing companies make up just 
26.6% of the total sample (571 IPOs). Similar to the estimation of the measures of 
accrual earnings management all variables are scaled by average total assets rather 
than lagged total assets.  
Sales-based manipulation leads to lower levels of cash flows from 
operations, and can be managed through offering more price discounts and/or more 
lenient credit terms (Roychowdhury, 2006). To measure sales-based manipulation, 
the abnormal level of cash flows from operations for an IPO firm is estimated using 
similar steps to the estimation of discretionary accruals. First, the normal level of 
cash flows from operations is estimated using the following cross-sectional 
regression for all non-IPO UK firms for each industry and year: 
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Where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations for firm i at period t . All variables are 
scaled by average total assets rather than lagged total assets to avoid estimation bias 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). 
Second, the estimated coefficients α0, β1, β2, and β3 from equation (4.4) are used to 
estimate the normal level of cash flows from operations (NCFOi,t) for all IPO firms 
in each year and industry as follows, 
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Third, the abnormal level of cash flows from operations (ABNCFO i,t) for IPO firms 
is calculated as actual cash flows from operations minus the normal level of cash 
flows from operations (NCFOi,t) as follows, 
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To measure discretionary-expenses based manipulation (the abnormal reduction of 
R&D, SG&A, and advertising expenses), the normal level of discretionary expenses 
is estimated following Roychowdhury (2006) for all non-IPO UK firms for each 
industry and year as follows, 
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DISXi,t is, therefore, calculated as the sum of, SG&A, R&D, and advertising 
expenses for firm i at period t . SALESi,t-1 is sales during the previous year.  The 
abnormal level of discretionary expenses for IPO firms is calculated as actual 
discretionary expenses minus the normal level of discretionary estimated using the 
coefficients from regression (4.7).
 
In order to measure the total effect of real earnings management, and 
following Cohen et al. (2008) and Zang (2012), the abnormal level of cash flows 
from operations and the abnormal level of discretionary expenses are combined to 
compute an aggregate measure of real earnings management. Specifically, abnormal 
cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by -
1, and then calculated as one aggregate measure. A higher amount of this aggregate 
measure implies that IPO firms are more likely to be manipulating sales to increase 
reported earnings and cutting discretionary expenses. 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the process of sample construction that is used in the analysis 
of this thesis, the data sources that are used to collect financial and non-financial 
data, and descriptive statistics for the key variables. This chapter also presents 
statistics for all samples that are used in the three empirical chapters; regulatory 
environments, audit quality, and IPO failure risks. The control sample (all non-IPO 
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UK firms) and the process of measuring real and accrual earnings management 
activities are also presented.  
The next chapter is the first empirical chapter in this thesis. It investigates the 
impact of different regulatory environments on real and accrual earnings 
management of IPO firms in the UK. 
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Chapter 5 
Real and Accrual Earnings Management around Initial Public 
Offerings under Different Regulatory Environments  
 
5.1 Introduction  
The objectives of this chapter are as follows. First, it examines the effect of different 
regulatory environments on real and accrual earnings management activities around 
IPOs via an analysis of the heavily regulated Main market of the London Stock 
Exchange and the more lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM).    
Second, it examines the effect of different regulatory environments on the 
association between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock 
returns performance. The UK stock market provides a unique setting to directly test 
the effect of the regulatory environment on earnings management as all firms are 
governed by the same legal regime, accounting standards and general economic 
environment, but are subject to differing listing requirements, disclosure systems 
and monitoring. Further, IPOs present a unique setting in which to examine the 
impact of regulatory environments on the real and accrual earnings management 
activities of firms, notably that managers of IPO firms have very strong incentives to 
manipulate reported earnings upward at the end of the IPO year to maintain high 
stock prices.18   
The findings of this chapter contribute to the literature by showing that IPO 
firms engage in both real and accrual earnings management around IPOs and more 
specifically, that the regulatory environment matters.  IPO firms on the AIM market 
engage in higher levels of sales-based and accrual-based, and a lower level of 
discretionary expenses-based manipulations compared to IPO firms on the Main 
                                            
18 Teoh et al. (1998a) indicate that the lock-up restriction on managerial shares selling post-IPO, 
avoiding future litigation risks due to an abnormal reduction in stock prices post-IPO, executive 
compensation, and meeting earnings forecast are among the most strong incentives to manage 
earnings upward at the end of the IPO year.  
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market.19 Further, post-IPO stock returns are determined not only by the level of real 
and accrual earnings management during the IPO, but also by the regulatory 
environment. The evidence suggests that the Main market has better 
mechanisms/capabilities than the AIM market to effectively correct the stock prices 
of IPO firms that manage earnings during the IPO year. 
Prior studies have presented evidence that IPO firms manipulate earnings 
using accrual earnings management around IPOs (e.g., Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al. 
1998a; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Morsfield and Tan, 2006). However, little 
research has examined real earnings management and IPOs. Analyzing real earnings 
management is important as manipulating real activities represents managerial 
decisions (that deviate from normal business practice) such as reducing research and 
development (R&D) expenses or increasing sales by offering greater price discounts 
and/or more lenient credit terms (Roychowdhury, 2006). Further, recent research 
shows that real earnings management activities have severe negative consequences 
for subsequent return and operating performance, with even greater consequences 
than accruals manipulation (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012). 
Moreover, and given the increasing interest in real earnings management, 
recent research finds evidence that stronger regulation has a direct impact on 
managers’ tendency to choose between real and accrual earnings management. 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) provide evidence that the level of real earnings 
management increases after accounting standards are strengthened. In line with the 
evidence of Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), Cohen et al. (2008) investigate the effect 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) on real and accrual earnings management and 
find evidence that US firms switch from accrual-based manipulation pre-SOX, to 
manipulating real activities post-SOX. The evidence of Cohen et al. (2008) suggests 
                                            
19 While the AIM market provides IPO firms with strong incentives and more flexibility to manage 
both real and accrual earnings management, the evidence shows that IPO firms on the AIM market 
avoid discretionary expenses-based manipulation. This is due to the following reasons. First, a higher 
level of sales-based manipulation that is combined with a lower level of discretionary expenses is 
likely to bring the attention of outsiders. Second, a lower level of discretionary expenses is associated 
with a higher probability of IPO failure (Demers and Joos, 2007) and, therefore, higher potential 
litigation risks. Third, both high quality auditors and prestigious underwriters are found to mitigate 
discretionary expenses manipulation for IPO firms on the AIM market (the results are reported in 
Table I in Appendix A). 
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that more stringent regulation mitigates accrual-based earnings management leading 
to the more extensive use of real earnings management.  Further, Zang (2012) finds 
evidence that managers engage in real and accrual earnings management as 
substitutes to manage reported earnings upward. Graham et al. (2005) meanwhile 
provide evidence that managers prefer real over accrual earnings management to 
avoid the scrutiny of regulators. Therefore, and in the light of previous evidence, the 
levels of real and accrual earnings management are likely to differ depending on the 
regulatory environment in which a firm operates. 
In the UK, the London Stock Exchange comprises two different regulatory 
environments; that is, the Main market and the AIM market. While IPO firms on the 
Main market are monitored and regulated by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA), 
IPO firms on the AIM market have to appoint and retain a Nominated Adviser 
(Nomad), who undertakes the role of regulator. Nomads are private companies that 
play the role of adviser and regulator for IPO firms on the AIM market. Compared 
with the Main market, and other developed markets such as those in the US, the 
AIM market imposes lower corporate governance requirements, lower levels of 
disclosure and transparency, and a lighter set of listing requirements. For example, 
while IPO firms on the Main market are required to comply with the UK Corporate 
Governance Code20, the AIM market only requires listing firms to have appropriate 
corporate governance and, therefore, there is a lower requirement for corporate 
governance mechanisms as compared to the Main market. However, whether these 
different regulatory burdens (restrictive vs. lighter) would lead to different impacts 
on disclosure system and financial reporting quality and, therefore, the level of 
earnings management by companies listed on these markets is still an open question.  
Prior literature indicates that the presence of lower quality disclosure system 
and lower quality financial reporting in the capital markets is associated with two 
main problems; the agency conflict and information asymmetry (Heal and Palepu, 
2001), and that the presence of agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986) and high levels of information asymmetry (Trueman and 
                                            
20 The UK Corporate Governance Code, formerly known as the Combined Code, is a set of standards 
and principles of good corporate governance practice concerning the board of directors, 
remuneration, shareholders, audit, accountability, etc. 
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Titman, 1988; Schipper, 1989; Dechow and Skinner, 2000) are among the most 
attractive incentives that lead managers to engage in earnings management. For 
example, a higher level of information asymmetry around IPOs can lead to two 
types of agency problems; adverse selection and moral hazard (Ritter and Welch, 
2002; Bruton et al., 2009). Adverse selection implies that managers have better 
information about the firm and therefore, they may not reveal all they know about 
the firm to outsiders e.g. shareholders (e.g. Bruton et al., 2009), while moral hazard 
implies that managers may not perform their duties efficiently in line with the 
interest of shareholders due to the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholder (Nygaard and Myrtveith, 2000). Thus, and as indicated by agency 
theory, this conflict between managers and shareholders may lead managers to 
engage in certain activities (e.g. earnings management) to obtain a private gain and 
that these activities may decrease the shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
Recent research examines the effect of the lighter AIM regulation compared 
to the more restrictive regulations of the Main market and other developed markets 
and provides evidence on the existence of high levels of information asymmetry in 
the AIM market. For example, Gerakos et al. (2011) find evidence that firms listed 
on the AIM market have higher levels of information asymmetry, lower levels of 
liquidity 21 , higher failure rates, and higher levels of post-listing stock return 
underperformance compared with firms listed on the Main market and other 
developed US markets. In addition, Campbell and Tabner (2011) and Jenkinson and 
Ramadorai (2010) find firms that move from the AIM market to the Main market 
experience positive returns on the announcement day of the move, while negative 
returns are found for firms that move from the Main market to the AIM market. 
Further, a recent debate by rival exchanges criticized the high level of flexibility of 
AIM market regulation, which has helped to attract many national and international 
IPO firms. Roel Campos, a former SEC Commissioner, described AIM as a ‘casino’ 
and pointed out that 30% of IPOs on AIM were ‘gone in a year’. 22 
                                            
21 Mendoza (2008) also presents evidence that the AIM market has liquidity problems. 
22 SEC official sparks row over Aim ‘casino’, Financial Times, March 8th 2007.    
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Furthermore, it is well-documented that earnings management during the 
IPO leads to negative impact for future stock returns performance. For example, 
studies have documented that IPO firms with a high level of accrual earnings 
management at the IPO experience poor stock returns and operating performance in 
the years following the IPO (DuCharme et al., 2001; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 2010). 
Thus, it is expected that the regulatory environment to play vital role on the 
association between earnings management and post-IPO stock return performance. 
On the one hand, a regulatory environment with good disclosure systems, is 
followed by a large number of analysts, and attracts large sophisticated investors is 
likely to have good mechanism to uncover any earnings manipulation and, therefore, 
stock prices are corrected accordingly. On the other hand, a regulatory environment 
with lower quality disclosure systems that is mainly designed to fit the needs of 
small, growing firms is less likely to attract the same attention of analysts and large 
sophisticated investors. Thus, a lighter regulatory environment is less likely to have 
good mechanisms to correct stock prices that were inflated by earnings management. 
Thus, and in the light of above discussion, it seems that the Main market of the 
London Stock Exchange is more likely to have better capabilities and mechanisms 
than the AIM market to evaluate the stock prices of IPO firms that managed 
earnings in the IPO year. Notably, that the Main market provides listing firms with a 
wide pool of capital and institutional investors and also is considered to be one of 
the most developed markets in the world (Arcot et al., 2007).  
Though prior research has extensively examined accrual-based manipulation 
around IPOs, few studies have extended their scope to examine whether IPO firms 
engage in the manipulation of real activities. 23  Further, no study to date has 
examined whether lighter regulation provides IPO firms with greater flexibility to 
utilize real and accrual earnings management techniques around IPOs, and whether 
the regulatory environment (restrictive vs. lighter) would lead to different impacts 
on the association between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO 
stock return performance. This study, therefore, progresses the earnings 
                                            
23 There are few published papers (e.g. Darrough and Rangan, 2005; Wongsunwai, 2012) that 
examines real earnings management around IPOs. More recently, a number of working papers have 
emerged examining real earnings management around IPOs. For example, Singer and Fedyk (2011) 
examine IPO valuation and real and accrual earnings management. 
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management literature by examining real and accrual based earnings management 
around IPOs and post-IPO stock return performance under the different regulatory 
environments of the AIM and Main markets in the UK. 
This chapter contributes to the earnings management literature by showing 
that IPO firms manage earnings upward by manipulating real activities more 
extensively than accrual-based activities. Further, IPO firms on the lightly regulated 
AIM market are found to have higher levels of sales-based and accrual-based 
earnings management around the IPO than firms listing on the more heavily 
regulated Main market. Also, the results show that IPO firms on the AIM market 
exhibit a lower level of discretionary expenses-based earnings management 
compared to IPO firms on the Main market. This is due to the fact that a higher level 
of sales-based manipulation, which is combined with a lower level of discretionary 
expenses, is likely to bring the attention of outsiders e.g. auditors, underwriters and, 
therefore, is likely to be associated with a higher probability of IPO failure (Demers 
and Joos, 2007) and higher future litigation risks. 24 Finally, while prior research 
focuses on accrual-based manipulation and finds evidence that it predicts post-IPO 
stock return underperformance, this chapter shows evidence that post-IPO stock 
return underperformance is a function of the level of both real and accrual based 
earnings manipulation in the IPO year. More importantly, the evidence shows that 
the regulatory environment matters and that IPO firms on the Main market, which 
exhibit higher levels of real and accrual earnings management at the end of the IPO 
year, experience more severe poor stock return performance in the following period. 
This evidence, in turn, confirms the view that the Main market is very developed 
market that attracts the attention of analysts and very sophisticated investors (Arcot 
et al., 2007).      
The study proceeds as follows. Section two provides a brief overview of UK 
stock markets. Section three reviews the related literature and presents the 
hypotheses development. Section four discusses data and research methods. Section 
five discusses empirical evidence on the use of real and accrual earnings 
                                            
24 For IPO firms on the AIM market Table I in Appendix A provides evidence that both high quality 
auditors and prestigious underwriters mitigate discretionary expenses-based manipulation during the 
IPO. 
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management around IPOs and the relations with the regulatory environment and 
post-IPO stock performance. Section six presents the additional analysis. Section 
seven concludes. 
5.2 Background of UK Stock Markets and Theories of 
Earnings Management  
5.2.1 Background of UK Stock Markets. 
The AIM and Main markets of the London Stock Exchange represent examples of 
relatively flexible versus restrictive regulatory environments. Jenkinson and 
Ramadorai (2010) present a detailed review and a discussion of the major 
differences between the AIM and Main markets. The regulatory environment of the 
Main market is more restrictive and similar to other developed stock markets, while 
the AIM market has lighter and more flexible regulation. The purpose of the AIM 
market is to provide small and medium size firms with greater opportunities to raise 
capital from the public, and as a result the market has a lighter regulatory 
environment to reduce compliance and listing costs. 
Comparing the listing requirements, IPO firms on the AIM market are not 
required to have previous financial records before going public or to have a 
minimum market capitalization.
25
 Hence, IPO firms on the AIM market can go 
public within a short period of commencing trading. In contrast, IPO firms on the 
Main market should have, at least three years of financial records, at least 25% of 
their capital should be in public hands prior to going public, a minimum market 
capitalization, and at least 75 percent of their business should be supported by a 
revenue earning record. IPO firms on the AIM market have no such requirements. 
In addition, prospectuses for IPO firms on the AIM market are not pre-vetted 
by the UKLA. In contrast, this is a mandatory requirement for IPO firms listing on 
the Main market, as all IPO firms on the Main market are monitored and regulated 
by the UKLA. AIM listed firms however, are monitored and regulated by a Nomad. 
                                            
25  This restriction does apply for some companies such as those engaged in scientific research,  
London Stock Exchange at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/home/homepage.htm   
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The Nomad plays the key role in monitoring and advising firms listed on the AIM 
market and is also crucial in ensuring the integrity of the AIM market. Further, while 
the Main market requires all listed firms to comply with the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, the AIM market only requires listing firms to have appropriate 
corporate governance. However, while Nomads play an important role in advising 
AIM firms on appropriate corporate governance practices, in general, such firms are 
more likely to have less effective corporate governance mechanisms than firms on 
the Main market.  In spite of the recent evidence by Gerakos et al. (2011) that shows 
the lighter regulation of the AIM market can have negative consequences on firms’ 
future performance, the AIM market has attracted many national and international 
firms with more than 3,100 IPO firms raising over £67 billion since its launch in 
1995.
26
 Table 5.1 presents a summary of the main differences between the two 
markets. 
Table 5.1 Differences in admission criteria and continuing obligations for the AIM and 
Main markets 
Aim Market Main Market 
No minimum market capitalization Minimum market capitalization 
No trading record requirement Normally 3-year trading record required 
No prescribed level of shares to be in public 
hands 
Minimum of 25% of shares held publically 
No prior shareholder approval for most 
transactions 
Prior shareholder approval required for 
substantial acquisitions and disposals 
(premium listings only) 
Nominated Adviser required at all times 
Sponsors needed for certain transactions 
(premium listings only) 
Admission documents not pre-vetted by the 
Exchange or by the UKLA in most 
circumstances. The UKLA will only vet an 
AIM admission document where it is also a 
Prospectus under the Prospectus Directive 
Pre-vetting of prospectus 
Table 5.1 reports differences in admission criteria and continuing obligations for the AIM and Main markets.27 
                                            
26 A Guide to AIM, page 6, available at: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/home/homepage.htm  
27 Source: London Stock Exchange Website (A Guide to AIM, page 6) Available at: 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/home/homepage.htm 
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5.2.2 Information Asymmetry, Agency Conflict, Earning Management 
and the Regulatory Environment of the AIM and Main markets in the 
UK. 
The quality of disclosure system and financial reporting is crucial to the success of 
capital markets and their liquidity level (Levitt, 1997)28 and to reducing information 
asymmetry and agency problems that may raise between managers and shareholders 
(Ball, 2001; Heal and Palepu, 2001). Prior research indicates that the existence of 
higher levels of information asymmetry and agency problems motivate managers to 
engage in earnings management to obtain a private gain (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Trueman and Titman, 1988; Schipper, 1989; 
Dechow and Skinner, 2000). For example, a regulatory environment with a higher 
level of information asymmetry implies that managers have better information about 
the firm’s current and future operations than outside investors and, therefore, it will 
be easier for managers to manipulate reported earnings if they have strong incentives 
e.g. executive compensation, managerial shares selling, etc. 
In the UK, the regulatory  environment of the AIM market is very flexible 
and mainly designed and structured to fit the needs of small, growing IPO firms that 
are required to appoint and retain a Nominated Adviser (Nomad), who are private 
companies that play the role of adviser and regulator for firms on the AIM market.29 
This view about AIM lighter set of rules is clearly expressed by the London Stock 
Exchange as follows,  
“In recognition of AIM’s role as a market for growing companies, 
the Exchange has made the AIM Rules relatively simple and clear, 
with entry requirements and continuing obligations which are less 
prescriptive than those of many other markets. For example, the 
                                            
28  Arthur Levitt, Chairman U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Remarks to the Inter-
American Development Bank: The Importance of High Quality Accounting Standards (September 29, 
1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/spch176.txt. 
29 A Guide to AIM (2010), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-
advisors/aim/publications/documents/a-guide-to-aim.pdf 
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UK Listing Authority’s Listing Rules, which apply to companies 
seeking to list on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange, 
are significantly longer and more prescriptive” (A Guide to AIM, 
2010, p.38).  
However, researchers criticize the lighter regulatory environment of the AIM 
market and its lighter disclosure systems. For example, Mendoza (2008) describes 
the AIM market, which has lighter set of rules, as principles-based rules that provide 
listed firms with more flexibility to apply these rules through the comply-or-explain 
option. One feature of this option is that firms on the AIM market are not required to 
comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code rather they just need to explain 
why not to comply. 30  Further, prior research indicates that these sub-optimal 
disclosures and lighter corporate governance standards in the AIM market can lead 
to investors being easily manipulated and even defrauded (Dey, 2006, cited in 
Mendoza, 2008).31 For example, sub-optimal disclosures system can lead to a higher 
level of information asymmetry, while lower corporate governance standards can 
motivate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders.32 Other research 
indicates that illiquidity and under-pricing are considered as drawbacks of the AIM 
market (Litvintsev, 2009). 
Furthermore, and by discussing the disclosure system as explained in AIM 
rules, Gerakos et al. (2011) indicate that firms listed on the AIM market are required 
to disclose information about the following; price-sensitive non-public information, 
substantial transactions, related party transactions, reverse takeovers, and assets 
disposal that could have strong impact on the business. However, both Mendoza 
(2008) and Gerakos et al. (2011) point out that it is just the Nomads’ responsibility 
to determine the merits of disclosure and which information is considered as price-
                                            
30  “Main Market companies, being admitted to the Official List, are required to adhere to the 
Principles of Good Governance set out in the The UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the 
Combined Code), a set of guidelines designed to ensure that each listed company is headed by an 
effective board acting in the interests of all stakeholders in the company”.      
A Guide to AIM, 2010, p.38, available at, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-
advisors/aim/publications/documents/a-guide-to-aim.pdf   
31  Iain Dey, “you have to go into AIM with your eyes open”, The Telegraph, June 18th 2006. 
32 Heal and Palepu (2001) indicate that board of directors plays a significant role to monitor 
managers and, therefore, mitigate any agency problems that could occur between insiders and 
outsiders. 
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sensitive information, and also to make sure that all the previous disclosures are 
made without any manipulations by their advisee firms.33 Consistent with this view, 
Litvintsev (2009) explains the importance of Nomads on AIM market by indicating 
that the role of a Nomad, based on the Article 14 of the AIM Rules, is to decide 
whether a company is ready and meets the requirements to be listed on the AIM 
market, not ready yet to list, or should be delisted from the stock exchange. 
Litvintsev (2009) also indicates that Nomad’s roles on the AIM market are similar to 
the roles of the SEC in the US and the UKLA in the UK Main market. Mendoza 
(2008) mentioned that many commentators point out the fact that some of the 
Nomads on the AIM market are small and speculative as the firms for which they 
acts as adviser.34  Therefore, whether a firm listed on the AIM market will exhibit 
higher levels of disclosure and higher quality financial reporting is something to be 
decided and evaluated by its Nomad. 
Recent research shows evidence confirming the previous view on the 
negative impact of AIM lighter regulatory environment on disclosure systems and 
financial reporting quality of firms listed on the AIM market, and on the negative 
impact of lower reputable Nomads on AIM firms’ future performance. For example, 
Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2010) and Campbell and Tabner (2011) find firms that 
move from the Main market to the AIM market experience negative returns on the 
announcement day of the move, suggesting that investors react negatively to this 
news. Gerakos et al. (2011) find firms listed on the AIM market have higher levels 
of information asymmetry, higher failure rates, higher post-listing return 
underperformance, and lower levels of liquidity. Mendoza (2008) indicates that the 
AIM market has liquidity problems. Espenlaub et al. (2012) investigate whether the 
future performance of firms listed on the AIM market is affected by the reputation of 
their Nomads. Espenlaub et al. (2012) find evidence that lower quality Nomads have 
a negative impact on survivability of AIM firms.  
                                            
33 For more details please see AIM Rules For Companies, available at 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/advisers/rules/aim-rules-for-
companies.pdf 
34 For example, “Business: AIM Changes” BRIEFINGS, Mischon de Reya, (December 2006). 
http://www.mishcon.com/news/briefings. 
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Thus, and based on the above discussion, it is more likely that IPO firms on 
the AIM market will exhibit higher levels of information asymmetry and agency 
conflict and, therefore, managers of AIM IPO firms will have strong incentives and 
more flexibility to manage earnings upward at the end of the IPO year utilizing real 
and accrual earnings management to support high stock prices. 
5.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
First, the literature on real and accrual earnings management around IPOs is 
reviewed.  Second, a discussion is presented on how earnings management might 
differ according to the nature of the regulatory regime. Third, the potential 
consequences of real and accrual earnings management on post-IPO stock 
performance and the regulatory environments are reviewed. The existing evidence 
and research in each of these areas are discussed to build and state the hypotheses. 
5.3.1 Real and Accrual Earnings Management around IPOs  
In pursuit of analyzing the impact of the regulatory environment on earnings 
management, this chapter first examines whether IPO firms undertake real and 
accrual earnings management around IPOs. An IPO is considered to be one of the 
most important events in a firm’s life cycle and, therefore, IPO firms have very 
strong incentives to manage earnings upward around IPOs (e.g., Aharony et al., 
1993; Friedlan, 1994; Roosenboom et al., 2003). For example, IPO firms may 
engage in earnings management pre the IPO to increase the offer price. Brau and 
Fawcett (2006) surveyed more than 300 executives about IPOs and found evidence 
that historical earnings represent the most important positive signal that executives 
attempt to send to outside investors. 
Further, IPO firms have strong incentives to manage earnings upward at the 
end of the IPO year (at the end of the first year of being public firms) to maintain 
high stock prices. For example, Teoh et al. (1998a) examine earnings management 
around IPOs and argue that IPO firms are likely to manage earnings at the end of the 
IPO year to maintain high stock prices for the following reasons. First, entrepreneurs 
usually are restricted by the lock-up period from selling their shares immediately 
post the IPO date and, therefore, any reversal of performance of earnings would lead 
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to negative impacts on stock prices and eventually the entrepreneurs’ investment.35  
Consistent with this, Darrough and Rangan (2005) find evidence that managers 
reduce R&D expenses at the end of the IPO year to manage earnings upward, and 
this reduction in R&D expenses was motivated by managerial share selling as 
managers believe investors place greater emphasis on current earnings. Second, IPO 
firms face a high litigation risk especially when the firms manage earnings upward 
pre the IPO and that their reported earnings post-IPO decline compared with the pre-
IPO period. This in turn suggests, and as indicated by Teoh et al. (1998a), that IPO 
firms which manage earnings upward pre-IPO are likely to manage the first reported 
earnings post the IPO date. Third, IPO firms may provide earnings forecasts in the 
prospectuses and, therefore, they are under pressure to meet their earnings forecast 
to maintain good relations with investors, underwriters, analysts, and to avoid any 
reputation damage or any future litigation risks by shareholders due to a reversal of 
earnings in the post-IPO period. Gramlich and Sorensen (2004) find evidence that 
IPO firms engage in accrual manipulation at the end of the IPO year (the first 
reported earnings after the date of IPO) to meet earnings forecasts. Teoh et al. 
(1998c) also added that executive compensation is considered as a strong incentive 
to manage earnings upwards, notably that the time to exercise compensation options 
is usually after the IPO date with a lot of several months. 
Other studies have, however, documented evidence that questions the 
existence of accrual earnings management during IPOs (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 
2008; Armstrong et al., 2009; Cecchini et al., 2012). For example, Armstrong et al. 
(2009) find that the previous negative association between accrual-based 
manipulation and the subsequent stock return performance is an artifact of the 
mispricing of operating cash flows. Cecchini et al. (2012) examine the allowance for 
uncollectable accounts and bad debt expenses and find evidence that IPO firms 
manage earnings downward using more decreasing allowances. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) examine accrual accounting during the year pre IPO for 171 UK 
                                            
35A commitment to a lock-up period by IPO managers is considered as a positive signal about the 
IPO firm’s quality (Courteau, 1995; Brau et al., 2005).However, a long lock-up period may lead 
managers to manage earnings upward in the months immediately post the IPO date to maintain high 
stock prices. For the UK IPO sample that is examined by this thesis, the average lock-up is 14 months 
post the IPO date. This in turn implies that post-IPO poor stock returns will lead to negative 
consequences for insiders’ wealth.   
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IPOs, which have similar information and characteristics in the financial reports and 
the prospectuses, over the period 1995 -1999. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) present 
evidence that UK IPO firms provide high quality reporting, tending towards 
accounting conservatism, rather than accounting manipulation. They argue that IPO 
firms report conservatively in response to the expected demand for high quality 
reporting, which is enforced by efficient players in the capital market. 
However, Lo (2008) discusses Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) paper and 
points out the possibility that Ball and Shivakumar (2008) may exclude the IPO 
firms that managed earnings because their sample is restricted to firms that present 
similar information and categorization between the financial reports and the 
prospectuses. In the UK, IPO firms have the right to restate their financial reports for 
the periods before the IPO year, but they should mention this restatement in their 
prospectuses. Lo (2008) argues IPO firms that managed earnings are more likely to 
provide different information and categorisation between the prospectus and the 
financial reports in order to make it harder for the outside investors to discover and 
detect any earnings manipulation. In addition, Lo (2008) indicates that IPO firms 
can manage earnings utilizing real earnings management activities, which are not 
examined by Ball and Shivakumar (2008). 
In summary, although some recent research questions the existence of 
accrual earnings management around IPOs, the majority of prior studies find 
evidence that IPO firms engage in accrual-based manipulation around the IPO event. 
However, this chapter addresses the comments of Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and 
Armstrong et al. (2009) to avoid any measurement error when discretinary accruals 
are estimated. For example, and as suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2008), the 
cash flow approach is used to estimate discretionary accruals rather than balance 
sheet approach. Further, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) point out that prior research 
uses lagged total assets as a deflator in accruals models and this inflates 
discretionary accruals. They argue that IPO firms use IPO proceeds to invest in their 
assets and, therefore, using lagged total assets would lead to bias in accruals 
estimation. Thus, to overcome this problem this chapter follows Armstrong et al. 
(2009) and scales all variables by average assets rather than lagged total assets. 
Finally, Armstrong et al. (2009) find the negative association between discretionary 
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accruals and post-IPO stock return performance is an artifact of cash flow 
mispricing. Thus, this chapter controls for the absolute value of cash flows from 
operations when the impact of real and accrual earnings management for subsequent 
stock return performance is examined.  
Despite the extensive research on accrual earnings management, there has 
been limited research examining whether IPO firms engage in manipulating real 
activities. Darrough and Rangan (2005) for example show IPO firms reduce R&D 
expenses during the IPO year to increase reported earnings. They find that the 
reduction in R&D is motivated by managerial share selling as managers believe 
investors place greater emphasis on current earnings. Consistent with this view, 
Graham et al. (2005) provide evidence that executives are more willing to undertake 
real as opposed to accrual earnings management to manipulate reported earnings. 
Compared to accrual-based manipulation, real earnings management is harder for 
auditors, regulators, investors, etc to detect (Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen et al., 2008). Further, firms that have engaged extensively in accrual-
based manipulation in previous years have limited flexibility to utilize accrual 
earnings management for the current year because the balance sheet accumulates all 
the previous changes of accounting methods (Barton and Simko, 2002). Therefore, 
IPO firms that undertook extensive accrual-based manipulation in previous years are 
more likely to switch to real earnings management in the current period (Gunny, 
2010). 
One final factor that must be considered is accrual earnings management is a 
relatively risky means of meeting earnings targets as it occurs at the end of a fiscal 
year or quarter (Roychowdhury, 2006). If managers decided to manage earnings 
using accrual manipulation alone, and the amount being manipulated fell short of the 
desired threshold, there would be insufficient time to manage real activities at this 
time of the year to meet the earnings target. A recent paper by Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) finds that SEO firms engage simultaneously in real and accrual earnings 
management during the offer year, while prior literature focused extensively on 
accrual-based manipulation around the SEO year. Zang (2012) find evidence that 
managers utilize real activities-based throughout the fiscal year and then accrual-
based earnings management is adjusted at the end of fiscal year by the unrealized 
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amount of real activities to meet the desired threshold. Given the limited research 
examining real earnings management around IPOs, but based upon the evidence 
above, this chapter examines whether IPO firms in the UK engage in real and 
accrual earnings management around the IPO year. The first hypothesis, in 
alternative form, is therefore as follows:36 
HYPOTHESIS  1.  IPO firms in the UK exhibit evidence of real and accrual 
earnings management around the IPO year. 
5.3.2 Real and Accrual Earnings Management around IPOs and the 
Regulatory Environment  
The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the effect of the regulatory 
environment on real and accrual earnings management. While the Main market in 
the UK imposes restrictive regulation on IPOs, the AIM market has fewer 
requirements and imposes lighter regulation. For example, while the Main market 
requires the firms to comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code, the AIM 
market requires listing firms to have an appropriate corporate governance 
mechanism. The Nomad advises IPO firms about their corporate governance to 
ensure the integrity of the market. Therefore, whether AIM firms meet the 
requirements of effective corporate governance is something evaluated by the 
appointed Nominated Advisor.  
The role of corporate governance in mitigating the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders (Heal and Palepu, 2001) and, therefore, preventing real 
and accrual earnings management has been extensively researched (e.g., Yang and 
Krishnan, 2005; Cornett et al., 2008; Laux and Laux, 2009). Specifically, the 
literature finds evidence that the proportion of outside directors on the board, the 
separation of CEO and Chairman, and the independence of the audit committee are 
the most effective monitoring and mitigating factors on real and accrual earnings 
management (e.g., Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Osma, 2008). More recently, 
                                            
36 It is worth noting that Hypothesis 1 is not new to the literature and it has been already addressed by 
prior research based on IPOs setting e.g. Teoh et al., 1998a; Wongsunwai, 2012. However, it is 
necessary to examine such hypothesis in the thesis to prove consistency with prior literature. 
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Gerakos et al. (2011) find evidence that firms on the AIM market have a higher level 
of information asymmetry than firms on the Main market. By comparing firms listed 
on the AIM market with firms listed on the Main market and US markets, they find 
evidence that firms listed on the AIM market have higher levels of information 
asymmetry, failure rates, post-listing underperformance as well as lower liquidity. 
Trueman and Titman (1988), Schipper (1989) and Dechow and Skinner 
(2000) indicate that the existence of high levels of information asymmetry is one of 
the motivations for managers to engage in earnings management. Richardson (2000) 
explores the effect of information asymmetry on accrual earnings management and 
finds evidence that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry have higher 
levels of accrual-based manipulation. Moreover, Mendoza (2008) indicates that the 
AIM market has liquidity problems and recent research finds evidence that firms 
with lower levels of liquidity have higher levels of earnings management. For 
example, Chung et al. (2009) present evidence that firms with a high level of 
earnings management experience a lower level of stock liquidity.  
Given the above evidence that the AIM market is likely to exhibit higher 
levels of agency conflict and information asymmetry, it is expected that IPO firms 
on the AIM market will have strong incentives and more flexibility to engage in real 
and accrual earnings management than IPO firms on the Main market. Therefore, 
the second hypothesis is as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS  2.  IPO firms on the AIM market exhibit higher levels of real 
and accrual earnings management than IPO firms on the Main Market. 
5.3.3 Real and Accrual Earnings Management and Post-IPO Stock 
Performance under Different Regulatory Environments    
To further examine the impact of the regulatory environment on earnings 
management and post-IPO stock return performance, this chapter analyzes the 
association between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock 
returns performance and whether the regulatory environment impacts this 
association. Prior research examines the association between real and accrual 
earnings management, which take place around equity offerings (e.g. SEOs and 
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IPOs), and future operating and stock return performance. For example, Rangan 
(1998) finds evidence that SEO firms manage earnings upward during the SEO year 
and experience poor stock returns and operating performance in the subsequent 
periods. Given the extensive evidence on accruals manipulation, Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) extend previous literature by examining whether SEO firms engage in real 
earnings management activities around the SEO year and whether these activities 
are associated with future operating performance. They find evidence that real 
earnings management takes place during the offer year and predicts post-SEO 
operating underperformance. Further, Kothari et al. (2012) focus on post-SEO stock 
return performance and find evidence that real earnings management that occur 
during the SEO year is negatively associated with post-SEO stock return 
performance. More importantly, both Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. 
(2012) find evidence that real earnings management activities have more severe 
negative consequences for future operating and stock return performance than 
accrual earnings management. 
Focusing on IPOs setting, prior literature also finds IPO firms which manage 
earnings upward using accrual-based manipulation during IPOs experience poor 
stock returns in subsequent periods. For example, Teoh et al. (1998a) find IPO firms 
that have high levels of accrual earnings management during the IPO year 
experience poor stock returns for up to three years after the IPO year. In addition, by 
comparing post-IPO stock returns across different levels of accrual earnings 
management Teoh et al. (1998a) find the decline in stock returns is more severe for 
those firms that aggressively managed their earnings during the IPO. Further, Teoh 
et al. (1998c) finds similar evidence that higher accrual earnings management during 
the IPO year is associated with lower stock returns in the post-IPO period. 
Roosenboom et al. (2003) also find evidence that IPO firms with high levels of 
accrual earnings management during the IPO year experience poor stock returns 
post-IPO. Fan (2007) finds evidence that accruals manipulation that takes place 
during the IPO year predicts post-IPO operating underperformance, while Chang et 
al. (2010) examine the moderating role of prestigious underwriters on the 
association between accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock return 
performance. For IPO firms with less reputable underwriters, Chang et al. (2010) 
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find evidence that accrual earnings management during the IPO is associated with 
poor long-term stock returns performance.   
In addition, as the London Stock Exchange compromises two different 
regulatory environments, the AIM and the Main markets, it is expected that each 
market will have different mechanisms/capabilities to evaluate the stock prices of 
IPO firms that managed earnings in the IPO year. The Main market is considered to 
be one of the most developed markets in the world that gives listing firms a wide 
pool of capital and institutional investors (Arcot et al., 2007). In contrast, the AIM 
market imposes a lighter regulatory environment in order to provide small and 
growing firms with the opportunity to raise capital. As a consequence, it is less 
likely to attract the same attention of analysts and sophisticated investors as the 
Main market. Due to the existence of a much larger number of professional investors 
and much greater coverage by analysts, IPO firms on the Main market that managed 
earnings upward during the IPO are more likely to be punished in the following 
period by a re-evaluation of their stock prices relative to those firms that listed on 
the AIM market. Therefore, it is expected that IPO firms on the main market will 
experience greater long-run return underperformance due to real and accrual 
earnings management that take place at the end of the IPO year. Hence, the next 
hypotheses are as follows:37 
HYPOTHESIS 3a.  IPO firms that report high levels of real and/or accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year will experience poor stock 
return performance in the post-IPO period.  
HYPOTHESIS 3b.  IPO firms on the Main market that report high levels of real 
and/or accrual earnings management during the IPO year will 
experience, ceteris paribus, poorer stock return performance in the 
post-IPO period than those firms that listed on the AIM market. 
                                            
37 Hypothesis 3a is not new to the literature and it has been already addressed by prior research based 
on IPOs setting e.g. Teoh et al., 1998a. However, it is necessary to examine such hypothesis in the 
thesis to prove consistency with prior literature. 
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5.4 Research Methods and Data 
5.4.1 Data and Sample Construction 
The sample consists of 571 IPO firms that went public on either the Main or AIM 
markets between January 1998 and December 2008.38  All financial IPO firms are 
excluded from the sample due to differences in their financial reporting and 
disclosure requirements (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; 1998c; Chen et al., 2005; 
Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 2010; Lee and Masulis, 2011; 
Chahine et al., 2012; Wongsunwai, 2012). The sample also is restricted to all IPO 
firms with available prospectuses and the necessary data to allow analyzing real and 
accrual earnings management. This restriction results in the sample consisting of 
larger and more successful firms, and as noted by Cohen et al., (2008) and Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010), a more conservative test of earnings management. Further, this 
chapter follows prior research by excluding from the control sample (all UK non-
IPO firms) any group of firms with less than 6 observations for each 2-digit SIC 
code industry-year group. This restriction results in 174 portfolios (industry-year 
groups) with more than 6 observations: 147 out of the 174 had observations more 
than 10.39 The IPO year (0) is defined as the fiscal year during which the IPO 
occurs.40  
Data are collected using the following sources: (1) IPO firms are identified 
using the list of IPOs on the London Stock Exchange website for UK firms that were 
admitted to the AIM and Main markets during the period 1998-2008. This list 
provides information about IPOs such as, issue price, the date of an IPO, market 
capitalization, etc; (2) the ICC Plum and Lexis-Nexis databases were used to obtain 
information about the company identifier for IPO firms, such as the WorldScope and 
                                            
38 The London Stock Exchange provides information about IPOs on the Main market starting from 
1998 while information about IPOs on the AIM market starts from 1995. Therefore, and to be 
consistent, the sample covers the period 1998 - 2008. 
39 Also the analysis is repeated using 10 observations for each industry-year group and the results are 
qualitatively similar but this restriction leads to a large decrease in the sample size and so this chapter 
follows Rosner, (2003), Iqbal et al., (2009), and Athanasakou et al., (2011) and uses 6 observations. 
40 To overcome any misspecification of the financial year end, the financial data obtained from 
WorldScope are cross checked with the financial data in the prospectus and the results are 
qualitatively similar.  
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ISIN codes; (3) financial data for the IPO firms and for the control sample of all UK 
non-IPO firms were obtained from the WorldScope database; (4); WorldScope 
however, does not provide all the required financial data for the sample of IPO 
firms, therefore, IPO prospectuses were downloaded from the Thomson One Banker 
database and all missing financial data were manually collected from IPO 
prospectuses; (5) the DataStream database was used to collect the stock prices for 
the sample of IPOs and their matched firms; (6) data concerning audit quality were 
obtained from the Fame database. 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics for the AIM and Main IPO samples. 
The mean market capitalization for IPO firms on the AIM market is approximately 
£28 million and for IPO firms on the Main market is approximately £384 million. 
This large difference in market values between IPO firms on the AIM and Main 
markets is consistent with the view that the AIM market is dominated by small, 
growing IPO firms. However, the range of market values shows that some IPO firms 
with large market values listed on the AIM market. 
Table 5.3 reports the distribution of IPOs over the period from 1998 to 2008 
and shows that the years 2000, 2004, 2005, and 2006 account for more than 60% of 
the sample. In addition, one consequence of the recent global financial crisis is that 
the lowest number of IPOs in the sample is in 2008. Table 5.4 shows the frequency 
of IPOs relative to the industry standard classification, measured by 2-digit SIC 
codes. Except for the clustering in the Business Services industry, which accounts 
for 31% of the total sample, the majority of other industries have similar percentages 
of IPOs ranging from 1% to 10%. 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics for sample IPO firms during 1998-2008 
 Total assets  
(£ mill.) 
Net income  
(£ mill.) 
Market value 
 (£ mill.) 
Money raised  
(£ mill.) 
Panel A: Whole sample (n=571) 
Mean 56.12 1.93 113.93 43.41 
Median 4.47 -0.03 25.11 7.00 
Std. dev 233.90 25.38 302.19 136.22 
Minimum 0.07 -124.10 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Panel B: AIM sample (n=433) 
Mean 15.99 -0.15 27.73 10.82 
Median 2.73 -0.09 17.83 5.00 
Std. dev 102.53 5.30 32.67 26.43 
Minimum 0.07 -12.61 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 1969.10 74.25 183.06 388.97 
Panel C: Main sample (n=138) 
Mean 182.06 8.47 384.40 145.65 
Median 29.86 1.75 151.80 53.21 
Std. dev 416.43 50.35 528.58 247.21 
Minimum 0.07 -124.10 6.11 0.55 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Table 5.2 presents sample descriptive statistics for the pooled, AIM, and Main Market IPO firms over the period 
1998-2008. Total assets are the beginning of period total assets; net income at the end of the IPO year; market 
value is the market capitalization for IPO firms immediately after the listing; and money raised is the offer 
amount of the IPO. Total assets and net income are obtained from the WorldScope database; market value and 
money raised are obtained from the London Stock Exchange website. 
 
Table 5.3 Time distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008 
 
AIM market Main Market Whole Sample 
Year Freq % Freq % Freq % 
1998 14 3.23 21 15.22 35 6.13 
1999 16 3.70 13 9.42 29 5.08 
2000 59 13.63 44 31.88 103 18.04 
2001 39 9.01 4 2.90 43 7.53 
2002 24 5.54 11 7.97 35 6.13 
2003 19 4.39 4 2.90 23 4.03 
2004 84 19.40 13 9.42 97 16.99 
2005 85 19.63 9 6.52 94 16.46 
2006 61 14.09 9 6.52 70 12.26 
2007 30 6.93 10 7.25 40 7.01 
2008 2 0.46 -    - 2 0.35 
Total 433 100.00 138 100.00 571 100.00 
Table 5.3 presents the frequency of IPO firms by year over the period 1998-2008 
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Table 5.4 Industry distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008 
  SIC AIM market Main Market Whole Sample  
Industry                                                  2-digit  Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Oil & gas extraction                                                         13 20 4.62 6 4.35 26 4.55 
Food products                                                  20 8 1.85 3 2.17 11 1.93 
Printing and publishing                                                        27 12 2.77 1 0.72 13 2.28 
Chemicals and allied products                                            28 28 6.60 9 6.52 37 6.48 
Industrial machinery                 35 16 3.50 2 1.45 16 2.80 
Electronic equipment                                36 28 6.47 8 5.80 36 6.30 
Instruments and related 
products                                        
38 16 3.70 7 5.07 25 4.21 
Communications 48 20 4.62 7 5.07 27 4.73 
Electric, gas, and sanitation                                   49 9 2.08 1 0.72 10 1.75 
Durable goods                                         50 7 1.62 4 2.90 11 1.93 
Eating and drinking 
establishments 
58 13 3.00 2 1.45 15 2.63 
Retail 59 5 1.15 3 2.17 8 1.40 
Business services                                                                   73 129 29.79 53 38.41 182 31.87 
Media and entertainment 78 6 1.39 2 1.45 8 1.40 
Amusement and recreation                                       79 24 5.54 3 2.17 27 4.73 
Engineering and management   87 49 11.32 9 6.52 58 10.16 
All others - 43 9.93 18 13.04 61 10.68 
Total   433 100.00 138 100.00 571 100.00 
Table 5.4 presents the frequency of IPO firms by industry over the period 1998-2008. 
 
5.4.2 Event periods 
This thesis focuses on examining real and accrual earnings management that take 
place at the end of the fiscal year. For example, if the IPO date was 14
th
 July  2005 
for firm X and the fiscal year for this firm starts at 1
st
 January and ends at 31
st
 of 
December, then real and accrual earnings management for firm X are estimated at 
the end of the fiscal year, which is at the 31
st
 of December 2005. For the years pre 
and post the IPO year, real and accrual earnings management are also estimated at 
the end of the fiscal year. This approach of estimating earnings management is 
consistent with prior research that examines earnings management around IPOs (e.g. 
Teoh et al. 1998a; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; 
Morsfield and Tan, 2006) and SEOs (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010). Figure 5.1 depicts the time periods when real and accrual earnings 
management are estimated. 
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Figure 5.1 Time periods analyzed and regulatory environments  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
  
                                                                                    Year -1
Real and accrual earnings management activities are estimated at the end of 
each fiscal year, over the period two years prior to the IPO year, the IPO year, 
and three years after the IPO year.  
 
Year 0 Year +3 
IPO date  
Fiscal year pre the IPO 
year (Year -1) 
 
Fiscal year during which the IPO 
occurs (Year 0= the IPO year) 
Year -2 Year +1 Year +2 Year +4 
Year +5 
Fiscal year post the IPO year (Year +1) 
 
This chapter examines the impact of the regulatory environments on real and accrual 
earnings management activities that take place at the end of the IPO year   
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5.4.3 Variable Measurement  
5.4.3.1 Measuring Accrual-based Earnings Management  
This chapter follows prior research (e.g. Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Fan, 2007; 
Cohen and Zarowin; 2010) by using the cash flows approach to estimate accruals 
measures. Following this approach total accruals are defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations. The advantage of cash flows 
approach over other approaches is to examine all accrual manipulations that are 
conducted using either current accruals (short-term) or non-current accruals (long-
term). For example, current accrual manipulation can be conducted through delay 
the recognition of expenses and accelerate the recognition of revenues, while non-
current accrual manipulation can be conducted through e.g. decelerating 
depreciation policies, reducing deferral tax, and realizing unusual gains (e.g., Teoh 
et al., 1998a, 1998b; 1998c; Chang et al., 2010; Chahine et al. 2012). Thus, total 
accruals are decomposed into discretionary accruals (related to manager discretion) 
and non-discretionary accruals (related to economic circumstances and outside 
managers’ control) (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a). 
To estimate discretionary accruals, and following prior research in earnings 
management, the Dechow et al. (1995) cross-sectional adaptation of the modified 
Jones (1991) model is used. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) point out estimating 
discretionary accruals for IPO firms using lagged total assets to scale accrual 
variables may inflate the measure of accruals in the current year. They argue that 
lagged total assets are qualitatively smaller than total assets at the end of the IPO 
year because IPO firms tend to use proceeds to invest in assets. In order to overcome 
this problem, this chapter follows Armstrong et al. (2009) and scales all variables by 
average total assets rather than lagged total assets.41 A cross-sectional regression is 
used for each year for all UK non-IPO firms for each 2-digit SIC industry category. 
This approach, in part, controls for changes in economic conditions that impact on 
total accruals across different industry groups, but allows for coefficients to vary 
through time (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010, Kasznik, 1999; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
                                            
41 The analysis is also repeated by scaling all variables by lagged total assets and the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter. 
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1994). In addition, return on assets is added to the model as suggested by Kothari et 
al. (2005) in order to control for extreme operating performance as this can bias the 
estimation of discretionary accruals. Then, the estimated coefficients are taken to 
estimate discretionary accruals for the IPO firm. Normal accruals are, therefore, 
estimated using the following cross-sectional regression for each industry and year 
for all non-IPO firms:42 
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Where TAi,t is total accruals defined as earnings before extraordinary items minus 
cash flows from operations; AvAssetsi,t is the sum of total assets at the beginning of 
the year and the total assets at the end of the year divided by 2; ∆SALESi,t  is the 
change in sales during a year scaled by average total assets; PPEi,t  is the gross value 
of property, plant and equipment scaled by average total assets; and ROAi,t  is return 
on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items scaled by average total 
assets. 
The coefficient estimates from equation (5.1) are used to estimate normal accruals 
(NAi,t) for all IPO firms in each year and industry as follows, 
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∆ RECi,t  is the change in receivables during the year scaled by average total assets.  
Discretionary accruals (DAi,t) are measured as the difference between total accruals 
and fitted normal accruals where, 
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For robustness this chapter also repeats this analysis using performance-
matched discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. (2005). Therefore, each IPO 
                                            
42 To take account of extreme values all variables are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. 
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firm is matched with a non-IPO firm based on year, 2-digit SIC industry code and 
the closest return on assets (+/- 0.20 of IPO firms’ return on assets). The results 
using the performance-matched discretionary accruals are qualitatively similar to 
those reported where return on assets is added as a control variable to the model. 
The imposition of the above restriction, however, reduces the sample by 20% as the 
appropriate matches are only available for 80% of the IPO sample. As the results are 
qualitatively similar, the results are reported based on the larger sample size that 
simply controls for return on assets. 
5.4.3.2 Measuring Real Earnings Management 
Following prior research real earnings management proxies are estimated based on 
models of real earnings management developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and applied 
by Roychowdhury (2006). Later researchers such as Wongsunwai, (2012), Zang, 
(2012), Cohen and Zarowin, (2010), and Cohen et al., (2008) also apply these 
models to estimate real earnings management. This chapter examines two real 
earnings management activities; sales-based manipulation and reducing 
discretionary expenses.43  Sales-based manipulation leads to lower levels of cash 
flows from operations, and can be managed through offering more price discounts 
and/or more lenient credit terms (see Roychowdhury, 2006). Discretionary expenses 
meanwhile represent the sum of research and development expenses (R&D), 
advertising expenses, and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A). 
Reducing discretionary expenses in the current period will boost reported earnings 
in the current period. In addition, where discretionary expenses are paid for in cash, 
any reduction in these expenses will increase cash flows in the current period 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Similar to the estimation of the measures of accrual 
earnings management all variables are scaled by average total assets.44 First, the 
                                            
43 Production cost manipulation is not considered within the analysis of real earnings management as 
this method can only be fully utilized by manufacturing companies (Roychowdhury, 2006) and 
manufacturing companies make up just 26.6% of the total sample which corresponds to 21.1 % of the 
AIM market sample and just 5.5% of the Main market sample.   
44 The test is also repeated by scaling all the variables by lagged total assets and the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter.  
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normal level of cash flows from operations is estimated using the following cross-
sectional regression for each industry and year for all non-IPO firms:45 
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Where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations for firm i at period t . The abnormal CFO 
for IPO firms is calculated as actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO estimated 
using the coefficients from regression (5.4). 
The normal level of discretionary expenses can be expressed as a linear function of 
contemporaneous sales as follows:  
(5.5)t,i
t,i
t,i
2
t,i
10
t,i
t,i
ε
AvAssets
SALES
β
AvAssets
1
βα
AvAssets
DISX

 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) point out, however, that 
estimating a normal level of discretionary expenses as specified in regression (5.5) 
can lead to poor estimation where firms manage sales upwards to increase reported 
earnings during any year. If a firm has managed sales upwards, this will result in 
unusually low residuals from running the regression as specified above. In order to 
overcome this problem, discretionary expenses are estimated as a function of lagged 
sales. This chapter, therefore, follows Roychowdhury (2006) and estimates the 
normal level of discretionary expenses for the IPO firms as follows, 
(5.6)
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DISXi,t is, therefore, calculated as the sum of, SG&A, R&D, and advertising 
expenses for firm i at period t. SALESi,t-1 is sales during the previous year. The 
abnormal level of discretionary expenses for IPO firms is calculated as actual 
                                            
45 To take account of extreme values all variables are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. 
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discretionary expenses minus the normal level of discretionary expenses estimated 
using the coefficients from regression (5.6). 
In order to measure the total effect of real earnings management, and 
following Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), the abnormal level of 
cash flows from operations and the abnormal level of discretionary expenses are 
combined to compute an aggregate measure of real earnings management. 
Specifically, abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary 
expenses are multiplied by -1, and then calculated as one aggregate measure. A 
higher amount of this aggregate measure implies that IPO firms are more likely to be 
manipulating sales to increase reported earnings and cutting discretionary expenses. 
5.4.3.3 Measuring Long-run Stock Price Performance   
Measuring long-run stock return performance is not without controversy as most 
long-term return anomalies change when methodologies change (Fama, 1998). This 
chapter, therefore, follows previous research and measures abnormal returns using 
two methods; namely, buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR). 46 Both BHAR and CAR are computed as the difference 
between the return for IPO firms and matched non-IPO firms starting 4 months after 
the date of the IPO to 3 years after the date of the IPO (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; 
Roosenboom at al., 2003).47 In addition, a matched sample is created from all UK 
non-IPO firms following Lyon et al. (1999). A firm is included in the matched 
sample if its market capitalization is between 70% and 130% of the IPO firms’ 
market value; then it will be matched with the closest book-to-market ratio to the 
IPO firms.48 If the IPO firm is delisted prior to the IPO returns’ ending date the 
                                            
46 The results are consistent using both BHAR and CAR and, therefore, this chapter presents only the 
BHAR results.  
47 To allow for a reporting lag and following Teoh et al. (1998a), the buy and hold returns are 
calculated starting from month 4, while matched sample are used to correct for the risk characteristics 
of IPO firms.   
48 The matching approach is consistent with Kothari et al. (2012) who match on post-issuance 
characteristics rather than pre-issuance. Kothari et al. (2012) indicate that equity offerings may 
change the risk characteristics of the firms and, therefore, matching on post-issuance reduces the 
complications of these changes.  
. 
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returns of the IPO firm and its matched firm are set to zero, while if the matched 
firm is delisted prior to the ending date it is replaced, on a point-forward basis, with 
another matched firm to avoid survivorship bias in the matched sample. The mean 
BHAR is calculated as follows 
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Where Ri,t is the monthly return for firm i in month t and Rbenchmark,t  is the monthly 
return for the benchmark in month t.                                                                                                                                                                                                           
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Empirical Evidence on Earnings Management around IPOs 
Table 5.5 presents time-series profiles of mean and median discretionary accruals, 
abnormal cash flows from operations (Sales), abnormal discretionary expenses, and 
aggregate real earnings management for years -2 to +3 relative to the IPO year 
which is year 0. The results are interpreted on the basis of median values. For 
discretionary accruals, a significant and positive coefficient indicates income-
increasing accrual-based earnings management. As noted above, to allow the 
measures of real earnings management to have the same interpretation as the 
measure of accrual-based earnings management, both abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by -1. A significant 
and positive coefficient for abnormal cash flows from operations or abnormal 
discretionary expenses can therefore be interpreted as being consistent with income-
increasing real earnings management. In addition, a significant and positive 
coefficient on the measure of aggregate real earnings management also indicates 
income-increasing real earnings management.    
Table 5.5 shows that IPO firms in the UK engage extensively in real and 
accrual-based earnings management during and after the IPO year. Consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Friedlan (1994), Teoh et al. (1998a), and Morsfield and Tan 
(2006)), Table 5.5 presents evidence of significant positive discretionary accruals. 
IPO firms, therefore, manage earnings upward using accrual-based earnings 
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management during the IPO year. However, no evidence is found on accruals 
manipulation during the year pre IPO. This result is consistent with Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) that IPO firms in the UK do not manage accrual accounting pre 
the IPO.49 The results also show that IPO firms manage earnings upwards in the 
post-IPO period, and the level of discretionary accruals increases above the IPO year 
level in the post-IPO year but is lower in years +2 and +3. 
In addition, and most importantly, Table 5.5 reports the median abnormal 
cash flows from operations during the IPO year is significant and positive. This is 
consistent with income-increasing real earnings management being undertaken. In 
the post-IPO period the level of real earnings management decreases, as the median 
abnormal cash flows from operations, despite remaining significant and positive, is 
closer to zero. 
Table 5.5 also shows that IPO firms do not manage earnings upward using 
discretionary expenses. One possible explanation for this result is that discretionary 
expenses-based manipulation is associated with higher future litigation risks. Sohn 
(2011) conducted a survey with big 4 audit firms and found that 34.1% of the 
respondents admitted that real earning management is associated with a higher 
future litigation risk. Further, and consistent with the importance of discretionary 
expenses, Demers and Joos (2007) find evidence that IPO firms with lower levels of 
R&D and SG&A spending pre-IPO have a lot higher probability of future failure. 
Therefore, an abnormal reduction of discretionary expenses is likely to attract the 
attention of underwriters and auditors, especially if the IPO firms exhibit high levels 
of sales.  
                                            
49 The evidence of no earnings management during the year pre the IPO can be attributed to several 
reasons. For example, it is well-known that IPO firms usually time their offerings to take advantage 
of the hot market period (e.g., Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Lowry and Schwert, 2002). This in turn does 
not allow having enough time to plan earnings management ahead. Further, Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) indicate that IPO firms report more conservatively during the year pre the IPO year in order to 
improve the quality of their financial reporting, so IPO firms can meet the market demand of high 
quality financial reporting during the IPO year. Other reason can be that many of IPO original shares 
holders are restricted by the lock-up period from selling their shares after the IPO directly. Thus, 
managing earnings pre the IPO would make it too difficult to manage earnings in the following years 
where the lock-up period will be terminated. For example, for IPOs sample the average lock-up 
period is 14 months after the IPO date. 
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Finally, examining the overall level of manipulation via real earnings 
management, Table 5.5 shows that the median aggregate measure of real earnings 
management during the IPO year is positive and statistically significant indicating 
that in aggregate, IPO firms are manipulating real earnings upwards. The aggregate 
measure of real earnings management declines in the year after the IPO year but 
remains significant. 
Collectively, the results presented in Table 5.5 support the first hypothesis 
that IPO firms manage earnings upward utilizing both sales-based and accrual-based 
earnings management techniques. Accrual-based earnings management results are 
consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2008) who find IPO firms in the UK report 
more conservatively during the year pre the IPO and with prior research that reports 
evidence on accrual earnings management during and after IPOs (see Teoh et al., 
1998a; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 2010). Further, the results 
show that IPO firms also engage in sales-based manipulation during the IPO year, 
and subsequent to the IPO year. While prior research focuses on accrual 
manipulations around IPOs, this chapter provides the first evidence to the literature 
that IPO firms engage in sales-based manipulation around IPOs to manage earnings 
upward. This evidence also suggests that the first year post-IPO is important as the 
level of accrual-based earnings management increases and the level of sales-based 
manipulation remains at around the same level. 
Table 5.6 shows the correlations between discretionary accruals, abnormal 
cash flows from operations, and abnormal discretionary expenses during the IPO 
year. Similar to prior research, the results show a significant positive correlation 
between discretionary accruals and abnormal cash flows from operations. This high 
positive correlation can be explained by IPO firms engaging in accrual-based 
manipulation and sales-based manipulation at the same time (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
In addition, the correlation coefficient between abnormal cash flows from operations 
and abnormal discretionary expenses is negative and statistically significant. This 
negative correlation is consistent with prior literature where a significant negative 
correlation between real earnings management activities has been found (e.g., Cohen 
et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010).  
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Table 5.5 Time-series profiles of real and accrual earnings management 
Year -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Discretionary accruals   
Median 0.007 0.007 0.018*** 0.046*** 0.010* 0.015** 
Mean -0.099 -0.051 0.022 0.042*** 0.029* 0.031*** 
Abnormal cash flows from operations   
Median -0.014 0.009 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
Mean -0.167 0.065 0.061** 0.080*** 0.098*** 0.086*** 
 Abnormal discretionary expenses  
Median -0.011 -0.010 0.023 -0.003 -0.017** -0.003 
Mean 0.125 -0.088 0.031 -0.024 -0.059** -0.076*** 
Aggregate real earnings management  
Median 0.035 0.013 0.073*** 0.051*** 0.045* 0.011 
Mean -0.042 -0.023 0.092*** 0.055*** 0.038 0.010 
N 98 159 571 387 388 323 
*, **, *** Denote significantly different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Differences in medians are tested using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and differences in means are tested using 
t-tests. Table 5.5 presents the time-series profiles of median and mean discretionary accruals, abnormal cash 
flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses and aggregate real earnings management for the pooled 
sample over the period two years prior to the IPO year, the IPO year, and three years after the IPO year. The IPO 
year is year 0. To avoid the influence of outliers all continuous financial data are Winsorized at the top 1% and 
bottom 99%. Discretionary accruals are the difference between total accruals and normal accruals, which are 
estimated according to the cash flow approach using the corrected version of the modified Jones (1991) model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) as follows: 
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where TAi,t is total accruals defined as, earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations, ∆ 
SALES i,t  is the change in sales during a year,  PPE i,t  is the gross value of property, plant and equipment, all 
variables are scaled by AvAssets i,t  which is the sum of total assets at the beginning of the year and the total 
assets at the end of the year divided by 2. ROA i,t is return on assets measured as earnings before extraordinary 
items divided by average total assets. Abnormal cash flows from operations are estimated as the deviations from 
the predicted values from the following industry-year regressions from a sample of UK non-IPO firms:  
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where CFOi,t is the cash flows from operations for firm i at period t. Abnormal discretionary expenses is the 
difference between actual discretionary expenses and the normal level of discretionary expenses, estimated as the 
deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-year regressions from a sample of UK non-IPO 
firms: 
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where DISXi,t is the sum of selling, general and administrative expenses, research and development expenses, 
and advertising expenses for firm i at period t. Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary 
expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual earnings management proxies to have the same 
interpretation. The aggregate measure of real earnings management is the sum of abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
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Table 5.6 Correlation matrix of earnings management proxies 
 Discretionary 
accruals 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations  
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
Aggregate real 
earnings 
management 
Discretionary 
accruals 
1 0.679*** -0.167*** 0.386*** 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations (Sales) 
0.681*** 1 -0.431*** 0.379*** 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
-0.215*** -0.425*** 1 0.670*** 
Aggregate real 
earnings 
management 
0.327*** 0.313*** 0.610*** 1 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Table 5.6 presents 
Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations between earnings management 
proxies during the IPO year for the sample of initial public offerings over the period 1998-2008. Discretionary 
accruals are estimated using corrected version of the modified Jones (1991) model (Dechow et al., 1995). 
Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models 
developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and as implemented by Roychowdhury, (2006). Abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual earnings 
management proxies to have the same interpretation. The aggregate measure of real earnings management is the 
sum of abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
 
5.5.2 Empirical Evidence on Earnings Management around IPOs 
under Different Regulatory Environments 
In order to examine the effect of the regulatory environment on real and accrual 
earnings management, the IPO sample is split by market i.e. AIM and Main. Table 
5.7 (Panel A) reports time-series profiles of median and mean real and accrual 
earnings management activities for IPO firms on the AIM market. The median 
discretionary accruals during the IPO year is positive and highly significant. In 
addition, discretionary accruals also increase above the IPO year level in the 
following year and remain highly significant. In years +2 and +3 the level of 
discretionary accruals then declines below the IPO year level, but remains 
significant. Similar evidence is reported for sales-based manipulation where the 
median abnormal cash flows from operations during the IPO year is positive and 
highly significant. Again, in the year after the IPO an increased level of sales-based 
manipulation occurs relative to the IPO year, and this then reduces in years +2 and 
+3 while remaining statistically significant.  
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However, there is no evidence of abnormal discretionary expenses 
manipulation either during the IPO year or the year after the IPO year. This is due to 
the fact that a higher level of sales is expected to be combined with a higher level of 
spending on selling and advertising expenses. Thus, IPO firms that simultaneously 
engage in sales-based and discretionary expenses-based manipulations are likely to 
bring the attention of outsiders e.g. high quality auditors, prestigious underwriters, 
etc. Further, a lower level of discretionary expenses around IPOs is found to be 
associated with a higher probability of IPO failure risks (Demers and Joos, 2007) 
and, therefore, higher potential litigation risks. 
In summary, the results of Table 5.7 (Panel A) show that IPO firms on the 
AIM market engage extensively in accrual-based earnings management and sales-
based manipulation during the IPO year and the year after the IPO. In addition, the 
levels of real and accrual earnings management during the post-IPO year are greater 
than the levels observed in the IPO year. This is consistent with the view that, IPO 
firms who manage earnings upward during the IPO year are likely to continue to do 
so in the year after the IPO to avoid disappointing the market about their 
performance (see for example, Jain and Kini, 1994).  
Panel B of Table 5.7 reports the results for IPO firms on the Main market.  
The results of Panel B show that real and accrual earnings management are less 
prevalent in the Main market compared to the AIM market. The median 
discretionary accruals during the IPO year can be seen to be statistically 
insignificant, and despite the level of discretionary accruals increasing in the year 
after the IPO, it remains insignificant. The median abnormal level of cash flows 
from operations during the IPO year is also insignificant. Further, the median 
abnormal discretionary expenses during the IPO year are insignificant. These 
preliminary results suggest that IPO firms on the Main market, therefore, exhibit 
little evidence of real and accrual earnings management around IPOs.50   
It worthwhile to mention that the reported results in Table 5.7 (Panels A and 
B) cannot be interpreted in the context of differences in the regulatory environments 
                                            
50 It is worth noting that Table 5.7 (Panel B) shows that the mean of abnormal cash flows from 
operations during the IPO year is positive and statistically significant indicating that there is some 
sales-based manipulation taking place in the Main market.  
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unless many other covariates (which are found to be associated with real and accrual 
earnings management) are controlled. In the next section OLS regressions are used 
to control for the impact of these covariates. 
Table 5.7 Time-series profiles of real and accrual earnings management of AIM and 
Main IPOs 
Year -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Panel A: AIM Market  
Discretionary accruals   
Median 0.017 0.009 0.038*** 0.055*** 0.015* 0.016** 
Mean -0.130 -0.020 0.034* 0.055*** 0.018* 0.029** 
Abnormal cash flows from operations   
Median -0.020 0.009 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 
Mean -0.230 0.035 0.060** 0.110*** 0.119*** 0.100*** 
 Abnormal discretionary expenses  
Median 0.002 -0.025 0.039 0.004 -0.020** -0.010 
Mean 0.170 -0.028 0.033 -0.041* -0.080*** -0.090*** 
Aggregate real earnings management 
Median 0.050 0.004 0.112*** 0.074*** 0.054 0.002 
Mean -0.052 -0.023 0.125*** 0.079*** 0.047 0.008 
N 72 119 433 285 289 241 
Panel B: Main Market  
Discretionary accruals   
Median -0.008 0.003 -0.009 0.014 0.002 0.006 
Mean -0.010 -0.020 0.020 0.008 0.018 0.031 
Abnormal cash flows from operations   
Median -0.002 0.008 0.032 0.015 0.005 -0.002 
Mean 0.005 0.068 0.058** 0.017 0.032 0.045 
 Abnormal discretionary expenses  
Median -0.022 -0.005 -0.012 -0.005 -0.012 -0.002 
Mean -0.018 -0.093 -0.062* -0.031 -0.016 -0.028 
Aggregate real earnings management 
Median -0.011 0.042 0.021 0.030 0.026 0.023 
Mean -0.013 -0.024 -0.007 -0.012 0.015 0.017 
N 26 40 138 102 99 82 
*, **, *** Denote significantly different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Differences in medians are tested using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and differences in means are tested using 
t-tests. Table 5.7 presents the time-series profiles of median and mean real and accrual earnings management 
activities for the AIM and Main IPO samples over the period two years prior to the IPO year, the IPO year, and 
three years after the IPO year. All other variables are previously defined.  
5.5.3 Earnings Management during IPOs under Different Regulatory 
Environments 
5.5.3.1 Regression of Earnings Management during IPOs under 
Different Regulatory Environments 
This chapter further tests the differences in real and accrual earnings management of 
IPO firms across the AIM and Main markets using the following OLS regression:  
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Where (EM i,t) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings management 
during the IPO year and (AIM) is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the IPO firms 
trade on AIM market and zero for firms trading on the Main market. In the above 
OLS regression abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary 
expenses are multiplied by -1. Thus, all real and accrual earnings management 
proxies have the same interpretation with respect to the regulatory environment. 
Further, this chapter follows prior research (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; 
Gerakos et al., 2011) by using the percentile rank of all variables (dependent and 
independent) in the regression models to avoid an outliers problem.51 
Based on prior research (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; Fan, 2007; Cohen et al., 
2008; Chi et al., 2011), a set of control variables is added to the model that are found 
to be associated with real and accrual earnings management.52 The possible impact 
of a size effect is controlled by adding the natural logarithm of market value 
(LnSize) to the model, calculated as the offer price multiplied by the number of 
outstanding shares on the first day of listing. In addition, returns variability 
(Volatility) is added as a control variable measured as the annualized standard 
diviation of daily stock returns. Gerakos et al. (2011) find evidence that firms listed 
                                            
51 Following Leone et al. (2012), the percentile rank are used for both dependent and independent 
variables. Leone et al. (2012) point out that Winsorizing just the independent variables without 
considering the dependent variable leads to estimation bias of the coefficient. 
52  Executives’ compensation is also a significant driver of earnings management (Cheng and 
Warfield 2005). As a robustness test, directors’ remuneration is included into the model as a control 
variable. This reduces the sample size by 50% as this variable (directors’ remuneration) is not 
available for the whole sample. After including directors’ remuneration as an explanatory variable, 
similar evidence is found that IPO firms on the AIM market exhibit higher levels of accrual earnings 
management than IPO firms on the Main market. Further, the coefficient of directors’ remuneration is 
found to be a positive and statistically significant at 10% level when the abnormal cash flows from 
operations is the dependent variable. This confirms the view that executives’ equity compensation is 
positively associated with earnings manipulation (Cheng and Warfield 2005). Also, a positive 
coefficient of directors’ remuneration is found when the aggregate measure of real earnings 
management and discretionary accruals are the dependent variables, but this coefficient is not 
statistically significant. Thus, directors’ remuneration is excluded from the model to avoid the large 
decrease in the sample size.  
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on the AIM market have higher levels of post-listing stock return underperformance 
compared with firms listed on the Main market and other developed US markets. 
Thus, firms may engage in higher levels of earnings management to avoid 
disappointing the markets about their operating performance, which is positively 
associated with the stock prices performance. Further, as DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) show, firms that have a higher level of debt have higher incentives to manage 
earnings, therefore, leverage (Lev) measured as total debtt/total assetst-1 is added as a 
control variable.  
In order to control for growth opportunities the model includes book-to-
market (BM); calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity. IPO firm age [Ln(1+age)] measured as the natural logarithm of 1+IPO firm 
age, where firm age is calculated as the difference between the founding date of the 
firm and the date of its IPO. Capital expenditure growth (CapexGrowth) which is 
computed as capital expenditure during the IPO year minus the capital expenditure 
in the previous year scaled by total assets in the year prior to the IPO year (e.g., 
Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010). 
Prior research finds evidence that higher quality auditors play a significant 
monitoring role in detecting and mitigating accrual-based earnings management 
(e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003) and that this effective 
monitoring of accrual-based earnings management leads firms to engage in a higher 
level of real earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011). 
Therefore, two variables are added to control for auditor quality; (Big N) a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm’s auditor is a Big N audit firm and zero 
otherwise, and (AudTenure) a continues variable that measures the cumulative 
number of years of the auditor-client relationship.53 
In addition, prior research shows IPO firms that are backed by venture 
capitalists or have a high profile underwriter have lower levels of real and accrual 
earnings management (e.g., Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Lee and Masulis, 2011; 
                                            
53 The classification for audit firms as big8, big 6, big 5, and big4 is changed over time after series of 
merger to become now as big 4 audit firms. 
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Wongsunwai, 2012). Therefore, venture capitalist (VC) and underwriter 
(Underwriter) dummy variables are added to control for the monitoring effect that 
these financial intermediaries may have on the earnings management activities of 
the firm.54 In order to control for profitability ROA is included to the model (e.g., 
Kothari et al., 2005; Gunny, 2010) while a dummy variable for firms that have 
reported a loss (Loss) is added as prior evidence shows that firms that have reported 
a loss are more likely to manage earnings (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006). The absolute 
value of cash flows from operations [Abs(CFO)] is added to control for the impact 
of operating cash flows (Dechow et al., 1995). 
Further, prior research finds evidence that effective corporate governance 
constrains real and accrual earnings management activities (.e.g., Klein, 2002; Xie et 
al., 2003; Osma, 2008). Thus, the model includes (OutDirectors) measured as the 
percentage of outside directors on the board, (BrdSize) is the number of directors on 
the board, and (Chrm/CEO) is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the chairman of the 
board and the CEO is the same director and zero otherwise. Also, equity retention 
(RetaiOwnership) measured as the percentage of retained ownership by insiders is 
added to control for the ownership structure. Fan (2007) finds evidence that retained 
ownership is associated with earnings management during the IPO. Finally (IND) 
and (Year) dummies are added to control for industry and time effects, respectively. 
Table 5.8 reports the results and shows evidence that IPO firms on the AIM 
market exhibit higher levels of abnormal cash flows from operations and accrual 
earnings management and lower levels of abnormal discretionary expenses than IPO 
firms on the Main market. Specifically, the results show positive coefficients of 
0.068 (P <0.10) and 0.093 (P<0.05) on AIM in the abnormal cash flows from 
operations and discretionary accruals regressions, respectively. This evidence also is 
consistent with the results in Table 5.7 that IPO firms on the AIM market exhibit 
higher levels of abnormal cash flows from operations and discretionary accruals 
                                            
54 Prestigious underwriters are those global investment banks as defined by Derrien and Kecskes 
(2007), while venture capitalist are those investors who hold more than 3 % of a firm’s shares and 
appear in the list of venture capitalists provided by British Venture Capitalist Association. 
Specifically, data are collected from the prospectuses about all the shareholders who hold more than 
3% of the total shares and then shareholder’s name is matched with a list of venture capitalists, which 
is obtained from the British Venture Capitalist Association. 
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during the IPO year. Further, Table 5.8 reports a negative coefficient of -0.091 
(p<0.05) on AIM in the abnormal discretionary expenses regression. This evidence 
suggests that IPO firms on the AIM market exhibit a lower level of discretionary 
expenses manipulation than IPO firms on the Main market. 
For AIM IPO firms, and by comparing between sales-based, discretionary 
expenses-based and accrual-based manipulations, it seems that an abnormal 
reduction of discretionary expenses is associated with higher future litigation risks 
than the other activities for the following reason. IPO firms that simultaneously 
engage in sales-based and discretionary expenses-based manipulations are likely to 
bring the attention of auditors, underwriters, analysts, etc. This is due to the fact that 
a high level of sales is normally expected to be combined with a high level of 
selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) and advertising expenses. Therefore, 
IPO firms that intend to manage earnings upward utilizing real activities are likely to 
choose between either sales-based or discretionary expenses-based manipulations. 
Thus, and given the fact that sales-based manipulation is hard to be detect by 
outsiders, notably that IPO firms will be in an upward tragedy in terms of sales 
growth around IPOs, it is expected IPO firms on the AIM market (which have strong 
incentives to manage earnings upward) to prefer sales-based over discretionary 
expenses-based manipulation.  
 In addition, and to explore cost factors that lead AIM IPO firms to choose 
between real and accrual earnings management activities, model 5.8 is re-estimated 
just for the AIM IPOs sample. Table I in Appendix A reports the results and shows 
both high quality auditors and prestigious underwriters play an effective role in 
mitigating discretionary expenses manipulation on the AIM market. IPO firms on 
the AIM market are small, growing IPO firms and riskier (Gerakos et al., 2011) and, 
therefore, any abnormal reduction in discretionary expenses during the IPO, which 
is combined with higher levels of sales-based manipulation, is likely to be associated 
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with a higher probability of IPO failure (Demers and Joos, 2007) and higher future 
litigation risks (Sohn, 2011). 55 
Further, the results in Table 5.8 show that IPO firms on the Main market 
exhibit lower levels of earnings manipulation than IPO firms on the AIM market. 
These results are expected due to the restricted regulatory environment on the Main 
market that overall restricts managers flexibility to manipulate earnings. In addition, 
IPO firms on the Main market are very large firms (compared with AIM IPOs) that 
can afford to pay the high cost and to meet the requirements of more reputable 
accounting and financial institutions (e.g. big N audit firms, prestigious 
underwriters, and prestigious venture capitalists) that can help to send positive 
signals about the IPO to outsiders (e.g., Titman and Trueman, 1986; Brau and 
Fawcett, 2006). These reputable institutions are found to play an effective role in 
mitigating real and accrual earnings management activities (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; 
Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Chi et al., 2011; Lee and Masulis, 2011; Wongsunwai, 
2012). 56 
                                            
55 Other observation about the results is why IPO firms on the AIM market would manage real 
earnings management activities which have severe negative consequences for subsequent operating 
and stock return performance (e.g., Kothari et al., 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). For example, 
someone would ask why young and small IPO firms on the AIM market would start with real 
activities (sales-based)! Why they do not just manage accrual accounting that is less costly for future 
performance compared with real activities? This can be explained as accrual earnings management 
occurs at the end of the fiscal year, while real earnings management occurs throughout the year. 
Thus, If IPOs’ managers on the AIM market decided to manage earnings solely using accrual-based 
manipulation, and the amount being manipulated fell short of the desired threshold, there may be 
insufficient time to utilize real earnings management during the rest of the year (Roychowdhury, 
2006). Zang (2012) confirms this view and finds evidence that real and accrual earnings management 
are utilized as substitutes. Specifically, Zang (2012) find managers engage in real earnings 
management activities throughout the fiscal year and then accruals earnings management is adjusted 
at the end of fiscal year by the unrealized amount of real activities to meet the desired threshold. 
Therefore, it seems IPO firms on the AIM market manage sales-based earnings management 
activities to avoid missing the desired threshold by solely utilizing accrual-based manipulation. 
56  For example, for IPOs sample on the Main market 34% backed by venture capitalists, 33% 
underwritten by prestigious underwriters, 88% audited by big N audit firms, and 39% reported a loss 
during the IPO year. While for IPO firms on the AIM market 18% backed by venture capitalist, 16% 
underwritten by prestigious underwriters, 33% audited by big N audit firms, and 53% reported a loss 
during the IPO year. Thus, and in addition to the impact of the restricted regulatory environment, 
firms-specific characteristics might also explain why IPO firms on the Main market do not exhibit 
evidence of earnings manipulation during the IPO year.   
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Table 5.8 Regressions of real and accrual earnings management under different 
regulatory environments 
 
Aggregate real 
earnings management 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
Discretionary 
accruals 
 
AIM -0.064 0.068 -0.091 0.093 
  (-1.432) (1.737)* (-2.124)** (2.001)** 
LnSize -0.057 0.082 -0.061 0.156 
  (-0.740) (1.207) (-0.853) (1.920)* 
Volatility 0.007 -0.020 0.007 0.000 
  (0.146) (-0.445) (0.139) (0.001) 
Lev 0.053 0.041 0.028 0.057 
  (1.186) (1.070) (0.641) (1.295) 
BM 0.136 0.019 0.126 0.147 
  (2.931)*** (0.468) (2.783)*** (3.045)*** 
Ln(1+age) -0.058 -0.024 -0.071 -0.027 
  (-1.290) (-0.586) (-1.599) (-0.595) 
CapexGrowth -0.039 -0.022 -0.040 -0.026 
  (-0.552) (-0.358) (-0.582) (-0.339) 
Big N -0.075 0.001 -0.068 -0.027 
  (-2.099)** (0.033) (-2.057)** (-0.769) 
AudTenure -0.063 -0.036 -0.013 -0.028 
  (-1.693)* (-1.109) (-0.337) (-0.743) 
VC -0.036 -0.029 -0.019 -0.035 
  (-1.090) (-1.044) (-0.586) (-1.092) 
Underwriter -0.032 0.035 -0.064 0.021 
  (-0.888) (1.150) (-1.883)* (0.598) 
ROA -0.147 -0.442 0.214 -0.212 
  (-1.704)* (-5.551)*** (2.500)** (-2.316)** 
Loss 0.029 -0.012 0.024 -0.011 
  (0.546) (-0.256) (0.451) (-0.205) 
Abs(CFO) 0.013 0.204 -0.176 0.048 
  (0.210) (3.430)*** (-2.780)*** (0.750) 
OutDirectors 0.024 -0.094 0.088 -0.032 
  (0.524) (-2.342)** (1.975)** (-0.696) 
BrdSize -0.022 0.014 -0.015 -0.041 
  (-0.480) (0.342) (-0.328) (-0.876) 
Chrm/CEO -0.006 0.034 -0.066 0.018 
  (-0.108) (0.718) (-1.267) (0.353) 
RetaiOwnership -0.049 -0.026 -0.006 -0.026 
  (-1.081) (-0.627) (-0.146) (-0.560) 
Constant 0.828 0.710 0.689 0.494 
  (5.413)*** (5.380)*** (4.831)*** (3.307)*** 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 547 547 547 547 
Adj.R
2
 0.079 0.268 0.143 0.077 
F-statistic                2.83           8.72            5.20        3.00 
Prob (F-statistic)    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000 
Mean VIF 1.87           1.87            1.87 1.87 
Max VIF 4.71           4.71            4.71 4.71 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics 
(appear in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level as suggested by Petersen (2009). Table 5.8 reports the 
results of regressions of real and accrual earnings management proxies on the regulatory environments. The 
dependent variable is proxies of real and accrual earnings management, while the main independent variable of 
interest is (AIM), a dummy variable equals 1 if the IPO firms listed on the AIM market and zero if the IPO firms 
listed on the Main market. VIF is Various Inflation Factor. All other variables are previously defined.  
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In summary, the results in Table 5.7, Table 5.8, and Table I in Appendix A 
confirm the hypothesis that IPO firms on the AIM market are expected to exhibit 
higher levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO than IPO 
firms on the Main market. 57  
5.5.3.2 Sample Selection-bias  
One possible observation about the results in Table 5.8 is that they may be affected 
by a sample selection-bias. Gerakos et al. (2011) find evidence that IPO firms listed 
on the AIM market have higher levels of information asymmetry, failure rates, post-
IPO stock return underperformance, and a lower level of liquidity than IPO firms 
listed on the Main market and other developed US markets. Thus, there is a 
possibility that IPO firms which choose to list on the AIM are sharing the same 
characteristics, which in turn may explain the differences in real and accrual 
earnings management between IPO firms on the AIM and Main markets. 
To rule out that the reported results in Table 5.8 are not driven by the sample 
selection-bias, this chapter uses a Heckman (1979) two-stage model to control for 
sample selection-bias where in the first stage a probit regression is used on the 
probability of listing on the AIM market. Then, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated 
and included as a control variable in the second stage regression. In the first stage 
the following model is used to obtain the probability of listing on the AIM market 
                                            
57 For robustness this chapter also follows the compensation literature (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; 
Core et al., 1999; Murphy, 1999; Core et al., 2008) by undertaking a two-stage analysis. In the first 
stage, the following OLS regression is used: 
EMi,t=α0+β1LnSize+β2BigN+β3VC+β4Underwriter+β5BM+β6Ln(1+age)+β7CapexGrowth+β8Lev     
              +β9ROA+β10Loss+β11SEO+ IND+ Year +εi,t.      
Where (EM i,t) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year, 
(SEO) a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm undertakes a seasoned equity offering during the IPO 
year and 0 otherwise, and all other variables are previously defined. In the second stage, the residuals 
(εit) from the above OLS regression are obtained and tested whether the difference in the mean and 
median residuals between AIM market and Main market IPOs are statistically significant during the 
IPO year. The residuals of the OLS regressions, therefore, represent the part of real and accrual 
earnings management that is not explained by size or any of the other factors that are likely to be a 
significant driver of earnings management. Table II in Appendix A reports the results of this second 
stage analysis and shows that IPO firms on the AIM market exhibit higher levels of real and accrual 
earnings management than IPO firms on the Main market. Therefore, this evidence confirms that the 
results in Table 5.8 can be interpreted in the context of differences in the regulatory environment. 
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where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm listed on the 
AIM market and 0 if the firm listed on the Main market:   
(5.9)t,i
13 121110
9876
5432 10
εYearIND
shipRetaiOwnerβROAβage)Ln(1β Chrm/CEOβ
BrdSizeβrsOutDirectoβOAgeSinceIPβngUnderpriciβ 
CurrβLitigationβ Volatilityβ rnLnZeroRetuβ LnSizeβα1 0,




 
After the inverse Mills ratio is calculated from the probit regression in the first stage, 
it is included as a control variable in the second stage of the Heckman test to control 
for sample selection bias. The following model is used in the second stage of 
Heckman test where (EM i,t) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings 
management:  
(5.10)
3
t,i13 12
11 109 87
6542   10t,i
εYearINDInvs_Mills βAudTenureβ 
rUnderwriteβVCβBigNβ age)Ln(1β Abs(CFO)β                
BMβLossβ hCapexGrowtβ LevβLnSizeβAIM βαEM



 
Where (LnZeroReturn) is measured as natural logarithm of (ZeroReturn /1- 
ZeroReturn) and ZeroReturn is defined as the number of zero-return trading days 
divided by the total number of trading days since the IPO date and up to one year 
later, 58  (Litigation) equals 1 if the firms in a high litigation industry and zero 
otherwise59, (Curr) is current ratio measured as current assets divided by current 
liabilities, (Underpricing) is the percentage difference between the offer price and 
the closing price on the first day of trading, (AgeSinceIPO) is the age of IPO firms 
measured as the cumulative number of years since the IPO date and up to the 
delisted date or 31/12/2011 (the one is sooner), (Invs_Mills) is the inverse Mills ratio 
calculated from the first stage probit regression on the probability of listing on the 
AIM market. All other variables are previously defined.  
The first stage includes a set of control variables that are excluded from the 
second stage regression (namely ZeroReturn, Litigation, Curr, Underpricing, 
Volatility, and AgeSinceIPO) to meet the exclusion restriction of Heckman (1979) 
                                            
58  This definition of ZeroReturn is consistent with Bekaert et al. (2007) and Gerakos et al. (2011).  
59  Following Zang (2012) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), high litigation industries are SIC codes 
2833–2836, 8731–8734, 7371–7379, 3570–3577, and 3600–3674. 
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test. Further, the proxy of size in the first stage (natural logarithm of market value) is 
highly correlated with the Invs_Mills ratio and, therefore, is replaced with the natural 
logarithm of sales in the second stage regression. 
Recent research shows that firms on the AIM market have higher levels of 
information asymmetry, lower level of liquidity, higher failure rates, and higher 
levels of stock return underperformance (Mendoza, 2008; Gerakos et al., 2011). 
Further, the AIM market imposes lighter requirements for corporate governance. 
Thus, and following Gerakos et al. (2011), (ZeroReturn) is included to control for 
the liquidity and information asymmetry problems as IPO firms with high level of 
information asymmetry their stock are less likely to be traded. Also, stock return 
variability (Volatility) is added to the model as Gerakos et al. (2011) show that firms 
on the AIM market experience greater returns underperformance compared with 
firms on the Main market and other developed US stock markets. Further, 
(Litigation) is included to control for future litigation risks as IPO firms on the AIM 
market have higher level of information asymmetry than other firms and regarded as 
more risky (e.g., Gerakos et al., 2011). The model also includes (Curr) to control for 
the liquidity problem, while Underpricing is included as IPO firms on the AIM 
market have higher levels of information asymmetry and more risky (Gerakos et al., 
2011) and, therefore, investors are expected to be compensated by underwriters to 
taking part in this IPO (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2002). Finally, (AgeSinceIPO) is 
included as Gerakos et al. (2011) find IPO firms on the AIM market have higher 
failure rates than IPO firms on the Main market and other US developed market.  
The results of the first-stage (Model 1) and the second-stage regressions 
(Models 2, 3, 4, and 5) are reported in Table 5.9 and show that the previous evidence 
(reported in Table 5.8) on real and accrual earnings management under different 
regulatory environments still holds after controlling for the sample selection bias. 60 
 
 
                                            
60 The multicollinearity problem is tested in the first and second stage regressions of Heckman (1979) 
test. The highest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was 4 for Invs_Mills in the second-stage regression. 
Thus, the reported results in Table 5.9 are not affected by the multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 5.9 Relation between regulatory environments and real and accrual earnings 
management after controlling for sample selection bias 
 Model (1) 
Probit 
Regression  
Model (2) 
OLS 
Regression   
Model (3) 
OLS 
Regression   
Model (4) 
OLS 
Regression   
Model (5) 
OLS 
Regression 
VARIABLES AIM=1 
Aggregate 
real earnings 
management 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations      
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
Discretionary 
accruals  
LnSize -6.018 0.131 0.069 0.06 -0.111 
  (-7.550)*** (1.666)* (0.967) (0.864) (-1.502) 
AIM  -0.061 0.076 -0.094 0.079 
   (-1.378) (1.889)* (-2.183)** (1.714)* 
LnZeroReturn 1.860     
 (3.273)***     
Volatility 0.524     
  (0.979)     
Litigation 0.067     
  (0.122)     
Curr 0.396     
  (0.916)     
Underpricing -0.009     
  (-0.024)     
AgeSinceIPO -0.492     
  (-1.376)     
OutDirectors -0.563     
  (-1.477)     
BrdSize -0.212     
  (-0.564)     
Chrm/CEO 0.206     
  (0.552)     
ROA -0.584     
  (-1.337)     
RetaiOwnership 0.706     
  (1.668)*     
Lev  0.062 0.056 0.024 0.06 
   (1.396) (1.416) (0.551) (1.409) 
CapexGrowth  -0.086 -0.047 -0.063 0.036 
   (-1.164) (-0.661) (-0.868) (0.451) 
Loss  0.131 0.231 -0.078 0.066 
   (3.557)*** (6.988)*** (-2.144)** (1.805)* 
BM  0.153 0.019 0.149 0.135 
   (3.252)*** (0.434) (3.288)*** (2.745)*** 
Abs(CFO)  0.018 0.252 -0.214 0.105 
   (0.279) (3.919)*** (-3.395)***        (1.593) 
Ln(1+age) -0.215 -0.098 -0.065 -0.073 -0.047 
  (-0.585) (-2.201)** (-1.560) (-1.680)* (-1.040) 
Big N  -0.067 0.013 -0.075 -0.021 
   (-1.930)* (0.431) (-2.292)** (-0.613) 
VC  -0.038 -0.047 -0.004 -0.047 
   (-1.188) (-1.669)* (-0.113) (-1.504) 
 
( The table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.9  (Continued) 
 
 Model (1) 
Probit 
Regression  
Model (2) 
OLS 
Regression   
Model (3) 
OLS 
Regression   
Model (4) 
OLS 
Regression   
Model (5) 
OLS 
Regression 
VARIABLES AIM=1 
Aggregate 
real earnings 
management 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations      
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
Discretionary 
accruals  
Underwriter  -0.014 0.056 -0.066 0.033 
   (-0.385) (1.749)* (-1.911)* (0.936) 
AudTenure  -0.057 -0.015 -0.022 -0.014 
  (-1.527) (-0.425) (-0.557) (-0.344) 
Invs_Mills  -0.124 -0.029 -0.008 0.050 
  (-1.482) (-0.387) (-0.108) (0.574) 
Constant 5.734 0.634 0.249 0.877 0.351 
 (4.625)*** (5.520)*** (2.436)** (8.123)*** (3.120)*** 
Year and industry 
dummies 
       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N    561 539 539 539 539 
Log likelihood 435.10     
Pseudo R
2
 0.7002     
Prob > chi2 0.0000     
Adj.R
2
     0.090 0.218 0.140 0.068 
F-statistic  3.34 7.32 5.52 3.01 
Prob (F-statistic)      0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000 
Mean VIF  1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86 
Max VIF  4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics 
(appear in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level as suggested by Petersen (2009). Table 5.9 reports the results 
of regressions of real and accrual earnings management proxies on the regulatory environments after controlling for 
the sample selection bias. Model 1 is a probit regression where the dependent variable (AIM) is a dummy variable 
equals 1 if the IPO firms listed on the AIM market and zero if the IPO firms listed on the Main market. Models 2, 3, 
4, and 5 are OLS regressions where the dependent variables are proxies of real and accrual earnings management. 
All other variables are previously defined.  
 
5.5.4 Earnings Management and Post-IPO Stock Performance 
5.5.4.1 Post-IPO Stock Performance Sorted by Real and Accrual 
Earnings Management  
Table 5.10 reports post-IPO 3-year abnormal returns measured using BHAR for IPO 
firms relative to the level of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO 
year. Table 5.10 (Panel A) reports the results for the pooled sample and shows that 
long-run underperformance occurs for the quartiles with the highest level of 
earnings manipulation and that this result is consistent for all earnings management 
proxies. For example, the underperformance as measured by the mean 3-year BHAR 
for the discretionary accruals quartiles ranges from -2.1% for the conservative 
quartile to -43.2% for the aggressive quartile. In addition, considering the aggregate 
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measure of real earnings management, the BHAR is 4% for the conservative quartile 
and -31.3% for the most aggressive. Similar results are reported when using an 
abnormal level of cash flows from operations. These results indicate that IPO firms 
that have higher levels of earnings management during the IPO year experience a 
higher decline in stock returns in the post IPO period. 
Table 5.10 also provides evidence on the difference between the long-run 
stock returns for AIM IPO firms (Panel B) and Main IPO firms (Panel C) by sorting 
the return quartiles relative to the levels of real and accrual earnings management 
during the IPO year. The results for the Main market show that, in general, IPO 
firms experience a greater decline in post-IPO stock return performance compared to 
the AIM market. For example, Panel B reports the results for the AIM market and 
shows for discretionary accruals, that the BHAR for the aggressive quartile is -
46.1% compared to the aggressive quartile presented in Panel C for Main market 
IPOs, -51.9%. In addition, comparing the stock returns across Panels B and C for the 
aggregate measure of real earnings management the results show that the stock 
return performance for aggressive Main market firms is -39.6%, while for AIM 
firms it is -23.3%.61 The results of Table 5.10 suggest that IPO firms with high 
levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year experience a 
decline in post-IPO returns performance.  
This chapter also tests abnormal returns for one-year and two-year holding 
periods and finds similar results to those are reported in Table 5.10. Further, due to 
the skewness problems associated with using the buy-and-hold approach, this 
chapter follows Lyon et al. (1999) and calculates the statistical significance of t-tests 
using a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic and the results are qualitatively 
similar to using the conventional t-statistic.  
 
 
                                            
61 These results are significant at 5%. 
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Table 5.10 Post-IPO 3-year buy-and-hold returns for IPO firms by level of real and 
accrual earnings management activities 
  Buy-and-hold abnormal returns  
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Panel A: Mean 3-year BHAR: Whole sample (n=571) 
Discretionary accruals -0.021 0.072 -0.133 -0.432 
(-0.27) (0.79) (-1.80)* (4.76)*** 
Abnormal cash flows from operations  0.025 -0.039 -0.150 -0.349 
(0.30) (-0.49) (-1.61) (-5.10)*** 
Abnormal discretionary expenses -0.091 -0.214 -0.131 -0.076 
(-1.03) (-2.24) (-1.50) (-1.18) 
Aggregate real earnings management 0.040 -0.134 -0.109 -0.313 
(0.40) (-1.73)* (-1.27) (-4.37)*** 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Panel B: Mean 3-year BHAR: AIM (n=433) 
Discretionary accruals  -0.101 -0.175 -0.130 -0.461 
(-1.11) (-1.62) (-1.48) (-4.14)*** 
Abnormal cash flows from operations  0.030 -0.038 -0.142 -0.366 
(0.31) (-0.34) (-1.24) (-4.52)*** 
Abnormal discretionary expenses -0.186 -0.260 -0.024 -0.047 
(-1.71)* (-2.18)** (-0.23) (-0.69) 
Aggregate real earnings management -0.018 -0.119 -0.147 -0.233 
(-0.14) (-1.27) (-1.32) (-3.14)*** 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Panel C: Mean 3-year BHAR: Main sample (n=138) 
Discretionary accruals -0.202 -0.102 -0.095 -0.519 
(-1.31) (-0.77) (-0.61) (-4.46)*** 
Abnormal cash flows from operations -0.121 -0.003 -0.290 -0.334 
(-0.82) (-0.02) (-1.88)* (-3.14)*** 
Abnormal discretionary expenses -0.200 -0.246 -0.175 -0.291 
(-1.50) (-1.69) (-1.19) (-1.93)* 
Aggregate real earnings management 0.253 -0.209 -0.161 -0.396 
(1.76)* (-1.67) (-1.15) (-2.52)** 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Differences in 
means are estimated using t-tests. Table 5.10 reports the mean 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the 
pooled, AIM, and Main IPO samples over the period 1998-2008 by level of earnings management during the 
IPO year. IPOs in each sample are divided into four quartiles relative to the level of real and accrual earnings 
management that occurred in the IPO year. The mean 3-year abnormal returns are then calculated for each 
quartile using BHAR. The holding period is 4 to 40 months after the IPO year. Q1 represents the most 
conservative quartile (IPO firms with the lowest level of earnings management) and Q4 the most aggressive 
(IPO firms with highest level of earnings management). Discretionary accruals are estimated using corrected 
version of the modified Jones (1991) model (Dechow et al., 1995). Abnormal cash flows from operations and 
abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and as 
implemented by Roychowdhury, (2006). Aggregate real earnings management is the sum of abnormal cash 
flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. The mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is 
calculated as follows: 

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Where Rt is monthly return for IPO firms in month t and Rbenchmark is the monthly return for the benchmark. 
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5.5.4.2 Regressions of Post-IPO Stock Performance  
To test whether the real and accrual earnings management activities of IPO firms 
predicts the stock return performance of IPO firms under different regulatory 
environments in the following period, this chapter follows prior research (e.g., Teoh 
et al., 1998a; Roosenboom et al., 2003) by running a cross-sectional regression 
where the dependent variable is three-year BHAR and the independent variables are 
the proxies of real and accrual earnings management plus a vector of control 
variables.  
As discussed above, a positive level of discretionary accruals is an indicator 
of income-increasing earnings management, as are negative abnormal cash flows 
from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. As before, abnormal cash 
flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by -1.  
This allows real and accrual earnings management proxies to have the same 
interpretation with respect to their effect on stock return performance. Thus, the 3-
year BHAR, adjusted on a size and book-to-market matched sample, from month +4 
through to month +40 is regressed against the different measures of real and accrual 
earnings management (EM) and their interaction terms with AIM market dummy 
(AIM). Where (AIM) is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm listed on the AIM 
market and 0 if the firm listed on the Main market  
In addition, and following previous research (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b; 
Roosenboom at al., 2003; Chang et al., 2010), a set of control variables are included, 
namely; firm size (LnSize); returns variability(Volatility); leverage ratio (Lev); book-
to-market ratio (BM); age [Ln(1+age)]; capital expenditure growth (CapexGrowth); 
profitability [ROA and Loss]; and the absolute value of cash flows from operations 
[Abs(CFO)]. Finally, dummies are added to control for industry (IND) and year 
(Year). Specifically, the following OLS regression is estimated using the percentile 
rank of all variables (dependent and independent) to avoid an outliers problem. 
(5.11)
t,i12
 11 109 87
65 4 3 2 10,i
εYearIND Abs(CFO)β
 Lossβ  ROAβ hCapexGrowtβ age)Ln(1βBMβ 
LevβVolatilityβLnSizeβ AIM  x EMβAIMβEMβα BHAR 4,40



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Table 5.11 reports the results for the analysis of whether the real and accrual 
earnings management activities of IPO firms predict post-IPO stock return 
performance. Table 5.11 shows that aggregate real earnings management, abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and discretionary accruals are associated with post-IPO poor 
stock returns performance, confirming the hypothesis that IPO firms with high levels 
of earnings manipulation during the IPO are expected to experience poor long-term 
stock return performance in the following period. 
Table 5.11 Regressions of 3-year post-IPO BHAR on real and accrual earnings 
management-the whole IPOs sample  
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics 
(appear in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level as suggested by Petersen (2009). Table 5.11 reports the 
results of regressions of abnormal returns on IPO year earnings management proxies for whole IPOs sample. 
The dependent variable is the 3 year abnormal buy-and-hold return. All other variables are previously defined. 
 
Table 5.12 reports the results for the analysis of whether the regulatory 
environments impact the relation between real and accrual earnings management 
activities of IPO firms and post-IPO stock return performance. Compared with AIM 
IPOs, Table 5.12 provides evidence that IPO firms on the Main market experience 
more severe post-IPO stock return underperformance due to earnings management 
activities that take place during the IPO year. Specifically, Model (1) indicates that 
for every 10% increase in the aggregated measure of real earnings management, 
post-IPO stock return performance is 2.85% lower in Main IPOs. The incremental 
BHARi = α + β1EMi + β2LnSizei + β3Volatilityi + β4 Levi + β5BMi + β6 Ln (1+age)i 
                   +β7CapexGrowthi + β8ROAi + β9Lossi + β10 Abs (CFO) i + IND+ Year +εi. 
 
 
BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR 
Aggregate real earnings 
management  
 -0.089    
(-1.932)*    
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations  
  -0.064   
 (-1.028)   
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
   -0.077  
  (-1.719)*  
Discretionary accruals  -0.124  -0.114  -0.164  -0.152 
(-2.628)*** (-2.014)** (-3.603)*** (-3.359)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  1.094  1.077  1.102   1.051 
(9.104)*** (9.057)*** (9.115)*** (-9.052)*** 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 547 547 547 547 
Adj.R
2
 0.082 0.077 0.081 0.078 
F-statistic 2.89 2.88 2.88 2.94 
Prob  (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.86 1.93 1.86 1.87 
Max VIF 4.60 4.86 4.65 4.60 
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effect of the aggregated measure of real earnings management for post-IPO stock 
return performance is 2.37% lower in AIM IPOs. Further, Model (3) indicates that 
for every 10% increase in abnormal discretionary expenses, post-IPO stock return 
performance is 2.64% lower in Main IPOs, while the incremental effect of abnormal 
discretionary expenses is 2.30% lower in AIM IPOs. Finally Model (4) indicates that 
for every 10% increase in discretionary accruals, post-IPO stock return performance 
is 2.45% lower in Main IPOs.  
In summary, the results of Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 presents evidence that 
real and accrual earnings management predict post-IPO stock return 
underperformance, and that the regulatory environment impacts the association 
between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock return 
performance. Specifically, the Main market is found to have better 
capabilities/mechanisms than AIM market to evaluate stock prices that were inflated 
by earnings management during the IPO. 
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Table 5.12  Regressions of 3-year post-IPO BHAR on real and accrual earnings 
management under different regulatory environments 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics 
(appear in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level as suggested by Petersen (2009). Table 5.12 reports the 
results of regressions of abnormal returns on IPO year earnings management proxies and the regulatory 
environments. The dependent variable is the 3 year abnormal buy-and-hold return. All other variables are 
previously defined. 
BHARi = α + β1EMi +  β2AIMi +  β3EMi x AIMi + β4LnSizei + β5Volatilityi + β6 Levi + β7BMi  
                             + β8 Ln (1+age)I+β9CapexGrowthi + β10ROAi + β11Lossi + β12 Abs (CFO) i  
                   + IND+ Year +εi. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR 
Aggregate real earnings 
management 
-0.285    
(-2.743)***    
Aggregate real earnings 
management  x  AIM 
0.237    
(2.106)**    
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations 
 -0.136   
 (-1.126)   
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations  x  AIM 
 0.086   
 (0.734)   
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses  
  -0.264***  
  (-2.760)  
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses   x  AIM 
  0.230**  
  (2.237)  
Discretionary accruals x  AIM    0.117 
   (0.994) 
Discretionary accruals -0.119 -0.111 -0.152 -0.245 
 (-2.514)** (-1.956)* (-3.351)*** (-2.285)** 
AIM -0.180 -0.094 -0.172 -0.113 
 (-2.372)** (-1.073) (-2.454)** (-1.348) 
LnSize -0.142 -0.134 -0.135 -0.136 
 (-2.087)** (-1.965)** (-1.991)** (-1.996)** 
Lev -0.042 -0.045 -0.038 -0.044 
 (-1.026) (-1.078) (-0.940) (-1.060) 
Volatility -0.127 -0.131 -0.120 -0.129 
 (-2.710)*** (-2.764)*** (-2.554)** (-2.741)*** 
CapexGrowth 0.101 0.102 0.108 0.099 
 (1.576) (1.562) (1.683)* (1.517) 
ROA -0.024 -0.037 0.001 -0.021 
 (-0.258) (-0.395) (0.010) (-0.230) 
Loss -0.050 -0.051 -0.048 -0.052 
 (-0.875) (-0.892) (-0.827) (-0.901) 
BM -0.057 -0.067 -0.059 -0.061 
 (-1.109) (-1.291) (-1.141) (-1.172) 
Abs(CFO) -0.051 -0.039 -0.057 -0.053 
 (-0.838) (-0.618) (-0.925) (-0.849) 
Ln(1+age) -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.154) (-0.018) (-0.051) (-0.018) 
Constant 1.286 1.196 1.259 1.189 
 (8.912)*** (7.657)*** (9.090)*** (8.127)*** 
N 547 547 547 547 
Adj.R2 0.089 0.076 0.087 0.077 
F-statistic 3.03 2.85 3.01 2.99 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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5.6 Additional Analysis 
5.6.1 Performance-Matched Approach  
This chapter also repeats the analysis during the IPO year using the performance-matched 
approach as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005), which is designed to control for the extreme 
performance that can bias the estimation of discretionary accruals. Thus, both real and 
accrual earnings management are estimated following the performance-matched approach. 
Specifically, each IPO firm is matched with a non-IPO firm based on year, 2-digit SIC 
industry code and the closest return on assets (+/- 0.20 of IPO firms’ return on assets). Table 
III in Appendix A reports the results and shows qualitatively similar evidence to those 
reported in (Tables 5.5 and 5.7) that IPO firms manage earnings upward utilizing real and 
accrual earnings management and that IPO firms on the AIM market exhibit higher levels of 
earnings management activities than IPO firms on the Main market.  
5.6.2 Multivariate Comparison of Earnings Management Activities  
For robustness this chapter also follows prior literature (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005, 2008; Chi et al., 2011, Zang, 2012) by using OLS regressions to examine 
whether firms with a strong incentive to manage earnings upwards (IPO firms) exhibit 
evidence of earnings management compared with firms that have no incentive to manipulate 
reported earnings (all UK non-IPO firms). Thus, real and accrual earnings management are 
estimated for all firms in the pooled sample, namely IPO and all UK non-IPO firms, over the 
period 1998-2008, and as explained previously in section 5.4.3 for the estimation process. All 
financial firms are excluded from the sample due to differences in their financial reporting 
and disclosure requirements (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a). After estimating earnings management 
for the pooled sample, the following OLS model is used to test the differences in real and 
accrual earnings management across IPO and non-IPO firms:62 
(5.12)3 t,i2  10t,i εYearINDROAβLnSizeβIPO βα EM   
                                            
62 Following prior research (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Gerakos et al., 2011; Leone et al., 2012), the 
percentile rank of all variables (dependent and independent) are used in the regression models to avoid an 
outliers problem. 
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Where (EM i,t) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings management, (IPO) is a 
dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm is an IPO firm and 0 otherwise. All other variables are 
previously defined. Further, and following Ball and Shivakumar (2008), model (5.12) is just 
estimated for industries with at least five IPOs. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) indicate that this 
restriction reduces the sample size, but leads to an easier interpretation for the coefficients. 
Hence, each industry-year group in the sample should have at least 5 IPO observations in 
order to be included to the final sample.  
Table IV in Appendix A reports the results and shows evidence that IPO firms in the 
UK exhibit higher levels of aggregate real earnings management, abnormal cash flows from 
operation, and discretionary accruals than non-IPO firms. Overall, the reported results in 
Table IV are consistent with the earlier reported results in Tables 5.5 that IPO firms engage in 
real activities-based and accrual-based manipulations during the IPO year. 63 
5.6.3 Sample Selection-bias Treatment Effect Model  
Sample selection-bias is still a cause for concern in accounting research, notably research that 
investigates earnings management, audit quality, voluntary disclosure, etc. A recent paper by 
Lennox et al. (2012) finds evidence that the self-selection model (Heckman two-stage test) is 
very sensitive to the model specification and the sample composition. Lennox et al. (2012) 
find any small changes in the model specification or any minor changes in the sample 
composition lead to change the result of the selection model, while they find that OLS 
regression is more robust.
 64 
   
For robustness this chapter follows recent literature (e.g. Demirakos et al., 2009) that 
addresses sample selection-bias by using a treatment effects framework to employ selection-
style models (Greene, 2003, pp.787-789; Stata, 2005, pp. 456-465).  Specifically, a treatment 
effect model is employed using a two-step estimator to simultaneously estimate the effect of 
an endogenous binary variable (AIM) on a continuous fully-observed variable (EM), 
conditional on two sets of independent variables (Stata, 2005, pp. 458). The first set of the 
                                            
63 Also, the analysis is repeated without imposing the restriction of five IPOs in each industry-year group. The 
results are reported in Table V in Appendix A and show similar results to those reported in Table IV.   
64 Lennox et al. (2012) find 30 papers out of 545 papers, published in The Accounting Review, Journal of 
Accounting and Economic, and Journal of Accounting Research through the period 2000-2007, use self-
selection models.   
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independent variables are included in the full choice model (AIM model), while the second 
set are included in the earnings management model. The hazard variable (lambda) is 
computed from the full choice model on the probability of listing on the AIM market.65 The 
full choice model includes the following independent variables; LnSize, LnZeroReturn, Curr, 
RetaiOwnership, Ln(1+age), and ROA, while the earnings management model includes the 
following independent variables; LnSales, Lev, CapexGrowth, Loss, BM, Abs(CFO), VC, 
Underwriter, Big N, AudTenure, OutDirectors, BrdSize and Chrm/CEO. LnSales is the 
natural logarithm of sales and all other variables are previously defined. 
The results are reported in Table VI in Appendix A and show similar evidence to the 
main analysis in Table 5.8 on the association between regulatory environments and real and 
accrual earnings management around IPOs after correcting for sample-selection bias.  
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter examines real and accrual earnings management around IPOs under different 
regulatory environments. Although prior research has examined accrual earnings 
management around IPOs (e.g., Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al. 1998a; Gramlich and Sorensen, 
2004; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Chahine et al., 2012), and a small number of recent papers 
have started to investigate real earnings management activities and IPOs (e.g., Darrough and 
Rangan, 2005; Singer and Fedyk, 2011; Wongsunwai, 2012), this chapter progresses the 
literature by examining the effect of the regulatory environment on real and accrual earnings 
management activities around IPOs and post-IPO stock return performance. 
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing the following evidence. First, 
the results show that IPO firms engage in both real and accrual based earnings management 
during the IPO year and the year after. In addition, the results show that IPO firms manage 
earnings upward by manipulating real activities more extensively than accrual based 
activities. Second, IPO firms on the lightly regulated AIM market are found to have higher 
levels of sales-based and accrual-based earnings management during the IPO year compared 
to those firms that list on the more heavily regulated Main market. Further, IPO firms on the 
AIM market are found to exhibit lower levels of discretionary expenses-based manipulation. 
                                            
65 Lambda is also known as the invers Mills ratio.  
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This is due to the fact that IPO firms cannot simultaneously engage in sales-based and 
discretionary expenses-based manipulations, notably that high levels of sales are expected to 
be combined with high levels of spending on selling and advertising expenses. Thus, 
managing both sales and discretionary expenses is likely to bring the attention of outsiders 
e.g. high quality auditors, prestigious underwriters, etc. 
Third, the results show that IPO firms with high levels of real and accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year experience post-IPO stock return underperformance, and 
that the regulatory environment matters. Specifically, and compared with the AIM market, 
IPO firms on the Main market are found to experience more severe poor stock return 
performance due to real and accrual earnings management that occur at the end of the IPO 
year. This is, in turn, consistent with the view that the Main market has better 
capabilities/mechanisms than the AIM market to correct stock prices that were inflated by 
earnings management at the IPO. Further, this evidence confirms the view that earnings 
management activities are negatively associated with subsequent return and operating 
performance (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998a; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012).66 
Overall, the findings of this chapter show that the regulatory environment impacts 
upon the accounting choices of managers and future stock returns performance. This chapter, 
therefore, adds to the growing evidence (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Zang, 2012) that first, earnings management research needs to consider real and accrual-
based manipulation and second, that the regulatory environment is an important factor that 
needs to be considered in future research. 
 
                                            
66 It is worth noting that recent research employed a two-stage model to examine the trade-off between real and 
accrual earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). However, such test is less likely to be 
employed due to the data limitation concerning several variables that need to be incorporated into the empirical 
models. These variables capture the costs of utilizing real and accrual earnings management e.g. executive 
compensation, the number of analysts following the firm, net operating assets, the length of operating cycle, the 
financial health of the firm proxied by Altman’s Z-score, the number of times that the firm meet or beat 
analysts’ earnings forecasts in the previous four quarters, etc. 
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   Appendix A 
Appendix A Table I Regressions of real and accrual earnings management for AIM IPO sample 
 
Aggregate real 
earnings management 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
Discretionary 
accruals 
 
Big N -0.073 0.007 -0.088 -0.013 
  (-1.812)* (0.220) (-2.430)** (-0.339) 
Underwriter -0.091 0.028 -0.127 0.002 
  (-1.913)* (0.654) (-3.047)*** (0.032) 
LnSize -0.029 0.098 -0.027 0.179 
  (-0.355) (1.347) (-0.352) (2.082)** 
Volatility 0.008 0.019 -0.017 0.045 
  (0.136) (0.365) (-0.325) (0.776) 
Lev 0.047 0.051 0.008 0.042 
  (0.905) (1.117) (0.160) (0.805) 
BM 0.146 -0.002 0.161 0.095 
  (2.686)*** (-0.040) (3.052)*** (1.698)* 
Ln(1+age) -0.060 0.001 -0.091 -0.008 
  (-1.124) (0.026) (-1.831)* (-0.153) 
CapexGrowth -0.055 0.016 -0.083 0.044 
  (-0.692) (0.233) (-1.125) (0.547) 
AudTenure -0.037 -0.021 0.006 -0.002 
  (-0.779) (-0.501) (0.129) (-0.037) 
VC -0.031 -0.013 -0.031 -0.032 
  (-0.755) (-0.339) (-0.806) (-0.727) 
ROA -0.120 -0.428 0.271 -0.141 
  (-1.137) (-4.469)*** (2.651)*** (-1.285) 
Loss 0.068 -0.009 0.083 0.002 
  (1.028) (-0.149) (1.270) (0.033) 
Abs(CFO) 0.004 0.233 -0.210 0.095 
  (0.054) (3.395)*** (-2.953)*** (1.338) 
OutDirectors 0.050 -0.089 0.103 0.000 
  (0.908) (-1.826)* (1.961)* (0.000) 
BrdSize -0.021 0.035 -0.019 -0.020 
  (-0.353) (0.680) (-0.353) (-0.337) 
Chrm/CEO -0.001 0.057 -0.092 0.050 
  (-0.018) (0.898) (-1.360) (0.769) 
RetaiOwnership -0.049 -0.001 -0.034 -0.000 
  (-0.934) (-0.022) (-0.700) (-0.006) 
Constant 0.690 0.643 0.580 0.422 
  (4.215)*** (4.638)*** (3.907)*** (2.662)*** 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 412 412 412 412 
Adj.R
2
 0.080 0.272 0.192 0.075 
F-statistic 2.65 8.62 6.39 2.94 
Prob (F-statistic)    0.0000     0.0000    0.0000   0.0000 
Mean VIF 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 
Max VIF 4.92 4.92 4.92 4.92 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics (appear in 
parentheses) are clustered at the firm level as suggested by Petersen (2009). Table I reports the results of regressions of real 
and accrual earnings management proxies with several explanatory variables for IPO firms on the AIM market. The 
dependent variables are proxies of real and accrual earnings management and all other variables are previously defined.  
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Appendix A Table II Differences in real and accrual earnings management residuals 
between AIM and Main IPOs 
  AIM   Main   Differences 
  Median   Median     Median    z-statistic  
(Mean) N (Mean) N   (Mean)    (t-statistic) 
Aggregate real earnings 
management  
0.020 
433 
0.062 
138 
-0.042 -1.133 
(-0.011) (0.034) (0.045) (-0.850) 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations  
0.042 433 -0.090 138 0.132 2.938*** 
(0.009) -(0.027) (0.036) (0.880) 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
0.000 
433 
0.138 
138 
-0.138 -3.170*** 
-(0.020) (0.061) (-0.081) (-1.529) 
Discretionary accruals 
 
0.030 
433 
-0.021 
138 
0.051 2.572** 
(0.007) (-0.023) (0.030) (0.998) 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Table II reports the 
difference in median (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test) and mean (t-test) real and accrual earnings management 
residuals during the IPO year between IPO firms on the AIM and Main markets over the period 1998-2008. The 
residuals (εi,t) are taken from the following regression:  
EMi,t=α0+β1LnSize+β2BigN+β3VC+β4Underwriter+β5BM+β6Ln(1+age)+β7CapexGrowth+β8Lev        
              +β9ROA +β10Loss+β11SEO+ IND+ Year +εi,t 
Where (EM) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings management, (SEO) is a dummy variable equals 
1 if the firm undertakes a Seasoned Equity Offering during the IPO year and 0 otherwise. All other variables are 
previously defined.  
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Appendix A Table III Real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year 
relative to a performance-matched sample 
  Whole sample AIM sample Main sample 
Panel A: The performance-adjusted discretionary accruals  
Median 0.020** 0.035*** -0.014 
Mean 0.028* 0.032* 0.007 
Panel B: The performance-adjusted abnormal level of cash flows from operations 
Median 0.027*** 0.034** 0.011 
Mean 0.028 0.022 0.045* 
Panel C: The performance-adjusted abnormal level of discretionary expenses 
Median 0.029** 0.049*** -0.048 
Mean 0.082** 0.117*** -0.029 
Panel D: The performance-adjusted aggregate measure of real earnings management 
Median 0.082*** 0.099*** 0.021 
Mean 0.107*** 0.142*** 0.007 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.       
Differences in medians are tested using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and differences in means are tested 
using t-tests. Table III reports median and mean the performance-adjusted measures of discretionary 
accruals, abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses and the aggregate 
measure of real earnings management for the Whole, AIM and Main IPO samples during the IPO year. 
The performance-adjusted measures are calculated as the difference between the levels of real and accrual 
earnings management for IPO firms and their matched firms. To create the matched sample, each IPO firm 
is matched with non-IPO firms based on year and industry membership, and that ROA of non-IPO firms 
within +/-0.20 of IPO firms’ ROA. To avoid outlier problems all financial continuous data for the IPO 
firms and the control samples are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. Abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual 
earnings management proxies to have the same interpretation. The aggregate measure of real earnings 
management is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses after 
multiplying by minus one. 
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Appendix A Table IV Multivariate comparison of real and accrual earnings 
management after excluding industries with less than five IPOs 
VARIABLES 
Aggregate 
real earnings 
management 
Abnormal 
cash flows 
from 
operations 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
Discretionary 
accruals 
IPO 0.062 0.100 0.005 0.109 
 (2.502)** (4.045)*** (0.189) (4.244)*** 
LnSize 0.043 -0.030 0.030 -0.014 
 (1.222) (-0.940) (0.822) (-0.374) 
ROA -0.161 -0.499 0.126 -0.120 
 (-5.347)*** (-18.095)*** (4.093)*** (-3.780)*** 
Constant 0.720 0.912 0.576 0.643 
 (13.191)*** (19.146)*** (10.990)*** (12.910)*** 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of IPO event-years 322 322 322 322 
No. of listed non-IPO firm/years 1079 1079 1079 1079 
No. of observations, total 1401 1401 1401 1401 
Adj.R
2
 0.021 0.247 0.014 0.029 
F-statistic 2.68        27.59       2.38         3.36 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000   0.0000  0.0000   0.0000 
Mean VIF 2.05 2.05        2.05         2.05 
Max VIF 4.22 4.22        4.22         4.22 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics 
(appear in parentheses). Table IV reports multivariate comparison of real and accrual earnings management 
across IPO firms and all UK non-IPO firms over the period 1998-2008, excluding industries with less than five 
IPOs. The dependent variables are proxies of real and accrual earnings management, (IPO) is a dummy variable 
equalling 1 if the firm is an IPO firm and 0 if the firm is non-IPO firm, and all other variables are previously 
defined. To facilitate ease of interpretation of the coefficients, and following Ball and Shivakumar (2008), 
industries with less than five IPOs are excluded from the analysis. 
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Appendix A Table V Multivariate comparison of real and accrual earnings 
management  
VARIABLES 
Aggregate 
real earnings 
management 
Abnormal 
cash flows 
from 
operations 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
Discretionary 
accruals 
IPO 0.076 0.050 0.026 0.060 
 (4.492)*** (2.919)*** (1.495) (3.337)*** 
LnSize 0.014 0.006 0.004 -0.030 
 (1.021) (0.439) (0.266) (-2.184)** 
ROA -0.165 -0.431 0.067 -0.088 
 (-11.323)*** (-32.270)*** (4.578)*** (-5.760)*** 
Constant 0.700 0.853 0.566 0.670 
 (32.347)*** (45.156)*** (25.752)*** (31.092)*** 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of IPO event-years 570 570 570 570 
No. of listed non-IPO firm/years 6072 6072 6072 6072 
No. of observations, total 6642 6642 6642 6642 
Adj.R
2
 0.031 0.179 0.012 0.013 
F-statistic 6.87        43.51        4.19         3.43 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000    0.0000   0.0000    0.0000 
Mean VIF 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 
Max VIF 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics 
(appear in parentheses). Table V reports multivariate comparison of real and accrual earnings management 
across IPO firms and all UK non-IPO firms over the period 1998-2008. The dependent variables are proxies of 
real and accrual earnings management, (IPO) is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm is IPO firm and 0 if the 
firm is non-IPO firm, and all other variables are previously defined. 
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Appendix A Table VI  Relation between regulatory environments and real and 
accrual earnings management after controlling for sample selection bias using a 
treatment effects framework (a two-step estimator) 
 
Panel A: Aggregate real earnings management and abnormal cash flows from operations 
models 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 VARIABLES  
AIM=1 
Aggregate real 
earnings 
management AIM=1 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations 
Ln(MarketCapital) -3.883  -3.883  
 (-8.904)***  (-8.904)***  
LnZeroReturns 1.313  1.313  
 (3.776)***  (3.776)***  
Curr 0.291  0.291  
 (1.029)  (1.029)  
RetaiOwnership 0.123  0.123  
  (0.452)  (0.452)  
Ln(1+age) -0.459  -0.459  
  (-1.711)*  (-1.711)*  
ROA -0.258  -0.258  
  (-0.896)  (-0.896)  
AIM  -0.052  0.161 
  (-0.789)  (2.632)*** 
Ln(Sales)  0.139  0.080 
  (1.989)**  (1.233) 
Lev  0.069  0.032 
   (1.664)*  (0.845) 
CapexGrowth  -0.175  -0.069 
  (-2.507)**  (-1.058) 
Loss  0.136  0.252 
  (4.053)***  (8.084)*** 
BM  0.156  0.007 
   (3.374)***  (0.156) 
Abs(CFO)  0.022  0.331 
  (0.373)  (6.090)*** 
VC  -0.041  -0.039 
   (-1.257)  (-1.299) 
Underwriter  -0.035  0.061 
  (-0.981)  (1.887)* 
Big N  -0.072  0.005 
  (-2.197)**  (0.174) 
AudTenure  -0.074  -0.015 
  (-1.975)**  (-0.435) 
OutDirectors  0.041  -0.054 
   (0.919)  (-1.312) 
BrdSize  -0.053  0.020 
   (-1.154)  (0.467) 
Chrm/CEO  -0.012  -0.011 
   (-0.256)  (-0.248) 
Constant 3.145 0.531 3.145 0.143 
 (5.468)*** (5.164)***      (5.468)*** (1.499) 
Chi-square        54.98        143.19 
Prob (Chi-square)                 0.0000        0.0000 
Value hazard of 
lambda 
 0.013       -0.057 
 (0.317)  (-1.455) 
N 541 541 541 541 
               (This Table is continued on the next page)  
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Table VI (Continued) 
Panel B: Abnormal discretionary expenses and discretionary accruals models 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 VARIABLES  
AIM=1 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses AIM=1 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Ln(MarketCapital) -3.883  -3.883  
 (-8.904)***  (-8.904)***  
LnZeroReturns 1.313  1.313  
 (3.776)***  (3.776)***  
Curr 0.291  0.291  
 (1.029)  (1.029)  
RetaiOwnership 0.123  0.123  
  (0.452)  (0.452)  
Ln(1+age) -0.459  -0.459  
  (-1.711)*  (-1.711)*  
ROA -0.258  -0.258  
  (-0.896)  (-0.896)  
AIM  -0.194  0.134 
  (-3.015)***  (2.013)** 
Ln(Sales)  0.068  -0.069 
  (1.006)  (-0.980) 
Lev  0.040  0.026 
   (0.984)  (0.624) 
CapexGrowth  -0.135  -0.009 
  (-1.988)**  (-0.132) 
Loss  -0.093  0.076 
  (-2.831)***  (2.240)** 
BM  0.150  0.110 
   (3.333)***  (2.365)** 
Abs(CFO)  -0.252  0.187 
  (-4.422)***  (3.155)*** 
VC  -0.016  -0.038 
   (-0.501)  (-1.166) 
Underwriter  -0.075  0.043 
  (-2.189)**  (1.223) 
Big N  -0.067  -0.009 
  (-2.122)**  (-0.260) 
AudTenure  -0.055  -0.020 
  (-1.507)  (-0.516) 
OutDirectors  0.071  -0.005 
   (1.635)  (-0.103) 
BrdSize  -0.048  -0.016 
   (-1.068)  (-0.350) 
Chrm/CEO  -0.032  -0.004 
   (-0.691)  (-0.089) 
Constant 3.145 0.938 3.145*** 0.339 
 (5.468)*** (9.369)*** (5.468) (3.269)*** 
Chi-square        83.60  42.26 
Prob (Chi-square)            0.0000  0.0000 
Value hazard of 
lambda 
 0.071  -0.054 
 (1.715)*  (-1.258) 
N 541 541 541 541 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Table VI 
reports the results of regressions of real and accrual earnings management proxies on the regulatory 
environments after controlling for the sample selection bias using a treatment effects model, two-step 
estimator. All other variables are previously defined.  
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Chapter 6 
Audit Quality, Real and Accrual Earnings Management and Stock 
Return Performance  
 
6.1 Introduction  
The prior literature on earnings management presents evidence that IPO firms 
manipulate earnings using accrual earnings management around IPOs and this 
manipulation leads to inferior post-IPO performance (Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 
1998a; DuCharme et al., 2001; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Gramlich and Sorensen, 
2004; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 2010). While IPO firms 
may attempt to manage earnings upward pre the IPO to increase the offer price, 
there are also strong incentives to manage earnings upward at the end of the IPO 
year (at the end of the first year of being public firms) to support the stock price (e.g. 
Teoh et al., 1998a). For example, Teoh et al. (1998a) indicate that the lock-up 
restriction on managerial shares selling post-IPO, executive compensation, avoiding 
future litigation risks due to an abnormal reduction in stock prices post-IPO, and 
meeting earnings forecast are among the most strong incentives to manage earnings 
upward at the end of the IPO year. Further, prior research provides evidence that big 
N audit firms help in mitigating accrual-based manipulation that takes place during 
the IPO year (e.g., Elder and Zhou, 2002; Chen et al., 2005). Thus, this chapter 
progresses the literature on earnings management by examining whether enhanced 
audit quality is associated with real and accrual earnings management at the IPO 
year and whether enhanced audit quality has an impact on relationship between real 
and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock return performance. 
Recently, there is a growing body of research that shows firms engage 
extensively in real earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). This research also provides evidence that the levels of 
real and accrual earnings management are likely to differ depending on the costs and 
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the benefits of utilizing each of them. Graham et al. (2005) for example provide 
evidence that managers prefer real over accrual earnings management to avoid the 
scrutiny of regulators and auditors. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) show 
theoretically that real earnings management increases after accounting standards are 
strengthened to restrict accrual earnings management. Cohen et al. (2008) find 
evidence that US firms utilize a higher level of real earnings management post the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) than pre-SOX. Cohen et al. (2008) 
indicate that more restrictive regulation mitigates accrual earnings management but 
at the expense of the more extensive use of real earnings management. Further, Zang 
(2012) finds evidence that managers utilize real and accrual earnings management as 
substitutes. Thus, firms with strong incentives to manage earnings (e.g. IPO firms) 
are likely to choose between real and accrual earnings management relative to the 
flexibility of utilizing each of them (e.g., IPOs backed by reputable venture 
capitalists have less flexibility to manage real earnings management).
67
  
Confirming prior literature on the trade-offs between real and accrual 
earnings management, Chi et al. (2011) find firms with strong incentives to manage 
earnings upward (e.g. Seasoned Equity Offering [SEO] firms) engage in a higher 
level of real earnings management to avoid the monitoring of accrual earnings 
management by big N audit firms. Further, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find similar 
evidence that SEO firms audited by big N audit firms have a higher probability to 
manage real earnings management during the offer year. Despite this limited 
research that has examined the effect of audit quality on real earnings management 
(e.g., Chi et al., 2011; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), the association between audit 
quality and accrual earnings management is well-documented. Prior studies provide 
evidence that high-quality auditing (proxied by the presence of big N audit firms and 
auditor industry specialism) is associated with a lower level of accrual earnings 
management (Becker et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2002; Balsam et al., 2003; Reichelt 
and Wang, 2010). For example, Elder and Zhou (2002) and Chen et al. (2005) find 
the presence of big N audit firms and auditor industry specialism mitigates accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year. Hence, and based on the previous 
                                            
67 Wongsunwai (2012) finds evidence that IPO firms backed by reputable venture capitalists exhibit a 
lower level of real earnings management. 
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evidence, high-quality auditing is expected to constrain accrual-based manipulation 
and lead firms that to resort to a higher level of real earnings management. 
Further, prior literature finds evidence that IPO and SEO firms experience 
inferior performance post IPO and SEO due to the higher levels of accrual earnings 
management during the offer year (Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al. 1998a, 1998b; 
Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Morsfield and Tan, 2006). For example, Teoh et al. 
(1998a) and Fan (2007) find IPO firms that have high levels of accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year experience a decline in stock returns and operating 
performance after the IPO year. Rangan (1998) focuses on SEO firms and finds 
similar evidence that accrual earnings management predicts post-SEO return and 
operating underperformance. More recently, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find SEO 
firms manipulate real earnings management activities during the offer year and 
experience a severe decline in post-SEO operating performance due to this 
manipulation. They also find the decline in post-SEO operating performance due to 
real earnings management is greater than the decline due to accrual earnings 
management. Kothari et al. (2012) find similar evidence to Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) that real earnings management has the most severe negative consequences 
for post-SEO stock return performance.  
Consequently, and based on the recent evidence by Chi et al. (2011) and 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010), the role of high quality auditors on real and accrual 
earnings management is expected to affect subsequent performance. On the one 
hand, the monitoring of accrual earnings management by high quality auditors 
should alleviate the negative consequences of accrual-based manipulation for 
subsequent performance. On the other hand, the high-quality auditing of accrual-
based manipulation may lead firms, which have strong incentives to manage 
earnings upward, to switch to a higher level of real earnings management that is 
costly for subsequent performance (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012). 
Therefore, this chapter examines whether the role of big N audit firms has an impact 
on the association between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO 
stock return performance. 
Chapter 6. Real and Accrual Earnings Management and Audit Quality  
156 
 
By examining accrual-based manipulation and two activities of real earnings 
management, namely the abnormal reduction of discretionary expenses 
(discretionary expenses-based manipulation) and the abnormal cash flows from 
operations (sales-based manipulation), for a sample consisting of 515 IPO firms that 
went public on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1998-2008, this chapter 
contributes to the literature by providing the following results. 
First, this chapter provides evidence that IPO firms audited by big N audit 
firms resort to a higher level of sales-based manipulation (conducted through 
offering more price discounts or/and more lenient credit terms) to avoid the 
monitoring of discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based manipulations by big 
N audit firms. The evidence on accrual-based manipulation is consistent with prior 
literature (Becker et al., 1998, Johnson et al., 2002), while this chapter provides new 
evidence that high-quality auditing constrains discretionary expenses-based 
manipulation.  
Second, while prior research focuses on accrual-based manipulation and 
finds evidence that it predicts post-IPO stock return underperformance, this chapter 
finds evidence that post-IPO stock return underperformance is associated with both 
real activities-based and accrual-based manipulations in the IPO year, and that sales-
based manipulation has the most severe negative consequences for post-IPO stock 
return performance. Finally, this chapter presents evidence that enhanced audit 
quality has an impact on the relation between real and accrual earnings management 
and post-IPO stock return performance. Specifically, IPO firms audited by big N 
audit firms are found to experience a severe decline in post-IPO stock return 
performance due to the extensive use of sales-based manipulation during the IPO 
year. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section two presents related literature and 
the development of the hypotheses. Data collection, sample description, and 
research method are presented in section three. Sections four presents the results. 
Section five provides additional analyses. Section six concludes. 
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6.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
First, this chapter reviews the literature on the association between audit quality and 
real and accrual earnings management. This chapter discusses whether IPO firms are 
expected to switch between real and accrual earnings management according to the 
quality of their auditors during the IPO. Second, this chapter reviews the literature 
whether enhanced auditing of real and accrual earnings management has an impact 
for subsequent stock return performance. 
6.2.1 Audit Quality and Real and Accrual Earnings Management 
around IPOs  
The first objective of this chapter is to examine whether enhanced audit quality 
affects the use of real and accrual earnings management. Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
provide evidence that historical earnings represent the most important positive signal 
that executives attempt to send to outside investors. Consistent with this, prior 
studies have presented evidence that IPO firms manage accrual-based manipulation 
to inflate reported earnings upward around the IPO (e.g., Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 
1998a; 1998c; DuCharme et al., 2001; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Morsfield and 
Tan, 2006; Fan 2007; Chang et al., 2010). Despite the extensive research on accrual 
earnings management, there has been limited research examining whether IPO firms 
engage in manipulating real activities.  
Recently, a growing body of research has revealed that real earnings 
management is extensively manipulated to inflate reported earnings (e.g. 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). This research 
indicates that managers prefer to manage real activities-based over accrual-based 
manipulations for the following reasons. First, high levels of accrual earnings 
management are likely to be constrained and discovered by auditors and regulators, 
while real activities-based manipulation is less susceptible to the scrutiny of 
regulators and auditors (Graham et al. 2005). Second, managers engage in accrual-
based manipulation at the end of the fiscal year or at the end of a quarter, while real 
activities-based can be used throughout the fiscal year. If managers decided to 
manipulate reported earnings solely using accrual-based manipulation, and the 
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amount being manipulated fell short of the desired threshold, there may be 
insufficient time to manipulate real activities-based during the rest of the year 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Finally, the balance sheet accumulates all the prior changes 
of accounting methods (Barton and Simko, 2002). Therefore, firms that engage in 
accrual earnings management extensively in previous periods are likely to resort to 
utilizing real activities-based manipulation in the current period, if they have a 
continued incentive to manage earnings upward (Gunny, 2010). 
These recent developments in the field of real earnings management have led 
to a renewed interest in examining whether IPO and SEO firms engage in such 
activities around the offer year. Darrough and Rangan (2005) for example show that 
IPO firms manage reported earnings upward by reducing R&D expenses during the 
IPO year. They find that the reduction in R&D expenses is positively associated 
with managerial share selling as managers believe investors place greater emphasis 
on current earnings. Wongsunwai (2012) finds evidence that both real and accrual 
earnings management activities are utilized by IPO firms during the offer year, and 
that the presence of reputable venture capitalists is associated with a lower level of 
real activities-based manipulation. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. 
(2012) find evidence that SEO firms engage in real earnings management during the 
offer year. Taken together, these findings indicate that both real and accrual 
activities are likely to be manipulated by firms that have strong incentives to inflate 
reported earnings. 
Focusing on monitoring bodies that may mitigate earnings manipulation, 
prior research finds evidence that high-quality auditing plays a significant role in 
mitigating accrual earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; Balsam et al., 2003). 
Becker et al. (1998) for example find evidence that clients of big N audit firms 
report a lower level of accrual earnings management. Elder and Zhou (2002) find a 
lower level of accrual earnings management is associated with the presence of big N 
audit firms and auditor industry expertise during the IPO year. Chen et al. (2005) 
find similar evidence that big N audit firms mitigate accrual earnings management 
during the IPO year. Balsam et al. (2003), Krishnan (2003), and Reichelt and Wang 
(2010) find evidence that auditor industry specialism mitigates accrual-based 
manipulation. Despite the previous extensive evidence on the association between 
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accrual earnings management and audit quality, few studies have examined whether 
enhanced audit quality affects real earnings management activities (e.g. Chi et al. 
2011).  
Real earnings management represents managerial decisions that deviate from 
normal business practices (Roychowdhury, 2006) and, therefore, are less subject to 
the scrutiny of regulators and audit firms (Graham et al., 2005). Consistent with this 
view, recent research shows high quality auditors play no role in mitigating real 
earnings management, but rather lead their clients to resort to a higher level of real 
earnings management to avoid the monitoring of accrual-based manipulation. For 
example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) present evidence that the probability of SEO 
firms to utilize real earnings management during the offer year increases when they 
are audited by big N audit firms. Chi et al. (2011) examine the association between 
audit quality and real and accrual earnings management for firms that have strong 
incentive to manage earnings upward (e.g. firms that just meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks and firms that issue Seasoned Equity). Chi et al. (2011) find evidence 
that a higher level of real earnings management is positively associated with high-
quality auditing as proxied by the presence of big N audit firms, audit industry 
specialism, higher audit fees, and longer audit tenure. Chi et al. (2011) indicate that 
high-quality auditing constrains accrual-based manipulation and, therefore, the 
clients switch intensively to a higher level of real earnings management. However, 
whether the association between high-quality auditing and real earnings 
management extends to the IPO setting is an open question.  
6.2.2 Litigation Risk, Audit Quality, and Trade-offs between Real and 
Accrual Earnings Management around IPOs  
Unlike many other settings (e.g. SEOs), the IPO event has different characteristics 
that may impact the level of monitoring of real land accrual earnings management 
by audit firms. It is well-documented that high quality auditors help to reduce 
information asymmetry and IPO underpricing (Balvers et al. 1988; Beatty 1989; 
Datar et al. 1991; Hogan, 1997) and, therefore, hiring high quality audit firms would 
help IPO firms to send a positive signal about the offer to outside investors (Titman 
and Trueman, 1986; Brau and Fawcett, 2006). However, the IPO event is associated 
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with a higher probability of future litigation risk given the fact that IPO firms have 
strong incentives to manage earnings upward around IPOs. Hogan (1997) indicates 
that audit firms who are unable to uncover material misstatement during the IPO 
(e.g. high levels of earnings management) face a higher litigation risk, especially 
when IPO firms experience post-IPO poor stock return performance. Indeed, this 
litigation risk would lead to severe negative consequences for the reputation of high 
quality auditors (big N audit firms) compared with lower quality auditors (non-big N 
audit firms) (Hogan, 1997). Therefore, big N audit firms are expected to provide 
high quality audits during the IPO for items that are considered outside the audit 
target, but are associated with a potential litigation risk (e.g. discretionary expenses). 
While accruals manipulation is considered as one of the main audit targets 
that auditors are responsible to detect and uncover, real activities represent 
managerial decisions that are less subject to the scrutiny of audit firms (Graham et 
al., 2005). However, and given the high risk that is associated with the IPO, high 
quality auditors are expected to monitor and detect any real earnings management 
activities that would lead to potential litigation penalties. Consistent with this view, 
Sohn (2011) conducted a survey with high quality auditors (Big 4) and found that 
more than 30% of the respondents admitted that real earning management activities 
are associated with a higher probability of future litigation penalties. 
By comparing between real earnings management activities (sales-based and 
discretionary expenses-based), high quality auditors are expected to provide high 
quality audits to monitor and detect discretionary expenses-based manipulation for 
the following reasons. First, audit firms consider the fact that a higher level of sales 
around IPOs should be combined with higher levels of spending on selling (SG&A) 
and advertising expenses. In other words, if an IPO firm intend to increase sales 
through normal business practices, then this should be combined with higher levels 
of selling and advertising expenses. Based on this view, IPO firms who 
simultaneously manipulate sales upward (e.g. through providing more price 
discounts and/or more lenient credit terms) and reduce discretionary expenses to 
increase reported earnings are likely to bring the attention of outsiders. Thus, and 
given that IPO firms are expected to experience high growth in sales around IPOs, 
high quality auditors are expected to provide high quality monitoring on 
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discretionary expenses-based manipulation that may take place during the IPO year. 
Second, IPO firms who spend less on discretionary expenses pre the IPO year are 
found to have a higher probability of IPO failure in the subsequent years (Demers 
and Joos, 2007). Thus, if an IPO firm experience post-IPO failure or poor stock 
return performance due to discretionary expenses-based manipulation, then there is a 
higher probability that audit firms will face potential litigation penalties.  
In summary, based on the previous discussion and given the fact the IPO 
firms have strong incentives to manage earnings upward at the end of the IPO year, 
IPO firms audited by high quality auditors (big N audit firms) are expected to 
exhibit a higher level of sales-based manipulation to avoid the monitoring of 
accrual-based and discretionary expenses-based manipulations by their auditors.
68 
 
Hence, the hypothesis is as follows  
HYPOTHESIS  1.  IPO firms that are audited by big N audit firms exhibit a 
lower level of accrual-based and discretionary expenses-based 
earnings management and a higher level of sales-based earnings 
management. 
6.2.3 Audit Quality and its Impact on Real and Accrual Earnings 
Management and Post-IPO Stock Return Performance  
The second objective of this chapter is to examine the effect of real and accrual 
earnings management on post-IPO stock return performance, and whether high-
quality auditing during the offer year has any impact on the relation between real 
and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock return performance. Prior 
research presents evidence that IPO firms that manage earnings upward using 
accrual-based manipulation during IPOs experience a decline in stock returns in 
                                            
68 IPO firms also can engage in real activities through production manipulation. Specifically, IPO 
firms may produce more units in order to lower the total cost of goods sold, which leads to increase 
the profit margin. However, production cost manipulation is not considered within the analysis of real 
earnings management as this is a method that can only be fully utilized by manufacturing companies 
(Roychowdhury, 2006) and manufacturing companies make up just 26.6% of the total sample. 
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subsequent periods. Teoh et al. (1998a) for example find IPO firms that have high 
levels of accrual earnings management during the IPO year experience a decline in 
stock returns for up to three years after the IPO year. In addition, by comparing post-
IPO stock returns across different levels of accrual earnings management Teoh et al. 
(1998a) find the decline in stock returns is more severe for those firms that 
aggressively managed their earnings during the IPO. Roosenboom et al. (2003) also 
find evidence that IPO firms with high levels of accrual earnings management 
during the IPO year experience worse stock returns post-IPO. Fan (2007) find IPO 
firms engage in accrual-based manipulation during the IPO and this manipulation 
leads to deterioration in post-IPO return and operating performance. 
More recently, and based on a SEO setting, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and 
Kothari et al. (2012) examine the effect of real earnings management on post-SEO 
operating and stock return performance. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find real 
earnings management that takes place during the offer year has severe negative 
consequences for post-SEO operating performance. Also, compared with the 
negative consequences of accrual-based manipulation, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
find real earnings management has the most severe negative consequences for post-
SEO operating performance. Kothari et al. (2012) focus on post-SEO stock return 
performance and find similar evidence that real earnings management, which is 
implemented during the offer year, has the most severe negative consequences for 
post-SEO stock return performance. Although the recent research has been carried 
out on the association between real earnings management and post SEO stock return 
and operating performance (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012), no 
study to date has examined the association between real earnings management and 
post IPO returns and operating performance. 
The extant empirical research has revealed that the role of high-quality 
auditing is a significant determinant of managers’ tendency to utilize real and 
accrual earnings management. On the one hand, prior literature finds evidence that 
big N audit firms constrain accrual-based manipulation (Becker et al., 1998; Balsam 
et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003; Elder and Zhou, 2002; Chen et al., 2005). For example, 
Elder and Zhou (2002) and Chen et al. (2005) find evidence for IPO firms that the 
presence of big N audit firms is associated with a lower level of accrual-based 
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manipulation during the IPO year. On the other hand, recent literature finds evidence 
that the monitoring of accrual-based manipulation by big N audit firms leads the 
clients to resort to a higher level of real activities-based manipulation. For example, 
Chi et al. (2011) find evidence that high quality auditors constrain accrual-based 
manipulation that takes place during the SEO year, and this monitoring of accrual 
earnings management leads SEO firms to resort to a higher level of real activities-
based manipulation. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find similar evidence that SEO 
firms audited by big N auditors have a higher probability to engage in real earnings 
management.  
Further, prior research finds evidence that accrual-based manipulation during 
the IPO year is negatively associated with post-IPO return and operating 
performance (Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998c; Gramlich and Sorensen, 
2004; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Fan, 2007). For example, Teoh et al. (1998a) and 
Fan (2007) find evidence that accrual-based manipulation, which takes place during 
the IPO-year, has a negative consequence for post-IPO stock return and operating 
performance. More recently, research has examined the relation between real 
earnings management and subsequent return and operating performance. For 
example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2012) find real earnings 
management that occurs during the SEO year predicts post-SEO return and 
operating underperformance. In addition, compared with accrual-based manipulation, 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2012) find real activities-based 
manipulation has the more severe negative consequences for post-SEO return and 
operating performance.  
Therefore, the presence of big N audit firms during the IPO year is likely to 
affect the relation between real and accrual earnings management and subsequent 
performance. On the one hand, the presence of big N audit firms is expected to 
constrain accrual-based manipulation. This in turn should alleviate the negative 
consequences of accrual-based manipulation for post-IPO return performance. On 
the other hand, and based on findings of the recent literature (e.g. Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011), the monitoring of accrual-based manipulation by 
big N audit firms is expected to lead IPO firms to resort to a higher level of real 
earnings management. Recent literature (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et 
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al. 2012) finds that real earnings management has more severe negative 
consequences for post-SEO stock return and operating performance than accrual-
based manipulation. 
In summary, IPO firms that manage real and accrual earnings management 
during the IPO year are expected to experience long-run stock return 
underperformance. Further, IPO firms audited by big N audit firms are expected to 
experience a severe decline in post-IPO return performance due to the extensive use 
of real activities-based manipulation during the offer year. Hence, the next 
hypotheses are as follows 
HYPOTHESIS  2a.  IPO firms that report high levels of real and/or accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year will experience post-IPO 
poor stock returns. 
HYPOTHESIS  2b.  IPO firms audited by big N audit firms, ceteris paribus, 
will experience a more severe post-IPO poor stock returns performance 
due to the extensive use of sales-based earnings management during 
the IPO. 
6.3 Research Methods and Data 
6.3.1 Data and Sample Construction 
This chapter focuses on IPOs as prior research shows that IPO firms have strong 
incentives to manage real and accrual earnings management around IPOs (e.g., 
Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 1998a; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Darrough and 
Rangan, 2005; Singer and Fedyk, 2011; Wongsunwai, 2012) and to hire higher 
quality auditors (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Brau and Fawcett, 2006). The sample 
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consists of 515 IPO firms69 that went public on the London Stock Exchange between 
January 1998 and December 2008, as the London Stock Exchange provides data 
about IPOs on the Main market starting from 1998 while data about IPOs on the 
AIM market starts from 1995. Therefore, and to be consistent, the sample covers the 
period from 1998 to 2008. All financial IPO firms are excluded from the sample due 
to differences in their financial reporting and disclosure requirements (e.g., Teoh et 
al., 1998a; 1998c; Chen et al., 2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Fan, 2007; Chang et 
al., 2010; Lee and Masulis, 2011; Chahine et al., 2012; Wongsunwai, 2012).  
Further, the sample is restricted to all IPO firms that have available 
prospectuses and the necessary data to measure real and accrual earnings 
management. This restriction follows Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) and leads to a more conservative test of earnings management by having a 
sample consisting of successful and large IPO firms. Further, to estimate real and 
accrual earnings management this chapter follows prior research by excluding from 
the control sample any industry-year group (2-digit SIC code) that has less than 6 
observations.
70
 The IPO year, year (0), is defined as the fiscal year during which the 
IPO occurs.
71
  
Data are collected using the following sources: (1) IPO firms are identified 
using the list of IPOs on the London Stock Exchange website for UK firms that were 
                                            
69 The initial sample with available prospectuses and necessary data is 570 IPOs, but the final sample 
is reduced to 515 IPOs as this chapter analyzes current accrual-based manipulation and the required 
variables (∆ account receivable, ∆ inventory, ∆ other current assets, ∆ account payable, ∆ tax payable, 
and ∆ other current liabilities) to estimate current accruals are not available for the whole sample. The 
reason to analyze current accruals is that managers have more flexibility to manipulate current 
accruals compared with long-term accruals (e.g. Teoh et al., 1998a; Chahine et al., 2012). Current 
accruals manipulation can be conducted by delaying the recognition of expenses and accelerating the 
recognition of revenues, while non-current (long-term) accruals manipulation can be conducted by 
decelerating depreciation policies, reducing deferred tax, and realizing unusual gains (Teoh et al., 
1998a). Consistent with this view, previous studies analyze current accrual-based manipulation when 
they examine the effect of several monitoring bodies on accruals manipulation during the IPO [e.g. 
the role of VCs, Morsfield and Tan, (2006), Chahine et al., (2012), Wongsunwai, (2012); the role of 
more reputable underwriters, Chang et al., (2010),  Lee and Masulis, (2011);  the role of high quality 
auditors, Chen et al., (2005)]. 
70 The analysis also is repeated using 10 observations for each industry-year group and the results are 
qualitatively similar but leads to a decrease in the sample size and, therefore, this chapter follows 
Rosner, (2003), Iqbal et al., (2009) and Athanasakou et al., (2011) by using 6 observations. 
71 To overcome any misspecification of the financial year end, the financial data obtained from 
WorldScope are cross checked with the financial data in the prospectus and the results are 
qualitatively similar.  
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admitted to the AIM and Main markets during the period 1998-2008, as 1998 is the 
first year that Main Market IPOs are reported here. This list provides information 
about IPOs such as, issue price, the date of an IPO, market capitalization, etc; (2) the 
ICC Plum and Lexis-Nexis databases are used to obtain information about the 
company identifier for IPO firms, such as the WorldScope and ISIN codes; (3) the 
prospectuses were then downloaded from the Thomson One Banker database; (4) 
financial data for the IPO firms and for the control sample of all UK non-IPO firms 
are obtained from the WorldScope database. WorldScope however, does not provide 
all the required financial data for the IPO firms; therefore, all missing financial data 
are manually collected from IPO prospectuses; (5) the DataStream database is used 
to collect the stock prices for the sample of IPOs and their matched firms; (6) the 
Fame database is used to collect audit quality data (the name of auditors, audit 
tenure, and audit and non-audit service fees) and cross checked with the 
prospectuses. Also, all missing data are manually collected from IPO prospectuses.  
6.3.2 Event periods 
This chapter focuses on examining the impact of audit quality on real and accrual 
earnings management that take place at the end of the IPO year. Also, it examines 
the impact of audit quality on the association between real and accrual earnings 
management and post-IPO stock returns performance. Analyzing earnings 
management activities that occur at the end of the IPO year is consistent with prior 
research that investigates the association between earnings management and audit 
quality around IPOs (e.g. Elder and Zhou, 2002; Chen et al., 2005). Figure 6.1 
depicts the time periods when real and accrual earnings management are estimated. 
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 Figure 6.1 Time periods analyzed and audit quality  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
  
                                                                                     
 
Year -1 Year 0 Year +3 
IPO date  
Fiscal year pre the IPO 
year (Year -1) 
 
Fiscal year during which the IPO 
occurs (Year 0= the IPO year) 
Year -2 Year +1 Year +2 Year +4 
Year +5 
Fiscal year post the IPO year (Year +1) 
This chapter examines the impact of audit quality on real and accrual earnings 
management activities that take place at the end of the IPO year (Year 0)   
 
IPO clients of high quality auditors represent IPO firms 
audited by big N auditors during the IPO year (Year 0) 
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6.3.3 Variable Measurement  
6.3.3.1 Measuring Accrual-based Earnings Management  
Prior research focuses on analyzing current accrual-based manipulation when it 
examines the impact of monitoring bodies (e.g. VCs, underwriters and auditors) on 
accrual earnings management at the IPO. This is due to the fact that managers have 
more flexibility (discretion) to manipulate current accruals (Teoh et al., 1998a; Xie 
et al., 2003; Chang et al., 2010; Chahine et al., 2012), while managing long-term 
accruals is likely to bring the attention of auditors. For example, current accrual 
manipulation can be conducted through delaying the recognition of expenses and 
accelerating the recognition of revenues, while non-current accrual manipulation can 
be conducted through decelerating depreciation policies, reducing deferred tax, and 
realizing unusual gains (Teoh et al., 1998a).  
Consistent with this view, Morsfield and Tan (2006), Chahine et al. (2012), 
and Wongsunwai (2012) investigate the role of Venture Capitalists (VCs) to reduce 
current accrual-based manipulation at the IPO year. Chang et al. (2010) and Lee and 
Masulis (2011) examine whether the presence of prestigious underwriters is 
associated with a lower level of current accrual-based manipulation at the IPO. Chen 
et al. (2005) explore whether high quality auditors constrain the use of current 
accrual-based manipulation by IPO firms. Thus, this chapter follows prior research 
by examining the association between audit quality and accrual-based manipulation 
that is measured based on current accruals rather than total accruals. Specifically, 
current accruals are defined as the difference between the change in noncash current 
assets and change in operating current liabilities (Teoh et al., 1998a; Morsfield and 
Tan, 2006). IPO firms at the IPO have a strong incentive to manage earnings upward 
and, therefore, they are expected to intensively engage in current accrual 
manipulation compared with non-current (long-term) accruals.  
Further, and following prior research in earnings management, a cross-
sectional adaptation of the modified Jones (1991) model is applied to estimate 
discretionary current accruals. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) point out estimating 
discretionary accruals for IPO firms using lagged total assets to scale accrual 
variables may inflate the measure of accruals in the current year. They argue that 
Chapter 6. Real and Accrual Earnings Management and Audit Quality  
169 
 
lagged total assets are qualitatively smaller than total assets at the end of the IPO 
year because IPO firms tend to use proceeds to invest in assets. In order to overcome 
this problem, this chapter follows Armstrong et al. (2009) and scales all variables by 
average total assets rather than lagged total assets.
72
 A cross-sectional regression is 
used for each year for all UK non-IPO firms for each 2-digit SIC industry category. 
This approach, in part, controls for changes in economic conditions that impact on 
current accruals across different industry groups, but allows for coefficients to vary 
through time (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010, Kasznik, 1999; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994). Also, return on assets (ROA) is added to the model as suggested by Kothari 
et al. (2005) in order to control for extreme operating performance as this can bias 
the estimation of discretionary current accruals.
73
 The estimated coefficients, then, 
are taken to estimate discretionary current accruals for the IPO firm. Normal current 
accruals are therefore estimated using the following cross-sectional regression for 
each industry and year for all non-IPO firms:
74
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Where CAi,t  is current accruals defined as the difference between the change in 
noncash current assets and the change in operating current liabilities (Teoh et al., 
1998a; Morsfield and Tan, 2006): 
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AvAssets i,t  is the sum of total assets at the beginning of the IPO year and the total 
assets at the end of the IPO year divided by 2, ∆ SALES i,t  is the change in sales 
                                            
72  The analysis also is repeated scaling all variables by lagged total assets and the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter. 
73 It is worth to mention that the analysis is repeated without controlling on ROA and the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter. 
74 To take account of extreme values all variables are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. 
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during a year scaled by average total assets, and ROA i,t is return on assets measured 
as earnings before extraordinary items divided by average total assets. 
The coefficient estimates from equation (6.1) are used to estimate normal current 
accruals for all IPO firms in each year and industry as follows 
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 Where ∆ REC i,t  is the change in receivables during the year scaled by average total 
assets.  
Discretionary current accruals (DCA) are measured as the difference between 
current accruals and fitted normal current accruals where, 
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For robustness this chapter also repeats this analysis using performance-
matched discretionary current accruals following Kothari et al. (2005) and find 
qualitatively similar results.
75
 Also, this chapter follows prior research by using the 
absolute value of discretionary current accruals as a proxy of accrual-based 
manipulation (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Krishnan, 2003) as the 
absolute value can capture both income-increasing and income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals. 
6.3.3.2 Measuring Real Earnings Management 
This chapter examines two of real earnings management activities; discretionary 
expenses-based (abnormal discretionary expenses) and sales-based (abnormal cash 
flows from operations) manipulations. Discretionary expenses represent the sum of 
R&D, advertising expenses, and selling, general and administrative expenses 
                                            
75 Each IPO firm is matched with a non-IPO firm based on year, 2-digit SIC industry code, and the 
closest return on assets. Therefore, the performance-matched discretionary current accruals are 
defined as discretionary current accruals for IPO firms minus the discretionary current accruals for 
the matched firms. 
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(SG&A). Reducing discretionary expenses in the current period will boost reported 
earnings in the current period. In addition, where discretionary expenses are paid for 
in cash, any reduction in these expenses will increase cash flows in the current 
period (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). The second activity that is analyzed is sales-
based manipulation. Sales-based manipulation leads to lower levels of cash flows 
from operations, and can be managed through offering more price discounts and/or 
more lenient credit terms (see Roychowdhury, 2006). Following prior research real 
earnings management proxies are estimated based on models developed by Dechow 
at al. (1998) and applied by Roychowdhury (2006). Later researchers such as Cohen 
et al., (2008), Cohen and Zarowin, (2010), Wongsunwai, (2012) and Zang, (2012), 
also apply these models to estimate real earnings management. Similar to the 
estimation of the measures of accrual earnings management all variables are scaled 
by average total assets.
76
 First, the normal level of cash flows from operations is 
estimated using the following cross-sectional regression for each industry and year 
for all non-IPO firms:
77
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Where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations for firm i at period t. The abnormal CFO 
for IPO firms is calculated as actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO estimated 
using the coefficients from regression (6.5).  
The normal level of discretionary expenses can be expressed as a linear function of 
contemporaneous sales where 
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76 Also, the test is repeated by scaling all the variables by lagged total assets and the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter.  
77 To take account of extreme values all variables Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. 
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Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) however, point out that 
estimating a normal level of discretionary expenses as specified in regression (6.6) 
can lead to poor estimation where firms manage sales upwards to increase reported 
earnings during any year. If a firm has managed sales upwards, this will result in 
unusually low residuals from running the regression as specified above. In order to 
overcome this problem, discretionary expenses are estimated as a function of lagged 
sales. Therefore, and following Roychowdhury (2006), the normal level of 
discretionary expenses for the IPO firms is estimated as follows 
(6.7)
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Where DISXit is the sum of R&D, SG&A, and advertising expenses for firm i at 
periodt , and SALES i,t-1 is sales during the previous year.
 
 
The abnormal level of discretionary expenses for IPO firms is calculated as 
actual discretionary expenses minus the normal level of discretionary expenses 
estimated using the coefficients from regression (6.7). As both the abnormal cash 
flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) and abnormal discretionary 
expenses represent deviation from the normal levels, the sign of these two activates 
is expected to be negative when the manipulation occurs. Thus, both abnormal cash 
flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) and abnormal discretionary 
expenses (discretionary expenses-based manipulation) are multiplied by minus one, 
so the same interpretation are applied for accrual-based and real activities-based 
manipulations (the higher value of these activities the higher earnings manipulation). 
6.3.3.3 Measuring Long-run Stock Price Performance   
To test whether real and accrual earnings management predict post-IPO stock return 
performance, and whether the role of big N audit firms on real and accrual earnings 
management feed through into post-IPO return performance, post-IPO stock return 
performance is examined using buy-and-hold-abnormal return (BHAR) and 
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cumulative abnormal return (CAR).
78
 Following previous research both BHAR and 
CAR are computed as the difference between the return for IPO firms and matched 
non-IPO firms starting 4 months after the date of the IPO to 3 years after the date of 
the IPO (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; Roosenboom at al., 2003).
79
 The matched sample is 
created from all UK non-IPO firms following Lyon et al. (1999). Therefore, the 
matched sample is identified from all UK non-IPO firms with market capitalizations 
between 70% and 130% of IPO firms’ market values, and then is matched with the 
closest book-to-market ratio to IPO firms and in the same year and industry.
80
 If the 
IPO firm is delisted prior to the IPO returns’ ending date the returns of the IPO firm 
and its matched firm are set to zero, while if the matched firm is delisted prior to the 
ending date it is replaced, on a point-forward basis, with another matched firm to 
avoid survivorship bias in the matched sample.
 81
 The mean BHAR is calculated as 
follows: 
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Where R i, t is the monthly return for firm i in month t and R benchmark, t is the 
monthly return for the benchmark in month t.   
                                            
78 The results are consistent using both BHAR and CAR. Therefore, this chapter presents only the 
BHAR results. 
79 To allow for a reporting lag and following Teoh et al. (1998a), buy and hold returns are calculated 
starting from month 4. 
80 Following Kothari et al. (2012), the matching approach is based on post-issuance characteristics to 
control for changing the risk characteristics of the firms. The matched sample is also identified based 
on pre-issuance characteristics and results are qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter. 
81 When it is too difficult to find a matching firm in the same industry using the 2-digit SIC code, the 
criterion is relaxed to a one-digit SIC code. In a very few cases when no matching firm is found 
based on one-digit SIC code, a matching firm is identify without industry restriction. 
Chapter 6. Real and Accrual Earnings Management and Audit Quality  
174 
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 6.1 (Panel A) presents descriptive statistics for the pooled IPO sample, while 
Panels B and C present the descriptive statistics based on audit quality. The mean 
market capitalization for IPO firms audited by big N auditors is approximately £200 
million and for IPO firms audited by non-big N auditors it is approximately £25 
million. This large difference in market values between the two samples is 
consistent with view that large firms prefer to hire big N audit firms.  
Table 6.2 (Panel A) reports the distribution of IPOs over the period from 
1998 to 2008 and shows that the years 2000, 2004, 2005, and 2006 account for more 
than 65% of the sample. In addition, one consequence of the recent global financial 
crisis is that the lowest number of IPOs in the sample is in 2008.  Table 6.2 (Panel B) 
shows the frequency of IPOs relative to the industry standard classification, 
measured by 2-digit SIC codes. Except for the clustering in the Business Services 
industry, which accounts for approximately 34% of the total sample, the majority of 
other industries have similar percentages of IPOs ranging from 1% to 11%. 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics for sample IPO firms during 1998-2008 
  
Total assets  Net income  Market value Money raised  
(£ mill.) (£ mill.)  (£ mill.) (£ mill.) 
Panel A: Pooled sample (n=515) 
Mean 52.68 1.87 109.97 41.01 
Median 4.32 0.00 26.26 7.50 
Std. dev 225.21 26.28 287.00 126.85 
Minimum 0.07 -124.10 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Panel B: IPO clients of big N audit firms sample (n=240)  
Mean 102.78 3.95 199.59 75.44 
Median 9.65 0.17 57.62 21.73 
Std. dev 319.86 38.21 380.08 169.42 
Minimum 0.20 -124.10 2.39 0.28 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Panel C: IPO clients of non-big N audit firms sample (n=275) 
Mean 8.97 0.05 24.83 10.97 
Median 2.03 -0.07 15.00 3.50 
Std. dev 42.33 3.88 29.45 56.62 
Minimum 0.07 -11.84 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 671.60 37.67 147.66 928.80 
Table 6.1 presents sample descriptive statistics for the pooled IPOs, IPO clients of big N auditors, and IPO 
clients of non-big N auditors over the period 1998-2008. Total assets are the beginning of period total assets; net 
income at the end of the IPO year; market value is the market capitalization for IPO firms immediately after the 
listing; and money raised is the offer amount of the IPO. Total assets and net income are obtained from the 
WorldScope database; market value and money raised are obtained from the London Stock Exchange website. 
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Table 6.2 Time and industry distribution 
 
Panel A: Time distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008 
 
 Pooled sample Big N clients non- Big N clients 
Year   Freq % Freq % Freq % 
1998 33 6.41 24 10.00 9 3.27 
1999 26 5.05 10 4.17 16 5.82 
2000 94 18.25 59 24.58 35 12.73 
2001 41 7.96 17 7.08 24 8.73 
2002 29 5.63 15 6.25 14 5.09 
2003 20 3.88 9 3.75 11 4.00 
2004 85 16.50 38 15.83 47 17.09 
2005 88 17.09 31 12.92 57 20.73 
2006 65 12.62 21 8.75 44 16.00 
2007 33 6.41 15 6.25 18 6.55 
2008 1 0.19 1 0.42 -    - 
Total 515 100.00 240 100.00 275 100.00 
 
Panel B: Industry distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008 
  Pooled Sample Big N clients non-Big N clients 
Industry                                                  2-digit SIC  Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Oil and gas extraction                                                         13 24 4.66 9 3.75 15 5.45 
Food products                                                  20 11 2.14 3 1.25 8 2.91 
Printing and publishing                                                        27 11 2.14 5 2.08 6 2.18 
Chemicals and allied 
products                                            
28 35 6.80 19 7.92 16 5.82 
Industrial machinery                 35 15 2.91 9 3.75 6 2.18 
Electronic equipment                                36 33 6.41 17 7.08 16 5.82 
Instruments and related 
products                                        
38 22 4.27 10 4.17 12 4.36 
Communications 48 27 5.24 15 6.25 12 4.36 
Electric, gas, and 
sanitation                                   
49 8 1.55 2 0.83 6 2.18 
Durable goods                                         50 10 1.94 5 2.08 5 1.82 
Eating and drinking 
establishments 
58 14 2.72 5 2.08 9 3.27 
Retail 59 8 1.55 3 1.25 5 1.82 
Business services                                                                   73 173 33.59 87 36.25 86 31.27 
Media and entertainment 78 5 0.97 1 0.42 4 1.45 
Amusement and recreation                                       79 26 5.05 7 2.92 19 6.91 
Engineering and 
management services                                   
87 56 10.87 19 7.92 37 13.45 
All others - 37 7.19 24 10.00 13 4.75 
Total   515 100.00 240 100.00 275 100.00 
Table 6.2 reports time and industry distributions for the pooled IPOs sample, IPO clients of big N auditors, and 
IPO clients of non-big N auditors over the period 1998-2008. Panel A presents the time distribution, while Panel 
B presents the industry distribution. 
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Table 6.3 (Panel A) reports descriptive statistics for all the variables in the 
regression models for the pooled sample. The results are interpreted on the basis of 
mean values. Both abnormal cash flows from operation and abnormal discretionary 
expenses are multiplied by minus one. Thus, for real activities-based and accrual-
based manipulations, significant and positive coefficients indicate income-increasing 
earnings management. Panel A shows preliminary evidence that IPO firms in the 
UK exhibit higher levels of sales-based manipulation during the IPO year. The mean 
abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) is 4.9 % positive 
and statistically significant at the 5 % level. Also, Panel A shows the mean absolute 
value of discretionary current accruals is 25 % and statistically significant at the 1 % 
level. Hence, these results show that IPO firms exhibit evidence of real activities-
based (sales-based manipulation) and accrual-based earnings management at the end 
of the IPO year.  In addition, Table 6.3 (Panel A) shows that approximately 47 % of 
the IPO sample is audited by big N audit firms. This in turn provides approximately 
equivalent numbers of IPOs in each sample (IPO firms audited by big N audit firms 
versus IPO firms audited by non-big N audit firms) to examine the effect of high-
quality auditing on real and accrual earnings management.
 82
 
Table 6.3 (Panel B) reports descriptive statistics for all the variables based on 
audit quality (IPO firms audited by big N audit firms versus IPO firms audited by 
non-big N audit firms). Panel B provides preliminary evidence that IPOs audited by 
big N audit firms exhibit a higher level of sales-based manipulation, and lower 
levels of discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based manipulations than IPO 
firms audited by non-big N audit firms. Specifically, Panel B reports for IPO firms 
audited by big N auditors (non-big N auditors) the mean abnormal cash flows from 
operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and absolute value of discretionary 
current accruals are 10.5 (0.0) %, -8.6 (10.5) %, and 14.5 (35.3) %, respectively.
83
  
 
                                            
82 Chi et al. (2011) examine the role of audit quality on real and accrual earnings management where 
96.8 % of their sample firms are audited by big N audit firms.  
83 The differences in discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based manipulations between the two 
groups are highly statistically significant at the 1 % level using a t-test, while the difference in 
abnormal cash flows from operations is statistically significant at the 5 % level. 
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Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics for the all the variables in the regressions models 
Panel A: Distribution of all variables during the IPO year (Pooled sample) 
VARIABLES Mean Median Std.dev Q1 Q3 t-values Prob>t 
Abnormal cash flows from operations   0.049 0.028 0.493 -0.134 0.224 2.25 0.0250 
Abnormal discretionary expenses 0.016 0.028 0.626 -0.216 0.241 0.58 0.5617 
Absolute discretionary current 
accruals 
0.256 0.100 0.442 0.046 0.255 13.14 <0.0001 
Big N  0.466 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 21.18 <0.0001 
LnSize 3.431 3.268 1.446 2.387 4.284 53.84 <0.0001 
MB 11.011 4.202 38.057 1.910 8.447 6.57 <0.0001 
Ln(1+age) 1.074 0.836 0.885 0.257 1.742 27.55 <0.0001 
Lev 0.359 0.110 0.662 0.000 0.434 12.30 <0.0001 
Loss 0.499 - 0.500 - - - - 
ROA -0.922 0.001 2.809 -0.827 0.137 -7.45 <0.0001 
Capex Growth 0.162 0.019 0.747 -0.002 0.096 4.93 <0.0001 
SEO 0.05 - 0.219 - - - - 
AIM 0.753 - 0.431 - - - - 
VC 0.227 - 0.419 - - - - 
Underwriter 0.186 - 0.390 - - - - 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. t-statistics and z-statistics for differences in means and 
medians across the two groups, respectively. Table 6.3 reports descriptive statistics for the all variables in the regressions models. 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample, while Panel B presents descriptive statistics based on the audit 
quality (IPO firms audited by big N audit firms versus IPO firms audited by non-big N audit firms) and  the difference means (t-test) 
and medians (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test). Where Abnormal cash flows from operations is abnormal levels of cash flows from 
operations, multiplied by minus one, Abnormal discretionary expenses is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, multiplied by 
minus one, Absolute discretionary current accruals is the absolute value of discretionary current accruals, Big N =1 if the firm is 
audited by big N audit firm and 0 otherwise, LnSize is the natural logarithm of market value, MB is the market-to-book ratio 
calculated as the market value of equity  divided by the book value of equity, Ln(1+age) is the natural logarithm of 1+ IPO firm age 
where the IPO firm’s age is calculated as the difference between the founding date of the IPO firm and the date of its IPO, Lev is 
total debt divided by total assets in the year prior to the IPO, Loss = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the IPO year and 0 otherwise, 
ROA is return on assets measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets in the year prior to the IPO, 
CapexGrowth is capital expenditure growth which is computed as capital expenditure for the IPO year minus previous year scaled 
by total assets the year prior, SEO=1  if the firms issue seasoned equity offering during the IPO year and 0 otherwise, AIM= 1 if the 
firms listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and 0 otherwise, VC= 1 if the firm is backed by a venture capitalist and 0 
otherwise, and Underwriter=1 if the firm is underwritten by a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Abnormal cash flows from 
operations and Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by Dechow at al. (1998) and as 
implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Discretionary current accruals are estimated using the corrected version of the modified 
Jones (1991) model.  “ –“ stands for “not meaningful”. 
Panel B: Distribution of all variables  during the IPO year based on audit quality 
 
Big N clients 
 
non-Big N clients 
 
Difference 
  VARIABLES Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations   
0.105 0.045 0.396 0.000 0.010 0.560 2.41**      1.63 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
-0.086 -0.031 0.513 0.105 0.095 0.698 -3.50***   -4.17*** 
Absolute discretionary 
current accruals 
0.145 0.076 0.247 0.353 0.137 0.542 -5.46***    -5.79*** 
LnSize 4.258 4.054 1.396 2.709 2.708 1.050 14.34***    12.30*** 
MB 12.401 4.046 40.701 9.797 4.412 35.621 0.77 0.06 
Ln(1+age) 1.130 1.068 0.908 1.024 0.64 0.862 1.36 0.86 
Lev 0.337 0.133 0.549 0.378 0.093 0.747 -0.70 0.94 
Loss 0.463 - 0.500 0.531 - 0.500 -1.55 - 
ROA -0.813 0.020 2.564 -1.016 -0.024 3.009 0.82 0.58 
Capex Growth 0.164 0.025 0.472 0.161 0.013 0.924 0.05      2.04** 
SEO 0.054 - 0.227 0.047 - 0.213 0.36 - 
AIM 0.538 - 0.500 0.942 - 0.235  -10.61***        - 
VC 0.292 - 0.455 0.171 - 0.377   3.29*** - 
Underwriter  0.283 - 0.452 0.102 - 0.303   5.41*** - 
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In summary, the results of Table 6.3 confirm the hypothesis that IPO firms 
audited by high quality auditors (big N) are expected to exhibit a higher level of 
sales-based earnings management and lower levels of discretionary expenses-based 
and accrual-based earnings management. 
One observation about the results in Table 6.3 (Panel B) concerning real and 
accrual earnings management is that they may be explained by other factors such as 
firm size and so on, rather than audit quality. This chapter, therefore, follows the 
compensation literature (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Core et al., 1999; Murphy, 
1999; Core et al., 2008) by undertaking a two-stage analysis. First, the following 
OLS regression is used: 
(6.9)t,i
1110 987 6
5 4 3210t,i
εYearIND
rUnderwriteβ  VCβ AIMβSEOβ  ROAβ Lossβ 
LevβGrowthCapexβ age)Ln(1βMBβLnSizeβαEM



 
Where (EM i,t) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings management. In 
the second stage, the residuals (εi,t) from the above OLS regression are obtained and 
tested whether the differences in mean and median residuals between IPO firms 
audited by big N audit firms and IPO firms audited by non-big audit firms are 
statistically significant during the IPO year.   
Based on prior research (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; Fan, 2007; Cohen et al., 
2008; Chi et al., 2011), the model includes a set of control variables that are found to 
be associated with real and accrual earnings management. To control for the size 
effect the natural logarithm of market value (LnSize) is added to the model, 
calculated as the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the offer price on the 
first day of listing.  
Growth opportunities are controlled by adding market-to-book ratio (MB); 
calculated as the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity; IPO firm 
age [Ln(1+age)] measured as the natural logarithm of 1+IPO firm age, where firm 
age is the difference between the incorporating date of the firm and its IPO date; and  
capital expenditure growth (Capex Growth) computed as capital expenditure during 
the IPO year minus the capital expenditure in the previous year divided by total 
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assets in the year prior to the IPO year (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; 
Roosenboom et al., 2003; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
Further, as DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find the level of debt is positively 
associated with earnings management, the model includes leverage ratio (Lev) 
measured as total debtt/total assetst-1 to control for the level of debt. Profitability is 
controlled by adding ROA (e.g., Kothari et al., 2005; Gunny, 2010), while (Loss) a 
dummy variable for firms that have reported a loss is added to the model as prior 
evidence shows that firms that have reported a loss are more likely to manage 
earnings (e.g., Chi et al., 2011). A SEO dummy (SEO) is added to control for those 
firms that raise further funds during the IPO year as Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find 
evidence that SEO firms engage in higher levels of real and accrual earnings 
management during the SEO year. 
As there are two stock markets in the UK, namely the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) and the Official List (Main market), an AIM dummy (AIM) is added 
to the model to control for the differences in regulations between these markets. 
Prior research also finds venture capitalists and high profile underwriters constrain 
the levels of real and accrual earnings management (e.g., Morsfield and Tan, 2006; 
Lee and Masulis, 2011; Wongsunwai, 2012). Thus, the model includes dummy 
variables for venture capitalist (VC) and underwriter (Underwriter)  to control for 
the monitoring role of these financial institutions.
84
 Finally the model includes (IND) 
and (Year) dummies to control for industry and time effects, respectively. 
Table 6.4 reports the results of this second stage analysis and shows that IPO 
firms audited by big N audit firms exhibit a higher level of sales-based 
manipulation, and lower levels of discretionary expenses-based accrual-based 
manipulations than IPO firms audited by non-big N audit firms.
85
 Specifically, for 
                                            
84 Prestigious underwriters are those global investment banks as defined by Derrien and Kecskes 
(2007), while venture capitalist are those investors who hold more than 3 % of a firm’s shares and 
appear in the list of venture capitalists provided by British Venture Capitalist Association. 
Specifically, data are collected from the prospectuses about all the shareholders who hold more than 
3% of the total shares and then shareholder’s name is matched with a list of venture capitalists, which 
is obtained from the British Venture Capitalist Association. 
85The results of the first stage of this analysis are not reported as the concern is only with the 
residuals from the regressions.  
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IPO firms audited by big N auditors (non-big N auditors) the means abnormal cash 
flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and absolute value of 
discretionary current accruals are 3.7 (-3.2) %, -4.7 (4.1) %, and -3.2 (2.8) %, 
respectively. These differences in real activities-based and accrual-based 
manipulations between the two groups are statistically significant at the 10 % level 
using a t-test. Therefore, this evidence confirms that the results in Table 6.3 (Panel 
B) can be interpreted in the context of differences in audit quality.  
In summary, the reported results in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are consistent with the 
hypothesis that IPO firms audited by big N audit firms are expected to engage in a 
higher level of sales-based earnings management to avoid the monitoring of 
discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based earnings management by their 
auditors.  
Table 6.4 Differences in real and accrual-based earnings management residuals 
between IPO clients of big N audit firm and IPO clients of non-big N audit firms 
 Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations       
Abnormal   
discretionary   
expenses 
Absolute discretionary 
current accruals 
Panel A: IPO clients of big N audit firms sample (n=240) 
Mean 0.037 -0.047 -0.032 
Median -0.012 0.003 -0.031 
Std dev 0.329 0.418 0.259 
Panel B: IPO clients of non-big N audit firms sample (n=275) 
Mean -0.032 0.041 0.028 
Median 0.003 0.079 -0.075 
Std dev 0.457 0.593 0.459 
Panel D: Differences in mean and median real and accrual earnings management residuals 
between IPO clients of big N audit firms and IPO clients of non-big N audit firms 
Mean  1.94* -1.92* -1.78* 
Median 0.62 -1.74* 1.10 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. t-statistics and z-statistics for differences 
in means and medians across the two groups, respectively. Table 6.4 reports the difference mean (t-test) and 
median (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test) residuals real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year 
between IPO firms audited by big N audit firms and IPO firms audited by non-big N audit firms. The residuals 
(εi.t) are taken from the following OLS regression: 
EM i,t=α0+β1 LnSize +β2 MB+β3 Ln(1+age)+ β4CapexGrowth +β5 Lev+β6 Loss+β7 ROA 
                +β8 SEO+ β9 AIM+ β10VC+β11Underwriter + IND+ Year +εi,t. 
Where (EM) is a proxy of Abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation), Abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and Absolute discretionary current accruals. All other variables are previously defined. 
Abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) and Abnormal discretionary expenses are 
estimated using models developed by Dechow at al. (1998) and as implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). 
Discretionary current accruals are estimated using the corrected version of the modified Jones (1991) model. 
Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow 
real and accrual earnings management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
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Table 6.5 reports the correlations matrix for all the variables of interest for 
the pooled sample. Notably, big N auditors are strongly negatively correlated with 
abnormal discretionary expenses and absolute discretionary current accruals, and 
positively correlated with abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based 
manipulation). These correlations indicate that the levels of discretionary expenses-
based and accrual-based manipulations are a decreasing function of high-quality 
auditing, which in turn leads IPO firms to resort to a higher level of sales-based 
manipulation. Further, these correlations are consistent with the reported results in 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 concerning the relations between audit quality and real and 
accrual earnings management. 
Table 6.5 Correlation matrix 
  VARIABLES 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
Absolute 
discretionary 
current 
accruals 
Big N 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations 
1 -0.416*** 0.023 0.072 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
-0.418*** 1 -0.027 -0.184*** 
Absolute discretionary 
current accruals 
0.037 0.034 1 -0.255*** 
Big N 0.106** -0.153*** -0.234*** 1 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Table 6.5 reports a correlation matrix for 
key variables for the pooled sample with Spearman correlations in the upper diagonal and Pearson correlation in 
the lower diagonal. All other variables are previously defined. Abnormal cash flows from operations and 
abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual earnings management 
proxies to have the same interpretation. 
 
6.4.2 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Results - Big N Audit Firms and 
Real and Accrual Earnings Management 
To test whether high-quality auditing (proxied by the presence of big N audit firms) 
affects the levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year, the 
following model is estimated: 
(6.10)t,i
1211 10987
 65 432 10t,i
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Where (EM i,t) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings management and 
(Big N) equals 1 if the firm is audited by a big N audit firm and 0 otherwise. 
Following prior research (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Becker et al., 1998; 
Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; Balsam et al., 2003; Roosenboom at al., 2003; 
Kothari et al., 2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Fan, 2007; Cohen et al, 2008; Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Chi et al., 2011; Zang, 2012), this model includes 
a number of control variables namely; firm size (LnSize); market-to-book ratio (MB); 
age [Ln(1+age)]; leverage ratio (Lev); loss (Loss); return on assets (ROA); capital 
expenditure growth (Capex Growth); seasoned equity offering (SEO); the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM); venture capitalist (VC); underwriter 
(Underwriter); and dummy variables are included to control for time and industry 
effects. All variables are previously defined.  
Table 6.6 reports the results for the analysis of whether enhanced audit 
quality affects real and accrual earnings management activities of IPO firms during 
the offer year. The results show a positive coefficient of 0.111 (P <0.01) on Big N in 
the abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) regression. 
Further, negative coefficients are found of -0.143 (P<0.01) and -0.093 (p<0.05) on 
Big N in the abnormal discretionary expenses and absolute discretionary current 
accruals regressions, respectively. This evidence is consistent with the results in 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 that IPO firms audited by big N audit firms exhibit a higher level 
of sales-based manipulation, and lower levels of discretionary expenses-based and 
accrual-based manipulations than IPO firms audited by non-big audit firms. Further, 
the reported results in Table 6.6 suggest that high quality auditors monitor and 
constrain discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based manipulations, and this 
monitoring leads their IPO clients to resort to a higher level of sales-based 
manipulation.
 
 
In summary, while the evidence that IPO firms audited by big N audit firms 
exhibit lower levels of discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based 
manipulations and a higher level of sales-based manipulation confirms the 
hypothesis, this chapter provides new evidence that high quality auditors constrain 
real activities that occur via discretionary expenses-based manipulation. Although it 
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is widely-believed that real earnings management activities are less subject to the 
scrutiny of audit firms, this chapter provides new evidence on this relation.
 
 
Table 6.6 Relation between big N audit firms and real and accrual earnings 
management 
VARIABLES 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
Absolute 
discretionary 
current accruals  
Big N  0.111 -0.143 -0.093 
 
(2.803)*** (-2.591)*** (-2.379)** 
LnSize 0.052 -0.083 -0.076 
 
(1.883)* (-2.848)*** (-3.931)*** 
MB -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 
(-0.733) (-0.533) (1.325) 
Ln(1+age) -0.007 -0.063 -0.034 
 
(-0.293) (-2.126)** (-1.900)* 
Lev -0.017 0.021 -0.013 
 
(-0.514) (0.412) (-0.406) 
Loss 0.194 -0.037 0.036 
 
(4.241)*** (-0.644) (0.900) 
ROA -0.056 0.056 -0.039 
 
(-3.940)*** (2.472)** (-2.879)*** 
Capex Growth -0.142 0.155 -0.062 
 
(-2.240)** (1.657)* (-0.818) 
SEO 0.041 -0.052 -0.128 
 (0.776) (-0.598) (-1.895)* 
AIM  0.051 -0.183 -0.113 
 (0.704) (-2.040)** (-2.179)** 
VC -0.045 -0.048 -0.094 
 (-1.179) (-0.856) (-2.475)** 
Underwriter 0.032 -0.083 -0.049 
 (0.767) (-1.449) (-1.461) 
Constant -0.420 0.650 0.660 
 (-2.568)** (3.676)*** (4.854)*** 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 515 515 515 
Adj.R
2
 0.217 0.165 0.188 
F-statistic 3.95 3.28 3.55 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.32 1.32 1.32 
Max VIF 3.26 3.26 3.26 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Table 6.6 reports the regression of real 
and accrual earnings management measures on audit quality proxy (big N audit firms) and other associated 
control variables for the IPO sample. All models include year and industry dummies to control for time and 
industry effects, and robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). To avoid the influence of outliers, all financial 
continuous data are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. All variables are previously defined. Abnormal 
cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and 
accrual earnings management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
 
 
It seems that big N audit firms consider the future litigation risk which is 
associated with manipulating discretionary expenses, notably that a high level of 
sales around IPOs is expected to be combined with a high level of discretionary 
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expenses e.g. selling and advertising expenses. Sohn (2011) conducted a survey with 
big 4 audit firms and found that 34.1% of the respondents admitted that real earning 
management is associated with a higher future litigation risk. Further, and consistent 
with the importance of discretionary expenses, Demers and Joos (2007) find 
evidence that IPO firms with lower levels of R&D and SG&A spending pre-IPO 
have a lot higher probability of future failure. Therefore, this explains why high 
quality auditors pay attention to constrain discretionary expense manipulation even 
though this manipulation is less subject to the scrutiny of audit firms. 
6.4.3 Self-selection Bias  
One possible observation about the results in Table 6.6 is that they may be affected 
by a sample selection-bias. Specifically, prior literature indicates that as firms self-
select their auditors (big N auditors vs. non-big N auditors) then this would 
introduce a bias for estimating the OLS regression (Titman and Trueman 1986; 
Datar et al, 1991; Chaney et al., 2004; Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Clatworthy et 
al., 2009; Lawrence et al., 2011). Therefore, this chapter uses a Heckman (1979) 
two-stage model to control for sample selection bias where in the first stage a probit 
regression is estimated on the probability of hiring high quality auditors (big N audit 
firms). Then, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated and included as a control variable 
in the second stage regression. Following prior literature (e.g., Chaney et al., 2004), 
in the first stage the following model is estimated to obtain the probability of hiring 
big N audit firms:   
(6.11)
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After the inverse Mills ratio is calculated from the probit regression in the first stage, 
it is included as a control variable in the second stage of the Heckman test to control 
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for sample selection bias. The following model is estimated in the second stage of 
the Heckman test: 
86
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Where (EM i,t) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings management, 
(Big N) equals 1 if the firm is audited by a big N audit firm and 0 otherwise, 
AssetTurn is asset turnover, calculated as sales divided by total assets pre the IPO, 
IPO_proceed is the IPO proceeds, Curr is current ratio measured as current assets 
divided by current liabilities, MainMarket equals 1 if the firms listed on the Main 
market and 0 otherwise, and Litigation equals 1 if a firm is in a high litigation 
industry and 0 otherwise,
87
 and Invs_Mills is the inverse Mills ratio calculated from 
the first stage probit regression on the probability of hiring big N audit firms. All 
other variables are previously defined.  
Table 6.7 reports the results and shows that big N audit firms constrain 
accrual-based and discretionary expenses-based manipulations and, this in turn, 
leads the clients to resort to a higher level of sales-based manipulation. Therefore, 
this evidence confirms that the reported results in Table 6.6 on the impact of 
enhanced audit quality on real and accrual earnings management still holds after 
controlling for sample selection bias.
88
 
                                            
86 Also the second stage of the Heckman test is estimated separately for firms that are audited by big 
N auditors and firms that are audited by non-big N auditors, where the dependent variables are 
earnings management proxies and the inverse Mills ratio is included in the right hand side of the 
regression. Similar results are reported confirming that the OLS regression results are not affected by 
sample selection bias. 
87 Following Zang (2012) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), high litigation industries are SIC codes 
2833–2836, 8731–8734, 7371–7379, 3570–3577, and 3600–3674. 
88 The Propensity Scored Matching (PSM) also is used to control for a sample selection bias. First, a 
probit regression is estimated to obtain the probability of hiring big N audit firms and then this score 
is used to match each IPO firm audited by big N audit firms to matched IPO firms audited by non-big 
N audit firms. By using the PSM, a very small sample size is found (80 IPO firms audited by big N 
audit firms versus 80 IPO firms audited by non-big N audit firms). However, by repeating the 
analysis in Table 6.6 for those IPO firms that are matched based on PSM similar evidence is found 
that big N audit firms effectively mitigate and prevent discretionary expenses-based manipulation. 
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Table 6.7  Relation between big N audit firms and real and accrual earnings 
management after controlling for sample selection bias 
 Model (1) 
Probit  Regression 
Model (2)  
OLS 
Regression 
Model (3) 
OLS 
Regression 
Model(4) 
OLS 
Regression 
VARIABLES Big N=1 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations      
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
Absolute 
discretionary 
current accruals  
Big N      0.110 -0.108 -0.080 
   (2.373)** (-1.716)* (-1.999)** 
LnSize 0.628 0.045 -0.025 0.011 
      (6.819)*** (0.759) (-0.394) (0.254) 
MB  0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.788) (0.308)  (3.022)*** 
Ln(1+age) -0.028 -0.013 -0.059 -0.047 
  (-0.360) (-0.547) (-1.962)*   (-2.647)*** 
Lev 0.134 -0.009 0.032 0.008 
  (1.207) (-0.277) (0.627) (0.249) 
Loss 0.080   0.235 -0.036 0.101 
  (0.497)      (4.852)*** (-0.595)  (2.451)** 
ROA 0.014    -0.024 0.028 -0.009 
  (0.746)       (-3.363)***  (2.325)** (-1.222) 
Capex Growth  -0.002    0.007 0.000 
   (-1.059)   (3.092)*** (0.149) 
SEO  0.024 -0.047 -0.142 
   (0.466) (-0.548)  (-2.229)** 
AIM   0.052   -0.182 -0.098 
   (0.645)    (-1.982)** (-1.885)* 
VC  -0.047           -0.080 -0.114 
   (-1.224) (-1.331)   (-3.110)*** 
Underwriter 0.372 0.008 0.001 0.006 
  (2.018)** (0.136) (0.019) (0.137) 
AssetTurn -0.081       
  (-1.492)       
IPO_proceed 0.000       
  (-0.350)       
Curr 0.000       
  (0.031)       
MainMarket 0.384    
  (1.592)    
Litigation -0.183    
  (-0.577)    
Invs_Mills  -0.031 0.248 0.236 
  (-0.170) (1.479) (1.934)* 
Constant -2.441 -0.370 0.087 0.153 
      (-5.353)*** (-0.963) (0.212) (0.505) 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -237.55431    
Pseudo R
2
 0.3265    
Prob > chi2 0.0000    
Adj.R
2
   0.178 0.109 0.163 
N 511 511 511 511 
( The table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.7 (Continued) 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). 
Table 6.7 reports the regression of real and accrual earnings management measures on audit quality proxy (big N 
audit firms) and other associated control variables for the IPO sample, after controlling for sample selection bias. 
Model 1 reports the result of a probit regression of the probability of hiring big N audit firms. The dependent 
variable (Big N) is a dummy variable =1 if the firm is audited by big N audit firm and 0 otherwise. Models 2, 3 
and 4 report the results of OLS regressions after including the Invs_Mills, which is obtained from the probit 
regression, as a control variable. Where Invs_Mills is the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the first stage probit 
regression on the probability of hiring big N audit firms, AssetTurn is asset turnover, calculated as sales divided 
by total assets pre the IPO, IPO_proceed is the IPO proceeds, Curr is current assets divided by current liabilities, 
MainMarket equals 1 if the firms listed on the Main market and 0 otherwise, and Litigation equals 1 if the firms 
in a high litigation industry and 0 otherwise. All other variables are previously defined. Abnormal cash flows 
from operations (sales-based manipulation) and Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models 
developed by Dechow at al. (1998) and as implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Discretionary current 
accruals are estimated using the corrected version of the modified Jones (1991) model. Abnormal cash flows 
from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual 
earnings management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
 
6.4.4 Post-IPO Returns Performance and Real and Accrual Earnings 
Management  
6.4.4.1 Post-IPO Stock Performance Sorted by Real and Accrual 
Earnings Management  
Table 6.8 reports the means and medians three-year BHAR for the IPO firms 
relative to real and accrual earnings management quartiles, namely abnormal cash 
flows from operations (sales-based manipulation), abnormal discretionary expenses, 
and the absolute value of discretionary current accruals during the IPO year.
89
 Q1 
represents the most conservative group (IPO firms with the lowest level of real and 
accrual earnings management) and Q4 represents the most aggressive group (IPO 
firms with highest level of real and accrual earnings management). The results are 
interpreted on the basis of the mean values.  
Table 6.8 (Panel A) reports the results for the pooled sample and shows that 
long-run underperformance occurs for the quartiles where the highest level of real 
and accrual earnings management occurs. For example, the mean three-year BHAR 
for abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) quartiles 
                                            
89 Also, the same test is repeated using CAR and the results are qualitatively similar to those reported 
in Table 6.8. 
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ranging from 2% for the conservative quartile to -39.3% for the aggressive quartile. 
The difference between the two groups is statistically significant at the 1% level. For 
abnormal discretionary expenses quartiles, the mean three-year BHAR ranges from -
14.9% for the conservative quartile to -6.3% for the aggressive quartile. However, 
the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant. Quartiles 2 and 
3 of abnormal discretionary expenses experience the most long-run stock return 
underperformance where means three-year BHAR are -28.9% and -15.7%, 
respectively. For the absolute value of discretionary current accruals quartiles the 
mean three-year BHAR ranges from -13.8% for the conservative quartile to -22.7% 
for the aggressive quartile, but the difference between the two groups is not 
statistically significant. These results indicate that IPO firms that have higher levels 
of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year experience a higher 
decline in stock returns in the post IPO period. 
Table 6.8 (Panel B) reports the results for IPO firms audited by big N audit 
firms and shows that the greatest long-run underperformance occurs for the 
aggressive quartile of abnormal cash flows from operation (sales-based 
manipulation). The underperformance as measured by BHAR for the abnormal cash 
flows from operations quartiles ranging from 9.1% for the conservative quartile to -
48% for the aggressive quartile and the difference between the two groups is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. For abnormal discretionary expenses 
quartiles, the most long-run stock return underperformance occurs for Q3 where the 
mean three-year BHAR is -22.4% and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Further, Panel B shows that the underperformance for the absolute value of 
discretionary current accruals quartiles ranging from 5% for the conservative 
quartile to -24.3% for the aggressive quartile, but the difference between the two 
groups is not statistically significant.
90
The most long-run stock return 
underperformance occurs for quartile 3 of the absolute value of discretionary current 
accruals where mean three-year BHAR is -32.6% and statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
                                            
90  However, using the median values the difference between the two groups (conservative and 
aggressive groups of absolute discretionary current accruals) is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 6.8 (Panel C) reports the results for IPO firms audited by non-big N 
audit firms and shows evidence that real activities-based and accrual-based 
manipulation predict post-IPO returns underperformance. For example, the mean 
three-year BHAR for abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based 
manipulation) quartiles ranges from -6.8% for the conservative quartile to -35.3% 
for the aggressive quartile and the difference is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. While for abnormal discretionary expenses quartiles, the most returns 
underperformance occurs for quartile 2 where the mean three-year BHAR  is -39.6% 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Finally, the underperformance for the 
absolute value of discretionary current accruals quartiles ranges from -31.1% for the 
conservative quartile to -21.6% for the aggressive quartile, but the difference 
between the two groups is not statistically significant. Finally Table 6.8 (Panel D) 
reports the differences in mean and median values between the aggressive quartiles 
for IPOs audited by big N versus IPOs audited by non-big N. Panel D shows that the 
difference between the two groups is not statistically significant.  
Overall, Table 6.8 provides preliminary evidence that real and accrual 
earnings management that take place during the IPO year predict post-IPO stock 
return underperformance and that real earnings management via sales-based 
manipulation has the most severe negative consequences for post-IPO stock return 
performance. It is worthwhile to mention that the reported results in Table 6.8 
cannot be interpreted in the context of differences in audit quality unless many other 
covariates (which are found to be associated with real and accrual earnings 
management) are controlled. In the next section OLS regressions are used to control 
for the impact of these covariates. 
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Table 6.8 Post-IPO three-year buy-and-hold returns for IPO firms sorted by the level 
of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year 
   Q1   Q2   Q3   Q4 
Difference 
(Q1-Q4) 
  
 Mean 
(Median) 
 Mean 
(Median) 
 Mean 
(Median) 
 Mean 
(Median) 
  t-statistic 
(z-statistic) 
Panel A: Mean and median three-year BHAR for pooled IPOs sample (n=515) 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations  
   0.020  -0.041  -0.249*** -0.393*** 3.695*** 
 (-0.005) (-0.028) (-0.163)*** (-0.222)*** (4.105)*** 
Abnormal 
discretionary expenses  
  -0.149   -0.289***   -0.157* -0.063 -0.721 
 (-0.056)  (-0.201)*** (-0.117)*** (-0.048) (-0.231) 
Absolute discretionary 
current accruals  
  -0.138   -0.137*   -0.157 -0.227*** 0.743 
 (-0.092)* (-0.087)* (-0.140)** (-0.099)*** (0.893) 
Panel B: Mean and median three-year BHAR for IPO firms audited by big N audit firms (n=240) 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations   
0.091 0.017 -0.297** -0.480*** 3.189*** 
(0.164) (-0.065) (-0.150)** (-0.324)*** (1.685)* 
Abnormal 
discretionary expenses  
-0.088 -0.210 -0.224* -0.134 0.2986 
(-0.030) (-0.226)* (-0.171)** (-0.064) (0.197) 
Absolute discretionary 
current accruals  
0.050 -0.142   -0.326*** -0.243* 1.535 
(0.036) (-0.101) (-0.247)*** (-0.067)* (1.685)* 
Panel C: Mean and median  three-year BHAR for IPO firms audited by non-big N audit firms (n=275) 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations  
-0.068    -0.003 -0.237 -0.353**** 1.835* 
(-0.044)    (0.005) (-0.090)** (-0.190)*** (2.268)** 
Abnormal 
discretionary expenses  
-0.128 -0.396*** -0.076 -0.061 -0.393 
(-0.024) (-0.176)*** (-0.061) (-0.095) (0.709) 
Absolute discretionary 
current accruals  
  -0.311***     0.005 -0.141 -0.216* -0.658 
 (-0.116)*** (0.003) (-0.076)* (-0.124)** (-0.541) 
*, **,*** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Differences in means are tested using t-
tests and differences in medians are tested using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. Table 6.8 reports the mean and 
median three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) sorted by the level of real and accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year and differences in means and medians across groups. IPOs in each sample are 
divided into four quartiles relative to the level of real and accrual earnings management that occurred in the IPO 
year. Q1 represents the most conservative quartile (IPO firms with the lowest level of real and accrual earnings 
management) and Q4 the most aggressive (IPO firms with highest level of real and accrual earnings 
management).All variables are previously defined. 
 
 
6.4.4.2 Regressions of Post-IPO Stock Performance 
Given the evidence in Table 6.8, this chapter follows prior research (e.g., Teoh et al., 
1998a; Roosenboom at al., 2003) by running a cross-sectional regression where the 
dependent variable is three-year abnormal returns (AR), measured using BHAR and 
Panel D: Differences in means and medians three-year BHAR between the aggressive quartiles of 
IPO firms audited by big N vs. non-big N audit firms. 
 
Big N Clients 
Q4 
non-Big N Clients 
Q4 
Difference 
(Q4-Q4) 
 Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
t-statistic 
(z-statistic) 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations  
-0.480*** -0.353**** 0.862 
(-0.324)*** (-0.190)*** (-0.837) 
Abnormal discretionary expenses  -0.134 -0.061 -0.537 
(-0.064) (-0.095) (0.092) 
Absolute discretionary current 
accruals  
-0.243* -0.216* -0.159 
(-0.067)* (-0.124)** (-0.159) 
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CAR, adjusted on a size and book-to-market matched sample, from month +4 
through to month +40 against different measures of real and accrual earnings 
management (EM).
 91
 
(6.13)
t,i131211
109876
543210,4,40i
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In addition, following prior research (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Teoh et al., 
1998a, 1998b; Roosenboom at al., 2003; Rangan, 1998; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 
2010) the model includes a number of control variables namely; firms size (LnSize), 
the book-to-market ratio (BM) is measured as the book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity, age [Ln(1+age)], capital expenditure growth (CapexGrowth), 
IPO underpricing (Underpricing) is measured as the percentage difference between 
the offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading, the lightly regulated 
environment of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), venture capitalist (VC), 
underwriter (Underwriter), leverage ratio (Lev), seasoned equity offering (SEO), the 
absolute value of cash flows from operations [Abs(CFO)], the absolute value of total 
current accruals [Abs(TCACC)], and dummy variables to control for industry and 
time effects. Both Abs(CFO) and Abs(TCACC) are added to the model when 
earnings management proxy, (EM), is absolute discretionary current accruals. 
Dechow et al. (1995) find cash flows from operations is negatively associated with 
accrual earnings management, while Armstrong et al. (2009) find that the previous 
negative association between accrual earnings management, and the subsequent 
decline in stock returns, is an artifact of the mispricing of cash flows. The 
Abs(TCACC) is added to the model to control for the level of total current accruals. 
All other variables are previously defined.
 
Table 6.9 reports the results using BHAR for the cross-sectional regressions 
for the pooled IPOs sample, IPO firms audited by big N audit firms, and IPO firms 
audited by non-big N audit firms, respectively. For the pooled sample Table 6.9 
(Panel A) reports evidence that sales-based and accrual-based manipulations predict 
                                            
91 Qualitatively, similar results are found using CAR as the dependent variable.  
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post-IPO returns underperformance. Specifically, a negative coefficient is found of -
0.311 (p<0.01) on abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) 
in the BHAR regression. Table 6.9 also reports a negative coefficient of -0.194 
(p<0.10) on absolute discretionary current accruals in the BHAR regression. These 
results confirm the hypothesis that both real (sales-based manipulation) and accrual 
earnings management have negative consequences for post-IPO returns performance, 
and suggest that sales-based manipulation has the most severe negative 
consequences for post-IPO return performance. These results also are consistent 
with the reported results in Table 6.8 (Panel A). 
For IPO firms audited by big N audit firms, Table 6.9 (Panel B) shows that 
sales-based manipulation has a severe negative consequence for post-IPO stock 
return performance. A negative coefficient is found of -0.595 (p<0.01) on abnormal 
cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) in the BHAR regression. 
Further, while the signs of the coefficients on abnormal discretionary expenses and 
absolute discretionary accruals in the BHAR regressions are negative and consistent 
with the predictions, they are statistically insignificant. These results show that IPO 
firms audited by big N audit firms experience a severe post-IPO stock return 
underperformance due to the extensive use of sales-based manipulation during the 
IPO year. These results also confirm the previous evidence in Table 6.6, which 
indicates that IPO firms audited by big N auditors resort extensively to a higher level 
of sales-based manipulation to avoid the monitoring of discretionary expenses-based 
and accrual-based manipulations. 
For IPO firms audited by non-big N audit firms Table 6.9 (Panel C) shows 
that both sales-based and accrual-based manipulations predict post-IPO returns 
underperformance. Specifically, Table 6.9 reports negative coefficients of -0.182 
(P<0.10) and -0.179 (P<0.10) on abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based 
manipulation) and absolute discretionary current accruals in the BHAR regressions, 
respectively. These IPO firms are audited by non-big N audit firms and therefore are 
expected to have more flexibility to manage earnings upward using both real and 
accrual earnings management. Hence, these results confirm the hypothesis that IPO 
firms with high levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year 
are expected to experience long-run stock return underperformance.  
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Table 6.9 Relation between Post-IPO stock return performance (measured by BHAR) 
and real and accrual earnings management 
BHARi = α + β1EMi + β2LnSizei + β3BMi + β4 Ln (1+age)i +β5CapexGrowthi + β6Underpricingi  
                   +β7 AIMi+ β8VCi + β9Underwriteri +β10Levi +β11SEOi + β12 Abs (CFO)i                 
                   +β13 Abs(TCACC)i + IND+ Year +εi.  
Panel A: Whole sample 
 
BHAR BHAR BHAR 
Abnormal cash flows from operations  -0.311   
(-3.524)***   
Abnormal discretionary expenses  0.007  
 (0.126)  
Absolute discretionary current accruals -0.132 -0.162 -0.194 
(-1.247) (-1.556) (-1.938)* 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.664 0.698 0.783 
(2.595)*** (2.707)**** (3.021)*** 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 507 507 507 
Adj.R
2
 0.079 0.058 0.078 
Panel B: Big N clients    
 
BHAR BHAR BHAR 
Abnormal cash flows from operations  -0.595   
(-2.730)***   
Abnormal discretionary expenses  -0.016  
 (-0.105)  
Absolute discretionary current accruals -0.335 -0.537 -0.626 
(-0.791) (-1.114) (-1.331) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.557 0.442 0.580 
(1.226) (0.961) (1.258) 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 236 236 236 
Adj.R
2
 0.144 0.104 0.116 
Panel C: non-Big N clients    
 
BHAR BHAR BHAR 
Abnormal cash flows from operations  -0.182     
 
(-1.863)*     
Abnormal discretionary expenses   -0.003   
 
  (-0.037)   
Absolute discretionary current accruals -0.133 -0.159 -0.179 
 
(-1.235) (-1.541) (-1.797)* 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.074 1.140 1.161 
 
(2.485)** (2.591)** (2.685)*** 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 271 271 271 
Adj.R2 0.019 0.007 0.030 
*, **,*** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). 
Table 6.9 reports the result of regressions of abnormal returns on year 0 real and accrual earnings management 
proxies for pooled IPOs sample, IPO firms audited by big N audit firms, and IPO firms audited by non-big N 
audit firms. The dependent variable is the three-year abnormal return calculated using BHAR relative to the 
matched sample as previously defined. BM is book-to-market ratio is measured as book value of equity divided 
by market value of equity, Underpricing is the percentage of the difference between the offer price and the 
closing price on the first day of trading, Abs(CFO) is the absolute value of cash flows from operations,  
Abs(TCACC) is the absolute value of total current accruals, and all other variables are previously defined. 
Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow 
real and accrual earnings management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
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In summary, the results in Table 6.9 confirm the hypothesis that real and 
accrual earnings management that have been undertaken during the offer year 
predict post-IPO stock return underperformance. Further, Table 6.9 confirms the 
hypothesis that IPO firms audited by big N audit firms are expected to experience a 
severe decline in post-IPO returns performance due to the extensive use of sales-
based earnings management during the IPO year.92 
6.5 Additional Analysis  
6.5.1 Audit and Non-audit Fees  
For robustness this chapter also examines other proxy of audit quality such as audit 
and non-audit fees, which are found to be associated with earnings manipulation. 
For example, Frankel et al. (2002) find evidence that audit fees are negatively 
associated with accrual-based manipulation (confirming the view that audit fees are 
considered as a good proxy of audit quality e.g. DeFond et al. (2000) and Francis 
(2004)), while non-audit fees are found to be positively associated with accrual-
based manipulation (suggesting that non-audit fees may compromise auditor 
independence). In addition, Basioudis et al. (2008) find evidence that the issuance of 
going-concern modified audit report is positively associated with the level of audit 
fees for financially stressed firms in the UK. While for financially stressed firms that 
paid high non-audit fees Basioudis et al. (2008) find evidence that these firms are 
less likely to receive a going-concern modified audit report.
93
 
Although prior research has focused on examining the association between 
audit fees, non-audit fees and accrual-based manipulation, limited research has 
examined whether audit and non-audit fees are associated with real activities-based 
manipulation (e.g. Chi et al., 2011; Sohn, 2011). For example, Chi et al. (2011) 
examine the association between audit fees and real activities-based manipulation 
for firms with strong incentives to manage earnings upward, namely SEO firms and 
                                            
92 Table I in Appendix B provides the results of estimating model (6.11) where all the coefficients of 
the control variables are reported. 
93 In contrast with the evidence of Frankel et al. (2002) and Basioudis et al. (2008), Lim and Tan  
(2008) find evidence that non-audit fees are associated with high-quality auditing, but just for firms 
audited by auditor industry expertise. 
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firms that just meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Chi et al. (2011) find evidence that 
high quality auditors and higher audit fees are associated with a higher level of real 
activities-based and a lower level of accrual-based manipulation. Chi et al. (2011) 
indicate that high-quality auditing (proxied by big N audit firms and higher audit 
fees) constrains accruals manipulation and, this in turn, leads firms to resort to 
higher levels of real activities manipulation. Further, Sohn (2011) finds evidence 
that audit fees are positively associated with real activities-based manipulation, 
suggesting that audit firms charge their clients higher audit fees due to the higher 
litigation risk that is associated with real earnings management. Despite the limited 
research on real earnings management and audit fees (e.g., Chi et al., 2011; Sohn, 
2011), no research yet has examined this association based on IPO setting. 
Thus, this chapter follows prior research (e.g. Chi et al., 2011; Sohn, 2011) 
and examines whether audit and non-audit fees are associated with real activities-
based and accrual-based manipulations during the IPO year by estimating the 
following model: 
(6.14)t,i
1211 10987
 65 432   10t,i
εYearIND                  
rUnderwriteβ  VCβ AIMβSEOβ GrowthCapexβROAβ                 
Lossβ Levβ age)Ln(1βMBβLnSizeβFeesβαEM



 
Where (EM i,t) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings management, 
(Fees) as a proxy for Ln(Total-Fees), Ln(Aud-Fees), and Ln(Non-AudFees). 
Ln(Total-Fees) is the natural logarithm of total audit and non-audit service fees
94
, 
Ln(Aud-Fees) is the natural logarithm of audit fees, and Ln(Non-AudFees) is the 
natural logarithm of non-audit service fees. All other variables are previously 
defined. 
Table II in Appendix B reports the results on the association between total 
fees (the sum of audit and non-audit service fees) and real and accrual earnings 
management. Table II shows no evidence that total fees are associated with real 
                                            
94  Prior research indicates that audit fees and non-audit fees are jointly determined (e.g., Whisenant. 
et al., 2003) and, therefore, this chapter follows Lim and Tan (2008) by examining the effect of total 
audit fees (the sum of audit and non-audit fees) on earnings management. 
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activities-based manipulation during the IPO year. However, a negative coefficient 
is found of -0.052 (P < 0.05) on Ln (Total-Fees) in the absolute discretionary current 
accruals regression, suggesting that higher total audit fees are associated with a 
lower level of accrual-based manipulation during the IPO. This result is consistent 
with the monitoring role of high quality auditors on accrual-based manipulation, 
which is presented in Table 6.6. In the next test, total fees are split into audit and 
non-audit service fees. 
Table III in Appendix B reports the results on the association between audit 
fees and real and accrual earnings management. Table III shows evidence that audit 
fees are associated with a higher level of sales-based manipulation (abnormal cash 
flows from operations) and with a lower level of accrual-based manipulation 
(absolute discretionary current accruals). Specifically, the results show a positive 
coefficient of 0.059 (P < 0.05) and a negative coefficient of -0.078 (P < 0.01) on Ln 
(Aud-Fees) in the abnormal cash flows from operations and the absolute 
discretionary current accruals regressions, respectively. Thus, the results in Table III 
are consistent with earlier reported results in Table 6.6 that high quality auditing 
constrains accrual-based manipulation and, therefore, the clients resort to a higher 
level of sales-based manipulation. In addition, these results are consistent with 
recent literature (Chi et al., 2011; Sohn, 2011) that audit fees are positively 
associated with real earnings management. 
Table IV in Appendix B reports the results on the association between non-
audit service fees and real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year. 
Table IV shows evidence that discretionary expenses-based manipulation is 
positively associated with non-audit fees during the IPO, suggesting that audit firms 
may turn a blind eye on real activities-based manipulation when the clients purchase 
a higher level of non-audit service fees. Specifically, a positive coefficient is found 
of 0.034 (P < 0.10) on Ln (Non-AudFees) in the abnormal discretionary expenses 
regression. This result also is consistent with Frankel et al. (2002) and Basioudis et 
al. (2008) that non-audit fees compromise auditor independence.  
In summary, the reported results in Tables II and III concerning audit fees 
confirm the earlier results in Table 6.6 that high quality auditors (big N auditors) 
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constrain accrual-based manipulation at the IPO and, therefore, the clients resort to 
higher levels of sales-based manipulation. In addition, Tables IV provides new 
evidence on a positive association between non-audit service fees and real earnings 
management via discretionary expenses-based manipulation, suggesting that non-
audit service fees may compromise auditor independence. 
6.5.2 Auditor Industry Expertise and Audit Tenure  
Prior studies also have examined whether accrual earnings management is 
associated with other proxies of audit quality such as auditor industry expertise 
(city-level and national-level) and audit tenure. While the majority of prior research 
provides evidence that auditor industry expertise constrains accrual-based 
manipulation (e.g., Elder and Zhou, 2002; Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003; 
Reichelt and Wang, 2010), mixed evidence is found on the association between 
accruals manipulation and audit tenure (e.g., Johnson et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; 
Gul et al., 2009). For example, Johnson et al. (2002) find shorter audit tenure is 
associated with lower earnings quality, while Davis et al. (2009) find a positive 
association between having either shorter or longer audit tenure and using accrual 
earnings management to meet earnings forecasts pre SOX-2002.  
Despite the evidence on the associations between auditor industry expertise, 
audit tenure and accrual earnings management, little research has examined these 
associations based on real earnings management (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Chi et al., 2011). For example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine real and accrual 
earnings management around SEOs and find evidence that SEO firms with longer 
audit tenure have a higher probability to manage real earnings management upward 
during the offer year. Chi et al. (2011) also examine the association between audit 
tenure, auditor industry expertise and real earnings management. By examining 
firms with strong incentives to manage earnings upward (SEO firms and firms that 
just meet or beat earnings benchmarks), Chi et al. (2011) find evidence that auditor 
industry expertise (city-level) and longer audit tenure are associated with higher 
levels of real earnings management. Chi et al. (2011) indicate that high quality 
auditing (proxied by auditor industry expertise and audit tenure) reduces accrual-
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based manipulation and, this in turn, leads the clients to resort to higher levels of 
real activities-based manipulation.  
Thus, and based on the above-evidence, this chapter examines whether 
enhanced audit quality (proxied by auditor industry expertise national-level
95
 and 
audit tenure) is associated with real earnings management during the IPO year. The 
following model is estimated to test the association between auditor industry 
expertise, audit tenure, and real and accrual earnings management during the IPO: 
 
(6.15)t,i
1211 10987
 65 432   10t,i
εYearIND                  
rUnderwriteβ  VCβ AIMβSEOβ GrowthCapexβROAβ                 
Lossβ Levβ age)Ln(1βMBβLnSizeβProxy-AuditβαEM



 
Where (EM i,t) is the different proxies for real and accrual earnings management, 
Audit-Poxy as a proxy for (Expertise) and (AudTenure). Expertise is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if the auditor is an industry expertise and zero otherwise, 
AudTenure is a continues variable that measures the cumulative number of years of 
the auditor-client relationship. All other variables are previously defined. Following 
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), an auditor is identified as an industry expertise if the 
auditor is the largest provider of audit services in the industry and the difference 
between the largest provider and second provider is greater than 10 percent in a 
specific industry and year. The market share for each auditor is calculated based on 
the total audit fees and just for big N audit firms to avoid a brand name effect 
(Craswell et al. 1995). 
Table V in Appendix B reports the results on the association between auditor 
industry expertise and real activities-based and accrual-based earnings management 
during the IPO year. Table V shows evidence that auditor industry expertise reduces 
accrual-based manipulation during the IPO. Specifically, a negative coefficient is 
found of -0.069 (P<0.05) on Expertise in the absolute discretionary current accruals 
                                            
95  Due to the data limitation concerning auditor industry expertise city-level, this chapter just 
examines the association between auditor industry expertise national-level and real and accrual 
earnings management.   
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regression. This evidence on the monitoring role of auditor industry expertise is 
consistent with prior research (e.g. Elder and Zhou, 2002; Balsam et al., 2003; 
Krishnan, 2003; Reichelt and Wang, 2010; Chi et al., 2011); however, no evidence 
is found that the presence of auditor industry expertise is associated with real 
activities-based manipulation during the IPO.  
It is worth noting that this result is consistent with Chi et al. (2011) who 
examine both national-level and city-level industry expertise and find evidence that 
just city-level industry expertise is associated with higher levels of real earnings 
management. The city-level industry expertise is not examined by this thesis due to 
data limitation, which provides a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Table VI in Appendix B reports the results on the association between audit 
tenure and real and accrual earnings management and shows no evidence that audit 
tenure is associated with real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year. 
One possible explanation for these results is that IPO firms are less likely to have 
longer audit tenure as other firms e.g. SEO firms, notably the majority of the IPO 
firms in the sample started its business within very short period before the IPO 
date.
96
   
In summary, auditor industry expertise is considered as a good proxy of audit 
quality as the results show that enhanced audit quality (proxied by either the 
presence of big N audit firm or auditor industry expertise) constrains accrual-based 
manipulation during the IPO year.  
6.6 Conclusions  
This chapter examines real and accrual earnings management activities of IPO firms. 
Although prior research has examined accrual earnings management around IPOs 
(e.g., Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al. 1998a; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Morsfield 
and Tan, 2006), and a small number of recent papers have started to investigate real 
earnings management activities and IPOs (e.g., Darrough and Rangan, 2005; 
                                            
96 The majority of the IPO sample has gone public on the AIM market (75%) where the regulation 
allows the IPO firms to go public without having previous earnings records. 
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Wongsunwai, 2012), this chapter progresses the literature by examining the effect of 
enhanced audit quality on real and accrual earnings management activities during 
the IPO year and how this feeds through into post-IPO stock return performance. 
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing the following evidence. 
First, this chapter provides evidence that high quality auditors mitigate and constrain 
real earnings management that occurs through discretionary expenses-based 
manipulation.  In addition, this chapter provides evidence on the trade-offs between 
real and accrual earnings management. IPO firms that are audited by high quality 
auditors are found to resort to a higher level of sales-based manipulation to avoid the 
monitoring of discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based manipulations by 
their auditors.  
Second, this chapter finds evidence that IPO firms who undertake higher 
levels of real and accrual-based earnings management during the IPO year 
experience a more severe decline in stock returns in the post-IPO period. Third, this 
chapter shows that enhanced audit quality has an impact on the relationship between 
real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO performance. IPO firms audited 
by high quality auditors are found to experience a severe decline in post-IPO stock 
return performance due to the extensive use of sales-based manipulation during the 
IPO year. While for IPO firms audited by low quality auditors, both sales-based and 
accrual-based manipulations, which take place during the offer year, are found to 
predict post-IPO stock return underperformance. 
Overall, this chapter shows evidence that enhanced audit quality has an 
impact on managers’ tendency to choose between real and accrual earnings 
management during the IPO and even this impact is a significant determinant of 
future IPO performance. The findings of this chapter, therefore, potentially have 
implications for audit firms, investors, and current policy maker, but they also 
provide a promising avenue for future research. Future research may investigate the 
impact of the audit committee on the association between enhanced audit quality and 
real earnings management.  
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Appendix B 
Appendix B Table I  Relation between Post-IPO stock return performance and real and accrual earnings management  
 Pooled sample  Big N clients  non-Big N clients 
VARIABLES BHAR3 BHAR3 BHAR3  BHAR3 BHAR3 BHAR3  BHAR3 BHAR3 BHAR3 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations    
      -0.311          -0.595      -0.182     
    (-3.524)***       (-2.730)***      (-1.863)*     
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses  
  0.007      -0.016      -0.003   
  (0.126)      (-0.105)      (-0.037)   
Absolute discretionary current 
accruals 
-0.132 -0.162 -0.194  -0.335 -0.537 -0.626  -0.133 -0.159 -0.179 
(-1.247) (-1.556) (-1.938)*  (-0.791) (-1.114) (-1.331)  (-1.235) (-1.541) (-1.797)* 
LnSize -0.070 -0.089 -0.141  -0.066 -0.060 -0.108  -0.161 -0.183 -0.229 
 (-1.713)* (-2.138)** (-3.313)***  (-0.897) (-0.814) (-1.418)  (-2.659)*** (-3.079)*** (-3.324)*** 
BM -0.222 -0.233 -0.242  -0.462 -0.450 -0.429  -0.261 -0.271 -0.268 
 (-1.247) (-1.302) (-1.374)  (-1.588) (-1.506) (-1.443)  (-1.127) (-1.188) (-1.105) 
Ln(1+age) 0.027 0.040 0.037  0.090 0.119 0.119  0.009 0.014 0.016 
 (0.594) (0.884) (0.811)  (1.282) (1.646) (1.632)  (0.147) (0.228) (0.257) 
Capex Growth 0.006 0.008 -0.004  0.003 0.004 -0.002  0.049 0.049 0.023 
 (0.995) (1.284) (-0.473)  (0.410) (0.660) (-0.234)  (1.127) (1.114) (0.563) 
Underpricing -0.075 -0.080 -0.059  0.337 0.186 0.212  -0.063 -0.075 -0.095 
 (-0.418) (-0.445) (-0.329)  (0.836) (0.464) (0.527)  (-0.373) (-0.446) (-0.563) 
AIM -0.237 -0.249 -0.239  -0.083 -0.108 -0.123  -0.399 -0.397 -0.384 
 (-1.774)* (-1.852)* (-1.791)*  (-0.480) (-0.607) (-0.696)  (-1.183) (-1.155) (-1.135) 
VC 0.005 0.012 0.045  0.125 0.154 0.159  -0.141 -0.148 -0.101 
 (0.049) (0.130) (0.465)  (0.972) (1.169) (1.216)  (-0.912) (-0.949) (-0.637) 
       
( The table is continued on the next page) 
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Appendix B Table I (Continued) 
 
 Pooled sample  Big N clients  non-Big N clients 
VARIABLES BHAR3 BHAR3 BHAR3  BHAR3 BHAR3 BHAR3  BHAR3 BHAR3 BHAR3 
Underwriter -0.021 -0.031 -0.014  -0.095 -0.111 -0.099  0.135 0.133 0.113 
 (-0.187) (-0.280) (-0.125)  (-0.673) (-0.767) (-0.668)  (0.631) (0.613) (0.538) 
Lev -0.059 -0.068 -0.082  -0.074 -0.092 -0.101  -0.108 -0.110 -0.138 
 (-0.784) (-0.921) (-1.109)  (-0.449) (-0.591) (-0.635)  (-1.314) (-1.363) (-1.686)* 
SEO -0.188 -0.182 -0.209  -0.190 -0.114 -0.142  -0.270 -0.275 -0.261 
 (-1.097) (-1.052) (-1.272)  (-0.806) (-0.482) (-0.631)  (-1.026) (-1.040) (-1.045) 
Abs(CFO)   0.005    0.004    -0.017 
   (0.942)    (0.904)    (-0.444) 
Abs(TCACC)   0.044    0.011    0.136 
   (2.917)***    (1.649)    (2.199)** 
Constant 0.664     0.698    0.783      0.557 0.442 0.580  1.074 1.140 1.161 
 (2.595)*** (2.707)**** (3.021)***     (1.226) (0.961) (1.258)  (2.485)** (2.591)** (2.685)*** 
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 507 507 507  236 236 236  271 271 271 
Adj.R
2
 0.079 0.058 0.078  0.144 0.104 0.116  0.019 0.007 0.030 
F-statistic 1.89 1.63 1.82  1.81 1.56 1.62  1.12 1.04    1.20 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0005 0.0063 0.0009  0.0027 0.0192 0.0119  0.2899 0.4053 0.2040 
Mean VIF 1.32 1.33 1.44  4.25 4.25 4.77  1.34 1.34 1.38 
Max VIF 3.22 3.31 3.84  1.54 1.54 1.67  1.94 1.96 2.43 
*, **,*** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). Table I reports the result of regressions of abnormal returns on year 0 real and accrual 
earnings management proxies for pooled IPOs sample, IPO firms audited by big N audit firms, and IPO firms audited by non-big N audit firms. The dependent variable is the three-year abnormal return 
calculated using BHAR relative to the matched sample. All other variables are previously defined. 
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Appendix B Table II Relation between total audit fees (the sum of audit and 
non-audit service fees) and real and accrual earnings management 
VARIABLES 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations      
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
Absolute 
discretionary 
current accruals  
Ln(Total-Fees) 0.028 -0.015 -0.052 
 
(1.320) (-0.548) (-2.265)** 
LnSize 0.057 -0.125 -0.059 
 
(1.772)* (-3.348)*** (-2.399)** 
MB -0.032 0.184 -0.367 
 
(-0.463) (2.041)** (-5.057)*** 
Ln(1+age) -0.005 -0.061 -0.033 
 
(-0.213) (-2.128)** (-1.892)* 
Lev -0.019 0.044 -0.045 
 
(-0.525) (0.878) (-1.527) 
Loss 0.198 -0.032 0.029 
 
(4.345)*** (-0.573) (0.752) 
ROA -0.048 0.051 -0.035 
 
(-3.687)*** (2.743)*** (-2.908)*** 
Capex Growth -0.003 0.009 0.004 
 
(-1.249) (3.763)*** (2.102)** 
SEO 0.031 -0.048 -0.123 
 (0.634) (-0.607) (-1.836)* 
AIM  0.038 -0.149 -0.035 
 (0.530) (-1.733)* (-0.660) 
VC -0.036 -0.061 -0.098 
 (-0.948) (-1.106) (-2.935)*** 
Underwriter 0.037 -0.070 -0.081 
 (0.889) (-1.250) (-2.461)** 
Constant -0.179 0.541 0.379 
 (-0.921) (2.409)** (2.602)*** 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 515 515 515 
Adj. R
2
 0.212 0.174 0.246 
F-statistic  3.91 3.72 3.65 
Prob (F-statistic)   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Mean VIF 1.36 1.36 1.36 
Max VIF 3.75 3.75 3.75 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Table II reports the regression of 
real and accrual earnings management measures on audit quality proxy [total audit fees (the sum of audit 
and non-audit fees)] and other associated control variables for the IPO sample. All models include year 
and industry dummies to control for time and industry effects, and robust t-statistics (appear in 
parentheses). To avoid the influence of outliers, all financial continuous data are Winsorized at the top   
1% and bottom 99%. All variables are previously defined. Abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-
based manipulation) and Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by 
Dechow at al. (1998) and as implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Discretionary current accruals are 
estimated using the corrected version of the modified Jones (1991) model. Abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual 
earnings management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
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Appendix B Table III Relation between audit fees and real and accrual earnings 
management 
VARIABLES 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations     
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
Absolute 
discretionary 
current accruals  
Ln(Aud-Fees) 0.059 -0.033 -0.078 
 
(2.061)** (-0.865) (-2.601)*** 
LnSize 0.044 -0.119 -0.052 
 
(1.456) (-3.132)*** (-2.050)** 
MB -0.031 0.183 -0.375 
 
(-0.430) (2.022)** (-5.183)*** 
Ln(1+age) -0.003 -0.062 -0.035 
 
(-0.140) (-2.144)** (-2.038)** 
Lev -0.016 0.043 -0.048 
 
(-0.472) (0.863) (-1.689)* 
Loss 0.202 -0.035 0.024 
 
(4.404)*** (-0.618) (0.622) 
ROA -0.050 0.051 -0.033 
 
(-3.791)*** (2.764)*** (-2.662)*** 
Capex Growth -0.004 0.009 0.004 
 
(-1.508) (3.852)*** (2.356)** 
SEO 0.014 -0.038 -0.104 
 (0.277) (-0.483) (-1.543) 
AIM  0.043 -0.152 -0.037 
 (0.591) (-1.765)* (-0.695) 
VC -0.029 -0.065 -0.108 
 (-0.758) (-1.165) (-3.213)*** 
Underwriter 0.038 -0.071 -0.080 
 (0.914) (-1.265) (-2.391)** 
Constant -0.017 0.452 0.232 
 (-0.090) (1.829)* (1.325) 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 515 515 515 
Adj. R
2
 0.217 0.175 0.249 
F-statistic  4.03 6.58 2.74 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mean VIF 1.37 1.37 1.37 
Max VIF 3.97 3.97 3.97 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Table III reports the regression of 
real and accrual earnings management measures on audit quality proxy (audit fees) and other associated 
control variables for the IPO sample. All models include year and industry dummies to control for time 
and industry effects, and robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). To avoid the influence of outliers, all 
financial continuous data are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. All variables are previously 
defined. Abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) and Abnormal discretionary 
expenses are estimated using models developed by Dechow at al. (1998) and as implemented by 
Roychowdhury (2006). Discretionary current accruals are estimated using the corrected version of the 
modified Jones (1991) model. Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary 
expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual earnings management proxies to have the 
same interpretation. 
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Appendix B Table IV Relation between non-audit fees and real and accrual 
earnings management 
VARIABLES 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations  
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
Absolute 
discretionary 
current accruals  
Ln(Non-AudFees) 0.001 0.034 -0.007 
 
(0.044) (1.832)* (-0.491) 
LnSize 0.058 -0.135 -0.079 
 
(1.719)* (-3.493)*** (-3.171)*** 
MB -0.016 0.208 -0.322 
 
(-0.225) (2.344)** (-4.465)*** 
Ln(1+age) -0.008 -0.068 -0.034 
 
(-0.360) (-2.320)** (-2.083)** 
Lev -0.005 0.019 -0.024 
 
(-0.145) (0.419) (-0.870) 
Loss 0.198 -0.085 0.026 
 
(4.031)*** (-1.479) (0.751) 
ROA -0.047 0.047 -0.026 
 
(-3.187)*** (2.369)** (-2.359)** 
Capex Growth -0.002 0.007 0.003 
 
(-0.944) (3.100)*** (1.559) 
SEO 0.016 -0.019 -0.063 
 (0.286) (-0.212) (-1.159) 
AIM  0.009 -0.071 -0.024 
 (0.117) (-0.823) (-0.466) 
VC -0.046 -0.001 -0.078 
 (-1.194) (-0.026) (-2.326)** 
Underwriter 0.005 -0.039 -0.068 
 (0.125) (-0.710) (-2.172)** 
Constant  -0.211 0.632 0.537 
 (-0.985) (2.664)*** (3.608)*** 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 456 456 456 
Adj. R
2
 0.192 0.130 0.218 
F-statistic  3.43 8.46 2.89 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.36 1.36 1.36 
Max VIF 3.41 3.41 3.41 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Table IV reports the regression of 
real and accrual earnings management measures on audit quality proxy (non-audit fees) and other 
associated control variables for the IPO sample. All models include year and industry dummies to 
control for time and industry effects, and robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). To avoid the 
influence of outliers, all financial continuous data are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. All 
variables are previously defined. Abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) and 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by Dechow at al. (1998) and as 
implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Discretionary current accruals are estimated using the 
corrected version of the modified Jones (1991) model. Abnormal cash flows from operations and 
abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual earnings 
management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
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Appendix B Table V Relation between auditor industry expertise and real and 
accrual earnings management 
VARIABLES 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations       
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
Absolute 
discretionary 
current accruals  
Expertise 0.035 0.017 -0.069 
 
(0.761) (0.299) (-2.248)** 
LnSize 0.071 -0.136 -0.085 
 
(2.402)** (-4.099)*** (-3.909)*** 
MB -0.019 0.179 -0.391 
 
(-0.273) (1.959)* (-5.338)*** 
Ln(1+age) -0.005 -0.062 -0.032 
 
(-0.236) (-2.128)** (-1.816)* 
Lev -0.017 0.044 -0.047 
 
(-0.489) (0.871) (-1.650)* 
Loss 0.199 -0.031 0.028 
 
(4.367)*** (-0.548) (0.693) 
ROA -0.048 0.051 -0.035 
 
(-3.741)*** (2.767)*** (-2.904)*** 
Capex Growth -0.003 0.008 0.003 
 
(-1.173) (3.594)*** (2.002)** 
SEO 0.041 -0.051 -0.141 
 (0.807) (-0.648) (-2.092)** 
AIM  0.031 -0.143 -0.022 
 (0.434) (-1.686)* (-0.420) 
VC -0.033 -0.061 -0.104 
 (-0.873) (-1.082) (-3.125)*** 
Underwriter 0.030 -0.069 -0.068 
 (0.728) (-1.231) (-2.057)** 
Constant  -0.293 0.606 0.592 
 (-1.623) (3.151)*** (4.930)*** 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 515 515 515 
Adj. R
2
 0.209 0.173 0.235 
F-statistic  3.74 5.85 2.70 
Prob (F-statistic)   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Mean VIF 1.32 1.32 1.32 
Max VIF 3.04 3.04 3.04 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Table V reports the regression of 
real and accrual earnings management measures on audit quality proxy (auditor industry expertise) and 
other associated control variables for the IPO sample. All models include year and industry dummies to 
control for time and industry effects, and robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). To avoid the 
influence of outliers, all financial continuous data are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. All 
variables are previously defined. Abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) and 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by Dechow at al. (1998) and as 
implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Discretionary current accruals are estimated using the 
corrected version of the modified Jones (1991) model. Abnormal cash flows from operations and 
abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual earnings 
management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
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Appendix B Table VI Relation between audit tenure and real and accrual 
earnings management 
VARIABLES 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations    
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses  
Absolute 
discretionary 
current accruals  
AudTenure -0.018 0.006 -0.012 
 
(-1.082) (0.340) (-0.927) 
LnSize 0.075 -0.135 -0.090 
 
(2.569)** (-4.140)*** (-4.196)*** 
MB -0.016 0.177 -0.384 
 
(-0.233) (1.938)* (-5.256)*** 
Ln(1+age) 0.002 -0.064 -0.029 
 
(0.082) (-1.974)** (-1.566) 
Lev -0.016 0.043 -0.046 
 
(-0.451) (0.859) (-1.601) 
Loss 0.194 -0.031 0.029 
 
(4.305)*** (-0.546) (0.738) 
ROA -0.049 0.051 -0.035 
 
(-3.762)*** (2.770)*** (-2.894)*** 
Capex Growth -0.003 0.009 0.003 
 
(-1.103) (3.690)*** (1.796)* 
SEO 0.037 -0.051 -0.138 
 (0.720) (-0.649) (-2.056)** 
AIM  0.026 -0.143 -0.020 
 (0.371) (-1.682)* (-0.367) 
VC -0.035 -0.062 -0.099 
 (-0.931) (-1.115) (-3.007)*** 
Underwriter 0.034 -0.068 -0.071** 
 (0.822) (-1.224) (-2.130) 
Constant  -0.297 0.605 0.595 
 (-1.642) (3.154)*** (4.947)*** 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 515 515 515 
Adj. R
2
 0.21 0.173 0.233 
F-statistic  3.72 5.94 2.67 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mean VIF 1.32 1.32 1.32 
Max VIF 2.94 2.94 2.94 
*, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. Table VI reports the regression of 
real and accrual earnings management measures on audit quality proxy (audit tenure) and other 
associated control variables for the IPO sample. All models include year and industry dummies to 
control for time and industry effects, and robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). To avoid the 
influence of outliers, all financial continuous data are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. All 
variables are previously defined. Abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation) and 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by Dechow at al. (1998) and as 
implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Discretionary current accruals are estimated using the 
corrected version of the modified Jones (1991) model. Abnormal cash flows from operations and 
abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accrual earnings 
management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
 
 
Chapter 7. Real and Accrual Earnings Management and IPO Failure Risks  
 
 
208 
 
Chapter 7 
Real and Accrual Earnings Management and IPO Failure Risks  
 
7.1 Introduction  
The failure of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a significant event in a firm’s life 
cycle that has consequences for the firm and its stakeholders (investors, lenders, 
financial institutions, etc). Fama and French (2004) document that the survival rates 
of IPO firms have sharply declined over the past several decades due to the new 
characteristics of IPO firms, which are lower profitability and higher growth that are 
both driven by the lower cost of equity in the market. Consistent with the 
importance of IPOs and the impact of their failure, prior research has investigated 
several factors that are associated with the survivability of IPOs e.g. the presence of 
venture capitalists (Jain and Kini, 2000), more prestigious underwriters (Schultz, 
1993), prestigious auditors and audit report (Willenborg and McKeown, 2001; 
Weber and Willenborg, 2003; Jain and Martin, 2005), underpricing, size and age at 
the IPO (Hensler et al., 1997) and corporate governance (Charitou et al., 2007). 
However, little research has examined whether firms-specific accounting items are 
associated with IPO failure risk and survivability (e.g. Li and Zhou, 2006; Demers 
and Joos, 2007).  
This chapter explores consequences of real and accrual earnings 
management for the probability of IPO failure and survivability.
97
 Prior accounting 
literature shows that IPO and SEO firms manipulate earnings upward utilizing real 
and accrual earnings management around the offer year (e.g., Aharony et al., 1993; 
Friedlan, 1994; Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a, 1998b; DuCharme et al., 2001; 
Elder and Zhou, 2002; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; 
                                            
97 IPO failure is defined as those IPO firms who delisted from the stock exchange for negative 
reasons (involuntary delisted) within 5 years post-IPO date. 
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Chen et al., 2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Chang et al., 2010; Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 
2011; Lee and Masulis, 2011; Chahine et al. 2012; Wongsunwai, 2012). This 
literature also found that real and accrual earnings management have severe negative 
consequences for post IPO and SEO stock returns and operating performance (e.g., 
Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a; Fan, 2007; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012).  
The increased interest in IPO failure research has led to an examination of 
the association between accrual earnings management and IPO failure. Consistent 
with this, Li and Zhou (2006) have investigated whether accrual earnings 
management that takes place during the IPO is associated with the probability of 
IPO failure and survivability in the subsequent periods and find evidence that IPO 
firms with high levels of accrual manipulation during the IPO year have a higher 
probability of failure and lower survival rates. In addition, Demers and Joos (2007) 
have examined whether firms-specific factors are associated with IPO failure risk 
and found a positive association between the probability of IPO failure and the level 
of discretionary expenses pre the IPO and find IPO firms that have lower spending 
on research and development (R&D) and selling, general, and administrative (SG& 
A) expenses during the year pre the IPO have a higher probability of failure in the 
following periods.
98
   
This chapter progresses the literature on earnings management by examining 
the effect of real earnings management on the probability of IPO failure and 
survivability. Real earnings management activities have been found to have severe 
negative consequences, with even greater than the consequences of accrual earnings 
management, for subsequent stock returns and operating performance (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012). Recent studies show that real earnings 
management activities are extensively utilized by IPO firms during the IPO year to 
manage reported earnings upward (e.g., Darrough and Rangan, 2005; Singer and 
                                            
98 For non- tech IPO firms Demers and Joos (2007) find that just the level of SG&A expenses during 
the year pre the IPO is associated with the probability of failure in the following period. Demers and 
Joos (2007) also examine several other factors such as sales, auditors, underwriters, VC, hot issue 
market, underpricing, age, offer price, leverage, etc. 
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Fedyk, 2011; Wongsunwai, 2012). Therefore, IPO firms with high levels of real and 
accrual earnings management during the IPO year are expected to have a higher 
probability of failure and lower survival rates in the subsequent periods.  
Consistent with this, the results of this chapter present evidence that IPO 
firms who delisted from the stock exchanges for negative reasons within five years 
post the IPO date exhibit higher levels of real and accrual earnings management 
during the IPO year. Further, the results show that IPO firms with high levels of real 
and accrual earnings management during the IPO year have a higher probability of 
failure and lower survival rates in subsequent periods.  
The study proceeds as follows. Section two reviews the related literature and 
presents hypotheses development. Section three discusses data, sample construction 
and empirical methodology. Section four discusses empirical evidence on real and 
accrual earnings management around IPOs and their relationships with IPO failure 
and survival rates. Section five presents additional analysis. Section six concludes. 
7.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
This chapter first reviews the literature on real and accrual earnings management 
around IPOs. Second, it discusses how earnings management might affect IPO 
failure risk and the survivability. This chapter discusses the existing evidence and 
research in each of these areas and builds on this evidence to state the hypotheses. 
7.2.1 Real and Accrual Earnings Management around IPOs  
IPO firms are expected to undertake real and accrual earnings management around 
IPOs, notably IPO firms exhibit higher levels of information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts around IPOs between insiders and outsiders and, this in turn, provides IPOs’ 
managers with strong incentives and more flexibility to manage reported earnings 
upward during the IPO. Consistent with this view, prior literature has presented 
evidence that IPO firms manage reported earnings upward around IPOs utilizing real 
and accrual earnings management activities (e.g., Aharony et al., 1993; Friedlan, 
1994; Teoh et al., 1998a; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; 
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Fan, 2007; Wongsunwai, 2012), and that real activities- based and accrual-based 
manipulations, which take place during the IPO, are negatively associated with post-
IPO stock returns and operating performance (e.g. Fan, 2007). Thus, and given the 
evidence on the existence of information asymmetry around IPOs (e.g. Teoh et al. 
1998a), it is expected that IPO firms in the UK will manage reported earnings 
upward around IPOs utilizing both real activities-based and accrual-based 
manipulations (Please see Section 5.3.1 for more detailed discussion about real and 
accrual earnings management around IPOs). 
7.2.2 Earnings Management and IPO Failure Risks  
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the effect of real activities-based 
and accrual-based manipulations on the probability of future failure risk. Prior 
research shows that real and accrual earnings management, which take place during 
the offer year, have negative consequences for post IPO and SEO operating and 
stock return performance (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a, 1998b; DuCharme 
et al., 2001; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Morsfield and 
Tan, 2006; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 2010; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 
2012). For example, Teoh et al. (1998a) find IPO firms that engage in accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year experience post-IPO stock returns 
underperformance. Teoh et al. (1998a) also compare post-IPO returns 
underperformance across their IPOs sample and find evidence that the most stock 
return underperformance occurs for IPO firms with the highest level of accruals 
manipulation during the IPO year. Roosenboom et al. (2003) find evidence that IPO 
firms with high levels of accrual earnings management during the IPO year 
experience worse stock returns post-IPO. Fan (2007) also find similar evidence that 
IPO firms with the highest level of accruals manipulation during the IPO experience 
a decline in post-IPO return and operating performance.  
Further, by focusing on the SEO setting Rangan (1998) find SEO firms that 
manage accounting accruals upward during the offer year experience inferior 
operating and stock return performance post the SEO. Teoh et al. (1998b) focus on 
accrual accounting during the year prior to the offer year and find evidence that SEO 
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firms inflate reported earnings utilizing accrual earnings management. Teoh et al. 
(1998b) also find accrual accounting prior to the offer year predict post-SEO stock 
return underperformance. More recently, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine both 
real and accrual earnings management activities for SEO firms and find evidence on 
earnings manipulations during the offer year.  Cohen and Zarowin (2010) also find 
real and accrual earnings management, which take place during the offer year, have 
negative consequences for post-SEO operating performance and that real earnings 
management activities have the most severe negative consequences. Kothari et al. 
(2012) examine the effect of real and accrual earnings management activities for 
post-SEO returns performance and find similar evidence to Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010). Kothari et al. (2012) find evidence that SEO firms manage earnings upward 
during the offer year utilizing real and accrual earnings management. They also find 
real earnings management activities have the most severe negative consequences for 
post-SEO stock return performance. 
Thus, if both real and accrual earnings management activities have severe 
negative consequences for future operating  and returns performance, then it is more 
likely that these activities will be positively associated with the probability of failure 
(delisted for negative reasons) in the following periods. Consistent with this view, Li 
and Zhou (2006) examine whether IPO firms that manage accrual accounting 
upward during the IPO year have a higher probability of failure (delisting from the 
stock exchange for negative reasons) in the following periods.
99
 Li and Zhou (2006) 
find evidence that IPO firms with a high level of accruals manipulation during the 
offer year have a higher probability of delisting from the stock exchange for 
negative reasons in the following periods. Li and Zhou (2006) also examine IPOs 
survivability and find evidence that IPO firms with high levels of accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year survive for a shorter period than other IPO firms.  
                                            
99 Li and Zhou (2006) define delisting for negative reasons (involuntary delisting) as those IPO firms 
who delisted from the stock exchange for failure within 5 years after the IPO date and have delisted 
codes between 400 and 600, excluding the following codes; 501, 502, 503, and 573. Where codes 
501, 502, and 503 denote those firms that switch from stock exchange to another, while 573 denotes 
firms that choose to go private. 
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In addition, Demers and Joos (2007) examine the association between the 
probability of IPO failure (delisting from the stock exchanges for negative reasons) 
and several accounting items. Demers and Joos (2007) find high-tech IPO firms that 
have lower spending on R&D and SG&A expenses during the year pre-IPO have a 
higher probability of failure in the following periods. While for both high-tech and 
non-tech IPO firms, Demers and Joos (2007) find evidence that lower spending on 
SG&A expenses during the year pre-IPO is positively associated with the 
probability of failure in the following periods. This evidence by Demers and Joos 
(2007) is in line with earnings management literature which finds that an abnormal 
reduction in discretionary expenses (R&D, SG&A, and advertising) leads to inferior 
subsequent operating and stock return performance (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Kothari et al. 2012). 
100
 
Other bodies of research have examined further covariates that may be found 
to be associated with the IPO event. For example, Willenborg and McKeown (2001) 
examine the association between auditor’s report and IPO failure and find evidence 
that IPO firms with a going-concern audit opinion during the IPO have a higher 
probability of delisting from the stock exchange within two years for deleterious 
reasons. Further, Weber and Willenborg (2003) find evidence that big N audit firms 
screen out risky IPO firms when they choose their clients and that big N auditor’s 
report on small IPO firms is more predictive of a post-IPO negative delisting. Weber 
and Willenborg (2003) also find that big N audit firms are less likely to give a clean 
audit report during the offer year for IPO firms that are delisted in the subsequent 
periods.                          
Therefore, IPO firms that have higher levels of real activities-based and 
accrual-based manipulations during the IPO year are expected to have a higher 
                                            
100 It is worth noting that Demers and Joos (2007) examine the annual level of R&D and SG&A 
expenses during the year pre the IPO, while Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2012) 
follow earnings management literature by using empirical models to estimate the abnormal level of 
discretionary expenses. In addition, Demers and Joos (2007) define IPO failure as IPO firms that are 
delisted within five years post the IPO and their delisted codes between 400 and 600, excluding the 
following codes; 501, 502, 503, and 573. 
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probability of failure in the subsequent periods.
101
 Hence, the second hypothesis, in 
alternative form, as follows:  
HYPOTHESIS  1a.  IPO firms that report high levels of real and/or accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year, ceteris paribus, will have a 
higher probability of failure in the post-IPO period. 
This chapter also conducts a survival analysis to examine whether real and 
accrual earnings management, which take place during the IPO year, are associated 
with IPO survivability in the subsequent periods. Prior studies have extensively used 
survival analysis to examine whether specific characteristics of IPO firms are 
associated with IPO survivability in the following periods (e.g., Hensler et al., 1997; 
Jain and Kini, 2000; Chadha, 2003; Fama and French, 2004; Jain and Martin, 2005; 
Li and Zhou, 2006; Demers and Joos, 2007; Carpentier and Suret, 2011; Gerakos et 
al., 2011; Espenlaub et al., 2012). For example, by conducting the survival analysis 
Jain and Kini (2000) find IPO firms backed by venture capitalists have a better 
probability of surviving in the following years than non-VC backed IPOs. They also 
find IPO firms backed by VCs have a higher level of R&D expenditure, better 
coverage by analysts, more successful road shows and are more likely to be 
underwritten by reputable underwriters. They find these characteristics, which result 
from the presence of VCs, contribute positively to higher survival rates and a lower 
failure risk in the post-IPO period.   
                                            
101 This chapter focuses on real and accrual earnings management that take place during the IPO year 
for several reasons. First, the reported results in Table 7.5 show that IPO firms do not manage 
earnings during the period pre the IPO. These results are consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
who find evidence that IPO firms report more conservatively during the year pre the IPO year in 
order to improve the quality of their financial reporting, so IPO firms can meet the market demand 
for high quality financial reporting during the first year as public firms. Further, it is well-known that 
IPO firms usually time their offerings to take advantage of hot market periods (e.g., Ibbotson and 
Jaffe, 1975; Lowry and Schwert, 2002). This in turn does not allow having enough time to plan 
earnings management ahead of the IPO date. Another explanation is that many of the original IPO    
shareholders are likely to be restricted in their share sales via a lock-up period. Thus, managing 
earnings upwards pre the IPO would not be overly sensible – in fact, conservative accounting subject 
to getting the IPO away would be more rational. For IPOs sample the average lock-up period is 14 
months after the IPO date. This chapter also does not consider earnings management that takes place 
during the period post the IPO year as many of IPOs sample are delisted during the first and second 
anniversary of their IPO date. Thus, this chapter focuses on earnings management during the IPO 
year. 
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In addition, Fama and French (2004) examine the characteristics of IPO 
firms that went public over the period 1973-2001. They find evidence that the 
survival rate for IPO firms has sharply declined due to the new characteristics of 
firms going public, which are lower profitability and a higher growth. They suggest 
these changes in the characteristics of IPO firms are consequences of the lower cost 
of equity in the market. Gerakos et al. (2011) find evidence that firms listed on the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK have higher failure rates compared 
with firms listed on the Main market and other developed US markets. Recently, 
Espenlaub et al. (2012) examine the survival rates for IPO firms on the AIM market 
and find evidence that the presence of a reputable Nomad improves the survival rate 
of an IPO in the subsequent periods. 
Accounting research has also conducted the survival analysis to examine 
whether accounting items are associated with the survivability of IPO firms (e.g., 
Jain and Martin, 2005; Li and Zhou, 2006; Demers and Joos, 2007). For example, 
Jain and Martin (2005) examine the association between audit quality and IPO 
survival rates, and find IPO firms audited by high quality auditors survive longer.  
Jain and Martin (2005) also find the impact of audit quality on IPO survivability is 
upheld after controlling for other covariates that are found to affect the survival rates 
of IPO firms. Demers and Joos (2007) examine IPO failure risks and conduct the 
survival analysis as a robustness test and find almost similar results to the Logit 
regression analysis that lower spending of R&D and SG&A expenses during the 
year pre-IPO is associated with lower survival rates in the following periods. 
Moreover, Li and Zhou (2006) examine whether accrual earnings management is 
associated with IPO survivability using the survival analysis and find IPO firms that 
engage aggressively in accrual earnings management during the IPO year have 
lower survival rates in the subsequent periods.  
Thus, this chapter conducts the survival analysis to examine whether real and 
accrual earnings management activities during the IPO year are associated with the 
survivability of IPO firms – it is expected IPO firms that aggressively manage 
earnings upward during the IPO year, utilizing real and accrual earnings 
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management, to have lower survival rates in subsequent periods. Hence, the final 
hypothesis, in alternative form, as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS  1b.  IPO firms that report high levels of real and/or accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year, ceteris paribus, will have 
lower survival rates post the IPO. 
7.3 Research Methods and Data 
7.3.1 Data and Sample Construction 
The initial sample of this chapter consists of 571 British IPO companies that have 
gone public on either the Main or AIM markets between January 1998 and 
December 2008.
102
 All financial IPO firms are excluded from the sample due to 
differences in their financial reporting and disclosure requirements (e.g., Teoh et al., 
1998a; 1998c; Chen et al., 2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Fan, 2007; Chang et al., 
2010; Lee and Masulis, 2011; Chahine et al., 2012; Wongsunwai, 2012). Further, the 
sample is restricted to all IPO firms that have available prospectuses and the 
necessary data to measure real and accrual earnings management. This restriction 
leads to have a sample consisting of larger and more successful firms, which results 
in a more conservative test of earnings management as noted by Cohen et al. (2008) 
and Cohen and Zarowin (2010). Further, this chapter follows prior research by 
excluding from the control sample (all UK non-IPO firms) any group of firms with 
                                            
102 The London Stock Exchange provides data about IPOs on the Main market starting from 1998 
while data about IPOs on the AIM market start from 1995. Therefore, and to be consistent, the 
sample covers the period 1998 - 2008. 
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less than 6 observations for each 2-digit SIC code industry-year group.
103, 104
 The 
IPO year (0) is defined as the fiscal year during which the IPO occurs.
105
  
Out of 571 UK IPOs, 317 IPOs are delisted prior to December 2011 (of 
which 90 IPOs are delisted for negative reason). Following prior research (e.g., Li 
and Zhou, 2006; Demers and Joos, 2007) this chapter defines IPO failure as those 
IPO firms who delisted from the stock exchanges for negative reasons (involuntary 
delisted); namely, administration, receivership, liquidation, winding up, and 
bankruptcy within five years post the IPO date. After imposing this restriction, 60 
IPOs left which are delisted for negative reasons within 5 years after the IPO date 
(the total is 90 IPOs that are delisted for negative reasons over the sample period). 
106  This chapter also distinguishes between IPO firms delisted for mergers and 
acquisitions, at the request of the company (going private) and other delisting 
reasons.  
Data are collected using the following sources: (1) IPO firms are identified 
using the list of IPOs on the London Stock Exchange website for UK firms that were 
admitted to the AIM and Main markets during the period 1998-2008. This list 
provides information about IPOs such as, issue price, the date of an IPO, market 
capitalization, etc; (2) the ICC Plum and Lexis-Nexis databases were used to obtain 
information about the company identifier for IPO firms, such as the WorldScope and 
ISIN codes; (3) financial data for the IPO firms and for the control sample of all UK 
non-IPO firms were obtained from the WorldScope database; (4) WorldScope 
                                            
103 The control sample consists of all UK non-IPO active and dead firms, excluding financial firms, 
over the sample period to avoid survivorship bias.  
104 The analysis is also repeated using 10 observations for each industry-year group and the results 
are qualitatively similar but this restriction leads to a large decrease in the sample size and so this 
chapter follows Rosner, (2003), Iqbal et al., (2009) and Athanasakou et al., (2011) and uses 6 
observations. 
105 To overcome any misspecification of the financial year end, the financial data obtained from 
WorldScope are cross checked with the financial data in the prospectus and the results are 
qualitatively similar.  
106 From those 60 delisted IPOs for negative reasons, 35 went into administration, 22 into liquidation, 
2 into receivership, and 1 into winding up. Further, the definition of failure that is adopted by this 
thesis is consistent with García Lara et al. (2009) who examined earnings quality for failed firms in 
the UK and defined failure as those firm delisted for administration, liquidation and receivership.  
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however, does not provide all the required financial data for the sample of IPO firms, 
therefore, IPO prospectuses were downloaded from the Thomson One Banker 
database and all missing financial data were manually collected from IPO 
prospectuses; (5) the DataStream database was used to collect the stock prices for 
the sample of IPOs and their matched firms and the delisted dates, (6) the Fame 
database is used to collect the reasons of delisting from the stock exchange and date 
of delisting, which was cross checked with the delisted dates obtained from 
DataStream. Further, the delisted reasons obtained from Fame are doubled checked 
with Companies House. 
7.3.2 Event periods 
This chapter focuses on examining the impact of real and accrual earnings 
management that take place at the end of the IPO year on the probability of IPO 
failure and survivability in subsequent periods. Consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Li and Zhou, 2006; Demers and Joos, 2007), IPO failure is defined as those IPO 
firms who delisted from the stock exchange for negative reasons (involuntary 
delisted); namely, administration, receivership, liquidation, winding up, and 
bankruptcy within five years post the IPO date. Further, and as the survival analysis 
is dealing with censored data, this chapter follows prior research (Li and Zhou, 
2006; Demers and Joos, 2007) by considering IPO firms as “right censored” if they 
have not delisted yet (still trading on the stock exchange since the IPO date) by the 
end of December 2011 or if they have delisted for any reasons other than negative 
reasons. Thus, non-survivor IPO firms are defined as those IPO firms who delisted 
from the stock exchanges just for negative reasons over the period 1998-2011. This 
approach of analyzing the impact of real and accrual earnings management on the 
probability of IPO failure and survivability is consistent with prior research (e.g. Li 
and Zhou, 2006). Figure 7.1 depicts the time periods when real and accrual earnings 
management are estimated. 
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Figure 7.1 Time periods analyzed and IPO failure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
  
                                                                                     Year -1
Year 0 Year +3 
IPO date  
Fiscal year pre the IPO 
year (Year -1) 
 
Fiscal year during which the IPO 
occurs (Year 0= the IPO) year) 
Year -2 Year +1 Year +2 Year +4 
Year +5 
IPO failure is defined as those IPO firms who delisted from the stock exchange for 
negative reasons (involuntary delisted) within 5-years post the IPO date. 
Fiscal year post the IPO year 
(Year +1) 
 
This chapter examines the impact of real and accrual earnings management activities that take place 
at the end of the IPO year on the probability of IPO failure and survivability in subsequent periods 
IPO. 
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7.3.3 Variable Measurement  
7.3.3.1 Measuring Accrual-based Earnings Management  
This chapter follows prior research (e.g. Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Fan, 2007; 
Cohen and Zarowin; 2010) by using the cash flows approach to estimate accrual 
measures. Following this approach total accruals are defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations. The advantage of cash flows 
approach over other approaches is to capture all accrual manipulations that are 
conducted using either current accruals (short-term) or non-current accruals (long-
term). For example, current accrual manipulation can be conducted through delaying 
the recognition of expenses and accelerating the recognition of revenues, while non-
current accrual (long-term accrual) manipulation can be conducted through 
decelerating depreciation policies, reducing deferred tax, and realizing unusual gains 
(Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b; 1998c; Chang et al., 2010; Chahine et al. 2012). Thus, 
total accruals are decomposed into discretionary accruals (related to managers’ 
discretion) and non-discretionary accruals (related to economic circumstances and 
outside managers’ control) (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Teoh et al., 
1998a). 
To estimate discretionary accruals, and following prior research in earnings 
management, the Dechow et al. (1995) cross-sectional adaptation of the modified 
Jones (1991) model is used. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) point out estimating 
discretionary accruals for IPO firms using lagged total assets to scale accrual 
variables may inflate the measure of accruals in the current year. They argue that 
lagged total assets are qualitatively smaller than total assets at the end of the IPO 
year because IPO firms tend to use proceeds to invest in assets. In order to overcome 
this problem, this chapter follows Armstrong et al. (2009) and scales all variables by 
average total assets rather than lagged total assets.
107
 This chapter uses a cross-
sectional regression for each year for all non-IPO firms for each 2-digit SIC industry 
                                            
107Also, the analysis is repeated scaling all variables by lagged total assets and the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter. 
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category. This approach, in part, controls for changes in economic conditions that 
impact on total accruals across different industry groups, but allows for coefficients 
to vary through time (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Kasznik, 1999; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010). Return on assets is also added to the model as suggested by Kothari 
et al. (2005) in order to control for extreme operating performance as this can bias 
the estimation of discretionary accruals. Then, the estimated coefficients are taken to 
estimate discretionary accruals for the IPO firm. Normal accruals are, therefore, 
estimated using the following cross-sectional regression for each industry and year 
for all non-IPO firms:
108
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Where TAi,t is total accruals defined as earnings before extraordinary items minus 
cash flows from operations; AvAssetsi,t is the sum of total assets at the beginning of 
the year and the total assets at the end of the year divided by 2; ∆SALESi,t  is the 
change in sales during a year scaled by average total assets; PPEi,t  is the gross value 
of property, plant and equipment scaled by average total assets; and ROAi,t  is return 
on assets measured as earnings before extraordinary items scaled by average total 
assets. 
The coefficient estimates from equation (7.1) are used to estimate normal accruals 
(NAi,t) for all IPO firms in each year and industry as follows, 
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 ∆ RECi,t  is the change in receivables during the year scaled by average total assets.  
                                            
108 To take account of extreme values all variables are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. 
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Discretionary accruals (DAi,t) are measured as the difference between total accruals 
and fitted normal accruals where, 
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For robustness this chapter also repeats this analysis using performance-
matched discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. (2005). Therefore, each IPO 
firm is matched with a non-IPO firm based on year, 2-digit SIC industry code and 
the closest return on assets (+/- 0.20 of IPO firms’ return on assets). The results of 
the performance-matched discretionary accruals are qualitatively similar to those 
reported where return on assets is added to the model. The imposition of the above 
restriction, however, reduces the sample by 20% as only appropriate matches are 
found for 80% of the IPO sample. As the results are qualitatively similar, this 
chapter reports the results based on the larger sample size that simply controls for 
return on assets. 
7.3.3.2 Measuring Real Earnings Management 
Following prior research real earnings management proxies are estimated based on 
models of real earnings management developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and applied 
by Roychowdhury (2006). Later researchers such as Cohen et al., (2008), Cohen and 
Zarowin, (2010), Wongsunwai, (2012) and Zang, (2012), also apply these models to 
estimate real earnings management. This chapter examines two real earnings 
management activities; sales-based manipulation and reducing discretionary 
expenses.
109
 Sales-based manipulation leads to lower levels of cash flows from 
operations, and can be managed through offering more price discounts and/or more 
lenient credit terms (see Roychowdhury, 2006). Discretionary expenses meanwhile 
represent the sum of research and development expenses (R&D), advertising 
expenses, and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A). Reducing 
                                            
109 This chapter does not consider production cost manipulation within the analysis of real earnings 
management as this is a method that can only be fully utilized by manufacturing companies 
(Roychowdhury, 2006) and manufacturing companies make up just 26.6% of the total sample.   
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discretionary expenses in the current period will boost reported earnings in the 
current period. In addition, where discretionary expenses are paid for in cash, any 
reduction in these expenses will increase cash flows in the current period (Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010). Similar to the estimation of accrual earnings management 
measure all variables are scaled by average total assets.
110
 First, the normal level of 
cash flows from operations is estimated using the following cross-sectional 
regression for each industry and year for all non-IPO firms:
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Where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations for firm i at period t . The abnormal CFO 
for IPO firms is calculated as actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO estimated 
using the coefficients from regression (7.4). 
The normal level of discretionary expenses can be expressed as a linear function of 
contemporaneous sales as follows:  
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Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) point out, however, that 
estimating a normal level of discretionary expenses as specified in regression (7.5) 
can lead to poor estimation where firms manage sales upwards to increase reported 
earnings during any year. If a firm has managed sales upwards, this will result in 
unusually low residuals from running the regression as specified above. In order to 
overcome this problem, discretionary expenses are estimated as a function of lagged 
sales. This chapter, therefore, follows Roychowdhury (2006) and estimates the 
normal level of discretionary expenses for the IPO firms as follows, 
                                            
110 The test also is repeated by scaling all the variables by lagged total assets and the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter.  
111 To take account of extreme values all variables are Winsorized at the top 1% and bottom 99%. 
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DISXi,t is, therefore, calculated as the sum of, R&D, SG&A, and advertising 
expenses for firm i at period t . SALESi,t-1 is sales during the previous year. The 
abnormal level of discretionary expenses for IPO firms is calculated as actual 
discretionary expenses minus the normal level of discretionary expenses estimated 
using the coefficients from regression (7.6). 
In order to measure the total effect of real earnings management, and 
following Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), the abnormal level of 
cash flows from operations and the abnormal level of discretionary expenses are 
combined to compute an aggregate measure of real earnings management. 
Specifically, abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary 
expenses are multiplied by -1, and then calculated as one aggregate measure. A 
higher amount of this aggregate measure implies that IPO firms are more likely to be 
manipulating sales to increase reported earnings and cutting discretionary expenses. 
7.3.3.3 Measuring the Survival Rates   
To test whether real and accrual earnings management are associated with post-IPO 
survival rates, this chapter examines the survivability of IPO firms using Kaplan-
Meier estimator and Cox proportional hazard model as developed by Cox (1972). In 
the first step the survival function of IPO firms is estimated using Kaplan-Meier 
estimator, which allows making inferences as to whether earnings management 
proxies are significant determinants for the IPO survival rates in the subsequent 
periods.  Kaplan-Meier estimator is defined as  
(7.7)ˆ 
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Where ni is the number of IPO firms that are still at risk at time ti and di is the 
number of firms that actually delisted (failed) at time t. This chapter uses the log 
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rank test to examine whether IPO firms relative to a specific stratum sharing the 
same curve of Kaplan-Meier. The strata are the variables of interest, namely real and 
accrual earnings management activities. 
In the second step, the Cox proportional hazard model is estimated as developed by 
Cox (1972) as follows  
(7.8)]YearINDAbs(CFO)βROAβ Levβ                  
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Where h0 (t) is the base-line hazard function, t is the duration to the date of an event 
(failure), (EMD) is a proxy for REM_Index, ABNCFO, ABNDEXP, and DISACCR. 
(REM_Index) is a dummy variable equalling to 1 if the level of the aggregate 
measure of real earnings management during the IPO year for an IPO firm is greater 
than zero (positive) and 0 otherwise, (ABNCFO) is a dummy variable equalling to 1 
if the level of the abnormal cash flows from operations during the IPO year for an 
IPO firm is greater than zero and 0 otherwise, (ABNDEXP) is a dummy variable 
equalling to 1 if the level of the abnormal discretionary expenses during the IPO 
year for an IPO firm is greater than zero and 0 otherwise, and (DISACCR) is a 
dummy variable equalling to 1 if the level of the discretionary accruals during the 
IPO year for an IPO firm is greater than zero and 0 otherwise.
112
 Compared with 
other hazard models, the advantage of the Cox (1972) model is that no assumption is 
required to about the distribution of the data. 
In addition, and following previous research (e.g., Schultz, 1993; Hensler et 
al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 2000; Willenborg and McKeown, 2001; Weber and 
Willenborg, 2003; Jain and Martin, 2005; Li and Zhou, 2006; Charitou et al., 2007; 
Demers and Joos, 2007), the model includes a set of control variables that are found 
to be associated with IPO survivability. For example, Jain and Martin (2005) find 
                                            
112 Also the model is re-estimated by adding a dummy variable for high tech industries and the 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter. 
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evidence that IPO firms audited by high quality auditors survive longer. Jain and 
Kini (2000) find evidence that IPO firms backed by venture capitalists have a higher 
probability of surviving in the following years than non-VC backed IPOs. Schultz 
(1993) finds evidence that the presence of more reputable underwriters is positively 
associated with IPO survivability. Thus, the model includes (Big N) which is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm’s auditor is a Big N audit firm and zero 
otherwise, (VC) which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firms backed by 
venture capitalists and zero otherwise, and (Underwriter) a dummy variable 
equalling 1 if the IPO firms have high profile underwriters and zero otherwise. 113 
The possible impact of a size effect is controlled by adding the natural 
logarithm of market value (LnSize) to the model, calculated as the offer price 
multiplied by the number of outstanding shares on the first day of listing, while IPO 
underpricing (Underpricing), defined as the percentage difference between the offer 
price and the closing price on the first day of trading, the offer price (Offer-price), 
and leverage ratio (Lev) are added to the model as suggested by previous studies 
(e.g., Schultz, 1993; Hensler et al., 1997; Li and Zhou, 2006; Demers and Joos, 
2007). Schultz (1993) for example finds evidence that the offer size, age, initial 
returns, and more prestigious underwriters are positively associated with IPO 
survivability. Demers and Joos (2007) find evidence that leverage ratio is positively 
associated with the probability of failure, while IPO firms with higher offer prices 
are less likely to fail. 
In order to control for growth opportunities the model includes book-to-
market (BM); calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity; and IPO firm age [Ln(1+age)] measured as the natural logarithm of 1+IPO 
firm age, where firm age is calculated as the difference between the founding date of 
the firm and the date of its IPO (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; 
                                            
113 Prestigious underwriters are those global investment banks as defined by Derrien and Kecskes 
(2007), while venture capitalist are those investors who hold more than 3 % of a firm’s shares and 
appear in the list of venture capitalists provided by British Venture Capitalist Association. 
Specifically, data are collected from the prospectuses about all the shareholders who hold more than 
3% of the total shares and then shareholder’s name is matched with a list of venture capitalists, which 
is obtained from the British Venture Capitalist Association. 
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Roosenboom et al., 2003; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Further, as the focus of this 
chapter is to examine the performance failure, and following prior research (e.g. Li 
and Zhou, 2006), the model controls for profitability proxied by return on assets 
(ROA) and the possible impact of operating cash flows [Abs(CFO)], which is 
defined as the absolute value of cash flows from operations. Finally, dummies are 
added to the model to control for industry (IND) and year (Year) effect. 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 7.1 present a breakdown of delisted IPO firms by delisted reasons and shows 
that 28.39% (90 IPOs) are delisted for negative reasons, 44.16% are delisted for 
being acquired by other firms, 21.46% are delisted at the request of the company, 
and 5.99% are delisted for other reasons. As this chapter imposes the 5-year 
restriction, 60 IPOs are left out of 90 IPOs that are delisted for negative reasons. 
Table 7.2 (Panels A, B, and C) presents descriptive statistics for the IPO 
samples. The means market capitalization for the pooled, delisted and survivor IPO 
samples are approximately £114 million, £33 million and £141 million, respectively.  
This large difference in market values between IPO firms delisted for negative 
reasons and other IPO firms suggests that small IPO firms have a higher probability 
of failure in the period following the IPO. Table 7.3 (Panel A) reports the 
distribution of IPOs over the period from 1998 to 2008 and shows that the years 
2000, 2004, 2005, and 2006 account for more than 60% of the sample. In addition, 
one consequence of the recent global financial crisis is that the lowest number of 
IPOs in the sample is in 2008.  Table 7.3 (Panel B) shows the frequency of IPOs 
relative to the industry standard classification, measured by 2-digit SIC codes. 
Except for the clustering in the Business Services industry, which accounts for 
approximately 32% of the total sample, the majority of other industries have similar 
percentages of IPOs ranging from 1% to 10%. 
Table 7.4 presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the IPO 
sample (pooled, delisted for negative reasons and survivor IPO samples) over the 
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period from 1998 to 2008. Table 7.4 shows that IPO firms delisted for negative 
reasons have lower levels of offer prices, stock return performance (post-IPO three-
year buy-and-hold-abnormal return [BHAR]) and operating cash flows compared 
with survivor IPOs. Further, Table 7.4 shows that the percentage of IPO firms 
delisted for negative reasons that are audited by big N audit firms is lower than the 
percentage of survivor IPO firms. The presence of those more reputable accounting 
firms are found to be positively associated with IPO survival rates in the following 
periods (e.g., Jain and Martin, 2005). Also, Panel B shows that IPO firms delisted 
for negative reasons have higher levels of initial underpricing and Chairman/CEO 
duality, and a lower level of board size than survivor IPO firms. 
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Table 7.1 Data on reasons for the cancellation (delisting) of 317 IPOs between January 
1998 and December 2011 
Delisted reasons 
 
Since the IPO date and up to 
December 2011 
 Since the IPO date and 
up to 5 years after the 
IPO date 
 
Number Percentage (%)  Number Percentage (%) 
Negative reasons  90 28.39  60 36.58 
Takeover (being acquired) 140 44.16  72 43.90 
At the request of the company  68 21.46  51 31.09 
Other reasons  19 5.99  11 6.71 
Total delisted IPOs 317 100.00  164 100.00 
Table 7.1 reports the distribution and reasons for the cancellation (delisting) of 317 IPOs between January 1998 
and December 2011. 
 
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics for sample IPO firms during 1998-2008 
  
Total assets  Net income  Market value Money raised  
(£ mill.) (£ mill.)  (£ mill.) (£ mill.) 
Panel A: Pooled sample (n=570) 
Mean 56.12 1.93 113.93 43.41 
Median 4.47 -0.03 25.11 7.00 
Std. dev 233.90 25.38 302.19 136.22 
Minimum 0.07 -124.10 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Panel B: IPO delisted for negative reasons within 5 years post IPO (n=60).  
Mean 7.75 -0.54 33.34 10.45 
Median   2.58 -0.32 18.26 4.70 
Std. dev 13.84 3.78 41.78 13.91 
Minimum 0.12 -11.84 1.44 0.25 
Maximum 75.18 16.19 193.04 55.00 
Panel C: IPO survivors  (n=253) 
Mean 78.45 4.51 140.80 60.86 
Median 4.11 0.01 26.12 6.64 
Std. dev 284.31 33.98 349.29 184.76 
Minimum 0.07   -124.10 1.44 0.14 
Maximum 1969.10 397.47 2020.68 1499.85 
Table 7.2 presents sample descriptive statistics for the pooled IPOs, IPO firms delisted for negative reasons 
within 5 years post IPO, and survivor IPO firms. Total assets are the beginning of period total assets; net income 
at the end of the IPO year; market value is the market capitalization for IPO firms immediately after the listing; 
and money raised is the offer amount of the IPO. Total assets and net income are obtained from the WorldScope 
database; market value and money raised are obtained from the London Stock Exchange website. 
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Table 7.3 Time and industry distribution 
 
Panel A: Time distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008 
 
Pooled sample 
Delisted for 
negative reasons 
within 5 years post 
IPO 
Survivors 
Year   Freq % Freq % Freq % 
1998 35 6.14 4 6.67 8 3.16 
1999 29 5.09 3 5.00 6 2.37 
2000 102 17.89 13 21.67 29 11.46 
2001 43 7.54 2 3.33 19 7.51 
2002 35 6.14 1 1.67 19 7.51 
2003 23 4.04 3 5.00 8 3.16 
2004 97 17.02 12 20.00 47 18.58 
2005 94 16.49 15 25.00 42 16.60 
2006 70 12.28 7 11.67 42 16.60 
2007 40 7.02 - - 31 12.25 
2008 2 0.35 - - 2 0.79 
Total 570 100.00 60 100.00 253 100.00 
Table 7.3 reports time and industry distributions for the pooled IPO sample, IPOs delisted for negative reasons 
and survivor IPO firms. Panel A presents the time distribution, while Panel B presents the industry distribution.
Panel B: Industry distribution of IPOs during 1998-2008  
    Pooled Sample 
Delisted for 
negative reasons 
within 5 years 
post IPO 
Survivors 
Industry                                                  2-digit SIC Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Oil and gas extraction                                                         13 26 4.56 2 3.33 17 6.72 
Food products                                                  20 11 1.93 1 1.67 4 1.58 
Printing and publishing                                                        27 13 2.28 1 1.67 6 2.37 
Chemicals and allied products                                            28 37 6.49 5 8.33 16 6.32 
Industrial machinery                 35 16 2.81 2 3.33 6 2.37 
Electronic equipment                                36 36 6.32 6 10.00 19 7.51 
Instruments and related products                                        38 22 3.86 2 3.33 9 3.56 
Communications 48 27 4.74 1 1.67 12 4.74 
Electric, gas, and sanitation                                   49 10 1.75 1 1.67 5 1.98 
Durable goods                                         50 11 1.93 - - 2 0.79 
Eating and drinking 
establishments   
58 15 2.63 3 5.00 5 1.98 
Retail 59 8 1.40 - - 3 1.19 
Business services                                                                   73 182 31.93 19 31.67 76 30.04 
Media and entertainment 78 8 1.40 1 1.67 5 1.98 
Amusement and recreation                                       79 27 4.74 7 11.67 8 3.16 
Engineering and management 
services  
87 58 10.18 1 1.67 28 11.07 
All others - 63 11.05 8 13.36 32 12.64 
Total   570 100.00 60 100.00 253 100.00 
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Table 7.4 Distribution of IPO firms’ characteristics during the IPO year based on the 
listing status. 
 
Pooled 
sample 
Delisted for negative 
reasons within 5 
years post IPO 
Survivors 
 
Delisted - Survivors 
Differences 
 VARIABLES 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
t-statistics 
(z-statistics) 
 Age 1.047 3.368 3.990 -0.565 
 (0.763) (0.701) (1.307) (-1.540) 
Offer-price 1.163 0.765 1.145      -2.629*** 
 (0.980) (0.615) (1.000)       (-2.729)*** 
Underpricing 0.209 0.671 0.150      1.981** 
 (0.063) (0.094) (0.058)    (1.836)* 
Underwriter 0.187 0.183 0.174 0.172 
 - - - - 
VC 0.221 0.150 0.209 -1.038 
  - - - - 
Big N 0.468 0.267 0.439     -2.456** 
 - - - - 
BHAR -0.140 -0.498 0.021       -3.834*** 
  (-0.100) (-0.388) (0.000)      -4.403*** 
Cash flows 6.247 -0.254 11.228  -1.802* 
 (-0.027) (-0.551) (0.040)      (-2.585)*** 
Lev 0.353 0.452 0.371 0.787 
 (0.108) (0.166) (0.084) (1.564) 
Chrm/CEO 0.082 0.200 0.071       3.085*** 
  - - - - 
BrdSize 5.708 4.867 5.822       -3.965*** 
 (6.000) (5.000) (6.000)       (-4.052)*** 
OutDirectors 0.452 0.453 0.455 -0.113 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (-0.082) 
N 570 60 253 - 
*, **, *** Denote significantly different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Differences in medians are tested using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and differences in means are tested using 
t-tests. Table 7.4 reports sample descriptive statistics of pooled IPOs sample, IPO firms delisted for negative 
reasons and survivor IPO firms. Where (Age) is the IPO firm age in years where the IPO firm’s age is  calculated 
as the difference between the founding date of the IPO firm and the date of its IPO, (Offer-price) is the IPO issue 
price, (Underpricing) is the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day of 
trading, Underwriter=1 if the IPO is underwritten by a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, VC= 1 if the firm 
is backed by a venture capitalist and 0 otherwise, Big N=1 if the firm is audited by a big N auditor and 0 
otherwise, (BHAR) is the mean 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns for IPOs sample (adjusted to matched 
sample based on size and book-to-market ratio) where the holding period is 4 to 40 months after the IPO date, 
(Cash flows) is cash flows from operations, (Lev) is leverage ratio measured as total debtt/total assetst-1, 
(Chrm/CEO) is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the Chairman and the CEO is the same director and zero 
otherwise, (BrdSize) is the number of directors on the board, and (OutDirectors) is the percentage of outside 
directors on the board. “ –“ stands for “not meaningful”. 
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7.4.2 Empirical Evidence on Earnings Management around IPOs 
Table 7.5 presents time-series profiles of mean and median aggregate real earnings 
management, abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based), abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and discretionary accruals for years -2 to +3 relative to the 
IPO year which is year 0. The results are interpreted on the basis of median values. 
Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are 
multiplied by -1 to allow the measures of real earnings management to have the 
same interpretation as the measure of accrual-based earnings management. Thus, for 
real activities-based and accrual-based a significant and positive coefficient 
indicates income-increasing earnings management.   
Table 7.5 shows that IPO firms exhibit evidence of real activities-based and 
accrual-based manipulations during and after the IPO year. For example, the median 
aggregate measure of real earnings management during the IPO year is positive and 
statistically significant indicating that in aggregate, IPO firms manage earnings 
upwards utilizing real activities. The aggregate measure of real earnings 
management declines in the year post-IPO but remains significant. Table 7.5 also 
shows that the median abnormal cash flows from operations during the IPO year is 
significant and positive. This is consistent with IPO firms manage sales upward 
during the IPO year to inflate reported earnings. In the post-IPO period the median 
abnormal cash flows from operations decreases but remains significant and positive. 
However, Table 7.5 shows no evidence that IPO firms reduce discretionary 
expenses during the IPO year to increase reported earnings. One possible 
explanation for this result is that discretionary expenses are associated with higher 
future litigations risks and, therefore, discretionary expenses-based manipulation is 
likely to attract the attention of underwriters and auditors. In line with the 
importance of discretionary expenses around IPOs, Demers and Joos (2007) find 
evidence that IPO firms with lower spending on R&D and SG& A expenses during 
the year pre the IPO have a higher probability of failure in the subsequent periods. 
Finally, and in line with prior research (e.g. Friedlan (1994), Teoh et al. 
(1998a), and Morsfield and Tan (2006)), Table 7.5 shows evidence that IPO firms 
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manage earnings upward utilizing accrual-based manipulation. The results also show 
that IPO firms manage earnings upwards in the post-IPO period, and the level of 
discretionary accruals increases above the IPO year level in the post-IPO year but is 
lower in years +2 and +3. Also, Table 7.5 shows that the mean and median 
discretionary accruals during the year pre the IPO are approximately zero. This 
result is consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2008) evidence that IPO firms in the 
UK do not manage earnings upward utilizing accrual earnings management pre the 
IPO. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) suggest that IPO firms report more conservatively 
to improve their financial reporting due to the expected high demand (by the market 
participants e.g. investors, regulators, analysts, etc.) on high quality financial 
reporting during first year as public firms.  
Collectively, the reported results in Table 7.5 confirm the view that IPO 
firms manipulate reported earnings upward utilizing both real activities-based and 
accrual-based earnings management during the IPO year. 
Table 7.5 Time-series profiles of real and accrual earnings management 
Year -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Aggregate real earnings management 
Median 0.035 0.013 0.073*** 0.051*** 0.045* 0.011 
Mean -0.042 -0.023 0.092*** 0.055*** 0.038 0.010 
Abnormal cash flows from operations (Sales)  
Median -0.014 0.009 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
Mean -0.167 0.065 0.061** 0.080*** 0.098*** 0.086*** 
 Abnormal discretionary expenses  
Median -0.011 -0.010 0.023 -0.003 -0.017** -0.003 
Mean 0.125 -0.088 0.031 -0.024 -0.059** -0.076*** 
Discretionary accruals 
Median 0.007 0.007 0.018*** 0.046*** 0.010* 0.015** 
Mean -0.099 -0.051 0.022 0.042*** 0.029* 0.031*** 
*, **, *** Denote significantly different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Differences in medians are tested using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and differences in means are tested using 
t-tests. Table 7.5 presents the time-series profiles of median and mean aggregate real earnings management, 
abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses and discretionary accruals for the pooled 
sample over the period two years prior to the IPO year, the IPO year, and three years after the IPO year. The IPO 
year is year 0. To avoid the influence of outliers all continuous financial data are Winsorized at the top 1% and 
bottom 99%. Discretionary accruals are estimated using corrected version of the modified Jones (1991) model 
(Dechow et al., 1995). Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated 
using models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and as implemented by Roychowdhury, (2006). Abnormal cash 
flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one to allow real and 
accrual earnings management proxies to have the same interpretation. The aggregate measure of real earnings 
management is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses.
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7.4.3 Differences in Real and Accrual Earnings Management Based on 
Listing Status  
Table 7.6 reports descriptive statistics of differences in real and accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year between IPO firms delisted for negative reasons 
and survivors. Table 7.6 shows that IPO firms delisted for negative reasons have 
higher levels of real activities-based and accrual-based manipulations during the IPO 
year than survivor IPO firms. The differences in the mean and median aggregate 
measure of real earnings management are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
For abnormal cash flows from operations, the differences in mean and median 
values are statistically significant at the 5% level. While for discretionary accruals, 
the differences in mean (median) values are statistically significant at the 10% (1%) 
level. However, Table 7.6 shows that the difference of discretionary expenses-based 
manipulation between the two samples is not statistically significant, confirming the 
results in Table 7.5 that IPO firms do not exhibit evidence of discretionary expenses-
based manipulation during the offer year. 
In summary, Table 7.6 presents preliminary evidence that IPO firms delisted 
for negative reasons exhibit higher levels of real and accrual earnings management 
during the IPO year than survivor IPO firms. However, these results cannot be 
interpreted in the context of differences in the listing status unless controlling for 
many other covariates that are associated with real and accrual earnings 
management. In the next section OLS regressions are estimated to control for the 
impact of these covariates. 
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Table 7.6 Difference in real and accrual earnings management during the offer year 
between IPO firms delisted for negative reasons and survivor IPO firms   
    Delisted for 
negative reasons 
within 5 years post 
IPO 
    
  Survivors 
        Difference 
VARIABLES 
Mean 
 
Mean   Mean t-statistic 
(Median ) N (Median ) N  (Median) (z-statistic) 
Aggregate real 
earnings 
management  
0.420**    -0.037  0.457 2.709*** 
  (0.229)***  (-0.006) (0.235) (2.975)*** 
Abnormal cash 
flows from 
operations  
  0.186*** 
 
0.034 
 
0.152 2.109** 
  (0.101)*** (0.014)  (0.087) (2.075)** 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
      0.108 
 
0.019 
 
0.089 1.060 
(0.049)*     (0.012)   (0.037) (0.947) 
Discretionary 
accruals 
0.110*** 
60 
0.019 
253 
0.091 1.887* 
(0.120)***    (0.003)   (0.117) (3.375)*** 
*, **, *** Denote two tailed tests significantly different at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Table 7.6 reports the difference in mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test) real and 
accrual earnings management during the IPO year between IPO firms delisted for negative reasons and 
survivors. All delisted IPOs are defined as those IPO firms that are delisted for negative reasons within 5 years 
post the IPO date. All variables are previously defined. 
 
 
7.4.4 Real and Accrual Earnings Management and IPO Failure  
To test whether real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year are 
associated with probability of IPO failure in the subsequent periods, this chapter 
follows Li and Zhou (2006) and Demers and Joos (2007) by estimating the 
following Logit model: 
(7.9)YearINDAbs(CFO)βROAβ Levβ
 age)Ln(1βBMβprice-Offerβ ngUnderpriciβ
LnSizeβrUnderwriteβ VCβNBigβ EMβαFailure
ti,12ti,11ti,10
ti, 9ti,8ti, 7ti, 6
ti,5ti,4ti,3ti, 2ti, 10t,i



 
Where Failure it is a dummy variable equals 1 if the IPO firms delisted for negative 
reasons (performance failure) within five years after the IPO date and EM it are the 
different proxies for real and accrual earnings management. The definition of IPO 
failure is consistent with Li and Zhou (2006) and Demers and Joos (2007). 
Following prior research (e.g., Schultz, 1993; Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 
2000; Willenborg and McKeown, 2001; Weber and Willenborg, 2003; Jain and 
Martin, 2005; Li and Zhou, 2006; Charitou et al., 2007; Demers and Joos, 2007), a 
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number of control variables are added to the model that might affect the probability 
of failure namely; audit quality (Big N); venture capitalists (VC); underwriters 
(Underwriter); firm size (LnSize); IPO underpricing (Underpricing); the offer price 
(Offer_price); book-to-market ratio (BM); age [Ln(1+age)]; leverage ratio (Lev); 
profitability (ROA); and the absolute value of cash flows from operations 
[Abs(CFO)]114. Finally, dummies are added to the model to control for industry 
(IND) and year (Year) effect. All variables are previously defined. 
Table 7.7 reports the results for the analysis of whether real and accrual 
earnings management activities of IPO firms during the offer year are associated 
with the probability of IPO failure in the subsequent periods. The analysis focuses 
on IPO firms delisted for negative reasons (performance failure) within five years 
after the IPO date. The results show a positive coefficient of 0.478 (P <0.01) on The 
aggregate measure of real earnings management in Model 1, confirming that IPO 
firms with high levels of real earnings management during the IPO year have a 
higher probability of failure in the subsequent periods. Further, a positive coefficient 
is found of 0.833 (P<0.05) on Abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based 
manipulation) in Model 2. Again, this result suggests that IPO firms with high levels 
of sales-based manipulation during the IPO year have a higher probability of IPO 
failure in the subsequent periods.  
However, Table 7.7 shows no evidence that discretionary expenses-based 
manipulation is associated with IPO failure in the following periods. The coefficient 
on Abnormal discretionary expenses in Model 3 is not statistically significant. This 
result is consistent with the previous results in Table 7.5 that IPO firms in the UK do 
not exhibit evidence of discretionary expenses manipulation during the IPO year, 
and with the reported results of Tables 7.6 that IPO firms delisted for negative 
reasons do not exhibit evidence of abnormal discretionary expenses compared with 
survivor IPO firms. 
                                            
114 See Model 5.8 for more details about the relationships between the probability of failure and the 
control variables. 
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Further, Table 7.7 presents evidence that accrual-based manipulation is 
positively associated with IPO failure in the following years. The results report a 
positive coefficient of 1.115 (P<0.05) on Discretionary accruals (accrual-based 
manipulation) in Model 4. This result is consistent with Li and Zhou (2006) who 
find evidence that accruals manipulation during the IPO year is positively associated 
with IPO failure in the subsequent periods. Finally, Table 7.7 (Model 5) reports the 
results where all earnings management activities are included, namely the aggregate 
measure of real earnings management (a combination between sales-based and 
discretionary expenses-based manipulations) and discretionary accruals. Model 5 
provides evidence that real earnings management activities are considered as 
significant determinants of IPO failure after controlling for the impact of accruals 
manipulation.  
In summary, the reported results in Table 7.7 support the hypothesis that IPO 
firms with high levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year 
have a higher probability of failure (delisted for negative reasons) in the following 
years.115 
 
                                            
115  For robustness test the analysis also is repeated by controlling for high-tech industries [as 
suggested by Demers and Joos (2007)] and the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
this chapter.  
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Table 7.7 Logistic regression estimation: prediction failure within five years of IPO 
VARIABLES 
Model 1 
Logit 
Regression  
Model 2 
Logit 
Regression 
Model 3 
Logit 
Regression 
Model 4 
 Logit 
Regression 
Model 5 
 Logit 
Regression 
Failure=1 Failure=1 Failure=1 Failure=1 Failure=1 
The aggregate measure of real 
earnings management  
0.478    0.392 
(2.747)***    (2.059)** 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations 
 0.833    
 (2.373)**    
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
  0.164   
  (0.662)   
Discretionary accruals    
      1.115 0.699 
   (2.275)** (1.303) 
Big N -0.895 -0.970 -0.830 -0.939 -0.937 
 (-2.318)** (-2.530)** (-2.190)** (-2.449)** (-2.414)** 
VC -0.333 -0.418 -0.368 -0.391 -0.340 
 (-0.795) (-0.999) (-0.883) (-0.937) (-0.809) 
Underwriter 0.502 0.436 0.469 0.444 0.486 
 (1.182) (1.038) (1.118) (1.051) (1.142) 
LnSize 0.057 -0.025 0.007 -0.039 0.039 
 (0.274) (-0.121) (0.034) (-0.193) (0.186) 
Underpricing 0.003 0.056 0.095 0.001 -0.041 
 (0.006) (0.129) (0.221) (0.002) (-0.091) 
Offer-price -0.361 -0.336 -0.375 -0.362 -0.364 
 (-1.069) (-0.976) (-1.099) (-1.042) (-1.062) 
BM 0.900 0.982 0.910 0.995 0.964 
 (1.849)* (2.012)** (1.873)* (2.025)** (1.956)* 
Ln(1+ age) 0.032 -0.034 -0.033 -0.044 0.022 
 (0.177) (-0.190) (-0.190) (-0.250) (0.119) 
Lev 0.426 0.482 0.408 0.427 0.436 
 (1.907)* (2.156)** (1.853)* (1.936)* (1.957)* 
ROA 0.031 0.052 -0.004 0.013 0.035 
 (0.604) (0.941) (-0.079) (0.255) (0.647) 
Abs(CFO) -0.027 -0.025 -0.026 -0.023 -0.026 
 (-0.683) (-0.621) (-0.665) (-0.581) (-0.649) 
Constant -18.56 -18.316 -17.087 -18.519 -18.546 
 
(-0.016) (-0.017) (-0.030) (-0.015) (-0.017) 
Year and industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Failure within five years  60 60 60 60 60 
N Total observations 567 567 567 567 567 
Log likelihood -159.21649 -160.24011 -163.09245 -160.48576 -158.33157 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1684 0.1631 0.1482 0.1618 0.1731 
chi2 64.50 62.46 56.75 61.96 66.27 
Prob > chi2 0.0012 0.0021 0.0085 0.0024 0.0011 
*, **, *** Denote two tailed tests significantly different at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Table 7.7 reports the results of Logistic regression estimates. The dependent variable (Failure) is a 
dummy variable equals to 1 if the IPO firms delisted for negative reasons within 5 years after the IPO date and 0 
otherwise. Where [Abs(CFO)] is the absolute value of cash flows from operations. All other variables are 
previously defined.  
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7.4.5 Real and Accrual Earnings Management and IPO Survival Rates   
7.4.5.1 Results of Kaplan-Meier Estimator Analysis  
In order to investigate the impact of earnings manipulation on the survivability of 
IPO firms, the survival function curve of Kaplan-Meier is constructed for IPOs 
sample based on the level of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO 
year. Specifically, IPOs sample is divided into two groups (conservative and 
aggressive) based on the level of real and accrual earnings management during the 
IPO year. The conservative group represents IPO firms with a negative earnings 
management during the IPO year (the level of earnings management is less than 
zero), while the aggressive group represents IPO firms with a positive earnings 
management (the level of earnings management is greater than zero). Therefore, it is 
expected that the survival function curve for the conservative group to be above the 
survival function curve for the aggressive group, implying that IPO firms with lower 
levels of earnings management during the IPO have higher survival rates in the 
subsequent periods.  
Figure 7.2 depicts survival functions for the IPO sample based on the level of 
the aggregate measure of real earnings management during the IPO year. As 
predicted, the survival function curve for conservative IPO firms is above the 
survival function curve for the aggressive group, indicating that IPO firms with the 
lower levels of real earnings management during the IPO year survive longer than 
other IPO firms in the following periods. Table 7.8 (Panel A) reports the test of 
equality across strata (the Log Likelihood Test) and shows that the survival function 
for the conservative group is significantly different from that of the aggressive group.  
Figure 7.3 depicts survival functions for the IPO sample based on the level of 
abnormal cash flows from operations during the IPO year. Figure 7.3 shows similar 
evidence to Figure 7.2 that IPO firms with lower levels of abnormal cash flows from 
operations during the IPO year experience higher survival rates. Specifically, the 
survival function curve for the conservative group is above the survival function 
curve for the aggressive group. Table 7.8 (Panel B) reports the test of equality across 
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IPO groups and presents evidence that the survival function for the conservative 
group is significantly different from that of the aggressive group.  
The survival function curves for the IPO sample based on the level of 
abnormal discretionary expenses during the IPO year are depicted in Figure 7.4. 
Specifically, the survival function curves for the conservative and aggressive groups 
overlap, indicating that discretionary expenses manipulation is not a significant 
determinant of IPO survivability. In addition, the log likelihood test in Table 7.8 
(Panel C) indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
survival function curves for the two groups. This result is consistent with the 
previous reported results in Table 7.5 that IPO firms in the UK do not exhibit 
evidence of discretionary expenses manipulation during the IPO year and, therefore, 
there is no expectation of observing an impact of discretionary expenses 
manipulation on post-IPO survivability. Also, this result confirms the results of the 
Logistic regression in Table 7.7 that discretionary expenses manipulation is not 
associated with the probability of IPO failure in the following periods. 
Figure 7.5 depicts the survival functions for IPOs sample based on the level 
of discretionary accruals during the IPO. Consistent with the evidence in Figures 7.2 
and 7.3, the survival function curve for the conservative group is found to be above 
the survival function curve for the aggressive group. This result indicates that IPO 
firms with lower level of accruals manipulation during the IPO year experience 
significantly higher survival rates than other IPO firms in the following periods. The 
test of equality across these groups is presented in Table 7.8 (Panel D), providing 
evidence that the survival function for the conservative group is significantly 
different from that of the aggressive group. Thus, IPO firms that engage in a lower 
level of accruals manipulation during the IPO year experience higher survival rates 
in the post-IPO period.  
In summary, the above results provide preliminary evidence that both real 
and accrual earnings management that take place during the IPO year are negatively 
associated with the survivability of IPO firms in the post-IPO period. The results 
show that IPO firms with lower levels of the aggregate measure of real earnings 
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management, abnormal cash flows from operations and discretionary accruals 
during the IPO year survive longer than other IPO firms in the following periods 
Table 7.8 Non-parametric analysis of IPO firms survivability  
*, **, *** Denote significantly different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 7.8 reports the results of the log rank test across the conservative and aggressive IPO groups based on their 
level of real and accrual earnings management (REM_Index, ABNCFO, ABNDEXP, and DISACCR) during the 
IPO year. Where (REM_Index < 0) represents the conservative IPOs group which their level of the aggregate 
measure of real earnings management during the IPO year is less than zero, (REM_Index >0) represent the 
aggressive IPOs group which their level of the aggregate measure of real earnings management during the IPO 
year is greater than zero, (ABNCFO < 0) represents the conservative IPOs group which their level of abnormal 
cash flows from operations during the IPO year is less than zero, (ABNCFO > 0) represents the aggressive IPOs 
group which their level of abnormal cash flows from operations during the IPO year is greater than zero, 
(ABNDEXP < 0) represents the conservative IPOs group which their level of abnormal discretionary expenses 
during the IPO year is less than zero, (ABNDEXP > 0) represents the aggressive IPOs group which their level of 
abnormal discretionary expenses during the IPO year is greater than zero, (DISACCR < 0) represents the 
conservative IPOs group which their level of discretionary accruals during the IPO year is less than zero, 
(DISACCR > 0) represents the aggressive IPOs group which their level of discretionary accruals during the IPO 
year is greater than zero. All other variables are previously defined. 
 Number of firms  
Number  of survivors 
(Survival rate) 
Log rank 
test  
 
Panel A: The aggregate measure of real earnings management (REM_Index) 
 
REM_Index < 0 (conservative IPOs) 227 147 
(64.75%) 
9.06***  
(0.0026) 
REM_Index > 0  (aggressive IPOs ) 343 164 
(47.81%)  
 
Panel B: Abnormal cash flows from operations (ABNCFO) 
ABNCFO < 0    (conservative IPOs) 251 118 
(47.01%) 
3.50* 
(0.0615) 
ABNCFO > 0   (aggressive IPOs ) 319 135 
(42.31%)  
 
Panel C: Abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNDEXP) 
ABNDEXP < 0 (conservative IPOs) 268 121 
(45.14%) 
0.74 
(0.3906) 
ABNDEXP > 0  (aggressive IPOs ) 302 132 
(43.70%)  
 
Panel D: Discretionary accruals (DISACCR) 
DISACCR < 0  (conservative IPOs) 255 124 
(48.62%) 
5.78** 
(0.0162) 
DISACCR > 0  (aggressive IPOs ) 315 129 
(40.95%)  
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Figure 7.2 Survival function by the aggregate real earnings management (REM_Index) 
 
Figure 7.2 depicts the survival functions for the IPO sample based on the level of the aggregate measure of real 
earnings management during the IPO year. Where (REM_Index < 0) represents the conservative IPOs group 
which their level of the aggregate measure of real earnings management during the IPO year is less than zero, 
(REM_Index > 0) represent the aggressive IPOs group which their level of the aggregate measure of real 
earnings management during the IPO year is greater than zero. All other variables are previously defined. 
 
Figure 7.3 Survival function by the abnormal cash flows from operations (ABNCFO) 
 
Figure 7.3 depicts the survival functions for the IPO sample based on the level of abnormal cash flows from 
operations during the IPO year. Where (ABNCFO < 0) represents the conservative IPOs group which their level 
of abnormal cash flows from operations during the IPO year is less than zero, (ABNCFO > 0) represents the 
aggressive IPOs group which their level of abnormal cash flows from operations during the IPO year is greater 
than zero. All other variables are previously defined. 
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Figure 7.4 Survival function by the abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNDEXP) 
 
Figure 7.4 depicts the survival functions for the IPO sample based on the level of abnormal discretionary 
expenses during the IPO year. Where (ABNDEXP < 0) represents the conservative IPOs group which their level 
of abnormal discretionary expenses during the IPO year is less than zero, (ABNDEXP > 0) represents the 
aggressive IPOs group which their level of abnormal discretionary expenses during the IPO year is greater than 
zero. All other variables are previously defined. 
 
Figure 7.5 Survival function by discretionary accruals (DISACCR) 
 
Figure 7.5 depicts the survival functions for the IPO sample based on the level of discretionary accruals during 
the IPO year. Where (DISACCR < 0) represents the conservative IPOs group which their level of discretionary 
accruals during the IPO year is less than zero, (DISACCR > 0) represents the aggressive IPOs group which their 
level of discretionary accruals during the IPO year is greater than zero. All other variables are previously defined.
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7.4.5.2 Results of Cox Proportional Hazards Model  
The results of the estimation of Cox proportional hazard model are presented in 
Table 7.9 where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the hazard rate, which is 
based on the delisting event. Thus, a positive (negative) coefficient implies that an 
increase in the independent variable leads to an increase (decrease) in the probability 
of delisting in the subsequent periods (Carpentier and Suret, 2011). Further, and 
since the survival analysis is dealing with censored data, this chapter follows prior 
research (Li and Zhou, 2006; Demers and Joos, 2007) by considering IPO firms as 
“right censored” if they have not delisted yet (still trading on the stock exchange) by 
the end of December 2011 or if they have delisted for any reasons other than 
negative reasons. In other words, non-survivor IPO firms are defined as those IPO 
firms who delisted from the stock exchanges just for negative reasons over the 
period 1998-2011. 
The hazard ratio for each variable is reported and computed as the 
exponentiated coefficient for each variable. For a dichotomous variable, the risk 
ratio is the ratio of the estimated hazard for firms with “1” to the estimated hazard 
ratio for firms with “0” (Jain and Martin, 2005; Carpentier and Suret, 2011). While 
the interpretation of the hazard ratio for a continuous variable is that (hazard ratio –
1)*100 represents the percentage of changes in hazard for each unit increase in the 
variable (Allison, 1995; Jain and Martin, 2005). Following prior research (e.g., 
Teachman 1983; LeClere, 2000, Jain and Martin, 2005),  risk ratios greater than 1, 
equal 1, and less than 1 are interpreted as follows: rapid time to failure, no impact on 
failure and slower time to failure, respectively. 
Table 7.9 (Model 1) reports the results based on the aggregate level of real 
earnings management. The results show a positive coefficient of 0.710 (P<0.01) on 
REM_Index, implying that IPO firms with high levels of the aggregate measure of 
real earnings management during the IPO year have lower survival rates in the 
following periods. This result is consistent with the previous evidence from the non-
parametric analysis (Figure 7.2) that IPO firms with high levels of real earnings 
management (the aggregate measure) during the IPO year survive for a shorter time 
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than other IPO firms. The risk ratio (2.034) suggests that the failure risk of IPO 
firms with high levels of aggregate real earnings management (REM_Index > 0) is 
203% of the failure risk of IPO firms with low levels of aggregate real earnings 
management (REM_Index < 0). 
Table 7.9 (Model 2) presents the results based on the level of abnormal cash 
flows from operations during the IPO year and shows similar evidence to the result 
reported in Model 1. Specifically, a positive coefficient is found of 0.606 (P<0.05) 
on ABNCFO, indicating that the IPO firms with higher levels of abnormal cash 
flows from operations during the IPO year survive for a shorter period. The risk 
ratio (1.832) suggests that the failure risk of IPO firms with high levels of abnormal 
cash flows from operations (ABNCFO > 0) is 183% of the failure risk of IPO firms 
with low levels of abnormal cash flows from operations (ABNCFO < 0). Taken 
together, these results are consistent with the earlier non-parametric analysis (Figure 
7.3) that the higher the levels of abnormal cash flows from operations during the 
IPO year the higher the probability of failure (shorter time to survive).  
The results based on the level of discretionary expenses-based manipulation 
are reported in Table 7.9 (Model 3). The results show a positive coefficient of 0.041 
on ABNDEXP, but it is statistically insignificant. This evidence confirms the 
analysis in Figure 7.4 that discretionary expenses-based manipulation is not 
associated with IPO survivability. In addition, this evidence is consistent with the 
reported results in Table 7.5 that IPO firms exhibit no evidence of discretionary 
expenses-based manipulation during the IPO year, and with the results of Table 7.7 
that discretionary expenses-based manipulation is not associated with the probability 
of IPO failure. 
Finally, Table 7.9 (Model 4) presents the results based on the level of 
accrual-based manipulation during the IPO year. A positive coefficient is reported of 
0.687 (P<0.01) on DISACCR, suggesting that IPO firms with higher levels of 
accruals manipulation during the IPO year experience lower survival rates in the 
following periods. The risk ratio (1.989) indicates that the failure risk of IPO firms 
with high levels of accrual-based manipulation (DISACCR > 0) is approximately 
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199% of the failure risk of IPO firms with low levels of accrual-based manipulation 
(DISACCR < 0). Further, these results are consistent with the non-parametric 
analysis (Figure 7.5) that IPO firms with high levels of accrual-based manipulation 
during the IPO year experience lower survival rates in the following period.
In summary, the reported results in Table 7.9 (Models 1, 2, 3, and 4) confirm 
the hypothesis that IPO firms which engage in higher levels of real and accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year are expected to have lower survival rates 
in the subsequent periods. Further, the reported results of Cox model in Table 7.9 
are consistent with the earlier reported results of the Logit model in Table 7.7. 116 
                                            
116 Table 7.9 (Model 5) reports the results where all real and accrual earnings management activities 
are included and shows similar evidence that earnings management is a significant determinant of 
IPO survivability. Specifically, Model 5 includes the aggregate measure of real earnings management 
(a combination of sales-based and discretionary expenses-based manipulation) and discretionary 
accruals.  
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*, **, *** Denote significantly different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. P-value appears 
between parentheses and hazard ratio appears between brackets. Table 7.9 reports the results for Cox proportional hazard models. 
Model 1, 2, 3, and 4 report the results where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the hazard rate, which is based on the delisting 
event. Where (REM_Index) is a dummy variable equalling to 1 if the level of the aggregate measure of real earnings management 
during the IPO year for an IPO firm is greater than zero (positive) and 0 otherwise, (ABNCFO) is a dummy variable equalling to 1 if 
the level of the abnormal cash flows from operations during the IPO year for an IPO firm is greater than zero and 0 otherwise, 
(ABNDEXP) is a dummy variable equalling to 1 if the level of the abnormal discretionary expenses during the IPO year for an IPO 
firm is greater than zero and 0 otherwise, and (DISACCR) is a dummy variable equalling to 1 if the level of the discretionary accruals 
during the IPO year for an IPO firm is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. The time to failure is measured as the number of months 
elapsed between the IPO month and the month in which the firm is delisted from the stock exchanges for negative reasons. The hazard 
ratio (HR) is calculated as the exponential of the estimated coefficient, exp (β). All other variables are previously defined. 
Table 7.9 Coefficient estimates from multivariate Cox Hazard models, time to failure.                                                                                                        
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  
 
(P-value) [HR] (P-value) [HR] (P-value) [HR] (P-value) [HR] (P-value) [HR] 
REM_Index  0.710***       0.571** 
(0.006) [2.034]       (0.032) [1.770] 
ABNCFO   0.606**        
  (0.020) [1.832]       
ABNDEXP     0.041      
   (0.868) [1.042]     
DISACCR        0.687*** 0.542**  
      (0.006) [1.989] (0.038 )  [1.720] 
Big N -0.577** -0.572** -0.535* -0.585** -0.598** 
(0.039) [0.562] (0.038) [0.564] (0.051) [0.585] (0.033) [0.557] (0.031) [0.550] 
VC 0.186  0.242  0.205  0.243  0.221  
(0.509) [1.204] (0.390) [1.274] (0.466) [1.227] (0.386) [1.275] (0.432) [1.247] 
Underwriter  0.212  0.189  0.175  0.205  0.239  
(0.528) [1.236] (0.568) [1.208] (0.600) [1.192] (0.538) [1.228] (0.476) [1.269] 
LnSize 0.034  -0.089  -0.011  -0.069  -0.017  
(0.821) [1.034] (0.560) [0.915] (0.940) [0.989] (0.651) [0.934] (0.913) [0.984] 
Underpricing -0.160  -0.102  -0.133  -0.094  -0.127  
(0.673) [0.852] (0.788) [0.903] (0.730) [0.875] (0.802) [0.910] (0.732) [0.881] 
Offer-price -0.302  -0.195  -0.256  -0.253  -0.288  
(0.204) [0.739] (0.408) [0.823] (0.282) [0.775] (0.292) [0.776] (0.229) [0.750] 
BM 0.587  0.681*  0.709*  0.579  0.502  
(0.138) [1.799] (0.073) [1.975] (0.071) [2.033] (0.140) [1.784] (0.209) [1.652] 
Ln(1+age) 0.077  0.033  0.036  0.032  0.071  
(0.551) [1.081] (0.803) [1.033] (0.779) [1.037] (0.803) [1.033] (0.586) [1.074] 
Lev 0.263  0.295*  0.270*  0.266*  0.263  
(0.105) [1.301] (0.064) [1.343] (0.090) [1.309] (0.090) [1.305] (0.101) [1.301] 
ROA -0.028  -0.011  -0.030  -0.024  -0.025  
(0.421) [0.973] (0.763) [0.990] (0.377) [0.970] (0.478) [0.976] (0.482) [0.976] 
Abs(CFO) -0.026  -0.021  -0.026  -0.017  -0.020  
(0.264) [0.974] (0.339) [0.979] (0.264) [0.974] (0.389) [0.983] (0.343)    [0.981] 
Industry Dm Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dm Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Chi-square   65.7  63.03  57.46  65.25  70.11  
Chi-square test 
Prob             
0.0006  0.0013  0.0052  0.0007 
 
0.0003  
N 567  567  567  567  567  
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7.5 Additional Analysis  
7.5.1 A Broad Definition of IPO Failure   
In the previous survival analysis, the IPO firms are considered as “right censored” if 
they have not delisted yet (still trading on the stock exchange) by the end of 
December 2011 or if they have delisted for any reasons other than negative reasons. 
For robustness this chapter also re-estimate Cox model where IPO firms are 
considered as “right censored” if they have not delisted yet from the stock exchange 
(still trading on the stock exchange). In other words, non-survivor IPO firms are 
defined as those IPO firms who delisted from the stock exchanges for negative 
reasons, mergers and acquisition, at the request of the company, and any other 
delisted reasons over the period from January 1998 to December 2011.  
Table I in Appendix C reports the results and shows qualitatively similar 
results to those reported in Table 7.10. Overall, these results confirm that IPO firms 
with high levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year 
survive shorter time than other firms. Further, these results confirm the recent 
literature (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012) on the negative impact of 
real and accrual earnings management for future performance. 
7.5.2 Post-IPO Stock Performance Sorted by Listing Status and Real 
and Accrual Earnings Management 
This chapter also examines whether real and accrual earnings management during 
the IPO year are associated with post-IPO stock return underperformance and 
whether these relationships are affected by the listing status. IPO firms that are 
delisted for negative reasons are expected to experience the most severe post-IPO 
stock returns underperformance due to the higher levels of real and accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year. Thus, IPOs sample is divided into four sub-
samples based on the listing status; namely IPOs delisted for negative reasons 
(within five years post-IPO), IPOs delisted for mergers and acquisitions (within five 
years post-IPO), IPOs delisted at the request of the company (within five years post-
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IPO) and survivor IPO firms. Then, each sub-sample is divided into four quartiles 
(Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) based on the level of real and accrual earnings management 
during the IPO and the mean 3-years buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) is 
calculated for each quartile. Q1 represents the most conservative quartile (IPO firms 
with the lowest level of earnings management during the IPO year) and Q4 the most 
aggressive quartile (IPO firms with highest level of earnings management during the 
IPO year). 
The BHAR is computed as the difference between the return for IPO firms 
and matched non-IPO firms starting 4 months after the date of the IPO to 3 years 
after the date of the IPO.117 Also, a matched sample is created from all UK non-IPO 
firms following Lyon et al. (1999). A firm is included in the matched sample if its 
market capitalization is between 70% and 130% of the IPO firms’ market value; 
then it will be matched with the closest book-to-market ratio to the IPO firms.118 
Following prior research (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a) if the IPO firm is delisted prior to 
the IPO returns’ ending date the returns of the IPO firm and its matched firm are set 
to zero, while if the matched firm is delisted prior to the ending date it is replaced, 
on a point-forward basis, with another matched firm to avoid survivorship bias in the 
matched sample. The mean BHAR is calculated as follows 
(7.10)





 

T
1t
benchmark
T
1t
t,i
N
1i
T )R(1  ) R(1
N
1
 BHAR t,
 
Where Ri,t is the monthly return for firm i in month t and Rbenchmark,t  is the monthly 
return for the benchmark in month t.    
                                            
117 To allow for a reporting lag and following Teoh et al. (1998a), the buy and hold returns are 
calculated starting from month 4. 
118 The matching approach is consistent with Kothari et al. (2012) who match on post-issuance 
characteristics rather than pre-issuance. Kothari et al. (2012) indicate that equity offerings may 
change the risk characteristics of the firms and, therefore, matching on post-issuance reduces the 
complications of these changes. 
. 
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Table II in Appendix C reports post-IPO 3-year abnormal returns measured 
using BHAR for IPO firms relative to the listing status and the level of real and 
accrual earnings management during the IPO year. Table II (Panel A) reports the 
results for IPO firms delisted for negative reasons and shows that long-run stock 
return underperformance occurs for the quartile with the highest level of earnings 
manipulation across all earnings management proxies. For example, considering the 
aggregate measure of real earnings management, the BHAR is -6.4% for the 
conservative quartile (Q1) and -59.7% for the most aggressive quartile (Q4). Similar 
results are reported for abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal 
discretionary expenses. In addition, the underperformance as measured by the mean 
3-year BHAR for the discretionary accruals quartiles ranges from -31.3% for the 
conservative quartile (Q1) to -85.1% and -35.7% for quartiles three (Q3) and four 
(Q4), respectively. Taken together, these results indicate that IPO firms delisted for 
negative reasons experience post-IPO stock return underperformance due to the 
higher levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year.  
Table II (Panel B) reports the results for IPO firms delisted for being taken 
over and shows evidence that these delisted IPOs experience a greater decline in 
post-IPO stock return performance due to the higher level of real earnings 
management during the IPO year. For example, Panel B shows that the BHAR for 
the aggressive quartile of the aggregate measure of real earnings management is (-
58%) and for the aggressive quartile of abnormal discretionary expenses is (-35.1%). 
However, the results show no evidence that abnormal cash flows from operations 
and discretionary accruals are associated with post-IPO stock return performance.  
Table II (Panel C) reports the results for IPO firms delisted at the request of 
the company and provides evidence that IPO firms in quartile three (Q3) of the 
aggregate measure of real earnings management, abnormal cash flows from 
operations, and discretionary accruals experience the most post-IPO stock return 
underperformance. Finally, Table II (Panel D) reports the results for survivor IPO 
firms and shows evidence that IPO firms in the aggressive quartiles of the aggregate 
measure of real earnings management, abnormal cash flows from operations, and 
discretionary accruals experience the most post-IPO stock return underperformance. 
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These results confirm our previous results that real and accrual earnings 
management have negative consequences for subsequent performance. 
In summary, the results of Table II in Appendix C confirm the expectations 
that IPO firms delisted for negative reasons experience the most severe decline in 
post-IPO stock return performance due to the higher levels of real and accrual 
earnings management that take place during the IPO year.
119
  Further, these results 
confirm the evidence of this chapter that IPO firms with higher levels of real and 
accrual earnings management during the IPO year experience a higher probability of 
failure and lower survival rates in the subsequent periods. 
7.5.3 Delisted IPOs for being Taken Over and Earnings Management  
One observation about the survival analysis is that IPO firms who are delisted for 
being taken over may exhibit higher quality than other delisted firms and, therefore, 
they should be considered as survivor rather than delisted IPOs. For robustness this 
chapter repeats the survival analysis by considering IPOs delisted for takeover as 
survivors.   
Table III in Appendix C presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics 
of IPOs delisted for being taken over and survivor IPO firms over the period from 
1998 to 2008. Table III shows that IPO firms delisted for being taken over have 
lower levels of aggregate real earnings management and stock return performance 
(post-IPO three-year buy-and-hold-abnormal return [BHAR]), and a higher market 
capitalization compared with survivor IPOs. Further, Table III shows that the 
percentage of IPO firms delisted for being taken over that are audited by big N audit 
firms is higher than the percentage of survivor IPO firms, while for other 
characteristics there is no a statistically significant difference, suggesting that IPO 
firms delisted for being taken over exhibit similar characteristics to survivor IPOs.  
                                            
119 It is worth noting for IPO firms delisted for negative reasons that 13.34% are delisted after the 
first anniversary of their IPO date, 25% are delisted after the second anniversary of their IPO date, 
and 61.66% are delisted after the third anniversary of their IPO date. 
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Thus, the survival analysis (Model 7.8) is repeated where all IPOs delisted 
for being taken over are considered as survivors. Specifically, the IPO firms are 
considered as “right censored” if they have not delisted yet (still trading on the stock 
exchange) by the end of December 2011 or if they have delisted for being taken over, 
while non-survivor IPO firms are defined as those IPO firms who delisted from the 
stock exchanges for negative reasons over the period from January 1998 to 
December 2011. Table IV in Appendix C reports the results and shows qualitatively 
similar results to the main analysis that is reported in Table 7.10. This in turn 
suggests that considering IPOs delisted for being taken over as survivor IPOs has no 
impact on the main analysis of this chapter.120    
7.6 Conclusions  
This chapter examines whether IPO firms manage real and accrual earnings 
management activities during the IPO year and whether these activities are 
associated with the probability of IPO failure in subsequent periods. Although 
limited research has examined the association between accrual earnings 
management and IPO failure risks (e.g., Li and Zhou, 2006), this chapter progresses 
the literature on earnings management by examining whether real earnings 
management activities during the IPO year are associated with IPO failure risks in 
the subsequent periods. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2012) find 
that real earnings management activities have severe negative consequences for 
subsequent operating and stock return performance, with even greater consequences 
than accruals manipulation. 
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing the following evidence. 
First, this chapter presents evidence that IPO firms delisted for negative reasons 
have higher levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year 
than surviving firms. Second, this chapter provides evidence that both real and 
                                            
120 Also, the analysis is repeated by considering IPOs delisted for being taken over as non-survivors 
and the results are qualitatively similar. Specifically, non-survivor IPOs are defined as those IPO 
firms who delisted from the stock exchanges for being taken over or negative reasons over the period 
from January 1998 to December 2011, while survivor IPOs represent IPO firms that have not delisted 
yet (still trading on the stock exchange) by the end of December 2011. 
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accrual earnings management during the IPO year are positively associated with 
post-IPO failure. Specifically, IPO firms with high levels of real and accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year have a higher probability of delisting 
from the stock exchanges for negative reasons in the subsequent periods. Further, 
this chapter presents evidence that IPO firms with higher levels of real and accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year have a lower survival rate in the 
subsequent periods.  
Overall, the evidence of this chapter contributes to the earnings management 
literature by showing that real and accrual earnings management are significant 
determinants of IPO failure risks. Further, the evidence confirms the recent 
accounting literature that real and accrual earnings management have a negative 
impact on the performance of firms (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a; Fan, 2007; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012). 
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Appendix C 
Appendix C Table I Coefficient estimates from multivariate Cox hazard models, time 
to failure  
*, **, *** Denote significantly different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
P-value appears between parentheses and Hazard ratio appears between brackets. Table I reports the results for Cox 
proportional hazard models. Model 1, 2, 3, and 4 report the results where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the 
hazard rate, which is based on the delisting event. All other variables are previously defined. The time to failure is measured 
as the number of months elapsed between the IPO month and the month in which the firm is delisted from the stock 
exchanges for negative reasons, mergers and acquisitions, at the request of the company, and any other delisted reasons. The 
hazard ratio (HR) is calculated as the exponential of the estimated coefficient, exp (β).  
 
Model 1 
[HR] 
Model 2 
[HR] 
Model 3 
[HR] 
Model 4 
[HR] 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
  (P-value)     (P-value) (P-value) (P-value) 
REM_Index  0.189       
(0.125) [1.208]       
ABNCFO   0.258**     
  (0.046) [1.294]     
ABNDEXP     -0.024    
    (0.845) [0.976]   
DISACCR        0.308**  
      (0.014) [1.361] 
Big N 0.078  0.063  0.069  0.064  
(0.577) [1.081] (0.651) [1.065] (0.622) [1.071] (0.644) [1.066] 
VC 0.189  0.205  0.182  0.201  
(0.195) [1.208] (0.160) [1.228] (0.213) [1.199] (0.167) [1.223] 
Underwriter  0.075  0.079  0.07  0.069  
(0.632) [1.078] (0.614) [1.082] (0.658) [1.072] (0.658) [1.072] 
LnSize 0.045  0.017  0.037  0.034  
(0.543) [1.046] (0.816) [1.017] (0.613) [1.038] (0.649) [1.034] 
Underpricing -0.143  -0.133  -0.146  -0.139  
(0.469) [0.866] (0.502) [0.876] (0.464) [0.864] (0.482) [0.870] 
Offer-price -0.131  -0.114  -0.121  -0.128  
(0.180) [0.877] (0.241) [0.892] (0.216) [0.886] (0.193) [0.880] 
BM 0.15  0.175  0.196  0.094  
(0.515) [1.162] (0.443) [1.191] (0.395) [1.217] (0.686) [1.098] 
Ln(1+age) -0.029  -0.035  -0.041  -0.029  
(0.679) [0.971] (0.613) [0.965] (0.555) [0.960] (0.680) [0.972] 
Lev 0.008  0.023  0.016  0.007  
(0.939) [1.008] (0.830) [1.023] (0.876) [1.017] (0.944) [1.007] 
ROA 0.017  0.024  0.017  0.021  
(0.437) [1.017] (0.280) [1.024] (0.447) [1.017] (0.344) [1.021] 
Abs(CFO) -0.007  -0.006  -0.007  -0.005  
(0.134) [0.993] (0.216) [0.994] (0.128) [0.993] (0.248) [0.995] 
Industry  Dm Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dm Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Chi-square 48.77  50.40  46.43  52.5  
Chi-square test 
Prob 
0.0484  0.0348  0.0758  0.0223 
 
N 567  567  567  567  
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Appendix C Table II Post-IPO 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns for IPO firms 
sorted by the listing status and the level of real and accrual earnings management 
during the offer year. 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Panel A: Mean 3-year BHAR: IPO firms delisted for negative reasons within 5 years post IPO  (n=60) 
Aggregate real earnings 
management 
-0.064 -0.535 -0.795 -0.597 
(-0.369) (-3.220)*** (-5.160)*** (-2.997)*** 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations  
-0.288 -0.418 -0.547 -0.738 
(-0.115) (-1.865)* (-5.013)*** (-3.569)*** 
Abnormal discretionary expenses 
  
-0.081 -0.662 -0.793 -0.454 
(-0.464) (-5.254)*** (-3.454)*** (-3.049)*** 
Discretionary accruals -0.313 -0.471 -0.851   -0.357 
(-2.291)** (-1.958)* (-5.317)*** (0.048)** 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Panel B: Mean 3-year BHAR: IPO firms delisted for being taken over within 5 years post IPO (n=72) 
Aggregate real earnings 
management 
0.166 -0.392 -0.098 -0.580 
(0.545) (-1.713) (-0.377) (-3.671)*** 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations  
0.021 -0.238 -0.376 -0.311 
(0.066) (-1.075) (-1.678) (-1.409) 
Abnormal discretionary expenses 
  
0.032 -0.306 -0.278 -0.351 
(0.135) (-0.939) (-1.230) (-1.811)* 
Discretionary accruals -0.218 -0.320 -0.063 -0.303 
(-0.669) (-1.386) (-0.257)   (-1.611) 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Panel C: Mean 3-year BHAR: IPO firms delisted at the request of the company within 5 years post IPO   
(n=51) 
Aggregate real earnings 
management 
-0.421 -0.012 -0.364 -0.392 
(-1.642) (-0.071) (-2.520)** (-0.933) 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations 
0.005 -0.181 -0.391 -0.641 
(0.025) (-1.230) (-1.910)* (-1.552) 
Abnormal discretionary expenses 
  
-0.381 -0.675 0.036 -0.151 
(-2.067)* (-2.019)* (0.124) (-1.036) 
Discretionary accruals 0.074 -0.294 -0.263 -0.732 
(0.326) (-1.587) (-2.176)* (-1.761) 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Panel D: Mean 3-year BHAR: Survivor IPO firms (n=253) 
Aggregate real earnings 
management 
0.230 0.088 -0.029 -0.211 
(1.840)* (0.734) (-0.200) (-2.079)** 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations  
0.107 0.084 0.128 -0.241 
(1.065) (0.659) (0.827) (-2.322)** 
Abnormal discretionary expenses 
  
0.015 -0.035 0.053 0.049 
(0.145) (-0.221)  (0.378) (0.574) 
Discretionary accruals 0.020 0.265 0.116 -0.320 
(0.174) (2.139)** (0.850) (-2.840)*** 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Table II reports the 
mean 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns for IPOs delisted (within 5 years post IPO) for negative reasons, 
being taken over, at the request of the company, and survivor IPO firms by level of earnings management during 
the IPO year. IPOs in each sample are divided into four quartiles relative to the level of real and accrual earnings 
management that occurred in the IPO year. The mean 3-year abnormal returns are then calculated for each 
quartile using BHAR. The holding period is 4 to 40 months after the IPO year. Q1 represents the most 
conservative quartile (IPO firms with the lowest level of earnings management) and Q4 the most aggressive 
(IPO firms with highest level of earnings management). The mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated as 
follows: 

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Where Rt is monthly return for IPO firms in month t and Rbenchmark is the monthly return for the matched firms in 
month t. All other variables are previously defined. 
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Appendix C Table III Descriptive statistics for IPOs delisted for takeover and survivor 
IPOs during 1998-2008 
 
 Delisted for 
takeover 
Survivors 
 
Takeover - Survivors 
Differences 
 VARIABLES 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
t-statistics 
(z-statistics) 
Aggregate real earnings 
management 
-0.297 -0.037 -1.790* 
(-0.076) (-0.006) (-1.480) 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations 
-0.009 0.034 -0.666 
-0.027 (0.014) (-0.009) 
Abnormal discretionary expenses -0.086 0.019 -1.440 
(-0.027) (0.012) (-1.353) 
Discretionary accruals -0.029 0.019 -1.094 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.656) 
Market value 94.324   140.800 -1.100 
 (35.719) (26.120)     (2.131)** 
 Age 3.777 3.990 -0.210 
 (0.936) (1.307) (-0.292) 
Offer-price 1.363 1.145 1.201 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.348) 
Underpricing 0.155 0.150 0.060 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.048) 
Underwriter 0.236 0.174 1.192 
 - - - 
VC 0.292 0.209 1.468 
  - - - 
Big N 0.597 0.439  2.390** 
 - - - 
BHAR -0.226 0.021 -1.839* 
  (-0.176) (0.000) (-1.609) 
Cash flows 3.840 11.228   -1.254 
 (0.478) (0.040)  (1.520) 
Lev 0.243 0.371 -1.491 
 (0.090) (0.084)  (0.109) 
Chrm/CEO 0.069 0.071 -0.050 
  - - - 
BrdSize 6.000 5.822 0.796 
 (6.000) (6.000) (1.226) 
OutDirectors 0.460 0.455  0.205 
 (0.429) (0.500) (-0.492) 
N 72 253  
*, **, *** Denote significantly different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Differences in medians are tested using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and differences in means are tested using 
t-tests. Table III reports the difference in mean and median sample characteristics of IPO firms delisted for 
takeover (within 5 years post IPO) and survivor IPOs. All variables are previously defined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7. Real and Accrual Earnings Management and IPO Failure Risks  
 
 
257 
 
Appendix C Table IV Coefficient estimates from multivariate Cox hazard models, time 
to failure  
*, **, *** Denote significantly different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Z-statistic appears between parentheses and Hazard ratio appears between brackets. Table IV reports the results for Cox 
proportional hazard models. Model 1, 2, 3, and 4 report the results where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the 
hazard rate, which is based on the delisting event. All other variables are previously defined. IPO firms are considered as 
“right censored” if they have not delisted yet (still trading on the stock exchange) by the end of December 2011 or if they 
have delisted for being taken over, while the time to failure is measured as the number of months elapsed between the IPO 
month and the month in which the firm is delisted from the stock exchanges for negative reasons. The hazard ratio (HR) is 
calculated as the exponential of the estimated coefficient, exp (β).  
 
Model 1 
[HR] 
Model 2 
[HR] 
Model 3 
[HR] 
Model 4 
[HR] 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
  (Z-statistic)     (Z-statistic)     (Z-statistic)     (Z-statistic)     
REM_Index  0.656       
(2.546)** 1.927       
ABNCFO   0.605     
  (2.282)** [1.832]     
ABNDEXP     0.014    
    (0.057) [1.014]   
DISACCR           0.777  
      (3.056)*** [2.174] 
Big N -0.521  -0.500  -0.482  -0.526  
(-1.870)* [0.594] (-1.815)* [0.607] (-1.754)* [0.617] (-1.911)* [0.591] 
VC 0.223  0.310  0.238  0.315  
(0.780) [1.250] (1.075) [1.363] (0.834) [1.268] (1.099) [1.370] 
Underwriter  0.200  0.171  0.151  0.197  
(0.593) [1.222] (0.513) [1.187] (0.448) [1.162] (0.588) [1.218] 
LnSize 0.002  -0.111  -0.042  -0.094  
(0.013) [1.002] (-0.739) [0.895] (-0.282) [0.959] (-0.628) [0.910] 
Underpricing -0.293  -0.250  -0.296  -0.237  
(-0.739) [0.746] (-0.629) [0.779] (-0.731) [0.744] (-0.605) [0.789] 
Offer-price -0.372  -0.292  -0.335  -0.357  
(-1.528) [0.689] (-1.203) [0.747] (-1.381) [0.715] (-1.445) [0.700] 
BM 0.540  0.618  0.662  0.492  
(1.404) [1.716] (1.661)* [1.855] (1.727)* [1.938] (1.275) [1.635] 
Ln(1+age) 0.046  0.006  0.001  -0.003  
(0.355) [1.047] (0.043) [1.006] (0.006) [1.001] (-0.026) [0.997] 
Lev 0.274  0.344  0.292  0.305  
(1.615) [1.316] (2.039)** [1.410] (1.741)* [1.340] (1.865)* [1.357] 
ROA -0.016  -0.000  -0.018  -0.014  
(-0.478) [0.984] (-0.014) [1.000] (-0.529) [0.982] (-0.387) [0.987] 
Abs(CFO) -0.022  -0.018  -0.022  -0.013  
(-1.033) [0.978] (-0.872) [0.982] (-1.029) [0.979] (-0.760) [0.980] 
Industry  Dm Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dm Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Chi-square 67.39  65.81  60.41  70.22  
Chi-square 
test Prob 
0.0004  0.0006  0.0025  0.0002 
 
N total 481  481  481  481  
N survivors  391  391  391  391  
Still trading 251  251  251  251  
Taken over 140  140  140  140  
N failure  90  90  90  90  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions  
 
8.1 Introduction  
This thesis builds on information asymmetry, agency conflicts and litigation-risk 
backgrounds to investigate earnings management activities around IPOs, mitigating 
factors (regulators and auditors), and consequences for future performance (stock 
return and IPO survivability). The IPO event is associated with a higher level of 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders due to the fact that an IPO 
firm is a private firm with limited information that is available to the public. This 
information asymmetry during the IPO is found to lead to two types of agency 
conflicts, namely moral hazard and adverse selection (e.g. Ritter and Welch, 2002; 
Bruton et al., 2009)121, which in turn provide managers with strong incentives to 
engage in certain transactions (e.g. earnings management) that aim to maximise their 
wealth instead of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a result of the 
information asymmetry around IPOs, IPO firms hire high quality auditors during the 
IPO to send positive signals about the offer to outside investors (Titman and 
Trueman, 1986), notably that high quality auditors are expected to provide high-
quality audits to avoid any future litigation risks (DeAngelo, 1981). This high 
quality audits during the IPO is found to lead to lower levels of information 
asymmetry and IPO underpricing (Balvers et al. 1988; Hogan, 1997). 
Consistent with the existence of information asymmetry and agency conflicts 
around IPOs, prior research finds evidence that IPO firms manipulate reported 
earnings upward around IPOs utilizing earnings management activities (e.g. Teoh et 
                                            
121 Moral hazard implies that managers may not perform their duties efficiently in line with the 
interest of shareholders due to the information asymmetry between managers and shareholder 
(Nygaard and Myrtveith, 2000), while adverse selection implies that managers have better 
information about the firm and therefore, they may not reveal all they know about the firm to 
outsiders e.g. shareholders (e.g. Bruton et al., 2009). 
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al. 1998a). However, no research to date has examined whether the regulatory 
environments have an impact on level of information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts during the IPO and, therefore, the use of real and accrual earnings 
management. Indeed, it is well-documented that disclosure systems and financial 
reporting quality in the capital markets are associated with the level of information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts (Ball, 2001; Heal and Palepu, 2001). Therefore, this 
thesis theoretically contributes to the knowledge by examining whether different 
regulatory environments (restrictive vs. lighter) that have different disclosure 
systems and financial reporting quality would have different impacts on the level of 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts and, therefore, the use of real and 
accrual earnings management. The findings of this thesis show that a lighter 
regulatory environment that has lower quality disclosure systems and financial 
reporting exhibits higher levels of information asymmetry and agency conflicts 
during the IPO and, therefore, provides IPOs’ managers with more flexibility and 
strong incentives to inflate reported earnings upward during the IPO utilizing real 
and accrual earnings management.122  
Further, prior research examines the litigation-risk hypothesis and audit 
quality around IPOs and finds evidence that high quality auditors mitigate the use of 
accrual earnings management during the IPO to avoid potential litigation risks (e.g. 
Elder and Zhou, 2002; Chen et al., 2005).123 In contrast with accrual manipulation 
which is considered as a primary audit target, real activities represent managerial 
decisions that are less subject to the scrutiny of audit firms (Graham et al., 2005) and, 
                                            
122 In this thesis, a higher level of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO is used as a 
proxy for the presence of higher levels of information asymmetry and agency conflicts between 
managers and outsiders e.g. shareholders. In addition to this proxy, the presence of a higher level of 
information symmetry during the IPO on the AIM market is supported by the results of chapter five. 
Specifically, the results of Table 5.9 show that the coefficient of ZeroReturn is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting AIM IPOs exhibit a higher level of information asymmetry during 
the IPO year than Main IPOs. The variable ZeroReturn is included into Model 5.9 to control for 
information asymmetry problems as IPO firms with high levels of information asymmetry their stock 
are less likely to be traded. ZeroReturn is defined as the number of zero-return trading days divided 
by the total number of trading days since the IPO date and up to one year later. 
123 Khurana and Raman (2004) examine the association between litigation risk, reputation damage, 
and enhanced audit quality and found that avoiding litigation risk is the primary driver for providing 
high quality audits by more reputable audit firms. 
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therefore, researchers have not examined the relationship between audit quality and 
real activities during the IPO. Therefore, this thesis theoretically contributes to the 
knowledge by examining whether a litigation-risk hypothesis would impact high 
quality auditors’ response to the use of real earnings management activities during 
the IPO year. The findings of this thesis show that litigation risks do impact the 
monitoring role of high quality auditors on real activities manipulation during the 
IPO. Specifically, high quality auditors are found to mitigate real earnings 
management activities that occur via discretionary expenses-based manipulation 
during the IPO year to avoid potential litigation risks. Finally, this thesis also 
empirically contributes to the knowledge in many aspects that are discussed in the 
following sections. 
This chapter presents a summary of the main findings of this thesis, 
limitations and future research avenues. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 
two provides a summary of results. Section three presents policy implications. 
Section four presents future research directions and research limitations. 
8.2 Summary of Results  
This thesis presents a detailed analysis of earnings management around IPOs and its 
consequences for future IPO performance, with a particular focus on real and 
accrual earnings management. Chapter two provided an overview on earnings 
management definitions, activities, and how this differs from accounting fraud. The 
motivations, mitigating factors, and theories that are related to earnings management 
were discussed and reviewed in chapter three. Chapter four discussed data sources, 
sample construction, and methodology. This thesis then examined three research 
questions in chapters five, six, and seven. In the next sections the main findings of 
these empirical chapters will be presented. 
8.2.1 Real and Accrual Earnings Management under Different 
Regulatory Environments 
The objectives of chapter five are as follows. First, it examines whether the 
regulatory environments impact the use of real and accrual earnings management 
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around IPOs via an analysis of the heavily regulated Main market of the London 
Stock Exchange and the more lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM). Second, it examines whether different regulatory environments (restrictive 
vs. lighter) have different mechanisms/capabilities to correct stock prices that were 
inflated by earnings management during the IPO. The results of chapter five show 
that IPO firms in the UK manage earnings upward by manipulating both real and 
accrual earnings management, and that IPO firms engage in real activities more 
extensively than accrual-based activities around IPOs. Further, IPO firms listing on 
the lightly regulated UK Alternative Investment Market are found to have higher 
levels of sales-based and accrual-based and a lower level of discretionary expenses-
based earnings management as compared to those firms listing on the more heavily 
regulated Main market of the London Stock Exchange. These results suggest that 
under a more lightly regulated environment IPOs’ managers have strong incentives 
and more flexibility to manage earnings upwards and, therefore, to choose between 
real and accrual earnings management activities based on the costs and benefits of 
utilizing each of them.124  
Finally, the results of chapter five show both real and accrual earnings 
management are negatively associated with post-IPO stock return performance and 
that IPO firms on the Main market are found to experience greater long-run stock 
return underperformance. IPO firms on the Main market are therefore more likely to 
be punished in the following period for any earnings manipulation during the IPO 
year due to the existence of a much larger number of professional investors and 
much greater coverage by analysts (Arcot et al., 2007). Thus, these results confirm 
that a more restrictive regulatory environment that attracts the attention of 
sophisticated investors and analysts is expected to have better 
mechanisms/capabilities to re-evaluate stock prices that were inflated by earnings 
manipulation during the IPO year.    
                                            
124  For example, the results show that IPO firms on the AIM market avoid managing earnings 
upward during the IPO year utilizing discretionary expenses-based manipulation due the monitoring 
of high quality auditors and prestigious underwriters. For more details please see Table I in Appendix 
A. 
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8.2.2 Audit Quality, Real and Accrual Earnings Management and 
Stock Return Performance 
Chapter six examines whether enhanced audit quality impacts real earnings 
management activities during the IPO and whether enhanced audit quality has an 
impact on managers’ tendency to choose between real and accrual earnings 
management. Further, this chapter examines whether enhanced audit quality affects 
the relationships between real and accrual earnings management and post-IPO stock 
return performance. Recent research examines firms with strong incentives to 
manage earnings upward and finds evidence that firm audited by high quality 
auditor engage more in real earnings management to avoid the monitoring of accrual 
earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al. 2011). In contrast with 
this view that real activities-based manipulation is less subject to the scrutiny of 
audit firms (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011), the results of this 
chapter provide new evidence that high quality auditors monitor and constrain real 
earnings management activities. Specifically, the findings show that high quality 
auditors constrain the use of discretionary expenses-based manipulation to inflate 
reported earnings upward during the IPO year. Further, the findings of this chapter 
show that high quality auditors constrain accrual-based manipulation during the IPO, 
and that this constraint on discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based 
manipulations leads IPO firms to resort to a higher level of sales-based manipulation 
to manage earnings upward during the IPO year.  
The results also show that both sales-based and accrual-based manipulations 
predict post-IPO stock return underperformance, and that sales-based manipulation 
has the most negative consequences for future stock return performance. In addition, 
this chapter shows that enhanced audit quality impacts the relationship between 
earnings manipulation and post-IPO returns performance. Specifically, the findings 
of this chapter provide evidence that IPO firms audited by high quality auditors 
experience a severe decline in post-IPO stock return performance due to the 
extensive use of sales-based manipulation that takes place during the offer year. 
Chapter 8. Conclusions  
 
 
263 
 
8.2.3 Real and Accrual Earnings Management and IPO Failure Risks  
Chapter seven analyzes the relation between real and accrual earnings management 
activities that take place during the IPO year and IPO failure risks and survivability 
in the following periods. Prior literature finds evidence that IPO firms with high 
level of accruals manipulation during the IPO year have higher probability of failure 
in the subsequent period (Li and Zhou, 2006), and that IPO firms with lower 
spending on research and development (R&D) and selling, general, and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses during the year pre the IPO have a higher 
probability of failure in the following periods (Demers and Joos, 2007). Consistent 
with this view, the results of this chapter show that IPO firms with higher levels of 
real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year have a higher probability 
of IPO failure and lower survival rates in the subsequent periods. Thus, the results of 
this chapter confirm the earlier evidence (presented in chapters five and six) that real 
and accrual earnings management are utilized by IPO firms to manage earnings 
upward, and that these activities have severe negative consequences for post-IPO 
stock return performance. Further, the results of this chapter are consistent with 
recent research that real and accrual earnings management activities have negative 
consequences for subsequent operating and stock return performance (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012) and, therefore, these activities are positively 
associated with the likelihood of IPO failure  (Li and Zhou, 2006; Demers and Joos, 
2007). 
8.3 Policy Implications 
The findings of this thesis have a number of implications for regulators, policy 
makers, accounting standards setters, investors, audit firms and financial institutions 
e.g. underwriters and venture capitalist. First, the regulators should enhance the 
disclosure systems and financial reporting quality in the capital markets to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
This in turn will help to prevent and mitigate real and accrual earnings management 
activities that take place around equity offering e.g. IPOs. While stock markets with 
lighter and more flexible regulation (e.g. AIM market in the UK, OTCQC market in 
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the US, AIM Italia market in Italy, AIM Tokyo market in Japan, etc) are designed to 
reduce the compliance and the listing costs by providing small and medium size 
firms with greater opportunities to raise capital from the public, the results of this 
thesis show that IPO firms on the lightly regulated environment (the AIM market) 
exhibit higher levels of information asymmetry and agency conflicts that result in 
more flexibility and strong incentives to engage in real and accrual earnings 
management activities around IPOs as compared to IPO firms on the more heavily 
regulated environment (the Main market). The results also show that IPO firms with 
high levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year experience 
post-IPO stock return underperformance, a higher probability of IPO failure, and 
lower survival rates. Hence, reforming the disclosure systems and financial reporting 
in the capital markets will help to reduce information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts between insiders and outsiders and, therefore, constrain real and accrual 
earnings management activities. This in turn will alleviate the negative 
consequences of these activities for future performance. 
 Second, high quality auditors should consider real activities that occurs via 
sales-based manipulation when they move to constrain discretionary expenses-based 
and accrual-based manipulations. The findings of this thesis show that firms audited 
by high quality auditors manage earnings upward during the IPO year by resorting 
to more sales-based manipulation (conducted through offering greater price 
discounts and/or more lenient credit terms) to avoid the monitoring of discretionary 
expenses-based and accrual-based manipulations. This extensive use of real 
activities via sales-based manipulation is found to have greater negative 
consequences for subsequent returns performance, with even greater consequences 
than discretionary expenses-based and accrual-based manipulations.  
Third, this thesis shows that IPO firms with high levels of real and accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year have a higher probability of failure and 
lower survival rates. Thus, and given the fact the failure of an IPO has negative 
consequences for the firm and its investors, lenders, financial institutions and other 
stakeholders, further steps should be taken by the investment banks (underwriters) to 
mitigate real activities-based and accrual-based manipulations around IPOs. Finally, 
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investors should consider real and accrual earnings management when they invest in 
IPOs. The findings of this thesis present evidence that investors of IPOs experience 
future negative stock returns due to the high levels of real activities-based and 
accrual-based manipulations that are being undertaken by IPO firms during the offer 
year.  
8.4 Further Work and Research Limitations 
The relation between real and accrual earnings management and the regulatory 
environment has not received more attention in prior research. Thus, future research 
will examine this relation in a SEO context, notably that managers of SEO firms 
have strong incentives to manage earnings upward during the offer year. For 
example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Chi et al. (2011), and Kothari et al. (2012) 
find evidence that SEO firms engage in real and accrual earnings management 
activities during the offer year to manage reported earnings upward. Thus, whether 
the regulatory environments impact managers’ tendency to manage earnings 
upwards around SEO and to choose between real activities-based and accrual-based 
earnings management represents a potentially fruitful line of empirical enquiry. 
In addition, while this thesis presents evidence that real earnings 
management activities are utilized by IPO firms and have severe negative 
consequences for post-IPO stock return performance, a further extension of this 
study might be to examine the impact of real and accrual earnings management for 
post-IPO operating performance. Prior research finds evidence that accrual earnings 
management, which takes place during the IPO year, is negatively associated with 
post-IPO operating performance (e.g. Fan, 2007).  
Further, the relation between real earnings management and IPO failure has 
not been examined by previous literature. This study is the first to examine this 
research question based on UK data and, therefore, further research can re-examine 
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this relationship using data other than UK data e.g. US data.125 For example, recent 
research finds evidence that IPO firms in the US engage in both real activities 
manipulation and accrual-based earnings management during the IPO year to 
manage earnings upward (e.g. Wongsunwai, 2012). Therefore, it would be 
worthwhile for future research to investigate whether real activities manipulation 
that occurs during the IPO is associated with IPO failure risks. 
Regarding the research limitations, a potential limitation relates to sample 
period as the data used extend only to 2008, which provides an avenue for future 
research. Further, another limitation relates to the post-IPO stock return period that 
is examined in this thesis, which may be inadequate length of time that the impact of 
earnings management to be revealed. Finally, a potential limitation arises from the 
fact that this thesis examines auditor industry expertise based on the national-level, 
while recent research finds that an industry expert based on the city-level is 
associated with higher levels of real activities manipulation (e.g. Chi et al., 2011). 
However, this provides interesting paths for future research.  
                                            
125 It is worth noting that Demers and Joos (2007) examine whether the level of SG&A expenses and 
sales during the year pre the IPO is associated with the probability of IPO failure in the following 
period.  However, while Demers and Joos (2007) just examine the annual level of these items pre the 
IPO, this thesis uses empirical models developed by Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate real activities 
manipulation during the IPO year. 
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